consent exception in Louisiana

2013State v. Green, 376 So.2d 1249 (La.1979).

2010State v. Green, 376 So.2d 1249 (La.1979).

2013This court discussed the standard for reviewing whether property was properly seized pursuant to the consent exception in State v. Hopkins, 2004-1268, pp. 10-11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/8/04) , 891 So.2d 707 , 714: The State has the burden of proving valid consent.

2010The defendant is now before this Court arguing strenuously that the trial court erred as the jurisprudence clearly prohibits a hotel owner or employee from giving the police consent to search a room in which the hotel guest has manifested an expectation of privacy, citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 84 S.Ct. 889 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964). 17Law and Analysis In State v. Hopkins, 04-1268, pp. 10-11 (LaApp. 4 Cir. 12/8/04), 891 So.2d 707, 714 , this Court set forth the standard for determining whether evidence was properly seized pursuant to the consent exception to the warrant requirement

2004App. 1 Cir. 7/9/03), 859 So.2d 81 , we held that a consent waiver of the ability to modify child support would be enforced unless the agreement was contrary to the child's best interest or in derogation of the public order.

2004In Richardson v. Richardson, 02-2415 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/9/03) , 859 So.2d 81 , we held that a consent waiver of the ability to modify child support would be enforced unless the agreement was contrary to the child’s best interest or in derogation of the public order.

2004In Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 9 (La.1999), 739 So.2d 762, 768 , the Louisiana Supreme Court specifically declined to abrogate "that body of law which has recognized that a consent (stipulated) judgment is by its nature a bilateral agreement between the parties wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent and thereby put an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss." Therefore, once a consent decree is properly confected, a party may no longer have control over the contents and may be subject to contempt proceedings if he or she

2004In Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 9 (La.1999), 739 So.2d 762, 768 , the Louisiana Supreme Court specifically declined to abrogate “that body of law which has recognized that a consent (stipulated) judgment is by its nature a bilateral agreement between the parties wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent and thereby put an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss.” Therefore, once a consent decree | 3is properly confected, a party may no longer have control over the contents and may be subject to contempt proceedings if he or s

2021Murriel, 697 So. 2d at 372 .

2019Smith, 923 So. 2d at 737 - 738.

2019Smith, 923 So. 2d at 740 .

2011State v. Singleton, 01-1070, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/25/02), 828 So.2d 1185, 1190 .

2010Id., 2 So.3d at 1179 . 113In this case, we find that the investigatory stop, search, and subsequent seizure of cocaine were valid, and, as such, the evidence should not have been suppressed.

2010Id., 2 So.3d at 1179 . 113In this case, we find that the investigatory stop, search, and subsequent seizure of cocaine were valid, and, as such, the evidence should not have been suppressed.

2010The defendant is now before this Court arguing strenuously that the trial court erred as the jurisprudence clearly prohibits a hotel owner or employee from giving the police consent to search a room in which the hotel guest has manifested an expectation of privacy, citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 84 S.Ct. 889 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964). 17Law and Analysis In State v. Hopkins, 04-1268, pp. 10-11 (LaApp. 4 Cir. 12/8/04), 891 So.2d 707, 714 , this Court set forth the standard for determining whether evidence was properly seized pursuant to the consent exception to the warrant requirement

2010The defendant is now before this Court arguing strenuously that the trial court erred as the jurisprudence clearly prohibits a hotel owner or employee from giving the police consent to search a room in which the hotel guest has manifested an expectation of privacy, citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 84 S.Ct. 889 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964). 17Law and Analysis In State v. Hopkins, 04-1268, pp. 10-11 (LaApp. 4 Cir. 12/8/04), 891 So.2d 707, 714 , this Court set forth the standard for determining whether evidence was properly seized pursuant to the consent exception to the warrant requirement

1998This case is distinguishable from State v. Talbert, 416 So.2d 97 (La.1982) in which we held that the defendant's prior rape of the same victim was admissible to prove the "defendant's intent to have intercourse without the victim's consent." 416 So.2d at 100 .

1998This case is distinguishable from State v. Talbert, 416 So.2d 97 (La.1982) in which we held that the defendant's prior rape of the same victim was admissible to prove the "defendant's intent to have intercourse without the victim's consent." 416 So.2d at 100 .

1997See Richard, 535 So.2d 414 ; Fricke, 571 So.2d 130 .

1993State v. Valenzuela, 590 So.2d 89 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied, 593 So.2d 380 (La.1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 130 , 121 L.Ed.2d 84 (1992).

1993State v. Valenzuela, 590 So.2d 89 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied, 593 So.2d 380 (La.1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 130 , 121 L.Ed.2d 84 (1992).

1993Id. at 24 .

1993State v. Valenzuela, 590 So.2d 89 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied, 593 So.2d 380 (La.1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 130 , 121 L.Ed.2d 84 (1992).

1988State v. Johnson, 380 So.2d 32 (La.1980); State v. Harris, 506 So.2d 1274 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied.

1988State v. Johnson, 380 So.2d 32 (La.1980); State v. Harris, 506 So.2d 1274 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied.

1988Plaintiffs' lack of consent-battery theory, based upon Pizzalotta v. Wilson, 437 So.2d 859 (La.1983), sounds in intentional tort and is a separate theory of action from lack of informed consent, which sounds in negligence.

1987State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202 (La.1984); State v. Helwig, 489 So.2d 296 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986), writ denied 495 So.2d 301 (La.1986).

1987State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202 (La.1984); State v. Helwig, 489 So.2d 296 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986), writ denied 495 So.2d 301 (La.1986).

1987State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202 (La.1984); State v. Helwig, 489 So.2d 296 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986), writ denied 495 So.2d 301 (La.1986).

1979State v. Angel, 356 So.2d 986 (La.1978).

1966Nevertheless, without discussion, the court held: "We have concluded that the required consent was not given by the insurance company before the settlement was made and that plaintiffs did not comply with the terms of the uninsured motorist clause of the policy." Phoenix Insurance Company v. Bowen, 178 So.2d 751 (Fla.App.1965) was a suit by the insurer for declaratory judgment as to its liability under the uninsured motorists clause.