related doctrine in Illinois

2024“Equitable tolling just means that without fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough information to sue within the period of limitations, and *** the period of limitations doesn’t start until he has the information ***.” Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying federal law). ¶ 23 When equitable tolling applies, the limitations period begins to run when the barrier preventing the plaintiff from filing suit is removed.

2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19

2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19

2011Miller, 77 F.3d at 191 ; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Equitable tolling just means that without fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough information to sue within the period of limitations ***.”); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Equitable tolling focuses primarily on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the limitations period,” whereas “[ejquitable estoppel focuses on the actions of the defendant” (emphases in original)).

2014"While res judicata bars subsequent actions involving identical causes of action, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues decided in earlier proceedings." (Emphasis added.) Diotallevi v. Diotallevi, 2013 IL App (2d) 111297 , & 21 (citing Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove, 362 Ill.

2014“While res judicata bars subsequent actions involving identical causes of action, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues decided in earlier proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Diotallevi v. Diotallevi, 2013 IL App (2d) 111297, ¶ 21 (citing Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove, 362 Ill.

2024It simply allows the plaintiff “the time necessary to find such additional information as the plaintiff absolutely needs in order to be able to file a suit.” Id. ¶ 22 “Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant.” Williams v. Board of Review, 241 Ill. 2d 352, 361 (2011).

2015We find the following statement by our supreme court instructive: “Generally, the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations where ‘because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control,’ the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to file suit on time. [Citation.] Unlike the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling requires no fault on the part of the defendant. [Citation]; see also Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 19

2021Masonry, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d at 404 . -8- ¶ 30 A related principle is that where the legislature chooses not to amend terms of a statute after judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the court’s statement of legislative intent.

2008Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 215 Ill.2d 397, 404 , 294 Ill.Dec. 172 , 830 N.E.2d 584 (2005) ("A related principle is that where the legislature chooses not to amend terms of a statute after judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the court's statement of legislative intent").

2025Under the related doctrine of substance over form, reviewing courts “ ‘look to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to a particular form the parties employed’ in deciding how to treat a particular transaction for tax purposes.” Shockley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 872 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978)). ¶ 19 Here, the Tribunal determined that PepsiCo’s primary motive in creating PGM was to reduce PepsiCo’s overall tax liability and that PGM had no economic substance apart from the tax benefits i

2025Under the related doctrine of substance over form, reviewing courts “ ‘look to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed’ in deciding how to treat a particular transaction for tax purposes.” Shockley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 872 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978)). ¶ 18 Here, the Tribunal determined that PepsiCo’s primary motive in creating PGM was to reduce PepsiCo’s overall tax liability and that PGM had no economic substance apart from the tax benefits

2025Under the related doctrine of substance over form, reviewing courts “ ‘look to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to a particular form the parties employed’ in deciding how to treat a particular transaction for tax purposes.” Shockley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 872 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978)). ¶ 19 Here, the Tribunal determined that PepsiCo’s primary motive in creating PGM was to reduce PepsiCo’s overall tax liability and that PGM had no economic substance apart from the tax benefits i

2025Under the related doctrine of substance over form, reviewing courts “ ‘look to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed’ in deciding how to treat a particular transaction for tax purposes.” Shockley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 872 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978)). ¶ 18 Here, the Tribunal determined that PepsiCo’s primary motive in creating PGM was to reduce PepsiCo’s overall tax liability and that PGM had no economic substance apart from the tax benefits

2021Czarobski v. Lata, 227 Ill. 2d 364, 369 (2008).

2021Czarobski v. Lata, 227 Ill. 2d 364, 369 (2008).

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 "The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). "[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be id

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 “The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). “[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 "The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). "[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be id

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 “The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). “[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 "The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). "[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be id

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 “The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). “[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be

2006See In re Estate of Hammond, 141 Ill.

2006See In re Estate of Hammond, 141 Ill.

2005“The requirements for application of collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to that presented in the current action; (2) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (3) the prior adjudication resulted in a final judgment on the merits.” Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, 333 Ill.

2005"The requirements for application of collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to that presented in the current action; (2) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (3) the prior adjudication resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories , 333 Ill.

2003In re Marriage of Duerr, 250 Ill.

2003In re Marriage of Duerr , 250 Ill.

2000See People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 386 (1994).

2000See People v. Enis, 163 Ill.2d 367, 386 , 206 Ill.Dec. 604 , 645 N.E.2d 856 (1994).

2009“It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that ‘where terms used in [a] statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent amendments or re-enactments of the statute, they are to be understood and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the court unless a contrary intention of the legislature is made clear.’ [Citations.] This rule is based upon the view that ‘the judicial construction [of a statute] becomes a part of the law, and it is presumed that the legislature in passing the law knew [of] such co

2009“It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that ‘where terms used in [a] statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent amendments or re-enactments of the statute, they are to be understood and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the court unless a contrary intention of the legislature is made clear.’ [Citations.] This rule is based upon the view that ‘the judicial construction [of a statute] becomes a part of the law, and it is presumed that the legislature in passing the law knew [of] such co

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 "The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). "[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be id

2014App. 3d 512, 516 (2005)). ¶ 54 “The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (2009) (citing People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002), and People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990)). “[F]or collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue decided in the prior proceeding must be

2014"While res judicata bars subsequent actions involving identical causes of action, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues decided in earlier proceedings." (Emphasis added.) Diotallevi v. Diotallevi, 2013 IL App (2d) 111297 , & 21 (citing Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove, 362 Ill.

2014“While res judicata bars subsequent actions involving identical causes of action, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues decided in earlier proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) Diotallevi v. Diotallevi, 2013 IL App (2d) 111297, ¶ 21 (citing Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove, 362 Ill.

2026See People v. Adams, 2024 IL App (1st) 221474, ¶ 36 (stating that appellants have the burden of affirmatively establishing error). ¶ 46 III.

2025See Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 128 (if the State negates any of the elements required for such a defense, the defendant’s claim of self-defense fails). ¶ 51 The analysis for defendant’s related claim, that of defense of others, is slightly different, as it encompasses more than the proceedings directly involving defendant.

2025See Davis v. Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 200519, ¶ 27 . -6- No. 1-23-2209 ¶ 23 We need not choose which of these doctrines applies, because the salient point is that the Kelley defendants do not address the issue at all, even though it was the sole basis for the circuit court’s ruling.