11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Alengigreen1 sentence2013A. +~Standard of Review «24 The standard of review for invited error has not been addressed by Colorado appellate courts, probably because invited error arises for the first time on appeal, The related doctrine of waiver in criminal cases presents "a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo." People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo.2006) (right to counsel). | 1 | 1 |
Pomeroy v. Waitkusgreen2 sentences2006As explained in Pomeroy, issue preclusion "holds that the final decision of a court on an issue actually litigated and determined is conclusive of that issue in any subsequent suit." 183 Colo. at 350 , 517 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added). 2006As explained in Pomeroy, issue preclusion "holds that the final decision of a court on an issue actually litigated and determined is conclusive of that issue in any subsequent suit." 183 Colo. at 350 , 517 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Rocky Mountain Microsystems, Inc. v. Public Safety Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2001Safety Sys., Inc., 989 F.Supp. 1352, 1358 (D.Colo.1998) (applying Colorado contract law and finding that fee-shifting provision in an express contract applied to a related claim based on quantum meruit), aff'd without opinion, 173 F.3d 864 (10th Cir.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Kempter v. Hurdgreen1 sentence1994See Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Colo. 1986) (“A judicial admission is a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorney makes in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or of facts about which there is no real dispute” and “generally continuéis] to have effect for a subsequent part of the same proceedings.”); see also People v. Garcia, 826 P.2d 1259 (Colo.1992); Larson v. A.T.S.I., 859 P.2d 273 (Colo.App.1993). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen1 sentence1994See Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Colo. 1986) (“A judicial admission is a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorney makes in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or of facts about which there is no real dispute” and “generally continuéis] to have effect for a subsequent part of the same proceedings.”); see also People v. Garcia, 826 P.2d 1259 (Colo.1992); Larson v. A.T.S.I., 859 P.2d 273 (Colo.App.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluridegreen2 sentences1985See Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392 , 532 P.2d 346 (1975). 1985See Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392 , 532 P.2d 346 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Marriage of Aragon
green
1 sentence2024In re Marriage of Aragon , 2019 COA 76, ¶ 23 . ¶ 26 Similarly, the related doctrine of issue preclusion (formerly collateral estoppel) “ prevents the re-litigation of discrete issues, 11 rather than causes of action. ” Nation SLP, LLC v. Bruner , 2022 COA 76, ¶ 17 (quoting Foster v. Plock , 2017 CO 39, ¶ 13 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Foster v. Plock
green
1 sentence2024In re Marriage of Aragon , 2019 COA 76, ¶ 23 . ¶ 26 Similarly, the related doctrine of issue preclusion (formerly collateral estoppel) “ prevents the re-litigation of discrete issues, 11 rather than causes of action. ” Nation SLP, LLC v. Bruner , 2022 COA 76, ¶ 17 (quoting Foster v. Plock , 2017 CO 39, ¶ 13 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Coleby
green
1 sentence2004However, defendant overlooks the related principle that “elements of a particular offense may have differing mens rea requirements, and ... the culpable mental state of a statute may speak to conduct, circumstances, result, or any combination thereof, but not necessarily to all three.” People v. Coleby, supra, 34 P.3d at 424 . *998 In Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo.2000), the supreme court relied on that distinction in concluding that § 18-4-105(2), C.R.S.2003, which provides that fourth degree arson is committed when a person “knowingly or recklessly starts or maintains a fire ... and | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Copeland v. People
green
1 sentence2004However, defendant overlooks the related principle that “elements of a particular offense may have differing mens rea requirements, and ... the culpable mental state of a statute may speak to conduct, circumstances, result, or any combination thereof, but not necessarily to all three.” People v. Coleby, supra, 34 P.3d at 424 . *998 In Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo.2000), the supreme court relied on that distinction in concluding that § 18-4-105(2), C.R.S.2003, which provides that fourth degree arson is committed when a person “knowingly or recklessly starts or maintains a fire ... and | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Thomas W. Whalem v. United States
green
1 sentence2000A. The common law approach begins for our purposes with a line of cases developing from Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C.Cir.1965), in which courts imposed a duty on the trial court to inject, sua sponte, the issue of a defendant's insanity when sufficient question is raised as to the defendant's mental state at the time of the commission of the offense. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
New York v. Belton
red
2 sentences1995In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S.Ct. at 2864 , the Supreme Court established a related exception to the warrant requirement. 1995In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S.Ct. at 2864 , the Supreme Court established a related exception to the warrant requirement. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Larson v. A.T.S.I.
green
1 sentence1994See Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Colo. 1986) (“A judicial admission is a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorney makes in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or of facts about which there is no real dispute” and “generally continuéis] to have effect for a subsequent part of the same proceedings.”); see also People v. Garcia, 826 P.2d 1259 (Colo.1992); Larson v. A.T.S.I., 859 P.2d 273 (Colo.App.1993). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Moreland v. Marwich, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1993On appeal, defendants, relying solely on Moreland v. Marwich, Ltd., 629 P.2d 1095 (Colo.App.1981), rev’d on other grounds, 665 P.2d 613 (Colo.1983), argue that, if NCC was to be entitled to any deficiency whatsoever, as part of its case-in-chief, it was required to prove generally that its bid was fair and proper and more specifically that it bid the fair market value. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Moreland v. Marwich, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1993On appeal, defendants, relying solely on Moreland v. Marwich, Ltd., 629 P.2d 1095 (Colo.App.1981), rev’d on other grounds, 665 P.2d 613 (Colo.1983), argue that, if NCC was to be entitled to any deficiency whatsoever, as part of its case-in-chief, it was required to prove generally that its bid was fair and proper and more specifically that it bid the fair market value. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1986Leland v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 712 P.2d 1060 (Colo.App.1985); Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 681 P.2d 974 (Colo.App.1984). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Leland v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois
green
1 sentence1986Leland v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 712 P.2d 1060 (Colo.App.1985); Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 681 P.2d 974 (Colo.App.1984). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences1985He has not asked that we abolish the common law doctrine of official immunity, as we did the related doctrine of sovereign immunity in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97 , 482 P.2d 968 (1971); but see § 24-10-101 to -118, 10 C.R.S. (1982 and 1984 Supp.), but rather that we rule that the scope of official immunity is not so extensive as to shield Kauvar from liability in this case. 1985He has not asked that we abolish the common law doctrine of official immunity, as we did the related doctrine of sovereign immunity in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97 , 482 P.2d 968 (1971); but see § 24-10-101 to -118, 10 C.R.S. (1982 and 1984 Supp.), but rather that we rule that the scope of official immunity is not so extensive as to shield Kauvar from liability in this case. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.