consent exception in Utah

15 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

Case	Followed	Cited
United States v. Lewis Nathaniel Dixongreen ca10 · 1993 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, 3 the Second Circuit held that a warrant-less seizure is valid if it meets “one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment’s warrant requirement.” United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993). 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, [3] the Second Circuit held that a warrantless seizure is valid if it meets "one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement." United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993).	2	2
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuitgreen ca2 · 1993 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, 3 the Second Circuit held that a warrant-less seizure is valid if it meets “one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment’s warrant requirement.” United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993). 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, [3] the Second Circuit held that a warrantless seizure is valid if it meets "one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement." United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993).	2	2
United States v. Doris Lasanta, Luis Rivera, Juan Cardona, and Eladio Gonzalezgreen ca2 · 1992 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, 3 the Second Circuit held that a warrant-less seizure is valid if it meets “one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment’s warrant requirement.” United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993). 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, [3] the Second Circuit held that a warrantless seizure is valid if it meets "one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement." United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993).	2	2
Thompson v. Jacksongreen utahctapp · 1987 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1990–1991 2 sentences 1991Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987). 1990Id.	1	2
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffrey Howard VAN POYCK, Defendant-Appellantgreen ca9 · 1996 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 2 sentences 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion 2023But upon reading the cases as a whole, an overarching consensus emerges: ―It is generally accepted that a prisoner who places a call from an institutional phone with knowledge that the call is subject to being recorded has impliedly consented to the recording.‖ United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).6 Further, consent may be ―express or may be implied in fact from surrounding circumstances indicating that the defendant knowingly agreed to the surveillance.‖ United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).	1	1
United States v. Faulknergreen ca10 · 2006 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023But upon reading the cases as a whole, an overarching consensus emerges: ―It is generally accepted that a prisoner who places a call from an institutional phone with knowledge that the call is subject to being recorded has impliedly consented to the recording.‖ United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).6 Further, consent may be ―express or may be implied in fact from surrounding circumstances indicating that the defendant knowingly agreed to the surveillance.‖ United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).	1	1
United States v. Footmangreen ca1 · 2000 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion	1	1
United States v. Joseph Feekes, Baltazar Lopez, and Juan Lopezgreen ca7 · 1989 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 2 sentences 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion 2023To this end, Wood echoes concerns raised by the Seventh Circuit—the lone circuit hesitant to apply the consent exception in these circumstances. ¶38 In United States v. Feekes, the Seventh Circuit ultimately exempted recorded inmate phone calls from the Wiretap Act under the law enforcement exception. 879 F.2d at 1565–66.	1	1
C.T. v. J.S.green alaska · 1998 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See C.T. v. J.S. , 951 P.2d 1199 , 1200 (Alaska 1998) ("The only question is whether the trial court permissibly circumvented the consent requirement ....	1	1
Keeter v. Alpine Towers International, Inc.green sc · 2014 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017If not, then the adoption decree is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction[.]"); 13 Brown , 766 S.E.2d at 378 ("Consent lies at the foundation of the adoption process[.]" (citation omitted)); 14 In re Adoption of L.D.S. , 155 P.3d at 8 ("[T]he best interests of the child can be served in no legitimate manner except in obedience to the policies and procedures mandated by law."). 15 In any case, the best interests of a child are not furthered by placing the child for adoption without parental consent.	1	1
In Re Adoption of Ldsgreen okla · 2007 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017If not, then the adoption decree is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction[.]"); 13 Brown , 766 S.E.2d at 378 ("Consent lies at the foundation of the adoption process[.]" (citation omitted)); 14 In re Adoption of L.D.S. , 155 P.3d at 8 ("[T]he best interests of the child can be served in no legitimate manner except in obedience to the policies and procedures mandated by law."). 15 In any case, the best interests of a child are not furthered by placing the child for adoption without parental consent.	1	1
United States v. Denny Ray Hunnicuttgreen ca10 · 1998 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 1 sentence 2012A motorist who consented to a search could be searched; and a motorist who refused consent could be searched, as well.” Santos, 403 F.3d at 1125–26; see also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1351 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as well as the consent doctrine.”). ¶12 However, the issue here is not whether refusal to consent supports reasonable suspicion, but whether it dispels reasonable suspicion, or at any rate terminates an officer’s attempts to confirm or dispel his or her original reasonable susp	1	1
People v. Martinezgreen coloctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005Cf. State v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo.Ct.App.2001) (stating that refuting a consent defense is a valid purpose to admit prior bad act evidence under rule 404(b)); see also People v. Letienne, no. 206259, 1999 WL 33453409 , 1, 1999 Mich.App: LEXIS 1303, 2 (Mich.Ct.App. 2005Cf. State v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo.Ct.App.2001) (stating that refuting a consent defense is a valid purpose to admit prior bad act evidence under rule 404(b)); see also People v. Letienne, no. 206259, 1999 WL 33453409 , *1, 1999 Mich.App.	1	1
Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc.green utah · 1994 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003In response to Schettler, Almon argues that its holding is inapplicable in this case because the trial court’s decision to set aside Almon’s default "mandates that the parties be returned to the status quo ante” under Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994).	1	1
United States v. George L. Carsongreen ca10 · 1986 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990	1	1
State v. Whittenbackgreen utah · 1980 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990	1	1
State v. Iaconogreen utah · 1986 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990	1	1
Basso v. Utah Power And Light Companygreen ca10 · 1974 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (21)

Case	Cited	Years
Coolidge v. New Hampshire green scotus · 1971 2 sentences 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, [3] the Second Circuit held that a warrantless seizure is valid if it meets "one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement." United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993). 1997Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, [3] the Second Circuit held that a warrantless seizure is valid if it meets "one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement." United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993).	2	1997–1997
State v. Vine green utahctapp · 2025 2 sentences 2025And the consent instruction read like this: The alleged sexual conduct is without consent of [Lisa] under any, all, or a combination of the following circumstances: 20221058-CA 10 2025 UT App 147 State v. Vine • [Lisa] expressed lack of consent through words or conduct; • [Vine] overcame [Lisa] through the application of physical force or violence; • [Vine] overcame [Lisa] through concealment or by the element of surprise; • [Vine] knew that [Lisa] was unconscious, was unaware that the act was occurring or was physically unable to resist; and/or • [Vine] knew that as a result of mental illness 2025In this case, the court gave two instructions that, together, told the jury what the law requires in this regard: an elements instruction that set forth the elements of the crime of forcible sodomy, and a consent instruction that set 20221058-CA 27 2025 UT App 147 State v. Vine forth the law regarding consent.	1	2025–2025
United States v. Workman green · 1996 1 sentence 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion	1	2023–2023
United States v. Verdin-Garcia green ca10 · 2008 1 sentence 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion	1	2023–2023
State v. Bradshaw green utah · 2006 2 sentences 2023We find their analysis to be helpful and ―instructive.‖ State v. Bradshaw, 2006 UT 87, ¶ 11 , 152 P.3d 288 . ¶31 Nine federal circuits have interpreted the consent exception in cases involving prison monitoring of inmate phone calls.4 And all but one have concluded that the consent exception applied. 2023We find their analysis to be helpful and ―instructive.‖ State v. Bradshaw, 2006 UT 87, ¶ 11 , 152 P.3d 288 . ¶31 Nine federal circuits have interpreted the consent exception in cases involving prison monitoring of inmate phone calls.4 And all but one have concluded that the consent exception applied.	1	2023–2023
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital green utah · 1992 1 sentence 2023This instruction, combined with the consent instruction, had the potential to mislead the jury into believing that Ms. Harward’s nonverbal action of presenting at the infusion center and submitting to treatment was sufficient to establish that she gave informed consent to receive gentamicin. ¶28 We view the “potential for confusion” created by the jury instructions to have been sufficiently “substantial” to give rise to “a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict may have been different absent the error.” See Nielsen, 830 P.2d at 275 .	1	2023–2023
State v. Wood neutral utah · 2023 2 sentences 2023We reject this argument because this statute does not provide for suppression as a remedy, and Wood has not persuaded us that it applies in these circumstances. 4 Cite as: 2023 UT 15 Opinion of the Court ¶18 Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s denial of Wood‘s motion to suppress the recordings of his jail calls. 2023The Interception Act states in relevant part that a person ―may intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication if that person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception.‖ Id. § 77- 23a-4(7)(a) (emphasis added). ¶30 Although we have not previously interpreted the scope of the consent exception in Utah‘s Interception Act, many federal appellate courts have interpreted identical language in the Wiretap Act.	1	2023–2023
United States v. Timothy Jones, Charles Wayne Norman, Perry Cecil Patronelli, and Richard Keith Hagler green ca5 · 1988 1 sentence 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion	1	2023–2023
United States v. Roosevelt Daniels green ca7 · 1990 2 sentences 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion	1	2023–2023
United States v. Ronald Craig Horr green ca8 · 1992 1 sentence 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion	1	2023–2023
United States v. Donte Hammond green ca4 · 2002 1 sentence 2023See __________________________________________________________ 4 See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hodge, 85 F. App‘x 278 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 7 STATE v. WOOD Opinion	1	2023–2023
State v. Mottaghian green utahctapp · 2022 1 sentence 2022You may also apply the common, ordinary meaning of consent to all of the facts and circumstances of this case.” Id. ¶39 The consent instruction that the trial court gave to the jury in this case was very similar to the model instruction.	1	2022–2022
Matter of Estate of Murnion green mont · 1984 1 sentence 2020In Whyte, the court stated that the consent requirement “has at times been expressed by the statement that a common law marriage must take place immediately or not at all,” and that “a relationship illicit in its inception is presumed to be illicit throughout the period of cohabitation.” 885 P.2d at 794–95 (citing In re Estate of Murnion, 686 P.2d 893 , 897–99 (Mont. 1984)). ¶21 Citing this language, the Estate asserts that Calsert’s “knowledge and intent” with regard to consent “must be evaluated as they actually existed as of the date she alleges her common law marriage began,” which is Marc	1	2020–2020
Whyte v. Blair green utah · 1994 1 sentence 2020In Whyte, the court stated that the consent requirement “has at times been expressed by the statement that a common law marriage must take place immediately or not at all,” and that “a relationship illicit in its inception is presumed to be illicit throughout the period of cohabitation.” 885 P.2d at 794–95 (citing In re Estate of Murnion, 686 P.2d 893 , 897–99 (Mont. 1984)). ¶21 Citing this language, the Estate asserts that Calsert’s “knowledge and intent” with regard to consent “must be evaluated as they actually existed as of the date she alleges her common law marriage began,” which is Marc	1	2020–2020
United States v. Santos green ca10 · 2005 1 sentence 2012A motorist who consented to a search could be searched; and a motorist who refused consent could be searched, as well.” Santos, 403 F.3d at 1125–26; see also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1351 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as well as the consent doctrine.”). ¶12 However, the issue here is not whether refusal to consent supports reasonable suspicion, but whether it dispels reasonable suspicion, or at any rate terminates an officer’s attempts to confirm or dispel his or her original reasonable susp	1	2012–2012
Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler green utahctapp · 1989 2 sentences 2003We concluded, however, that "the consent requirement of [rule] 38(d) does not apply once default has been entered" and that the trial court properly allowed the plaintiff "to unilaterally withdraw its jury demand following the entry of [defendant’s] default.” Schettler, 768 P.2d at 963 . 2003In accordance with the holding of Schettler, we conclude that "the consent requirement of [rule] 38(d) does not apply once default has been entered” and that the trial court properly allowed Noel "to unilaterally withdraw [her] jury demand following the entry of [Almon's] default.” Id.	1	2003–2003
Bowen v. Ellender green scotus · 1986	1	1990–1990
Batterton v. Texas General Land office green scotus · 1986	1	1990–1990
Oliver v. Wainwright green scotus · 1986	1	1990–1990
Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc. green utah · 1984	1	1987–1987
STATE, DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. Higgs green utah · 1982	1	1987–1987

Where else courts name it

TX 191 (1969–2026) CA 110 (1909–2025) OH 110 (1987–2026) PA 102 (1850–2026) NY 80 (1843–2026) IL 70 (1973–2026) WA 57 (1975–2026) MN 56 (1944–2024) MI 56 (1915–2026) FL 51 (1906–2024) OR 49 (1886–2026) WI 43 (1882–2026) GA 39 (1897–2025) IN 36 (1881–2019) IA 34 (1888–2026) NJ 34 (1968–2026) ID 32 (1981–2026) DC 31 (1984–2023) AL 29 (1853–2025) CO 28 (1961–2024) LA 24 (1966–2021) AZ 22 (1975–2026) NM 22 (1975–2023) MA 22 (1925–2025) KS 20 (1980–2024) HI 18 (1989–2020) CT 17 (1984–2019) ME 17 (1978–2026) TN 16 (1975–2023) MD 16 (1932–2022) MS 15 (1985–2017) UT 15 (1987–2025) VA 15 (1925–2022) MO 13 (1894–2012) AK 13 (1979–2023) SC 12 (1985–2023) MT 12 (1977–2018) OK 11 (1969–2020) NE 10 (1988–2023) AR 9 (1972–2017) SD 9 (1992–2024) RI 8 (1986–2017) WY 8 (1978–2008) NC 8 (1939–2020) ND 6 (1976–2017) NV 6 (2016–2024) VT 6 (1992–2026) DE 5 (1963–2022) WV 5 (1951–2001) NH 3 (1965–2011) GU 2 (2023–2025) KY 2 (2006–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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