related claim in California

2013But that case involved the defendant’s killing of her abuser and it related to the defendant’s claim of self-defense. 3 Given this result, the related claim raised in Mercado’s habeas corpus petition is denied. 4 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. 5 Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Sotomayor. 6 “[A] five-justice majority of the high court and at least six of the seven justices on the California Supreme Court appear to agree that, for purposes of the confrontation clause, out-of-cou

2013But that case involved the defendant’s killing of her abuser and it related to the defendant’s claim of self-defense. 3 Given this result, the related claim raised in Mercado’s habeas corpus petition is denied. 4 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. 5 Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Sotomayor. 6 “[A] five-justice majority of the high court and at least six of the seven justices on the California Supreme Court appear to agree that, for purposes of the confrontation clause, out-of-cou

2014If, however, the second action is on the same claim [(i.e., same cause of action or primary right)], . . . issue preclusion based on the earlier determination is described as “direct estoppel.” (See Rest.2d Judgments, § 17, com. c, pp. 149-150; Rest.2d Judgments, § 27, com. b, pp. 251-252.) Both collateral and direct estoppel, “like the related doctrine of res judicata [fn. omitted], ha[ve] the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” (Parklane H

2014If, however, the second action is on the same claim [(i.e., same cause of action or primary right)], . . . issue preclusion based on the earlier determination is described as “direct estoppel.” (See Rest.2d Judgments, § 17, com. c, pp. 149-150; Rest.2d Judgments, § 27, com. b, pp. 251-252.) Both collateral and direct estoppel, “like the related doctrine of res judicata [fn. omitted], ha[ve] the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” (Parklane H

2014(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 ; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703 .) Sentence Both parties assert the trial court committed a sentencing error.

2013(People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 834 ; People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450 .) Not every denial of a request for a continuance violates due process, “even if the party seeking the continuance thereby fails to offer evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 921 .) “Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice, the trial court’s denial does not warrant reversal. [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin, at p. 450.) As to the related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before exam

2024Second, unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion can be raised by one who was not a party or privy in the first suit.” (Ibid.) “In summary, issue preclusion applies (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.) More recently, courts have also recognized the related doctrine of judicial estoppel. “ ‘ “The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes referred to as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent posi

2018The doctrine of judicial estoppel cannot be invoked where the position first assumed was taken as a result of ignorance or mistake ( Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171 , 182, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ), and the related doctrine of equitable estoppel only applies to the intentional assertion of an inconsistent position. ( Ibid . ) Sagi makes no attempt to argue that either species of estoppel applies.

2015It is the general rule that “ ‘issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417 (Sea & Sage Audubon Society); see also Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 .) As a related principle, “ ‘[a] party is not permitted to change his [or her] position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal.’ ” (In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501 .) The rationale for both of these tenets is that permitting consideration of new theories at the appellate

2005(In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 397 ].) 4 Prilliman actually states the principle backwards: “The related principle of ‘judicial admission’ has not been accorded as broad [an] application as the D’Amico rule.” (Prilliman, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 961 .) However, it is clear from the discussion set forth in the remainder of the paragraph that the court meant just the opposite: It is the D’Amico rule which has not been accorded as broad an application as the principle of judicial admissions. 5 Lodge Log argues that the deposition testimony presented

2026ViaPath’s argument is not well taken. “ ‘An unbroken line of cases holds that, in traditional mandamus actions challenging quasi-legislative administrative decisions, evidence outside the administrative record (extra-record evidence) is not admissible.’ ” (San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 159, 167 (San Joaquin Local), quoting Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1269 ; see also Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 574 [“It is well settled that extra-record evidence is generally not admissible in non-CE

2026ViaPath’s argument is not well taken. “ ‘An unbroken line of cases holds that, in traditional mandamus actions challenging quasi-legislative administrative decisions, evidence outside the administrative record (extra-record evidence) is not admissible.’ ” (San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 159, 167 (San Joaquin Local), quoting Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1269 ; see also Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 574 [“It is well settled that extra-record evidence is generally not admissible in non-CE

2026ViaPath’s argument is not well taken. “ ‘An unbroken line of cases holds that, in traditional mandamus actions challenging quasi-legislative administrative decisions, evidence outside the administrative record (extra-record evidence) is not admissible.’ ” (San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 159, 167 (San Joaquin Local), quoting Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1269 ; see also Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 574 [“It is well settled that extra-record evidence is generally not admissible in non-CE

2026ViaPath’s argument is not well taken. “ ‘An unbroken line of cases holds that, in traditional mandamus actions challenging quasi-legislative administrative decisions, evidence outside the administrative record (extra-record evidence) is not admissible.’ ” (San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 159, 167 (San Joaquin Local), quoting Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1269 ; see also Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 574 [“It is well settled that extra-record evidence is generally not admissible in non-CE

2026Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320 [failure to raise hearsay objection during trial waived issue].) Crockett also raises a related claim that admission of this hearsay evidence violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2026Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320 [failure to raise hearsay objection during trial waived issue].) Crockett also raises a related claim that admission of this hearsay evidence violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2024It is well settled “ ‘that a party to an action may not, for the first time on appeal, change the theory of the cause of action [citations] and that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citations.]’ (Estate of Westerman (1968) 68 Cal.2d 267, 279 , fn. omitted; see Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1350, fn. 12 .)” (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 ; see generally Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 8:229.) Plaintiffs’ argument is also barred by the r

2015It is the general rule that “ ‘issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417 (Sea & Sage Audubon Society); see also Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 .) As a related principle, “ ‘[a] party is not permitted to change his [or her] position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal.’ ” (In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501 .) The rationale for both of these tenets is that permitting consideration of new theories at the appellate

2024It is well settled “ ‘that a party to an action may not, for the first time on appeal, change the theory of the cause of action [citations] and that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citations.]’ (Estate of Westerman (1968) 68 Cal.2d 267, 279 , fn. omitted; see Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1350, fn. 12 .)” (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 ; see generally Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 8:229.) Plaintiffs’ argument is also barred by the r

2015It is the general rule that “ ‘issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417 (Sea & Sage Audubon Society); see also Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 .) As a related principle, “ ‘[a] party is not permitted to change his [or her] position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal.’ ” (In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501 .) The rationale for both of these tenets is that permitting consideration of new theories at the appellate

2021(See People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 495 [an appellate court may address a forfeited issue to forestall a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel].) 27 After hearing further argument, and hearing recorded jail conversations, the court said: “All right.

2021(See People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 495 [an appellate court may address a forfeited issue to forestall a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel].) During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly reminded the jurors about the direct testimony they had heard from the LPO and the other percipient witnesses.

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2017Some decisions state an appellate court has discretion to resolve "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (E.g., In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 473 P.2d 737 , italics added; accord, In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 , 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Others state an appellate court may decide "otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." (E.g., Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 , italics added; accord, Thompson v. Dep

2021The related doctrine of collateral estoppel “prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 .) Collateral estoppel applies: “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at pp. 824-825.) Here, the City determined that the remodel of the residence at 11 Lagunita Drive did not

2020(Wilson v. County of San Joaquin (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1, 7 .) 10 dismissed claim.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 91 (Kim).) The related doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action. [Citation.] Under issue preclusion, the prior judgment conclusively resolves an issue actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN).) The doctrine “appli

2022We have consistently rejected this claim, explaining that “the automatic appeal process following judgments of death is a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect [citations], because it assures careful review of the defendant’s conviction and sentence [citation].” (Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 606 .) We also recently considered the related claim under Jones v. Chappell (C.D.Cal. 2014) 31 F.Supp.3d 1050 , reversed by Jones v. Davis (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 538 , that systematic delays render California’s capital punishment scheme arbitrary and capricious in violation of the E

2019(People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1371–1375; accord, People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 645 ; see also Jones v. Davis (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 538 , 546–553 [theory of arbitrariness by delay proposes new rule of constitutional law that cannot be applied to state procedures in federal habeas corpus case].) Defendant’s briefing provides no grounds for reexamining either of these conclusions. 91 PEOPLE v. RHOADES Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.