consent exception in North Carolina

2020App. 356, 372 , 777 S.E.2d 103, 114 (2015) (“Acknowledging that a potential conflict exists, without identifying the potential conflict, does not provide the parties with informed consent. . . . [T]he parties could not give informed consent of dual representation without full disclosure from [their attorney].” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Co. v. Mako One Corp., 919 F.3d 529, 536 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding no informed consent under the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct where a consent waiver letter made “no attempt to explain to [the client] the advantages, disadv

2020App. 356, 372 , 777 S.E.2d 103, 114 (2015) (“Acknowledging that a potential conflict exists, without identifying the potential conflict, does not provide the parties with informed consent. . . . [T]he parties could not give informed consent of dual representation without full disclosure from [their attorney].” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Co. v. Mako One Corp., 919 F.3d 529, 536 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding no informed consent under the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct where a consent waiver letter made “no attempt to explain to [the client] the advantages, disadv

2017Further, the State has the burden to prove that “consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” Id. at 222 , 93 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 , 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968)).

2017Further, the State has the burden to prove that “consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” Id. at 222 , 93 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 , 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968)).

2017See generally Bailey v. State, 338 Ga. App. 428 , 434 & n.42, 790 S.E.2d 98 , 103 & n.42 (2016) (“[I]mplied consent of an unconscious suspect is insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”) (collecting cases). -9- STATE V.

2017See generally Bailey v. State, 338 Ga. App. 428 , 434 & n.42, 790 S.E.2d 98 , 103 & n.42 (2016) (“[I]mplied consent of an unconscious suspect is insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”) (collecting cases). -9- STATE V.

2017Compare People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 32 , ___ P.3d ___, ___ (holding that blood draw from an unconscious suspect was constitutional because statutory implied consent satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement), with State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz. 506 , ___, 389 P.3d 1251, 1253, 1255 (2017) (holding that the “unconscious clause” of the implied-consent statute was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant and further determining that the “unconscious clause” can be constitutionally applied only when exigent circumstances prevent law enforcement from obtaining a

2017Compare People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 32 , ___ P.3d ___, ___ (holding that blood draw from an unconscious suspect was constitutional because statutory implied consent satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement), with State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz. 506 , ___, 389 P.3d 1251, 1253, 1255 (2017) (holding that the “unconscious clause” of the implied-consent statute was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant and further determining that the “unconscious clause” can be constitutionally applied only when exigent circumstances prevent law enforcement from obtaining a

2017Compare People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 32 , ___ P.3d ___, ___ (holding that blood draw from an unconscious suspect was constitutional because statutory implied consent satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement), with State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz. 506 , ___, 389 P.3d 1251, 1253, 1255 (2017) (holding that the “unconscious clause” of the implied-consent statute was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant and further determining that the “unconscious clause” can be constitutionally applied only when exigent circumstances prevent law enforcement from obtaining a

2017Compare People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 32 , _ P.3d _ ,_ (holding that blood draw from an unconscious suspect was constitutional because statutory implied consent satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement), with State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz. 506 , _, 389 P.3d 1251, 1253, 1255 (2017) (holding that the “unconscious clause” of the implied-consent statute was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant and further determining that the “unconscious clause” can be constitutionally applied only when exigent circumstances prevent law enforcement from obtaining a warrant

2015See State v. Sines, 158 N.C.

2000I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute." State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446 , 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Joh

2000I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute." State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446 , 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Joh

2000I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute." State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446 , 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Joh

2000I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute." State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446 , 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Joh

2000I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute." State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446 , 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Joh

2000I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute." State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446 , 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Joh

1975Thompson v. Thompson, 280 Ala. 566 , 196 So. 2d 412, 414 (1967) ; Mangham v. Mangham, 264 Ala. 354 , 87 So. 2d 818 (1956) ; Moran v. Moran, 219 Md. 399 , 149 A. 2d 399 (1959) ; 24 Am.

1975Thompson v. Thompson, 280 Ala. 566 , 196 So. 2d 412, 414 (1967) ; Mangham v. Mangham, 264 Ala. 354 , 87 So. 2d 818 (1956) ; Moran v. Moran, 219 Md. 399 , 149 A. 2d 399 (1959) ; 24 Am.