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6 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jarasgreen2 sentences2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request consent) 2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila , 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras , 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request conse | 1 | 1 |
State v. Frankgreen2 sentences2014See People v. Williams, 114 Cal.App.3d 67, 72 , 170 Cal.Rptr. 433 (1980) (“A voluntary consent to search creates a separate and independent exception to the warrant requirement and justifies a warrantless search of all areas covered by the consent over which defendant had authority.”); State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (“The automobile exception and the consent exception to the warrant requirement are separate and distinct doctrines.”). 2014See People v. Williams , 114 Cal. App. 3d 67, 72 (Ct. App. 1980) (“A voluntary consent to search creates a separate and independent exception to the warrant requirement and justifies a warrantless search of all areas covered by the consent over which defendant had authority.”); State v. Frank , 650 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“The automobile exception and the consent exception to the warrant requirement are separate and distinct doctrines.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dale Eldridge, Also Known as Dale Smith, United States of America v. John David Fuget, Also Known as Poncho Proffergreen2 sentences2014Our holding simply noted that, by leaving the purse behind voluntarily, the purse remained in the area that was already covered by the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. [¶ 22] Similarly, the State points to United States v. Padilla, an unpublished Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in which a vehicle itself was the subject of a search, pursuant to the consent of the driver, who had common authority over the vehicle. 242 F.3d 378 , 2000 WL 1533260 , *1 (8th Cir.2000); see also United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1993) (explaining that the consen 2014Our holding simply noted that, by leaving the purse behind voluntarily, the purse remained in the area that was already covered by the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. [¶22] Similarly, the State points to United States v. Padilla , an unpublished Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in which a vehicle itself was the subject of a search, pursuant to the consent of the driver, who had common authority over the vehicle. 242 F.3d 378 , *1 (8th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Eldridge , 984 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the consent exception app | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Jimenogreen2 sentences2014See id. at ¶ 7 (applying the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in a vehicle search case, Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 , 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), to a search of a house). 2014See id. at ¶ 7 (applying the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in a vehicle search case, Florida v. Jimeno , 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), to a search of a house). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request consent) 2014Minn. 1980) (failure to order uninvited officer to leave apartment is “hardly enough to establish consent”); Robinson v. State , 578 P.2d 141, 144 (Alaska 1978) (where defendant at no time indicated consent to officers’ presence except by silence, failure to demand that officers leave was not voluntary consent); Ingram v. State , 364 So.2d 821, 822 (Fla.Ct.App. 1978) (submission to apparent authority of officer is not necessarily consent to search, and a showing of acquiescence without at least tacit consent is not sufficient to prove consent); 1 W. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Shaibugreen2 sentences2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request consent) 2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila , 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras , 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request conse | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2014See People v. Williams, 114 Cal.App.3d 67, 72 , 170 Cal.Rptr. 433 (1980) (“A voluntary consent to search creates a separate and independent exception to the warrant requirement and justifies a warrantless search of all areas covered by the consent over which defendant had authority.”); State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (“The automobile exception and the consent exception to the warrant requirement are separate and distinct doctrines.”). 2014See People v. Williams , 114 Cal. App. 3d 67, 72 (Ct. App. 1980) (“A voluntary consent to search creates a separate and independent exception to the warrant requirement and justifies a warrantless search of all areas covered by the consent over which defendant had authority.”); State v. Frank , 650 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“The automobile exception and the consent exception to the warrant requirement are separate and distinct doctrines.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wenzelgreen2 sentences2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request consent) 2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila , 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras , 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request conse | 1 | 1 |
Ingram v. Stategreen2 sentences2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request consent) 2014Minn. 1980) (failure to order uninvited officer to leave apartment is “hardly enough to establish consent”); Robinson v. State , 578 P.2d 141, 144 (Alaska 1978) (where defendant at no time indicated consent to officers’ presence except by silence, failure to demand that officers leave was not voluntary consent); Ingram v. State , 364 So.2d 821, 822 (Fla.Ct.App. 1978) (submission to apparent authority of officer is not necessarily consent to search, and a showing of acquiescence without at least tacit consent is not sufficient to prove consent); 1 W. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kummergreen1 sentence2010Kummer , at 439. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2017In Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S.Ct. at 2185 , in the context of analyzing implied-consent laws under the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the Court said nothing in that case should be read to cast doubt on the “general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply” with those laws. [¶17] We conclude Birchfield v. North Dakota , does not change our analysis in Baxter for pre-arrest onsite screening tests of an individual’s breath for purposes of administrative license proceedings. 2017In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. at 2185 , in the context of analyzing implied-consent laws under the consent exception to, the warrant requirement, the Court said nothing in that case should be read to cast doubt on the “general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply” with those laws. [¶ 17] We conclude Birchfield v. North Dakota, does not change our analysis in Baxter for pre-arrest onsite screening tests of an individual’s breath for purposes of administrative license proceedings. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Avila
green
2 sentences2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila , 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras , 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request conse 2014This Court’s position on the conduct required to establish the consent exception is clear: “[T]o sustain a finding of consent, the State must show affirmative conduct by the person alleged to have consented that is consistent with the giving of consent, rather than merely showing that the person took no affirmative actions to stop the police from [searching].” State v. Avila , 1997 ND 142, ¶ 17 , 566 N.W.2d 410 (citing United States v. Jaras , 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996) (consent cannot be inferred from silence and failure to object when police do not expressly or implicitly request conse | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Genre
green
2 sentences2014“Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement.” Genre, 2006 ND 77, ¶ 17 , 712 N.W.2d 624 (citation omitted). 2014“Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement.” Genre, 2006 ND 77, ¶ 17 , 712 N.W.2d 624 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Prigge
green
1 sentence1990State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726 (N.D.1990); State v. Prigge, 437 N.W.2d 520 (N.D.1989). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence1990State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726 (N.D.1990); State v. Prigge, 437 N.W.2d 520 (N.D.1989). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Dyer v. Howell
green
2 sentences1976The statute does not list cases of parental misconduct which will obviate the consent requirement. *849 In Dyer in Howell, 212 Va. 453 , 184 S.E.2d 789 (1971), the Virginia court granted an adoption petition over the objection of a natural parent, implying that it would give little weight to any inherent parental interest in the child and would require only a showing that the adoption was in the child's best interests. 1976The statute does not list cases of parental misconduct which will obviate the consent requirement. *849 In Dyer in Howell, 212 Va. 453 , 184 S.E.2d 789 (1971), the Virginia court granted an adoption petition over the objection of a natural parent, implying that it would give little weight to any inherent parental interest in the child and would require only a showing that the adoption was in the child's best interests. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.