related claim in Utah

2015"Thus, the Commerce Clause limits. the manner in which States may legitimately compete for interstate trade, for 'in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State'" Id. at 272, 104 S.Ct. 8049 (emphasis added) (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 387 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ), 6 127 A related principle has been invoked in cases involving local laws rewarding the extent of business activity within the home state.

2015"Thus, the Commerce Clause limits. the manner in which States may legitimately compete for interstate trade, for 'in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State'" Id. at 272, 104 S.Ct. 8049 (emphasis added) (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 387 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ), 6 127 A related principle has been invoked in cases involving local laws rewarding the extent of business activity within the home state.

2022See, e.g., K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5 , ¶¶ 30-42, 414 P.3d 933 (determining that the court’s factual findings were inadequate where it made factual conclusions but did not discuss the evidence underlying those conclusions and rejected the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without explanation); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2015 UT App 2, ¶ 6 , 342 P.3d 296 (rejecting the court’s conclusory finding that the mother was “better able and equipped to support and sustain a positive relationship between the children and their father” where the “court identified no subsidiary facts supporting this findi

2022See, e.g., K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5 , ¶¶ 30-42, 414 P.3d 933 (determining that the court’s factual findings were inadequate where it made factual conclusions but did not discuss the evidence underlying those conclusions and rejected the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without explanation); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2015 UT App 2, ¶ 6 , 342 P.3d 296 (rejecting the court’s conclusory finding that the mother was “better able and equipped to support and sustain a positive relationship between the children and their father” where the “court identified no subsidiary facts supporting this findi

2022See, e.g., K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5 , ¶¶ 30-42, 414 P.3d 933 (determining that the court’s factual findings were inadequate where it made factual conclusions but did not discuss the evidence underlying those conclusions and rejected the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without explanation); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2015 UT App 2, ¶ 6 , 342 P.3d 296 (rejecting the court’s conclusory finding that the mother was “better able and equipped to support and sustain a positive relationship between the children and their father” where the “court identified no subsidiary facts supporting this findi

2022See, e.g., K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5 , ¶¶ 30-42, 414 P.3d 933 (determining that the court’s factual findings were inadequate where it made factual conclusions but did not discuss the evidence underlying those conclusions and rejected the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without explanation); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2015 UT App 2, ¶ 6 , 342 P.3d 296 (rejecting the court’s conclusory finding that the mother was “better able and equipped to support and sustain a positive relationship between the children and their father” where the “court identified no subsidiary facts supporting this findi

2022See, e.g., K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5 , ¶¶ 30-42, 414 P.3d 933 (determining that the court’s factual findings were inadequate where it made factual conclusions but did not discuss the evidence underlying those conclusions and rejected the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without explanation); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2015 UT App 2, ¶ 6 , 342 P.3d 296 (rejecting the court’s conclusory finding that the mother was “better able and equipped to support and sustain a positive relationship between the children and their father” where the “court identified no subsidiary facts supporting this findi

2017See id. ; Hill , 765 P.2d at 866 ; State Farm Mut.

2015Westinghouse Hlee, Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 , 104 S.Ct., 1856 , 80 L.Ed,2d 388 (1984), for example, involved a New York tax provision that afforded q.corporate tax credit proportional to the ratio of goods that a company exported from the state.

2015Westinghouse Hlee, Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 , 104 S.Ct., 1856 , 80 L.Ed,2d 388 (1984), for example, involved a New York tax provision that afforded q.corporate tax credit proportional to the ratio of goods that a company exported from the state.

2015Nothing in Bacchus suggests that a tax exemption for all fruit wine, whether produced in or out of the state, would implicate the dormant Commerce Clause just because it might yield an advantage to manufacturers leaving a larger ―footprint‖ on the Hawaiian econ- omy. 10 Cite as: 2015 UT 93 Opinion of the Court or the business operations performed in any other State.‘‖ Id. at 272 (emphasis added) (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 337 ).6 ¶27 A related principle has been invoked in cases involving lo- cal laws rewarding the extent of business activity within the home state.

2009Indeed, the trial court’s discretion is so broad “that its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.” Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 17 , 45 P.3d 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 9 In a related challenge, Wife claims that the Business is a de-facto partnership and that she was therefore entitled to an accounting of the Business’s affairs and a share of its revenues.

2009Indeed, the trial court’s discretion is so broad “that its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.” Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 17 , 45 P.3d 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 9 In a related challenge, Wife claims that the Business is a de-facto partnership and that she was therefore entitled to an accounting of the Business’s affairs and a share of its revenues.

2004Seq, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ¶¶ 1-3 , 27 P.3d 538 (involving a petitioner who sought a declaration of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to obtain a divorcee and divide marital assets); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶¶ 1-2 , 1 P.3d 1074 (involving a petitioner who filed for an adjudication of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to determine whether she could claim benefits under a former cohabitant's insurance policy); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Utah 1998) (addressing the appeal of a erim-inal defendant who sought a declaration of marriage under se

2004Seq, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ¶¶ 1-3 , 27 P.3d 538 (involving a petitioner who sought a declaration of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to obtain a divorcee and divide marital assets); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶¶ 1-2 , 1 P.3d 1074 (involving a petitioner who filed for an adjudication of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to determine whether she could claim benefits under a former cohabitant's insurance policy); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Utah 1998) (addressing the appeal of a erim-inal defendant who sought a declaration of marriage under se

2004See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ¶¶ 1-3 , 27 P.3d 538 (involving a petitioner who sought a declaration of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to obtain a divorce and divide marital assets); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶¶ 1-2 , 1 P.3d 1074 (involving a petitioner who filed for an adjudication of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to determine whether she could claim benefits under a former cohabitant's insurance policy); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Utah 1993) (addressing the appeal of a criminal defendant who sought a declaration of marriage under sect

2004Seq, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ¶¶ 1-3 , 27 P.3d 538 (involving a petitioner who sought a declaration of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to obtain a divorcee and divide marital assets); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶¶ 1-2 , 1 P.3d 1074 (involving a petitioner who filed for an adjudication of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to determine whether she could claim benefits under a former cohabitant's insurance policy); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Utah 1998) (addressing the appeal of a erim-inal defendant who sought a declaration of marriage under se

2004Seq, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ¶¶ 1-3 , 27 P.3d 538 (involving a petitioner who sought a declaration of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to obtain a divorcee and divide marital assets); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶¶ 1-2 , 1 P.3d 1074 (involving a petitioner who filed for an adjudication of marriage under section 30-1-4.5 in order to determine whether she could claim benefits under a former cohabitant's insurance policy); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Utah 1998) (addressing the appeal of a erim-inal defendant who sought a declaration of marriage under se

1983The use of the warranty deed in this case not only assured conveyance of all of the vendors’ current interest, but would also automatically transfer to the grantees or their successors any “legal estate subsequently acquired.” Such is the specific effect of our statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 57-1-10; Cox v. Ney, Utah, 580 P.2d 1085 (1978), as well as the related doctrine of estoppel by deed. 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 294, et seq. (1965); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 554 (1943); Annot., 58 A.L.R. 345 (1929).

1979The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence grew out of the related doctrine of boundary by agreement. 1 Florence v. Hiline Equipment Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978) defined both doctrines and stated that boundary by agreement falls somewhere between adverse possession and estoppel.