related doctrine in Vermont

2025See Rollo v. Cameron, 2013 VT 74, ¶¶ 9-12 , 194 Vt. 499 (explaining that where defendant had actual notice of RFA action, “[t]o properly assert the defense of insufficient service of process, defendant needed to either file a motion to dismiss prior to the final [RFA] hearing or raise the defense at the hearing itself”).

2025See Rollo v. Cameron, 2013 VT 74, ¶¶ 9-12 , 194 Vt. 499 (explaining that where defendant had actual notice of RFA action, “[t]o properly assert the defense of insufficient service of process, defendant needed to either file a motion to dismiss prior to the final [RFA] hearing or raise the defense at the hearing itself”).

2024See State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301 , 304 n.2, 706 A.2d 1359 , 1360 n.2 (1997) (explaining that issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, “estops a party from relitigating those issues necessarily and essentially determined in prior litigation” in a final judgment on the merits (quotation omitted)). 11 increase in the cost of litigation,” and that the legal and factual contentions contained within are supported by existing law and evidence.

2024See State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301 , 304 n.2, 706 A.2d 1359 , 1360 n.2 (1997) (explaining that issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, “estops a party from relitigating those issues necessarily and essentially determined in prior litigation” in a final judgment on the merits (quotation omitted)). 11 increase in the cost of litigation,” and that the legal and factual contentions contained within are supported by existing law and evidence.

2009Appellants also assert that these questions should not be barred, notwithstanding 24 V.S.A. § 4442(c), based on the doctrine of “equitable tolling,” or the related doctrine of “equitable estoppel.” The doctrine of equitable tolling applies either where a party “is shown to have actively misled or prevented the plaintiff in some extraordinary way from discovering the facts essential to the filing of a timely lawsuit, 9 or where the plaintiff has timely raised the same claim in the wrong forum.” Kaplan v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 2009 VT 78, ¶ 11 (mem.) (citing Beecher v. Stratton Corp., 170

2008See State v. Synnott, 2005 VT 19, ¶ 19 , 178 Vt. 66 , 872 A.2d 874 (evaluating similar question); Goodhue, 2003 VT 85, ¶ 16 (same).

2008See State v. Synnott, 2005 VT 19, ¶ 19 , 178 Vt. 66 , 872 A.2d 874 (evaluating similar question); Goodhue, 2003 VT 85, ¶ 16 (same).

2008Later, the Court reaffirmed that in Barker it had "expressly rejected the *1124 notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial." Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 , 94 S.Ct. 188 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that the state court committed a "fundamental error" in concluding that a showing of prejudice to the defense at trial was essential to establishing a speedy-trial claim).

2008Later, the Court reaffirmed that in Barker it had “expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that the state court committed a “fundamental error” in concluding that a showing of prejudice to the defense at trial was essential to establishing a speedy-trial claim).

2008See State v. Synnott, 2005 VT 19, ¶ 19 , 178 Vt. 66 , 872 A.2d 874 (evaluating similar question); Goodhue, 2003 VT 85, ¶ 16 (same).

2000See Bull v. Pinkham Eng’g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450, 461 , 752 A.2d 26, 34-35 (2000) (“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties, so long as there was a final judgment on the merits and the issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.”).

2000See Bull v. Pinkham Eng’g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450, 461 , 752 A.2d 26, 34-35 (2000) (“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties, so long as there was a final judgment on the merits and the issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.”).

1996See id. at 56 , 615 A.2d at 144 .

1996See id. at 56 , 615 A.2d at 144 .

1990See 151 Vt. at 192-95 , 559 A.2d at 1083-85 .

1990See 151 Vt. at 192-95 , 559 A.2d at 1083-85 .

1989Friends of the Shawanqunks, Inc. v. Watt, 97 F.R.D. 663, 667 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (bald assertions of bad faith insufficient to require high agency officials to submit to depositions); see also Carpenters 46 County Conference Bd., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am,.

1989Cf. Davis v. United States, 390 A.2d 976, 981 (D.C. 1978) (witness subpoenas quashed as to federal attorney general, state lottery director, and city police chief). 6 A related doctrine in cases involving judicial review of administrative agency action similarly precludes depositions of high agency officials except in limited circumstances.