17 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2022"To demonstrate that the consent exception to a warrant requirement applies, however, the State must prove, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture."' Id. (quoting State v Bailey, 2012 ME 55 , ~ 16, 41 A.3d 535 .). 2018See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2186 n.9 (citing Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) ). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Barlowgreen2 sentences2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re 2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re | 2 | 2 |
State v. Nadeaugreen2 sentences2018See State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 18 , 1 A.3d 445 . 2018See State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 18 , 1 A.3d 445 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Koucoulesgreen2 sentences2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re 2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re | 2 | 2 |
Heien v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences2018See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2186 n.9 (citing Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) ). 2018See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2186 n.9 (citing Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) ). | 2 | 2 |
Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion)green1 sentence2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app | 1 | 1 |
Carl Stephen Thomas v. J.W. Humfieldgreen1 sentence2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app 2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app | 1 | 1 |
Guardianship of Sebastien Chamberlaingreen2 sentences2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app 2026See In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶¶ 17-20 , 118 A.3d 229 (noting that due process protections apply to guardianship determinations and applying the due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party to litigation is entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and app | 1 | 1 |
State v. Littlegreen1 sentence2023The intrusion on a person occasioned by field sobriety testing does not amount to an arrest for which probable cause is required, largely because “[t]he performance of a couple of quick, simple physical coordination tests is not particularly onerous, offensive or restrictive.” State v. Little, 468 A.2d 615, 617 (Me. 1983). | 1 | 1 |
In re Child of Nicholas P.green1 sentence2021See In re Child of Nicholas P., 2019 ME 152, ¶ 11 , 218 A.3d 247 . [¶27] We therefore interpret the unambiguous plain language of UIFSA to state that the consent requirement set out in sections 2965(2)(A) and 3253(1)(B) is jurisdictional rather procedural, as the District Court concluded. | 1 | 1 |
Hl 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLCgreen2 sentences2021See HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 2011 ME 29, ¶ 25 , 15 A.3d 725 (“It is apparent that the Legislature knew how to create statutory language that allows [the intended result in other provisions] . . . . 2021See HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 2011 ME 29, ¶ 25 , 15 A.3d 725 (“It is apparent that the Legislature knew how to create statutory language that allows [the intended result in other provisions] . . . . | 1 | 1 |
Dissell v. Trans World Airlinesgreen1 sentence2021P. 12(h)(1), (3); Hawley, 1999 ME 127 , ¶ 10 & n.6, 736 A.2d 268 ; Cohen, 25 N.E.3d at 844-45 ; Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 443 (Me. 1986). [¶23] To determine whether the consent requirement of UIFSA is jurisdictional or procedural, we interpret the statute de novo by evaluating its plain meaning to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. | 1 | 1 |
Erik Wuori v. Travis Otisgreen2 sentences2021See Wuori v. Otis, 2020 ME 27, ¶ 6 , 226 A.3d 771 . 2021See Wuori v. Otis, 2020 ME 27, ¶ 6 , 226 A.3d 771 . | 1 | 1 |
| Back Bay Spas, Inc. v. 441 Stuart Marketing, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
In re Alexandria C.green2 sentences2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. 2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. | 1 | 1 |
| Wagner v. Wagnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samuel B. Pollock Jr. And Laura Pollock v. Sandra T. Pollock, Oliver H. Barber, and Luann C. Glidewellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Spencergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell v. Pricegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gagnon's Hardware & Furniture, Inc. v. Michaudgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Florence L. Petersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| David Jessie Graves v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bangor Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Robbins Plumbing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Carey v. Boulettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2022"To demonstrate that the consent exception to a warrant requirement applies, however, the State must prove, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture."' Id. (quoting State v Bailey, 2012 ME 55 , ~ 16, 41 A.3d 535 .). 2022"To demonstrate that the consent exception to a warrant requirement applies, however, the State must prove, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture."' Id. (quoting State v Bailey, 2012 ME 55 , ~ 16, 41 A.3d 535 .). | 3 | 2017–2022 |
State v. Tozier
green
2 sentences2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re 2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
2 sentences2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re 2018A search is unreasonable if a person’s consent to the search was “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force” or duress, or was induced by “deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ; State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me. 1974); see State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974). 15 [¶23] The circumstances under which LeMeunier-Fitzgerald agreed to submit to a blood test are undisputed; the parties’ disagreement centers on the effect of the warnings on the voluntariness of her consent.8 In the absence of any factual dispute, “we re | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State of Maine v. Matthew T. Collier
green
2 sentences2017To demonstrate that the consent exception to a warrant requirement applies, however, the State must prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture.” State v. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 16 , 41 A.3d 535 (quotation marks omitted). [¶11] Because the State bore the burden of proof and was the unsuccessful party before the suppression court, the State bears the burden to demonstrate on appeal “that the trial court was compelled to make findings in 6 its favor.” State v. Collier, 2013 ME 44, ¶ 6 , 66 A.3d 563 . 2017To demonstrate that the consent exception to a warrant requirement applies, however, the State must prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture.” State v. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 16 , 41 A.3d 535 (quotation marks omitted). [¶11] Because the State bore the burden of proof and was the unsuccessful party before the suppression court, the State bears the burden to demonstrate on appeal “that the trial court was compelled to make findings in 6 its favor.” State v. Collier, 2013 ME 44, ¶ 6 , 66 A.3d 563 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Sylvain
green
2 sentences2023We have held 6“For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, [t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, ¶ 21 , 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted). 10 that a brief detention of a driver to “[s]ubject[] the driver to field sobriety tests,” Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 18 , 814 A.2d 984 , is allowed if an officer has “a reasonable articulable suspicion of impairment,” State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 8 , 36 A.3d 881 . 2023We have held 6“For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, [t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, ¶ 21 , 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted). 10 that a brief detention of a driver to “[s]ubject[] the driver to field sobriety tests,” Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 18 , 814 A.2d 984 , is allowed if an officer has “a reasonable articulable suspicion of impairment,” State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 8 , 36 A.3d 881 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State of Maine v. Brent Croteau
neutral
2 sentences2023We have held 6“For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, [t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, ¶ 21 , 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted). 10 that a brief detention of a driver to “[s]ubject[] the driver to field sobriety tests,” Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 18 , 814 A.2d 984 , is allowed if an officer has “a reasonable articulable suspicion of impairment,” State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 8 , 36 A.3d 881 . 2023We have held 6“For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, [t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, ¶ 21 , 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted). 10 that a brief detention of a driver to “[s]ubject[] the driver to field sobriety tests,” Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 18 , 814 A.2d 984 , is allowed if an officer has “a reasonable articulable suspicion of impairment,” State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 8 , 36 A.3d 881 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. McPartland
green
2 sentences2023We have held 6“For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, [t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, ¶ 21 , 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted). 10 that a brief detention of a driver to “[s]ubject[] the driver to field sobriety tests,” Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 18 , 814 A.2d 984 , is allowed if an officer has “a reasonable articulable suspicion of impairment,” State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 8 , 36 A.3d 881 . 2023We have held 6“For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, [t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, ¶ 21 , 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted). 10 that a brief detention of a driver to “[s]ubject[] the driver to field sobriety tests,” Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 18 , 814 A.2d 984 , is allowed if an officer has “a reasonable articulable suspicion of impairment,” State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 8 , 36 A.3d 881 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State of Maine v. Randy R. Marquis
green
1 sentence2022State v. Marquis, 2018 ME 39, ¶ 17 , 181 A.3d 684 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Marquis
green
1 sentence2022State v. Marquis, 2018 ME 39, ¶ 17 , 181 A.3d 684 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Ayotte
green
1 sentence2022A blood draw for this purpose “therefore requires a warrant or the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent.” Ayotte, 2019 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 207 A.3d 614 . [¶21] For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, “[t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture” and was freely and voluntarily given. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State of Maine v. Cade H. Ayotte
green
1 sentence2022A blood draw for this purpose “therefore requires a warrant or the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent.” Ayotte, 2019 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 207 A.3d 614 . [¶21] For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, “[t]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture” and was freely and voluntarily given. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hawley v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2021P. 12(h)(1), (3); Hawley, 1999 ME 127 , ¶ 10 & n.6, 736 A.2d 268 ; Cohen, 25 N.E.3d at 844-45 ; Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 443 (Me. 1986). [¶23] To determine whether the consent requirement of UIFSA is jurisdictional or procedural, we interpret the statute de novo by evaluating its plain meaning to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. 2021P. 12(h)(1), (3); Hawley, 1999 ME 127 , ¶ 10 & n.6, 736 A.2d 268 ; Cohen, 25 N.E.3d at 844-45 ; Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 443 (Me. 1986). [¶23] To determine whether the consent requirement of UIFSA is jurisdictional or procedural, we interpret the statute de novo by evaluating its plain meaning to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cohen v. Cohen
green
1 sentence2021P. 12(h)(1), (3); Hawley, 1999 ME 127 , ¶ 10 & n.6, 736 A.2d 268 ; Cohen, 25 N.E.3d at 844-45 ; Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 443 (Me. 1986). [¶23] To determine whether the consent requirement of UIFSA is jurisdictional or procedural, we interpret the statute de novo by evaluating its plain meaning to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Children of Jeremy A.
green
2 sentences2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. 2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re M.P.
green
2 sentences2019P. 60(b)(6) in accordance with our guidance in In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 20, 126 A.3d 718 , similarly asserted ineffective assistance of counsel based on (1) her former attorney's failure to produce two specified witnesses at the consent hearing, and (2) her involuntary consent. 2019P. 60(b)(6) in accordance with our guidance in In re M.P. , 2015 ME 138 , ¶ 20, 126 A.3d 718 , similarly asserted ineffective assistance of counsel based on (1) her former attorney's failure to produce two specified witnesses at the consent hearing, and (2) her involuntary consent. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Troxel v. Granville green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Rideout v. Riendeau green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Davis v. Anderson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Matthew W. Pitts v. Amanda M. Moore green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Bailey green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| POLAND TELEPHONE CO. v. Pine Tree Tel. & Tel. Co. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Todd green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Towry neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Lebel v. Swincicki green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Findlay green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Kroening green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Capelle green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Howard green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.