related claim in Pennsylvania

2020As this Court explained in Nicholas v. Hofmann, 158 A.3d 675, 696 (Pa.Super. ____________________________________________ 4 Ms. Polao did not argue application of the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, which applies if: “(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the party or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

2019W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740, 748 (Pa. 2005).

2021See id. at 240 .

2018See Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 240 (Pa. 2006).

2019Appellant first contends that his aggregate judgment of sentence of 45 years to life imprisonment “constituted a de facto life sentence requiring that the Commonwealth establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] is incapable of rehabilitation.” (Appellant’s brief at 18.) In a related claim, appellant further avers that, “the Commonwealth failed to show that [he] was incapable of being rehabilitated as required to support a de facto life sentence because the record reflects that [appellant] has, in fact, been rehabilitated.” (Id. at 28.) Appellant’s claims implicate the legality of his

2019Appellant first contends that his aggregate judgment of sentence of 45 years to life imprisonment “constituted a de facto life sentence requiring that the Commonwealth establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] is incapable of rehabilitation.” (Appellant’s brief at 18.) In a related claim, appellant further avers that, “the Commonwealth failed to show that [he] was incapable of being rehabilitated as required to support a de facto life sentence because the record reflects that [appellant] has, in fact, been rehabilitated.” (Id. at 28.) Appellant’s claims implicate the legality of his

2019“The determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; an appellate court’s standard of review in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 771 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 195 A.3d 166 (Pa. 2018).

2019“The determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; an appellate court’s standard of review in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 771 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 195 A.3d 166 (Pa. 2018).

2019See Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Of Newtown Tp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa. 2013) (“Where the issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely advisory and, therefore, inappropriate.”); see also City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003) (“judicial intervention is appropriate only where the underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather than abstract”).

2019See Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Of Newtown Tp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa. 2013) (“Where the issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely advisory and, therefore, inappropriate.”); see also City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003) (“judicial intervention is appropriate only where the underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather than abstract”).

2019See Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Of Newtown Tp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa. 2013) (“Where the issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely advisory and, therefore, inappropriate.”); see also City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003) (“judicial intervention is appropriate only where the underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather than abstract”).

2019See Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Of Newtown Tp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa. 2013) (“Where the issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely advisory and, therefore, inappropriate.”); see also City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003) (“judicial intervention is appropriate only where the underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather than abstract”).

2017Idaho Apr. 20, 1999) (explaining that Staples and two other Supreme Court decisions “have not altered the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but have only stated that knowledge is required where the statute specifically imposes that type of requirement”); cf. Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 332 (8th Cir. 1934) (in a civil setting, distinguishing ignorance of the law from ignorance of certain facts); Ciesielski v. Prudential Ins.

2017Idaho Apr. 20, 1999) (explaining that Staples and two other Supreme Court decisions “have not altered the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but have only stated that knowledge is required where the statute specifically imposes that type of requirement”); cf. Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 332 (8th Cir. 1934) (in a civil setting, 25 Although 21 U.S.C. §841 (a) facially applies to controlled substances, under the federal Analogue Act the term subsumes controlled substance analogues, see 21 U.S.C. §813 , the very category of chemicals at issue in McFadden. [J-124-2016] -

2017Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 561-62 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 , 622 n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 1805 n.3, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption ,.. that ... ignorance of the law ... is no defense ....” (emphasis added)); United States v. Elias, 1999 WL 1204529 , at *1 (D.

2017Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 561-62 , 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700 , 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 , 622 n.3, 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 1805 n.3, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption ,.. that ... ignorance of the law ... is no defense ....” (emphasis added)); United States v. Elias, 1999 WL 1204529 , at *1 (D.

2026Specifically, the Association contends that because substantial evidence was not presented at the October 20, 2020 Board meeting relating to the requirements of Section 6.102.F. of the Ordinance,9 This Court in In re Appeal of Martin, [ 381 A.2d 1321, 1322 (Pa. Cmwlth.] 1978), affirmed the lower court’s holding that the action of the legislature in removing the provision (former Section 1007) requiring [an] appellant to obtain and file the transcript and in supplying the new provision requiring the . . . board to certify the entire record, including any transcript, “evinced an intention to shi

2026For the sake of clarity, like the trial court, we reorder the Association’s claims on appeal. 7 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. §11003-A(b). 8 See also Appeal of Crossley, 432 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), in which we stated: (Footnote continued on next page…) 7 Finally, in a related claim, the Association asserts that the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s decision because there is not substantial evidence demonstrating that Applicant met all of the express criteria in the Ordinance supporting the Board’s grant of its Appli

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“A defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy[] and may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.”).

2025The failure to present an in-court challenge to the voluntariness of the plea at the guilty plea hearing or the failure to raise a related claim in a timely-filed post-sentence motion “results in waiver.” Lincoln, 72 A.2d at 610; see also Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[A] request to withdraw a guilty plea on the grounds that it was involuntary is one of the claims that must be raised by motion in the trial court in order to be reviewed on direct appeal”).

2025Servs., Inc. v. D’Amico, 219 A.3d 619, 627 (Pa. Super. 2019) (noting that the finder of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses); see also N.T., 12/20/24, at 34-35, 73 (indicating Cohen’s testimony he listed Precious One’s as a Registered Prospect because of a payment dispute on Precious One’s original lease); id. at 36, 64 (indicating Cohen’s testimony on direct and cross- ____________________________________________ 5 Although Foxhunt asserts that Situs should be estopped from denying the applicability of section 4, Foxhunt

2025“The purpose of this waiver rule is to allow the trial court to correct its errors at the first opportunity, and, in doing, further judicial efficiency.” - 10 - J-A20037-25 Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 469 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2025See Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (PCRA timeliness exception at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(ii) requires a petitioner to “demonstrate [that] he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence”) (emphasis added). - 22 - J-S30045-25 In the course of arguing the first issue, Appellant alludes to a separate related claim seeking relief – not under the PCRA – but under the contractual theory of specific performance: “Appellant is entitled to relief because Appellant entered into an agreemen

2024See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005) (recognizing that we must consider and analyze an ineffective assistance claim as a “distinct legal ground” for PCRA review).

2024“Prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel means demonstrating there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1162 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). -6- J-S14017-24 Crippen’s first claim alleges that trial counsel ineffectively failed to call Nadi Hatchett to support his defense that he was not “Mikey.” Crippen pursued a related claim on direct appeal, which argued that the Commonwealth violated its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclo

2024Id. at 513 (“[A] challenge to the [Department of Corrections’s] computation or construction of a sentence … imposed may not be brought by a PCRA petition.”); see also Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 395 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that a claim that the Department of Corrections failed to follow the trial court’s unambiguous sentence was not cognizable under the PCRA). -7- J-A10038-24 April 4, 2001, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

2024Id. at 513 (“[A] challenge to the [Department of Corrections’s] computation or construction of a sentence … imposed may not be brought by a PCRA petition.”); see also Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 395 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that a claim that the Department of Corrections failed to follow the trial court’s unambiguous sentence was not cognizable under the PCRA). -7- J-A10038-24 April 4, 2001, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

2023Here, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel requires that “the issue decided in the prior case is identical to one presented in the later case.” Weissberger v. Myers, 90 A.3d 730, 733 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal quotations & citation omitted).

2022See Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”). -6- J-A17045-22 Judgment Entered.

2022In his first claim, Appellant asserts that the Contraband Offense, and the related instruction defining the offense as read to the jury, are “violative of his fundamental right to procedural and substantive due process rights as ____________________________________________ operation of law.” Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158 , 159 (Pa. Super. 1997) (emphasis added).

2022In his first claim, Appellant asserts that the Contraband Offense, and the related instruction defining the offense as read to the jury, are “violative of his fundamental right to procedural and substantive due process rights as ____________________________________________ operation of law.” Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. Super. 1997) (emphasis added).