consent exception in Alaska

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

1979In Erickson v. State, we explained the state’s burden when it asserts the consent exception to the warrant requirement: Note however, that “consent to a search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred.” 507 P.2d at 515 (footnote omitted).

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021In particular, Gosuk argues that the 20 Gieffels v. State, 590 P.2d 55, 62 (Alaska 1979); Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 613 (Alaska App. 1999) (citing Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973)). 21 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (holding that a State’s burden to prove voluntary consent “cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 596 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that “acquiescence cannot . . . substitute for free consent” and acknowledging the potential “implicit threats

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021In particular, Gosuk argues that the 20 Gieffels v. State, 590 P.2d 55, 62 (Alaska 1979); Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 613 (Alaska App. 1999) (citing Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973)). 21 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (holding that a State’s burden to prove voluntary consent “cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 596 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that “acquiescence cannot . . . substitute for free consent” and acknowledging the potential “implicit threats

2021In particular, Gosuk argues that the 20 Gieffels v. State, 590 P.2d 55, 62 (Alaska 1979); Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 613 (Alaska App. 1999) (citing Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973)). 21 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (holding that a State’s burden to prove voluntary consent “cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 596 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that “acquiescence cannot . . . substitute for free consent” and acknowledging the potential “implicit threats

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2023To hold that this requirement can be waived through the mere inaction of counsel would frustrate the clear intent of the 27 Brown v. State, 404 P.3d 191, 193 (Alaska App. 2017) (citations omitted). 28 Akers v. State, 389 P.3d 65, 68 (Alaska App. 2016). 29 AS 22.15.160(a); Alaska R.

2023To hold that this requirement can be waived through the mere inaction of counsel would frustrate the clear intent of the 27 Brown v. State, 404 P.3d 191, 193 (Alaska App. 2017) (citations omitted). 28 Akers v. State, 389 P.3d 65, 68 (Alaska App. 2016). 29 AS 22.15.160(a); Alaska R.

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2021But we agree with other courts that have held that, given the coercive circumstances of a traffic stop and the fact that the driver is otherwise required to provide a driver’s license and other documents, a reasonable passenger would not feel free to refuse an officer’s request for identification during a routine traffic stop.55 When the State relies on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden to prove both that the defendant actually consented and that this consent was voluntary — i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, and uncontaminated by dur

2019On appeal, Kasgnoc argues that he did not raise a consent defense, and he therefore contends that evidence of his prior conduct was inadmissible under Rule 4 See Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398, 415-16 (Alaska App. 2003) (setting out the factors a trial court must consider before admitting evidence of a defendant’s other acts for propensity purposes). –5– 2648 404(b)(3).

2019Accordingly, evidence of Kasgnoc’s prior conduct was not admissible under Rule 404(b)(3).7 5 Cf. Willock v. State, 400 P.3d 124, 128 (Alaska App. 2017) (suggesting that defendant’s denial that any sexual penetration occurred meant that consent was not at issue). 6 Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), at 368. 7 Because we conclude that evidence of Kasgnoc’s prior conduct was not admissible under Rule 404(b)(3) because he did not raise a consent defense, we need not resolve the separate question of whether prior acts of sexual abuse of a minor are admissible under Rule 404(b)(3), since — acco

2016Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians &Gynecologists, 227 Ariz. 262 , 257 P.3d 181, 186 (Ariz.App. 2011); Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 372 Ill.Dec. 255 , 991 N.E.2d 745 , 765-69 (2013); In re Doe, 407 So.2d 1190 (La. 1981) (per curiam); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 424 Mass. 586 , 677 N.E.2d 101 , 106 n. 10 (1997); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 656-60 (Miss. 1998); cf. Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. 2007) (upholding related statute providing civil penalties against providers of abortions who assist minors without parental c

2016Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians &Gynecologists, 227 Ariz. 262 , 257 P.3d 181, 186 (Ariz.App. 2011); Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 372 Ill.Dec. 255 , 991 N.E.2d 745 , 765-69 (2013); In re Doe, 407 So.2d 1190 (La. 1981) (per curiam); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 424 Mass. 586 , 677 N.E.2d 101 , 106 n. 10 (1997); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 656-60 (Miss. 1998); cf. Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. 2007) (upholding related statute providing civil penalties against providers of abortions who assist minors without parental c

2016Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians &Gynecologists, 227 Ariz. 262 , 257 P.3d 181, 186 (Ariz.App. 2011); Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 372 Ill.Dec. 255 , 991 N.E.2d 745 , 765-69 (2013); In re Doe, 407 So.2d 1190 (La. 1981) (per curiam); Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 424 Mass. 586 , 677 N.E.2d 101 , 106 n. 10 (1997); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 656-60 (Miss. 1998); cf. Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. 2007) (upholding related statute providing civil penalties against providers of abortions who assist minors without parental c

2004Therefore, we assume that the consent exception is inapplicable in this case. [10] Blank, 3 P.3d at 362 . [11] Id. [12] AS 11.41.120(a). [13] AS 28.35.060(a). [14] Blank, 3 P.3d at 362 . [15] Id. at 371 . [16] Id. at 366, 368 .

2004Therefore, we assume that the consent exception is inapplicable in this case. [10] Blank, 3 P.3d at 362 . [11] Id. [12] AS 11.41.120(a). [13] AS 28.35.060(a). [14] Blank, 3 P.3d at 362 . [15] Id. at 371 . [16] Id. at 366, 368 .

1994Safety, 825 P.2d 887, 894 (Alaska 1992).

1994Safety, 825 P.2d 887, 894 (Alaska 1992).