consent defense in Florida

2014This Court affirmed, holding that the circuit 4 The Department submitted an affidavit stating that Trimble was arrested at 11:40 p.m. but inconsistently stating that a request and warning was given to Trimble at 12:45 a.m.; a printout from the Breathalyzer that reflected a refusal occurred at 12:47 a.m.; and an officer’s report said a warning was given at 12:50 a.m. 821 So. 2d at 1086 . 23 court did not reweigh the evidence; instead, it applied well-established law on what constitutes competent substantial evidence, stating the “hearing officer’s finding that Trimble was given a consent warnin

2014This Court affirmed, holding that the circuit 4 The Department submitted an affidavit stating that Trimble was arrested at 11:40 p.m. but inconsistently stating that a request and warning was given to Trimble at 12:45 a.m.; a printout from the Breathalyzer that reflected a refusal occurred at 12:47 a.m.; and an officer’s report said a warning was given at 12:50 a.m. 821 So. 2d at 1086 . 23 court did not reweigh the evidence; instead, it applied well-established law on what constitutes competent substantial evidence, stating the “hearing officer’s finding that Trimble was given a consent warnin

2001The court held that, because the parental consent statute impinged upon minors' privacy rights, the "state must prove that the statute furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive means," In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1193 , and that the statutory provision purporting to impose the consent requirement was unconstitutional for failure to vindicate a compelling state interest by the least intrusive means.

2001The court held that, because the parental consent statute impinged upon minors’ privacy rights, the “state must prove that the statute furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive means,” In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1193 , and that the statutory provision purporting to impose the consent requirement was unconstitutional for failure to vindicate a compelling state interest by the least intrusive means.

1999Hansman v. State, 679 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Coleman v. State, 592 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (owner of residence's testimony was sufficiently ambiguous on subject of consent to preclude burglary conviction of Coleman, who had entered residence to flush cocaine down toilet; owner testified that her teenage son may have given permission after Coleman sought his permission to enter, and that, in pretrial deposition, owner herself had indicated having given him permission).

1999Hansman v. State , 679 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Coleman v. State, 592 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (owner of residence’s testimony was sufficiently ambiguous on subject of consent to preclude burglary conviction of Coleman, who had entered residence to flush cocaine down toilet; owner testified that her teenage son may have given permission after Coleman sought his permission to enter, and that, in pretrial deposition, owner herself had indicated having given him permission).

1999Hansman v. State, 679 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Coleman v. State, 592 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (owner of residence's testimony was sufficiently ambiguous on subject of consent to preclude burglary conviction of Coleman, who had entered residence to flush cocaine down toilet; owner testified that her teenage son may have given permission after Coleman sought his permission to enter, and that, in pretrial deposition, owner herself had indicated having given him permission).

1999Hansman v. State , 679 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Coleman v. State, 592 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (owner of residence’s testimony was sufficiently ambiguous on subject of consent to preclude burglary conviction of Coleman, who had entered residence to flush cocaine down toilet; owner testified that her teenage son may have given permission after Coleman sought his permission to enter, and that, in pretrial deposition, owner herself had indicated having given him permission).

1996In Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084 (Fla.1994), the supreme court squarely held that section 800.04, Florida Statutes, is constitutional because the state's compelling interest in protecting children outweighed a minor's right to privacy.

1994Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084 (Fla.1994).

1987The 1984 amendment added subparagraph (2) and changed the language of the last sentence for the expressed purpose of overcoming the effect of the decision in Lanier v. State, 443 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), which held that section 800.04, prohibiting lewd and lascivious conduct with children under the age of 14 years did not prohibit acts of sexual intercourse between an adult and an unchaste, consenting child, and ... took the view that, where the victim is younger than 14 years of age but not younger than 12 years of age, the victim's consent was a defense to the crime of lewd and lascivio

1986The preamble to that amendment, Chapter 84-86, Laws of Florida, provides: WHEREAS, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held in the case of Lanier v. State, 443 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) that the statute prohibiting lewd and lascivious conduct with children under the age of 14 years did not prohibit acts of sexual intercourse between an adult and an unchaste, consenting child, and WHEREAS, the District Court of Appeal additionally took the view that, where the victim is younger than 14 years of age but not younger than 12 years of age, the victim's consent was a defense to the crim

1968State v. Richardson, 47 S.C. 166 , 25 S.E.R. 220, 35 L.R.A. 238 .

1906State v. Richardson, 47 S. C. 166, 25 S. E.

2024Neither the victim’s lack of chastity nor the victim’s consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by this section. 6 Id. (emphasis added).

2021We find “this position is without merit, as the law on this point is well- established: a defendant’s mere failure to object to a declaration of mistrial is not tantamount to consent.” Merchant, 201 So. 3d at 152 ; see also State v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1956) (noting that “silence of the defendant on trial for a crime or his failure to object or protest against an illegal discharge of the jury” does not constitute consent to the trial court’s 10 declaration of a mistrial); Allen v. State, 41 So. 593 , 593 (1906) (holding that the defendant’s “silence or failure to object or protes

2017See § 800.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2013) (providing that “[n]either the victim’s lack of chastity nor the victim’s consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by this section”); Khianthalat v. State, 935 So. 2d 583, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (consent is not a defense to crime of lewd and lascivious battery on a child twelve years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age); State v. Raleigh, 686 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2016This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011)).

2016This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011)).

2016This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011)).

2016See State v. Grayson, 90 So.2d 710, 713 (Fla.1956) (noting that “silence of the defendant on trial for a crime or his failure to object” does not constitute consent to the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial); McLendon v. State, 74 So.2d 656, 657 (Fla.1954)(finding “the defense of former jeopardy is not available to a defendant where mistrial is granted with his consent, approval or upon his motion or is granted where the circumstances show a manifest, urgent or absolute necessity in the interest of justice.”); Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1 , 41 So. 593 (1906) (holding that the defendant’s “si

2015Lesser Included Offenses [[Image here]] *945 Comment This instruction was adopted in 2013 [ 131 So.3d 720 ] and amended in 2015. 13.1 BURGLARY § 810.02; Fla. Stat. Give if the information or indictment charges entering with the intent to commit an offense: To prove the crime of Burglary, the State must prove the following [two] [three] elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1.