consent exception in Minnesota

2015State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). 6 For a search to fall under the consent exception, the [s]tate must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented.

2015“For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the 9 evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented.” State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014).

2014“For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was given freely and voluntarily.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846 .

2014“For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was given freely and voluntarily.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846 .

2014In determining whether consent was voluntary, we examine “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 102 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). “[C]onsent can be voluntary even if the circumstances of the encounter are uncomfortable for the person being questioned.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 569 .

2014In determining whether consent was voluntary, we examine “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 102 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). “[C]onsent can be voluntary even 3 if the circumstances of the encounter are uncomfortable for the person being questioned.” State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014).

2015“For a search to fall under the consent exception, the [s]tate must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented.” Id.

2015State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). 6 For a search to fall under the consent exception, the [s]tate must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented.

2015Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 , 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (1973); State v. Deide, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011).

2015Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 , 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (1973); State v. Deide, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011).

2024“The independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984); see also State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011).

2016In State v. Brooks, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the police did not violate Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights when they took blood and urine samples from him without a warrant after he expressly consented to the searches. 838 N.W.2d 663, 565-66 (Minn. 2013).

2016See State v. Moore, 493 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. App. 1992) (noting that the “complainant’s knowledge of a scab or sore on [the defendant’s] penis greatly diminishes the credibility of [the consent defense]”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).

2016State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 2005).

2015See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (“[Appellate courts] generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court, including constitutional questions of criminal procedure.”).

2014The court of appeals must follow Minnesota Supreme Court precedent.1 State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).

2014See George, 557 N.W.2d at 579 .

2014Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 619 , 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-14 (1989); see also State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013) (blood and urine testing), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). “[P]olice do not need a warrant if the subject of the search consents.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 . 3 “For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented [to a search].” Id. “‘Consent’ that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.” Florida v. Bostick,

2014Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 619 , 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-14 (1989); see also State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013) (blood and urine testing), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). “[P]olice do not need a warrant if the subject of the search consents.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 . 3 “For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented [to a search].” Id. “‘Consent’ that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.” Florida v. Bostick,

2014Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 619 , 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-14 (1989); see also State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013) (blood and urine testing), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). “[P]olice do not need a warrant if the subject of the search consents.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 . 3 “For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented [to a search].” Id. “‘Consent’ that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.” Florida v. Bostick,

2014Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 619 , 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-14 (1989); see also State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013) (blood and urine testing), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014). “[P]olice do not need a warrant if the subject of the search consents.” Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 . 3 “For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented [to a search].” Id. “‘Consent’ that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.” Florida v. Bostick,

2014State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 177- 78 (Minn. 2007) (“Generally, evidence seized in violation of the constitution must be suppressed.”).

2014See Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007) (noting that a postconviction court’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo); see also Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568-72 (discussing the consent exception in the context of DWI enforcement).

2011Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, “[wjarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ applies.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn.2003) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).

2004Larson v. Johnson, 175 Minn. 502, 505-06 , 221 N.W. 871, 873 (1928). 5 We have also held that a contract vendor may cancel the contract for deed based upon the breach of such a consent clause.

2004Larson v. Johnson, 175 Minn. 502, 505-06 , 221 N.W. 871, 873 (1928). 5 We have also held that a contract vendor may cancel the contract for deed based upon the breach of such a consent clause.

2004In Minnesota Central Railroad Co. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 595 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn.App.1999), the court of appeals held that a grant of an easement contrary to a consent clause was ineffective where the recipient of the easement had constructive notice of the consent clause through the recording of the contract for deed.

2004In Minnesota Central Railroad Co. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 595 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn.App.1999), the court of appeals held that a grant of an easement contrary to a consent clause was ineffective where the recipient of the easement had constructive notice of the consent clause through the recording of the contract for deed.

2004Karim v. Werner, 333 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn.1983); see also 25 Eileen Roberts, Minnesota Practice— Real Estate Law § 6.08(b) (2003).

2004Bank Midwest, Minnesota, Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 661 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn.App.2003).

2004Lipetzky, 661 N.W.2d at 295-96 . 6 We agree with the court of appeals dissent that the word “convey” is not controlling.

2003See State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn.1993) (stating “detention of the person stopped may not continue indefinitely but only as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop” (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985))).

2003See State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn.1993) (stating “detention of the person stopped may not continue indefinitely but only as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop” (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985))).

2003See State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn.1993) (stating “detention of the person stopped may not continue indefinitely but only as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop” (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985))).

2002See State v. Pederson Maxwell, 619 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn.App.2000) (stating that searches of motor vehicles when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband do not violate the warrant requirement); Hatton, 389 N.W.2d at 232 (stating that searches conducted with consent and without a warrant do not violate the warrant requirement).