consent exception (Michigan) · Go Syfert
← Michigan issues

consent exception in Michigan

56 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2026 17 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (20)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Mahdigreen
michctapp · 2016 · cited in 9 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2017–2026
2 sentences

2026“The consent exception permits a search and seizure if the consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446, 460 ; 894 NW2d 732 (2016).

2026“The consent exception permits a search and seizure if the consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446, 460 ; 894 NW2d 732 (2016).

39
People v. Guajardogreen
michctapp · 2013 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 34-35 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013).

2022See People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 34-35 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013).

22
People v. Gillisgreen
mich · 2006 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See Gillis, 474 Mich at 113 . -11- sexual intercourse before it could find defendant guilty.” Id., quoting People v Johnson, 128 Mich App 618, 623 ; 341 NW2d 160 (1983).

2022See Gillis, 474 Mich at 113 . -11- sexual intercourse before it could find defendant guilty.” Id., quoting People v Johnson, 128 Mich App 618, 623 ; 341 NW2d 160 (1983).

22
People v. Johnsongreen
michctapp · 1983 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See Gillis, 474 Mich at 113 . -11- sexual intercourse before it could find defendant guilty.” Id., quoting People v Johnson, 128 Mich App 618, 623 ; 341 NW2d 160 (1983).

2022See Gillis, 474 Mich at 113 . -11- sexual intercourse before it could find defendant guilty.” Id., quoting People v Johnson, 128 Mich App 618, 623 ; 341 NW2d 160 (1983).

22
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen
scotus · 1973 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1998–2001
2 sentences

2001People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294 ; 118 NW2d 406 (1962); People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 355 ; 447 NW2d 157 (1989); see generally Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973).

2001People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294 ; 118 NW2d 406 (1962); People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 355 ; 447 NW2d 157 (1989); see generally Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973).

22
People ex rel. Harty v. Faygreen
ny · 1961 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1979–1982
2 sentences

1982See People ex rel Harty v Fay, 10 NY2d 374 ; 179 NE2d 483 (1961).” While we agree that the question of retention or loss or jurisdiction should not depend solely on the consent or waiver of defendant, we find the Turner panel’s characterization of waiver as "meaningless” impossible to reconcile with the Supreme *95 Court’s holding in In re Tinholt, 223 Mich 483, 484 ; 194 NW 131 (1923): "By consenting, plaintiff has waived the right to complain of the indefinite postponement.

1982See People ex rel Harty v Fay, 10 NY2d 374 ; 179 NE2d 483 (1961).” While we agree that the question of retention or loss or jurisdiction should not depend solely on the consent or waiver of defendant, we find the Turner panel’s characterization of waiver as "meaningless” impossible to reconcile with the Supreme *95 Court’s holding in In re Tinholt, 223 Mich 483, 484 ; 194 NW 131 (1923): "By consenting, plaintiff has waived the right to complain of the indefinite postponement.

22
People v. Waltonengreen
michctapp · 2007 · cited in 3 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2026Furthermore, although “consent can be utilized as a defense to negate the elements of force or coercion” associated with a CSC charge, People v Waltonen, 272 Mich App 678, 689 ; 728 NW2d 881 (2006), a consent defense is not available for a CSC-III charge under MCL 750.520d(1)(c) because consent requires that a person agree to a sexual act freely and willingly, whereas a person who is “mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless,” pursuant to MCL 750.520d(1)(c), is not able to willingly agree to a sexual act.

2026Furthermore, although “consent can be utilized as a defense to negate the elements of force or coercion” associated with a CSC charge, People v Waltonen, 272 Mich App 678, 689 ; 728 NW2d 881 (2006), a consent defense is not available for a CSC-III charge under MCL 750.520d(1)(c) because consent requires that a person agree to a sexual act freely and willingly, whereas a person who is “mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless,” pursuant to MCL 750.520d(1)(c), is not able to willingly agree to a sexual act.

13
Minnesota v. Olsongreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 96-97 ; 110 S Ct 1684 ; 109 L Ed 2d 85 (1990) (providing an overnight guest in a home is entitled to protection from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment); People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446, 460 ; 894 NW2d 732 (2016) (reasoning the “defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to [his mother’s apartment] that was objectively reasonable because he resided at the residence with his mother and had the ability to control the area searched and items seized”).

2025See Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 96-97 ; 110 S Ct 1684 ; 109 L Ed 2d 85 (1990) (providing an overnight guest in a home is entitled to protection from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment); People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446, 460 ; 894 NW2d 732 (2016) (reasoning the “defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to [his mother’s apartment] that was objectively reasonable because he resided at the residence with his mother and had the ability to control the area searched and items seized”).

11
People v. Adairgreen
mich · 1996 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024See Adair, 452 Mich at 482 .

11
Casey v. Auto-Owners Insurancegreen
michctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023See id.

11
People v. Heikkinengreen
michctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
11
People v. Vaughngreen
michctapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
11
People v. Borchard-Ruhlandgreen
mich · 1999 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
People v. McGrawgreen
mich · 1915 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Thompson v. Dulaneygreen
utd · 1993 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Schubiner v. New England Insurancegreen
michctapp · 1994 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Pollock v. Pollockgreen
kywd · 1997 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Gaioni v. Folmargreen
almd · 1978 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
11
Stroeber v. Commission Veteran's Auditoriumgreen
iasd · 1977 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
11
Collier v. Millergreen
txsd · 1976 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (49)

CaseCitedYears
Lavigne v. Forshee green
michctapp · 2014
2 sentences

2017The consent exception to the warrant requirement allows a search and seizure when consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” Lavigne v Forshee, 307 Mich App 530, 538 ; 861 NW2d 635 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2017The consent exception to the warrant requirement allows a search and seizure when consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” Lavigne v Forshee, 307 Mich App 530, 538 ; 861 NW2d 635 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

42016–2017
People v. Malone green
michctapp · 1989
2 sentences

2001People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294 ; 118 NW2d 406 (1962); People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 355 ; 447 NW2d 157 (1989); see generally Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973).

2001People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294 ; 118 NW2d 406 (1962); People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 355 ; 447 NW2d 157 (1989); see generally Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973).

41991–2001
People v. Frohriep green
michctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2025“The consent exception to the warrant requirement allows a search and seizure when consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” People v Frohriep, 247 Mich App 692, 702 ; 637 NW2d 562 (2001) (quotation 3 As a preliminary matter, the prosecution has not raised whether defendant had standing to challenge the warrantless search of the basement under the Fourth Amendment.

2025“The consent exception to the warrant requirement allows a search and seizure when consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” People v Frohriep, 247 Mich App 692, 702 ; 637 NW2d 562 (2001) (quotation 3 As a preliminary matter, the prosecution has not raised whether defendant had standing to challenge the warrantless search of the basement under the Fourth Amendment.

32014–2025
Terry v. Ohio green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

2022In these cases, defendants only argued that fingerprinting was appropriate under Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968), and that Harrison consented to fingerprinting.

2022In these cases, defendants only argued that fingerprinting was appropriate under Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968), and that Harrison consented to fingerprinting.

32022–2022
People v. Marsack green
michctapp · 1998
2 sentences

2014LEGAL STANDARDS Both the United States and Michigan constitutions “guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.”27 To comply with this requirement, police officers must have a warrant to conduct a search or must establish that their conduct was “within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.”28 If police officers obtain evidence while violating the Fourth Amendment, the evidence is generally inadmissible in criminal proceedings.29 The consent exception to the search warrant requirement allows officers to conduct a search “wh

2014LEGAL STANDARDS Both the United States and Michigan constitutions “guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.”27 To comply with this requirement, police officers must have a warrant to conduct a search or must establish that their conduct was “within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.”28 If police officers obtain evidence while violating the Fourth Amendment, the evidence is generally inadmissible in criminal proceedings.29 The consent exception to the search warrant requirement allows officers to conduct a search “wh

32014–2017
People v. Kaigler green
mich · 1962
2 sentences

2001People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294 ; 118 NW2d 406 (1962); People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 355 ; 447 NW2d 157 (1989); see generally Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973).

2001People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294 ; 118 NW2d 406 (1962); People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 355 ; 447 NW2d 157 (1989); see generally Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 ; 93 S Ct 2041 ; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973).

31989–2001
People v. Galloway green
michctapp · 2004
2 sentences

2024As discussed, to establish the consent exception to the warrant requirement, evidence must show that the officers received consent that “is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” See Galloway, 259 Mich App at 648 .

2016The consent exception to the search warrant requirement allows officers to conduct a search “when consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634 ; 675 NW2d 883 (2003).

22016–2024
People v. Farrow green
mich · 1999
2 sentences

2023People v Farrow, 461 Mich 202, 206 ; 600 NW2d 634 (1999). -4- 486; Brown, 422 US at 602 ; Royer, 460 US at 507-508 .

2014LEGAL STANDARDS Both the United States and Michigan constitutions “guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.”27 To comply with this requirement, police officers must have a warrant to conduct a search or must establish that their conduct was “within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.”28 If police officers obtain evidence while violating the Fourth Amendment, the evidence is generally inadmissible in criminal proceedings.29 The consent exception to the search warrant requirement allows officers to conduct a search “wh

22014–2023
People v. Unger green
michctapp · 2008
2 sentences

2022Unger, 278 Mich App at 256 .

2022Unger, 278 Mich App at 256 .

22022–2022
People v. Matuszak green
michctapp · 2004
2 sentences

2022In People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59 ; 687 NW2d 342 (2004), this Court discussed, in the context of reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim, defense counsel’s failure to request a consent instruction in a case in which the defendant was charged with CSC-I for engaging in sexual penetration accomplished by force or coercion and causing personal injury.

2022In People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59 ; 687 NW2d 342 (2004), this Court discussed, in the context of reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim, defense counsel’s failure to request a consent instruction in a case in which the defendant was charged with CSC-I for engaging in sexual penetration accomplished by force or coercion and causing personal injury.

22022–2022
People v. Stevens green
michctapp · 2014
2 sentences

2018Because “counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection,” Stevens, 306 Mich App at 628 , counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek an instruction under M Crim JI 20.27 with regard to the CSC-I charge. -5- We acknowledge that defendant was also charged with, and convicted of, CSC-III pursuant to MCL 750.520d(1)(b), and a consent-to-penetration defense could have been used to negate the element of force or coercion for that charge.

2018Because “counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection,” Stevens, 306 Mich App at 628 , counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek an instruction under M Crim JI 20.27 with regard to the CSC-I charge. -5- We acknowledge that defendant was also charged with, and convicted of, CSC-III pursuant to MCL 750.520d(1)(b), and a consent-to-penetration defense could have been used to negate the element of force or coercion for that charge.

22018–2018
People v. DiPiazza green
michctapp · 2009
2 sentences

2015Id. at 156 . *655 In 2011, SORA was amended to include “a consent exception .. . that provides some youthful offenders relief in situations involving consensual sex acts.” Temelkoski, 307 Mich App at 261 .

2014Dipiazza, 286 Mich App at 147 , citing Ayres, 239 Mich App at 14-15 . 7 For purposes of SORA, defendant is considered to have been “convicted” of CSC-II under MCL 750.520c; because the complainant in this case was not 16 at the time of the offense (she was 12), the consent exception of MCL 28.728c(3) and (14)(c) does not apply to defendant. 8 Michigan Public Sex Offender Registry <http:// communitynotification.com/ cap_main.php?office=55242/> (accessed August 1, 2014) [http://perma.cc/5WBM-222J].

22014–2015
People v. Bonilla-Machado green
mich · 2011
2 sentences

2026Defendant’s appellate counsel argues that there was no tactical reason for defendant to not testify given that “[h]e, and he alone, could testify to consent.” But “the ultimate decision whether to testify at trial remains with the defendant.” People v Bonilla-Machado, 489 Mich 412, 419 ; 803 NW2d 217 (2011).

2026Defendant’s appellate counsel argues that there was no tactical reason for defendant to not testify given that “[h]e, and he alone, could testify to consent.” But “the ultimate decision whether to testify at trial remains with the defendant.” People v Bonilla-Machado, 489 Mich 412, 419 ; 803 NW2d 217 (2011).

12026–2026
People v. Goldston green
mich · 2004
1 sentence

2026GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION Relying on federal precedent, our Supreme Court adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Goldston, 470 Mich at 541 .

12026–2026
People v. Harris green
mich · 2014
1 sentence

2025Id. at 127 .9 The applicable statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: Abramsky was not paying attention during the evaluation and appeared to be on drugs, but again cites no record evidence to support these allegations. 8 Arguably, defendant’s argument could be considered an argument that the court erred by failing to allow him to raise a consent defense.

12025–2025
Reed Estate v. Reed green
michctapp · 2011
2 sentences

2023A waiver “is the intentional relinquishment of a known right that may be shown by express declarations or by declarations that manifest the parties’ intent and purpose.” Reed Estate v Reed, 293 Mich App 168, 176 ; 810 NW2d 284 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2023A waiver “is the intentional relinquishment of a known right that may be shown by express declarations or by declarations that manifest the parties’ intent and purpose.” Reed Estate v Reed, 293 Mich App 168, 176 ; 810 NW2d 284 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

12023–2023
Florida v. Royer green
scotus · 1983
1 sentence

2023People v Farrow, 461 Mich 202, 206 ; 600 NW2d 634 (1999). -4- 486; Brown, 422 US at 602 ; Royer, 460 US at 507-508 .

12023–2023
In re Brennan neutral
mich · 2019
1 sentence

2023The doctrine of equitable estoppel arises when: (1) a party by representation, admissions, or silence, intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts; (2) the other party justifiably relies and acts on this belief; and (3) the other party will be prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the existence of the facts. [Williamstown Twp v Sandalwood Ranch, LLC, 325 Mich App 541, 553 ; 927 NW2d 262 (2018) (citation omitted).] “Equitable estoppel is not an independent cause of action, but instead a doctrine that may assist a party by precluding the opposing party from a

12023–2023
Township of Williamstown v. Sandalwood Ranch LLC green
michctapp · 2018
12023–2023
Wong Sun v. United States green
scotus · 1963
1 sentence

2023Wong Sun, 371 US at 2 The consent exception to the warrant requirement allows for a warrantless search and seizure when consent, absent any actual or implied duress or coercion, is unequivocal, specific, voluntary, and intelligently given.

12023–2023
Conagra, Inc v. Farmers State Bank green
michctapp · 1999
12023–2023
Brown v. Illinois green
scotus · 1975
1 sentence

2023People v Farrow, 461 Mich 202, 206 ; 600 NW2d 634 (1999). -4- 486; Brown, 422 US at 602 ; Royer, 460 US at 507-508 .

12023–2023
Browder v. International Fidelity Insurance green
mich · 1982
12019–2019
People v. Bayer green
michctapp · 2008
12018–2018
People v. Khan green
michctapp · 1978
12018–2018
People v. Bayer green
mich · 2008
12018–2018
People v. Temelkoski green
michctapp · 2014
12015–2015
People v. Zuccarini green
michctapp · 1988
12014–2014
In Re Ayres green
michctapp · 2000
12014–2014
Mapp v. Ohio green
scotus · 1961
12014–2014
People v. Kazmierczak green
mich · 2000
12014–2014
Boerth v. Detroit City Gas Co. green
mich · 1908
12004–2004
West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources Ex Rel. Wright v. David L. green
wva · 1994
11998–1998
United States v. Perez green
scotus · 1824
11994–1994
United States v. Dinitz green
scotus · 1976
11994–1994
People v. Dubis green
michctapp · 1987
11994–1994
People v. Brown green
michctapp · 1983
11991–1991
People v. Wagner green
michctapp · 1981
11991–1991
Coolidge v. New Hampshire green
scotus · 1971
11985–1985
People v. Blackburn neutral
michctapp · 1980
11984–1984

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401 (10) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520d (10) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b (8) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b (8) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12 (5) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.722 (4) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7403 (4) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a (4) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529 (4) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84 (4) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.11 (4) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 771.1 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 191 (1969–2026) CA 110 (1909–2025) OH 110 (1987–2026) PA 102 (1850–2026) NY 80 (1843–2026) IL 70 (1973–2026) WA 57 (1975–2026) MN 56 (1944–2024) MI 56 (1915–2026) FL 51 (1906–2024) OR 49 (1886–2026) WI 43 (1882–2026) GA 39 (1897–2025) IN 36 (1881–2019) IA 34 (1888–2026) NJ 34 (1968–2026) ID 32 (1981–2026) DC 31 (1984–2023) AL 29 (1853–2025) CO 28 (1961–2024) LA 24 (1966–2021) AZ 22 (1975–2026) NM 22 (1975–2023) MA 22 (1925–2025) KS 20 (1980–2024) HI 18 (1989–2020) CT 17 (1984–2019) ME 17 (1978–2026) TN 16 (1975–2023) MD 16 (1932–2022) MS 15 (1985–2017) UT 15 (1987–2025) VA 15 (1925–2022) MO 13 (1894–2012) AK 13 (1979–2023) SC 12 (1985–2023) MT 12 (1977–2018) OK 11 (1969–2020) NE 10 (1988–2023) AR 9 (1972–2017) SD 9 (1992–2024) RI 8 (1986–2017) WY 8 (1978–2008) NC 8 (1939–2020) ND 6 (1976–2017) NV 6 (2016–2024) VT 6 (1992–2026) DE 5 (1963–2022) WV 5 (1951–2001) NH 3 (1965–2011) GU 2 (2023–2025) KY 2 (2006–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check