80 New York opinions name it 12 courts 1843–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2025This period is excludable as an adjournment made at the request of or with the consent of defense counsel ( see CPL § 30.30[4][b]; People v Martinez , 186 AD3d 1530, 1531 [2d Dept 2020] ["delays occasioned by adjournments at the request of or with the consent of the defense" are excludable under CPL § 30.30(4)(b)]). 2025This period is excludable as an adjournment made at the request of or with the consent of defense counsel ( see CPL § 30.30[4][b]; Martinez , 186 AD3d at 1531 ). | 5 | 5 |
St. Francis Preparatory School v. Kaplangreen2 sentences2024Accord , People v Barnes , 160 AD3d 890 , 890, 75 NYS3d 229 , 231 [2d Dep't 2018] [adjournment granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant excludable] and People v Hall , 61 AD2d 1050, 1051 [2d Dep't 1978] [adjournments requested by the defendant are not chargeable to the prosecution]. 2024Accord , People v Barnes , 160 AD3d 890 , 890, 75 NYS3d 229 , 231 [2d Dep't 2018] [adjournment granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant excludable] and People v Hall , 61 AD2d 1050, 1051 [2d Dep't 1978] [adjournments requested by the defendant are not chargeable to the prosecution]. | 3 | 3 |
In re Ricky P.green2 sentences2006Unquestionably, the consent provision of subdivision (f) is an integral component of the intervention statute (Matter of Ricky P., 135 Misc 2d at 31 [Legislature mandated obtaining approval of respondent parent as prerequisite to intervention by relatives]), and Family Court’s “discretionary” grant of intervention to the K.s would render the consent requirement of subdivision (f) meaningless. 2006Although the consent requirement certainly limits the right of relatives to gain full party status in a child protective proceeding, it “does not work to give the respondent parent a veto power over interested relatives being considered as alternative caretakers for the children” (Matter of Ricky P., 135 Misc 2d at 31 ). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Cortesgreen2 sentences2025This period is also excludable as the People had previously declared their readiness for trial ( see Cortes , 80 NY2d at 214 [People not required to repeatedly announce their readiness for trial throughout the pendency of a criminal action]). 2025This period is also excludable as the People had previously declared their readiness for trial ( see Cortes , 80 NY2d at 214 [People not required to repeatedly announce their readiness for trial throughout the pendency of a criminal action]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Alvaradogreen2 sentences2021People v Alvarado , 281 AD2d 318, 319 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 859 [2001]). 2021People v Alvarado , 281 AD2d 318, 319 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 859 [2001]). | 2 | 2 |
Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W.green2 sentences2013Additionally, the court must find that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and “that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence” ( 8 USC § 1101 [a] [27] [J] [i], [ii]; see Matter of Hei Ting C., 109 AD3d at 104; Matter of Nirmal S. v Rajinder K., 101 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2012]; Matter of Mohamed B., 83 AD3d 829, 831 [2011]; Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v Joan W., 73 AD3d 793, 795 2013Additionally, the court must find that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and “that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence” ( 8 USC § 1101 [a] [27] [J] [i], [ii]; see Matter of Hei Ting C., 109 AD3d at 104; Matter of Nirmal S. v Rajinder K., 101 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2012]; Matter of Mohamed B., 83 AD3d 829, 831 [2011]; Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v Joan W., 73 AD3d 793, 795 | 2 | 2 |
In re Mohamed B.green2 sentences2013Additionally, the court must find that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and “that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence” ( 8 USC § 1101 [a] [27] [J] [i], [ii]; see Matter of Hei Ting C., 109 AD3d at 104; Matter of Nirmal S. v Rajinder K., 101 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2012]; Matter of Mohamed B., 83 AD3d 829, 831 [2011]; Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v Joan W., 73 AD3d 793, 795 2013Additionally, the court must find that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and “that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence” ( 8 USC § 1101 [a] [27] [J] [i], [ii]; see Matter of Hei Ting C., 109 AD3d at 104; Matter of Nirmal S. v Rajinder K., 101 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2012]; Matter of Mohamed B., 83 AD3d 829, 831 [2011]; Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v Joan W., 73 AD3d 793, 795 | 2 | 2 |
In the Interest of J. J. X. C.green2 sentences2013The amendments also modified the consent requirement by deleting the language requiring the Attorney General to “expressly consentí ] to the dependency order,” and replacing it with, “the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status” (Pub L 110-457, 122 US Stat 5044, 5079). 2 Thus, under the current law, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or “legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an ind 2013The amendments also modified the consent requirement by deleting the language requiring the Attorney General to “expressly consentí ] to the dependency order,” and replacing it with, “the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status” (Pub L 110-457, 122 US Stat 5044, 5079). 2 Thus, under the current law, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or “legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an ind | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. Spinnergreen2 sentences2013Additionally, the court must find that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and “that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence” ( 8 USC § 1101 [a] [27] [J] [i], [ii]; see Matter of Hei Ting C., 109 AD3d at 104; Matter of Nirmal S. v Rajinder K., 101 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2012]; Matter of Mohamed B., 83 AD3d 829, 831 [2011]; Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v Joan W., 73 AD3d 793, 795 2013Additionally, the court must find that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and “that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence” ( 8 USC § 1101 [a] [27] [J] [i], [ii]; see Matter of Hei Ting C., 109 AD3d at 104; Matter of Nirmal S. v Rajinder K., 101 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2012]; Matter of Mohamed B., 83 AD3d 829, 831 [2011]; Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v Joan W., 73 AD3d 793, 795 | 2 | 2 |
In re Hei Ting C.green2 sentences2013The amendments also modified the consent requirement by deleting the language requiring the Attorney General to “expressly consentí ] to the dependency order,” and replacing it with, “the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status” (Pub L 110-457, 122 US Stat 5044, 5079). 2 Thus, under the current law, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or “legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an ind 2013The amendments also modified the consent requirement by deleting the language requiring the Attorney General to “expressly consentí ] to the dependency order,” and replacing it with, “the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status” (Pub L 110-457, 122 US Stat 5044, 5079). 2 Thus, under the current law, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or “legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an ind | 2 | 2 |
In re Tristram K.green2 sentences2007The First Department also emphasized that the new permanency statutes were designed to enhance the role of family members in the disposition of child protective proceedings — and that such enhanced role relates exclusively to their availability as custodial resources for the child: “Indeed, the lack of intervenor status does not prevent suitable relatives from being considered as primary custodial resources of the child” (Matter of Tristram K., 36 AD3d 147, 152 [2006] [emphasis added]; see also Besharov, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 1035, at 82-8 2007The First Department also emphasized that the new permanency statutes were designed to enhance the role of family members in the disposition of child protective proceedings—and that such enhanced role relates exclusively to their availability as custodial resources for the child: "Indeed, the lack of intervenor status does not prevent suitable relatives from being considered as primary custodial resources of the child" ( Matter of Tristram K. , 36 AD3d 147, 152 [2006] [emphasis added]; see also Besharov, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 1035, at 82-8 | 2 | 2 |
David S.S. v. Mia B.M.green1 sentence2026Thus, the Referee "lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the petition" ( Matter of David S.S. v Mia B.M. , 48 AD3d 1246, 1246 [4th Dept 2008]; see Rivera , 120 AD3d at 1351 ), even without prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Rivera v. Arochogreen1 sentence2026Thus, the Referee "lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the petition" ( Matter of David S.S. v Mia B.M. , 48 AD3d 1246, 1246 [4th Dept 2008]; see Rivera , 120 AD3d at 1351 ), even without prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
People v. . Katzgreen2 sentences2025Even if one could conclude that a defendant's criminal intent is readily inferable from the specific circumstances of the sexual encounter, a consent defense in an acquaintance context creates ambiguity not around whether the act occurred but around the defendant's state of mind in engaging in the act ( cf. Valentin , 29 NY3d at 156 [stating that a defendant's intent to sell drugs is "usually readily inferable from the sale itself" but where the defendant disputes that they had the intent to sell, Molineux evidence may be admitted to establish that intent]; People v Vargas , 88 NY2d 856, 858 [ 2025Even if one could conclude that a defendant's criminal intent is readily inferable from the specific circumstances of the sexual encounter, a consent defense in an acquaintance context creates ambiguity not around whether the act occurred but around the defendant's state of mind in engaging in the act ( cf. Valentin , 29 NY3d at 156 [stating that a defendant's intent to sell drugs is "usually readily inferable from the sale itself" but where the defendant disputes that they had the intent to sell, Molineux evidence may be admitted to establish that intent]; People v Vargas , 88 NY2d 856, 858 [ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vargasgreen2 sentences2025Even if one could conclude that a defendant's criminal intent is readily inferable from the specific circumstances of the sexual encounter, a consent defense in an acquaintance context creates ambiguity not around whether the act occurred but around the defendant's state of mind in engaging in the act ( cf. Valentin , 29 NY3d at 156 [stating that a defendant's intent to sell drugs is "usually readily inferable from the sale itself" but where the defendant disputes that they had the intent to sell, Molineux evidence may be admitted to establish that intent]; People v Vargas , 88 NY2d 856, 858 [ 2025Even if one could conclude that a defendant's criminal intent is readily inferable from the specific circumstances of the sexual encounter, a consent defense in an acquaintance context creates ambiguity not around whether the act occurred but around the defendant's state of mind in engaging in the act ( cf. Valentin , 29 NY3d at 156 [stating that a defendant's intent to sell drugs is "usually readily inferable from the sale itself" but where the defendant disputes that they had the intent to sell, Molineux evidence may be admitted to establish that intent]; People v Vargas , 88 NY2d 856, 858 [ | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Jose Valentingreen2 sentences2025Even if one could conclude that a defendant's criminal intent is readily inferable from the specific circumstances of the sexual encounter, a consent defense in an acquaintance context creates ambiguity not around whether the act occurred but around the defendant's state of mind in engaging in the act ( cf. Valentin , 29 NY3d at 156 [stating that a defendant's intent to sell drugs is "usually readily inferable from the sale itself" but where the defendant disputes that they had the intent to sell, Molineux evidence may be admitted to establish that intent]; People v Vargas , 88 NY2d 856, 858 [ 2025Even if one could conclude that a defendant's criminal intent is readily inferable from the specific circumstances of the sexual encounter, a consent defense in an acquaintance context creates ambiguity not around whether the act occurred but around the defendant's state of mind in engaging in the act ( cf. Valentin , 29 NY3d at 156 [stating that a defendant's intent to sell drugs is "usually readily inferable from the sale itself" but where the defendant disputes that they had the intent to sell, Molineux evidence may be admitted to establish that intent]; People v Vargas , 88 NY2d 856, 858 [ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vargasgreen1 sentence2024The trial court ruled that, given the defendant’s consent defense, the prosecution could, under Molineux, present testimony from four other women that the defendant had committed sexual misconduct against them, and, in response, the defendant abandoned his consent defense and a jury later convicted him on a host of counts, including first-degree rape (id. at 857-858; see also People v Vargas, 215 AD2d 415, 416 [2d Dept 1995] [listing the convicted counts]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Schulzgreen1 sentence2023The issue here is whether the recorded conversation obtained from OCJC was “derived” from an “intercepted communication.” Guided by the principle that “article 700 and all its integral parts [should] not be treated lightly or with cavalier disregard” (Schulz, 67 NY2d at 149 [internal quotation marks and alterations omitted]), we interpret the statute to require an independent consent analysis for the eavesdropping conducted pursuant to the warrant. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hathawaygreen1 sentence2018The curative action alleviated any prejudice under these circumstances and, accordingly, the initial error did not deprive defendant of a fair trial ( see People v Santiago , 52 NY2d 865, 866 [1981]; People v Peterson , 118 AD3d 1151, 1155-1156 [2014], lvs denied 24 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Hathaway , 159 AD2d 748, 751 [1990]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Petersongreen1 sentence2018The curative action alleviated any prejudice under these circumstances and, accordingly, the initial error did not deprive defendant of a fair trial ( see People v Santiago , 52 NY2d 865, 866 [1981]; People v Peterson , 118 AD3d 1151, 1155-1156 [2014], lvs denied 24 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Hathaway , 159 AD2d 748, 751 [1990]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Santiagogreen1 sentence2018The curative action alleviated any prejudice under these circumstances and, accordingly, the initial error did not deprive defendant of a fair trial ( see People v Santiago , 52 NY2d 865, 866 [1981]; People v Peterson , 118 AD3d 1151, 1155-1156 [2014], lvs denied 24 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Hathaway , 159 AD2d 748, 751 [1990]). | 1 | 1 |
| Rozen v. 7 Calf Creek, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Auxillygreen | 1 | 1 |
| 185 Madison Associates v. Ryangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Padell Nadell Fine Weinberger & Co. v. Midtown Realty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dobsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Weavergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Angelogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Damianogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Steinberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bender v. Jamaica Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. . Rydergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gonzalez
green
2 sentences2018The majority makes its misunderstanding over this basic point clear by divorcing "express" consent from "voluntariness," but traditional-expressed-consent always requires voluntariness ( see Gonzalez , 39 N.Y.2d at 124 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 215 , 347 N.E.2d 575 [1976] ). 1984Voluntariness of Consent to Enter a Suspect’s Home Where a search and seizure of a person or property is allegedly based on consent, as is asserted by the presentment agency here, the People have a heavy burden of showing the voluntariness of the consent and the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights (People v Whitehurst, 25 NY2d 389 ; People v Rodriguez, 11 NY2d 279 ; Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 ; People v Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122,128 ; Bumper vNorth Carolina, 391 US 543, 548-549 ). | 3 | 1984–2018 |
People v. Kates
green
2 sentences2018Under a traditional consent analysis, voluntariness is both required and evaluated, which is our distinction when using the term "expressed consent" as opposed to one that is "deemed" ( see Kates , 53 N.Y.2d at 594 , 444 N.Y.S.2d 446 , 428 N.E.2d 852 ). 2018Under a traditional consent analysis, voluntariness is both required and evaluated, which is our distinction when using the term "expressed consent" as opposed to one that is "deemed" ( see Kates , 53 N.Y.2d at 594 , 444 N.Y.S.2d 446 , 428 N.E.2d 852 ). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
In re Mario S.
green
2 sentences2013The amendments also modified the consent requirement by deleting the language requiring the Attorney General to “expressly consentí ] to the dependency order,” and replacing it with, “the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status” (Pub L 110-457, 122 US Stat 5044, 5079). 2 Thus, under the current law, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or “legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an ind 2013The amendments also modified the consent requirement by deleting the language requiring the Attorney General to “expressly consentí ] to the dependency order,” and replacing it with, “the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status” (Pub L 110-457, 122 US Stat 5044, 5079). 2 Thus, under the current law, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or “legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an ind | 2 | 2013–2013 |
American Rock Salt Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation & Finance
green
2 sentences2012Matter of American Rock Salt Co., LLC v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin. of the State of N.Y., 104 AD3d 12 [2012] [decided herewith], supra; Matter of American Fruit & Vegetable Co., 2011 WL 3561181 , *2-3, 2011 NY Tax LEXIS 167, *7-8 [Tax Appeals Trib., Aug. 4, 2011, DTA 822631]; Matter of OM P. Popli, P.E., L.S., P.C., 2011 WL 3561178 , *2-3, 2011 NY Tax LEXIS 166, *6-7 [Tax Appeals Trib., Aug. 4, 2011, DTA 822622]). 2012Matter of American Rock Salt Co., LLC v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin. of the State of N.Y., 104 AD3d 12 [2012] [decided herewith], supra; Matter of American Fruit & Vegetable Co., 2011 WL 3561181 , *2-3, 2011 NY Tax LEXIS 167, *7-8 [Tax Appeals Trib., Aug. 4, 2011, DTA 822631]; Matter of OM P. Popli, P.E., L.S., P.C., 2011 WL 3561178 , *2-3, 2011 NY Tax LEXIS 166, *6-7 [Tax Appeals Trib., Aug. 4, 2011, DTA 822622]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Elmer W. Davis, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation & Finance
neutral
2 sentences2012The Tribunal’s interpretation and application of this provision of the General Municipal Law to petitioner erodes the statute’s overriding goal of fostering economic development while not advancing in any discernible way the concerns that gave rise to the consent requirement (see Matter of Elmer W Davis, Inc. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 104 AD3d 50 , 57 [2012] [decided herewith]). 2012The Tribunal’s interpretation and application of this provision of the General Municipal Law to petitioner erodes the statute’s overriding goal of fostering economic development while not advancing in any discernible way the concerns that gave rise to the consent requirement (see Matter of Elmer W Davis, Inc. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 104 AD3d 50 , 57 [2012] [decided herewith]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Owens
green
2 sentences1990In that regard, People v Owens ( 69 NY2d 585 , supra), cited by the Anderson plurality in support of the consent requirement, does not impose any such requirement. 1 Owens held that the dangers of overemphasis attendant to the distribution of Judge-selected written portions of the charge, "not unlike” the dangers created when CPL 310.30 is violated, were too serious to permit that practice over the defendant’s objection. 1987The consent of defense counsel is an "absolute precondition” to furnishing the jury with the text of a statute (People v Owens, 69 NY2d 585, 590 ; CPL 310.30), because "questions may arise concerning which sections of pertinent statutory material should be given to the jury” (Mem of Office of Court Administration, 1980 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1967; People v Owens, supra). | 2 | 1987–1990 |
Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller
green
2 sentences1974Inst. v. Miller ( 301 N. Y. 189 ), wherein the court held that the particular consent requirement contained in the ordinance in question was invalid in that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and section 6 of article I of the New York Constitution. 1967In holding that that consent requirement was invalid and that it should be disregarded, the court said (p. 786): “The court believes that the provision of the ordinance which is here attacked has no substantial relation to the general public welfare; on the contrary, it places in the hands of neighboring owners the power to limit competition and to withhold consent for private reasons having no relation whatever to the legitimate purposes intended to be served by building zone regulations.” It should be observed that in Concordia ( 301 N. Y. 189 , supra) the Court of Appeals was dealing with a | 2 | 1967–1974 |
Butler v. Flynn
neutral
2 sentences1911In Butter v. Flynn ( 51 App. Div. 225 ) this court held that the consent clause referred to is based “upon the equitable principle that one who knowingly receives the benefit of the labor or property of another in the form of improvements upon his land, ought to have his property subjected to a lien for the value of such improvements.” In that case the mere inspection of the contract, plans and specifications, with permission given for the performance of the work, was held an adequate compliance with the requirements of the statute. ■ In Husted v. Mathes ( 77 N. Y. 388 ) the consent was implie 1907Butler v. Flynn, 51 App. Div. 225 . | 2 | 1907–1911 |
People v. Mede
green
1 sentence2025The district attorney is charged with the post-readiness delay requested and not with the time beyond that request ( see People v Nielson , 306 AD2d 500 [2d Dept 2003]). (7 days charged. 40 total days charged.) Thereafter this court administratively adjourned the case, with the consent of the defense, to February 26, 2025, for the pretrial suppression hearing. (0 days charged. 40 total days charged.) On February 26, 2025, the district attorney announced not ready for the hearing and requested an adjournment of two days. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Goldstein v. Goldstein green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Brooks neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Moss green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Robinson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Maio Ni green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Al Malki v. Krieger green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| United States v. Charles Grimes green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Griffin v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Huntley green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Westminister Properties, Ltd. v. Kass green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Notholt green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Fecunda green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Richardson neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Lenti green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Mitchem neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Edwards neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Goldbeck green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Collier green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Vargas green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Commonwealth v. Appleby green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Samuels v. California green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Crogan green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Chu Zhu neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Bellmon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Waiters v. BD. OF EDUC., AMITYVILLE UNION FREE SCH. DIST. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Greer green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Baer v. Nyquist green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Barr & Creelman Co. v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| A. & J. Buyers, Inc. v. People neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.