related claim in New Jersey

2025By comparison, under the related doctrine of impossibility or impracticability of performance, a party is excused from having to perform his contract obligations 'where performance has become literally impossible, or at least inordinately more difficult, because of the occurrence of a supervening event that was not within the original contemplation of the contracting parties. [Ibid. (quoting JB Pool Mgmt., 431 N.J.

2021Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 261 cmt. b. "[U]nder the related doctrine of frustration of purpose, . . . the supervening event fundamentally has changed the nature of the parties' overall bargain." JB Pool Mgmt., 431 N.J.

2011The related principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of an issue that has already been addressed in a prior matter, if (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [First Union Nat’l B

2011The related principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of an issue that has already been addressed in a prior matter, if (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [First Union Nat’l B

2026"The doctrine of reasonable expectations is a related doctrine [and also] applie[s] in cases where an ambiguity is alleged." Ibid.

2020Our Supreme Court has identified the following related factors to be weighed and balanced as part of this "complex" duty analysis: [1] the nature of the underlying risk of harm, that is, its foreseeability and severity, [2] the opportunity and ability to exercise care to prevent the harm, [3] the comparative interests of, and the relationships between or among, the parties, and, [4] ultimately, based on considerations of public policy and fairness, the societal interest in the proposed solution. [J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337 (1998) (citing Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439 ).] The first factor, th

2020Our Supreme Court has identified the following related factors to be weighed and balanced as part of this "complex" duty analysis: [1] the nature of the underlying risk of harm, that is, its foreseeability and severity, [2] the opportunity and ability to exercise care to prevent the harm, [3] the comparative interests of, and the relationships between or among, the parties, and, [4] ultimately, based on considerations of public policy and fairness, the societal interest in the proposed solution. [J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337 (1998) (citing Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439 ).] The first factor, th

2019See N.J.R.E. 408 (providing that "evidence of statements or conduct by parties or their attorneys in settlement negotiations, . . . including offers of compromise or any payment in settlement of a related claim, shall not be admissible to prove liability for, or invalidity of, or amount of the disputed claim"); N.J.R.E. 410 (providing similar protections as Rule 408 to criminal defendants and the State in the context of plea negotiations); Williams, 184 N.J. at 447-49 ; Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J.

2018Super. 205, 221 (App. Div. 2005), we construed N.J.R.E. 408, which provides that "offers of compromise or any payment in settlement of a related claim, shall not be admissible to prove liability for, or invalidity of, or amount of the disputed claim." We determined that a communication is not a "settlement communication" where the communication "does not contain any 'offer[] of compromise' or other statement related to [a] settlement." Ibid.

2018In Hogan , the Court "impos[ed] a limited duty on prosecutors" to inform the grand jury of exculpatory evidence "that both directly negates the guilt of the accused and is clearly exculpatory." 144 N.J. at 237 , 676 A.2d 533 .

2018In Hogan , the Court "impos[ed] a limited duty on prosecutors" to inform the grand jury of exculpatory evidence "that both directly negates the guilt of the accused and is clearly exculpatory." 144 N.J. at 237 , 676 A.2d 533 .

2017Our Supreme Court has noted the TCA's unimproved-property immunity serves "the legislature's avowed purpose of encouraging the public to use unimproved recreational property at its own risk." Troth, supra, 117 N.J. at 272 .

2017Our Supreme Court has noted the TCA's unimproved-property immunity serves "the legislature's avowed purpose of encouraging the public to use unimproved recreational property at its own risk." Troth, supra, 117 N.J. at 272 .

2016Ed. 2d 597, 607-08 (1980), under the Confrontation Clause and replaced it with the present "testimonial" standard. 541 U.S. at 51-53 , 124 S. Ct. at 1364 - 65, 158 L.

2016Ed. 2d 597, 607-08 (1980), under the Confrontation Clause and replaced it with the present "testimonial" standard. 541 U.S. at 51-53 , 124 S. Ct. at 1364 - 65, 158 L.

2013Edwards, supra, 20 N.J.Super. at 55 , 89 A.2d 264 (observing that the frustration doctrine pertains to situations in which the parties’ “common object” has been frustrated by “destruction or cessation [that] demolishes the attainment of the vital and fundamental purpose of the contracting parties”).

2013Edwards, supra, 20 N.J.Super. at 55 , 89 A.2d 264 (observing that the frustration doctrine pertains to situations in which the parties’ “common object” has been frustrated by “destruction or cessation [that] demolishes the attainment of the vital and fundamental purpose of the contracting parties”).

2012Equitable estoppel does not require a definite promise, but may be invoked when there is “conduct, either express or implied, which reasonably misleads another to his prejudice so that a repudiation of such conduct would be unjust in the eyes of the law.” McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 480 , 32 A.3d 1122 (2011) (quoting Dambro v. Union Cnty.

2012Equitable estoppel does not require a definite promise, but may be invoked when there is “conduct, either express or implied, which reasonably misleads another to his prejudice so that a repudiation of such conduct would be unjust in the eyes of the law.” McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 480 , 32 A.3d 1122 (2011) (quoting Dambro v. Union Cnty.

2012In contrast, the related doctrine of equitable estoppel provides that “the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might have otherwise existed ... as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.” Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 , 403 A.2d 880 (1979) (citations omitted).

2012In contrast, the related doctrine of equitable estoppel provides that “the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might have otherwise existed ... as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.” Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 , 403 A.2d 880 (1979) (citations omitted).

2011The related principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of an issue that has already been addressed in a prior matter, if (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [First Union Nat’l B

2011The related principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of an issue that has already been addressed in a prior matter, if (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [First Union Nat’l B

2007Or, as we put it in City of East Orange v. Board of Water Commissioners, 79 N.J.Super. 363, 371 , 191 A.2d 749 (App.Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 41 N.J. 6 , 194 A.2d 459 (1963), “[i]t is settled that the receipt of a grossly insufficient benefit by a municipality will not prevent a substantial donation by the public from being considered an unconstitutional gift.” Defendants concede that given the procedural posture of this case, dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, our review is governed by these principles: we must search the complaint “in depth and with liberality to a

2007Or, as we put it in City of East Orange v. Board of Water Commissioners, 79 N.J.Super. 363, 371 , 191 A.2d 749 (App.Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 41 N.J. 6 , 194 A.2d 459 (1963), “[i]t is settled that the receipt of a grossly insufficient benefit by a municipality will not prevent a substantial donation by the public from being considered an unconstitutional gift.” Defendants concede that given the procedural posture of this case, dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, our review is governed by these principles: we must search the complaint “in depth and with liberality to a

2007Such incidental private benefit is permissible under our cases. [Ibid, (citation omitted).] In City of Bayonne v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 520, 522-30 , 221 A.2d 741 (1966), the Court accepted and applied a related rule of law; namely, that an agreement violates the constitutional article cited above if it involves the transfer of public funds to a private entity but is unsupported by consideration flowing to the governmental entity.

2007Such incidental private benefit is permissible under our cases. [Ibid, (citation omitted).] In City of Bayonne v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 520, 522-30 , 221 A.2d 741 (1966), the Court accepted and applied a related rule of law; namely, that an agreement violates the constitutional article cited above if it involves the transfer of public funds to a private entity but is unsupported by consideration flowing to the governmental entity.

2007Or, as we put it in City of East Orange v. Board of Water Commissioners, 79 N.J.Super. 363, 371 , 191 A.2d 749 (App.Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 41 N.J. 6 , 194 A.2d 459 (1963), “[i]t is settled that the receipt of a grossly insufficient benefit by a municipality will not prevent a substantial donation by the public from being considered an unconstitutional gift.” Defendants concede that given the procedural posture of this case, dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, our review is governed by these principles: we must search the complaint “in depth and with liberality to a

2007Or, as we put it in City of East Orange v. Board of Water Commissioners, 79 N.J.Super. 363, 371 , 191 A.2d 749 (App.Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 41 N.J. 6 , 194 A.2d 459 (1963), “[i]t is settled that the receipt of a grossly insufficient benefit by a municipality will not prevent a substantial donation by the public from being considered an unconstitutional gift.” Defendants concede that given the procedural posture of this case, dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, our review is governed by these principles: we must search the complaint “in depth and with liberality to a

2003We also discussed the related doctrine of “curative admissibility.” Id. at 555 , 677 A.2d 734 .

2003We also discussed the related doctrine of “curative admissibility.” Id. at 555 , 677 A.2d 734 .

2002Co., 304 N.J.Super. 83, 92 , 698 A. 2d 543 (App.Div.1997).] We, therefore, leave any further determination respecting plaintiff's non-economic damage claims based upon the allegations in his second complaint to further proceedings in accordance with either R. 4:27-1 or R. 4:38-1.

2002Co., 304 N.J.Super. 83, 92 , 698 A. 2d 543 (App.Div.1997).] We, therefore, leave any further determination respecting plaintiff's non-economic damage claims based upon the allegations in his second complaint to further proceedings in accordance with either R. 4:27-1 or R. 4:38-1.