consent exception in Iowa

2024See State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“The Missouri Implied Consent Law was enacted to codify the procedures under which a law enforcement officer could obtain bodily fluids for testing by consent without a search warrant. . . .

2024See State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“The Missouri Implied Consent Law was enacted to codify the procedures under which a law enforcement officer could obtain bodily fluids for testing by consent without a search warrant.”); State v. Williams, 246 A.3d 960, 965 (Vt. 2020) (“We recently explained that a defendant’s 13 submission to a law enforcement officer’s warrantless request for a breath test— where that request is made, like those challenged here, in accordance with the implied-consent law’s requirements—satisfies the consent exception to Article 11’s warrant requirem

2017Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 8 8Though only four justices joined the section of the opinion containing this passage, no opinion by any justice suggested statutorily implied consent falls within the scope of the consent exception to the warrant requirement.

2017Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 8 8Though only four justices joined the section of the opinion containing this passage, no opinion by any justice suggested statutorily implied consent falls within the scope of the consent exception to the warrant requirement.

2016See State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 899 , 901–02 (Haw. 1995); State v. McLees, 994 P.2d 683, 691 (Mont. 2000); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 455, 461 (N.M.

2016See State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 899 , 901–02 (Haw. 1995); State v. McLees, 994 P.2d 683, 691 (Mont. 2000); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 455, 461 (N.M.

2016See State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 899 , 901–02 (Haw. 1995); State v. McLees, 994 P.2d 683, 691 (Mont. 2000); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 455, 461 (N.M.

2016See State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 899 , 901–02 (Haw. 1995); State v. McLees, 994 P.2d 683, 691 (Mont. 2000); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 455, 461 (N.M.

2021The consent doctrine has been characterized by the Supreme Court as “jealously and carefully drawn.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006) (quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 499 , 78 S. Ct. at 1257 ); see also State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2012) (“The State has the burden to prove the consent was voluntary, and voluntariness is a ‘question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ‘The State is required to establish the consent was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Lane, 7

2020See Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 469 .

2026As Melcher argues, “the implied-consent statute occupies the field as the ‘comprehensive statutory scheme to implement the consent exception to 6 For this proposition, the majority quotes Frescoln, 911 N.W.2d at 455 .

2024When the statutory conditions exist, “chapter 321J is a comprehensive statutory scheme to implement the consent exception to the constitutional preference for search warrants . . . .” Laub, 2 N.W.3d at 830–31; see also Young, 232 N.W.2d at 537 ; Frescoln, 911 N.W.2d at 453 (“Consent to 12 chemical testing obtained under the implied consent statute falls under the voluntary consent exception to the warrant requirement.”).

2025See, e.g., Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 577 .

2021The consent doctrine has been characterized by the Supreme Court as “jealously and carefully drawn.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006) (quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 499 , 78 S. Ct. at 1257 ); see also State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2012) (“The State has the burden to prove the consent was voluntary, and voluntariness is a ‘question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ‘The State is required to establish the consent was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Lane, 7

2021However, in Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court stated, “When 46 a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” 391 U.S. 543, 548 , 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968).

2020See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 292 (Iowa 2010) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)) (reasoning that the State does not prove its burden “by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority” and a consent “search conducted in reliance upon an officer’s claim of authority cannot be justified if the claim of authority turns out to be invalid”); State v. Leaton, 836 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Consent given to a search must be unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.”); State v. Carre, No. 18-1584, 2020 WL 1049823 , at *2–3 (

2014Ed. 2d 854 , 872–74 (1973) (departing from the narrow consent doctrine established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.

2014Ed. 2d 854 , 872–74 (1973) (departing from the narrow consent doctrine established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.

2021The Supreme Court elaborated on the consent doctrine in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, noting that “whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” 412 U.S. 218, 227 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 2047–48 (1973).

2021The Supreme Court elaborated on the consent doctrine in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, noting that “whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” 412 U.S. 218, 227 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 2047–48 (1973).

2007Id. at 269-70. *133 Nevertheless, not all state courts have adopted the vicarious consent doctrine.

2007Id. at 269-70 .

2025This implied-consent approach finds support in Eighth Circuit decisions such as Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., in which the court interpreted Minnesota law. 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying a similar approach to South Dakota law).

2025This implied-consent approach finds support in Eighth Circuit decisions such as Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., in which the court interpreted Minnesota law. 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying a similar approach to South Dakota law).

2025This implied-consent approach finds support in Eighth Circuit decisions such as Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., in which the court interpreted Minnesota law. 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying a similar approach to South Dakota law).

2025This implied-consent approach finds support in Eighth Circuit decisions such as Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., in which the court interpreted Minnesota law. 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying a similar approach to South Dakota law).

2024See State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“The Missouri Implied Consent Law was enacted to codify the procedures under which a law enforcement officer could obtain bodily fluids for testing by consent without a search warrant.”); State v. Williams, 246 A.3d 960, 965 (Vt. 2020) (“We recently explained that a defendant’s 13 submission to a law enforcement officer’s warrantless request for a breath test— where that request is made, like those challenged here, in accordance with the implied-consent law’s requirements—satisfies the consent exception to Article 11’s warrant requirem

2024When the statutory conditions exist, “chapter 321J is a comprehensive statutory scheme to implement the consent exception to the constitutional preference for search warrants . . . .” Laub, 2 N.W.3d at 830–31; see also Young, 232 N.W.2d at 537 ; Frescoln, 911 N.W.2d at 453 (“Consent to 12 chemical testing obtained under the implied consent statute falls under the voluntary consent exception to the warrant requirement.”).

2021Ct. 2017) (“[I]t needs no citation of authorities to state that an unconscious man is incapable of giving consent.” (quoting Carrington v. Superior Ct., 107 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1973))); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (“[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent.”); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939 , 946 (Nev. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he statute does not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver’s so-called consent cannot be considered voluntary

2021The consent doctrine has been characterized by the Supreme Court as “jealously and carefully drawn.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006) (quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 499 , 78 S. Ct. at 1257 ); see also State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2012) (“The State has the burden to prove the consent was voluntary, and voluntariness is a ‘question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ‘The State is required to establish the consent was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Lane, 7

2021The consent doctrine has been characterized by the Supreme Court as “jealously and carefully drawn.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006) (quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 499 , 78 S. Ct. at 1257 ); see also State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2012) (“The State has the burden to prove the consent was voluntary, and voluntariness is a ‘question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ‘The State is required to establish the consent was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Lane, 7

2021“While rule 32:1.8(a) does not prohibit business dealings between a lawyer and his or her client, it imposes stringent requirements on such a transaction.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 901 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Iowa 2012)); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hamer, 915 N.W.2d 302, 322 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing rule 32:1.8 as imposing “harsh and demanding” 17 responsibilities on attorneys and noting the “onerous burden . . . should make such business transactions the exception rath

2021“While rule 32:1.8(a) does not prohibit business dealings between a lawyer and his or her client, it imposes stringent requirements on such a transaction.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 901 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Iowa 2012)); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hamer, 915 N.W.2d 302, 322 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing rule 32:1.8 as imposing “harsh and demanding” 17 responsibilities on attorneys and noting the “onerous burden . . . should make such business transactions the exception rath

2021“While rule 32:1.8(a) does not prohibit business dealings between a lawyer and his or her client, it imposes stringent requirements on such a transaction.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 901 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Iowa 2012)); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hamer, 915 N.W.2d 302, 322 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing rule 32:1.8 as imposing “harsh and demanding” 17 responsibilities on attorneys and noting the “onerous burden . . . should make such business transactions the exception rath

2021Ct. 2017) (“[I]t needs no citation of authorities to state that an unconscious man is incapable of giving consent.” (quoting Carrington v. Superior Ct., 107 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1973))); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (“[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent.”); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939 , 946 (Nev. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he statute does not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver’s so-called consent cannot be considered voluntary

2021Ct. 2017) (“[I]t needs no citation of authorities to state that an unconscious man is incapable of giving consent.” (quoting Carrington v. Superior Ct., 107 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1973))); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (“[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent.”); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939 , 946 (Nev. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he statute does not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver’s so-called consent cannot be considered voluntary

2021The consent doctrine has been characterized by the Supreme Court as “jealously and carefully drawn.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006) (quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 499 , 78 S. Ct. at 1257 ); see also State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2012) (“The State has the burden to prove the consent was voluntary, and voluntariness is a ‘question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’ ‘The State is required to establish the consent was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Lane, 7

2021Ct. 2017) (“[I]t needs no citation of authorities to state that an unconscious man is incapable of giving consent.” (quoting Carrington v. Superior Ct., 107 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1973))); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) (“[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent.”); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939 , 946 (Nev. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he statute does not allow a driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver’s so-called consent cannot be considered voluntary

2020See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 292 (Iowa 2010) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)) (reasoning that the State does not prove its burden “by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority” and a consent “search conducted in reliance upon an officer’s claim of authority cannot be justified if the claim of authority turns out to be invalid”); State v. Leaton, 836 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Consent given to a search must be unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.”); State v. Carre, No. 18-1584, 2020 WL 1049823 , at *2–3 (

2020See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 292 (Iowa 2010) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)) (reasoning that the State does not prove its burden “by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority” and a consent “search conducted in reliance upon an officer’s claim of authority cannot be justified if the claim of authority turns out to be invalid”); State v. Leaton, 836 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Consent given to a search must be unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.”); State v. Carre, No. 18-1584, 2020 WL 1049823 , at *2–3 (

2017While we share the district court’s skepticism that the incident here—labeled an “ice fight”—was something the legislature intended to qualify as a “sport, social, or other activity” under the code, we need not decide that issue because we agree with the court’s conclusion that the assault was not “a reasonably foreseeable incident” of the “ice fight.” In State v. Floyd, our court rejected a defendant’s request for a consent instruction when a fight broke out after a basketball game. 466 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Iowa Ct. App 1990).

2017We also note that “persistence ... in perpetuating [a] falsehood is a remarkable aggravating factor.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 885 N.W.2d 408, 424 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 466 (Iowa 2014)).