consent requirement in Indiana

2018Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-PL-2462 | October 18, 2018 Page 24 of 26 [33] For its part, Cincinnati relies on Maplehurst Farms I, in which a divided panel of this Court stated that “where an insured enters into a settlement agreement without the insurer’s consent in violation of a voluntary payment provision, that obligation cannot be recovered from the insurer, and prejudice is irrelevant.” 953 N.E.2d at 1161 (emphasis added).16 This begs the question, unanswered by my colleagues, of whether Franke Plating entered into its settlement agreements in violation of the 1987 Pol

2013Companies v. Maplehurst Farms, Inc., 953 N.E.2d 1153, 1161 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) ("[lt is apparent that where an insured enters into a settlement agreement without the insurer's consent in violation of a voluntary payment provision, that obligation cannot be recovered from the insurer, and prejudice is irrelevant."), trans. denied.

2015State v. Romero, 578 N.E.2d 673, 676-77 (Ind.1991) (disqualifying a former prosecutor who attempted to represent a defendant in a matter substantially related to a prior prosecution without the State’s consent in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11’s duty to maintain confidences of the State, his former client). 5 .Indiana Code Section 33-39-10-2(b)(3) also allows the appointment of a special prosecutor if "(A) the prosecuting attorney files a petition requesting the court to appoint a special prosecutor; and (B) the court finds that the appointment is necessary to avoid the appearance

1999State v. Romero, 578 N.E.2d 673, 676-77 (Ind.1991) (disqualifying former prosecutor who attempted to represent a defendant in a matter substantially related to a prior prosecution without the State’s consent in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11’s duty to maintain confidences of the State, his former client).

2012“The very fact that Congress mandated that all fifty states adopt UIFSA strongly mitigates against a construction of FFCCSOA that would impliedly preempt UIFSA to any degree.” LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn. 2001).

2012“The very fact that Congress mandated that all fifty states adopt UIFSA strongly mitigates against a construction of FFCCSOA that would impliedly preempt UIFSA to any degree.” LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn.2001).

2018Id. at 272 .

2017Id. at 272 .

2018Id. [25] Taken in the light most favorable to the court’s findings with respect to Ri.L., the record reveals that his last visit with Children was April 5, 2015.

2018See Rust, 714 N.E.2d at 772 (noting that one two-hour visit and one fifteen minute visit with the child in a twenty-two month period was not substantial contact and were only token efforts taken by the natural father). [27] The record further reveals that Adoptive Parents filed the petition for adoption on January 29, 2016; that they did not attempt to thwart any efforts by Appellants to communicate with Children; and that Adoptive Parents have not moved or changed their phone numbers and have attended the same church Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 52A02-1711-AD-2753 | July

1985Consequently, a consent decree is an unappealable final judgment: "'That the judgment was rendered by consent of the parties does not detract from its dignity, or lessen its conclusiveness as an adjudication between the parties, but the consent is a waiver of error precluding a review upon appeal." *1390 State v. Huebner, 230 Ind. 461, 468 , 104 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1952); accord McNelis v. Wheeler, 225 Ind. 148 , 73 N.E.2d 339 (1947).

1985Consequently, a consent decree is an unappealable final judgment: "'That the judgment was rendered by consent of the parties does not detract from its dignity, or lessen its conclusiveness as an adjudication between the parties, but the consent is a waiver of error precluding a review upon appeal." *1390 State v. Huebner, 230 Ind. 461, 468 , 104 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1952); accord McNelis v. Wheeler, 225 Ind. 148 , 73 N.E.2d 339 (1947).

2018Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). [10] Here, White argues that the search that produced the marijuana was illegal because it was warrantless and the consent exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.

2018It also argues that Dreaded and Maplehurst Farms I do not control, because the 1987 Policy lacks a consent requirement, and that the trial court should have instead relied on Governmental Interinsurance Exch. v. City of Angola, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134-1135 (N.D.

2018It also argues that Dreaded and Maplehurst Farms I do not control, because the 1987 Policy lacks a consent requirement, and that the trial court should have instead relied on Governmental Interinsurance Exch. v. City of Angola , 8 F.Supp.2d 1120 , 1134-1135 (N.D.

2018Furthermore, in some circumstances, the denial of a motion to continue can be “so arbitrary as to violate due Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A04-1707-AD-1590 | January 23, 2018 Page 5 of 8 process.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (“[A] myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.”). [11] Here, the objective of the consent hearing was to determine whether—in the past—Father had failed, without justifiable cause, to communicate significantly with Child for th

2015See In re Adoption of J.M., 10 N.E.3d 16, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that parents’ consent to adoption not required given their historical difficulty with substance abuse and their inability to rectify the situation, notwithstanding genuine attempts to do so, by the time of the consent hearing). [14] Additionally, it is undisputed that Guardian has provided Child with a stable, nurturing environment.

2013See id. at 514-15 .

2012More importantly, as noted by the State, since Christian was decided, the United States Supreme Court has explained that for the Cronic presumption of prejudice to be applicable, counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “must be complete.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 ) (noting that presumption of prejudice will apply only “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.”) (emphasis added).

2011See U.S. v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 742 (9th Cir.2010) (police entry onto the curtilage based upon a mistaken belief that the owner was trespassing on his own property) and U.S. v. Taylor, 722 F.Supp.2d 937, 946 (W.D.Tenn.2010) (owner did not extend an invitation to the police to search curtilage). 4 .Dora also argues that his comments to the Officers should be analyzed under the consent exception to the warrant requirement.

2011See U.S. v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 742 (9th Cir.2010) (police entry onto the curtilage based upon a mistaken belief that the owner was trespassing on his own property) and U.S. v. Taylor, 722 F.Supp.2d 937, 946 (W.D.Tenn.2010) (owner did not extend an invitation to the police to search curtilage). 4 .Dora also argues that his comments to the Officers should be analyzed under the consent exception to the warrant requirement.

2011However, "an issue not raised in an appellant's brief may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Chupp v. State, 830 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).

2009See, e.g., McHale v. McHale, 210 Ariz. 194 , 109 P.3d 89 (Ariz.Ct.App.2005); Linn v. Delaware Child Support *822 Enforcement, 736 A.2d 954 (Del.1999); In re Marriage of Metz, 31 Kan.App.2d 623 , 69 P.3d 1128 (2003); Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525 , 600 N.W.2d 159 (1999); Etter v. Etter, 18 P.3d 1088 (Okla.Civ.App.2001); and (2) a 2001 amendment to the consent requirement in the federal USIFA provides that a state maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: "even if this State is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is is

2009See, e.g., McHale v. McHale, 210 Ariz. 194 , 109 P.3d 89 (Ariz.Ct.App.2005); Linn v. Delaware Child Support *822 Enforcement, 736 A.2d 954 (Del.1999); In re Marriage of Metz, 31 Kan.App.2d 623 , 69 P.3d 1128 (2003); Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525 , 600 N.W.2d 159 (1999); Etter v. Etter, 18 P.3d 1088 (Okla.Civ.App.2001); and (2) a 2001 amendment to the consent requirement in the federal USIFA provides that a state maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: "even if this State is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is is

2003The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the consent exception was accepted in United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378-379 (2nd Cir.1987).

2003Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit found that the consent exception did not apply in Feekes because "to take a risk [was] not the same thing as consent." Id.