related claim in North Carolina

2016Thus, "[g]iven the difference between the federal and State pleading standards, we must conclude," as this Court did in Fox , "that a federal court's dismissal of claims pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of collaterally estopping ... plaintiff[s] from raising the same or related claim[ ] under State law in our State's courts." Id. at ----, 777 S.E.2d at 325 (citation omitted).

2016Thus, "[g]iven the difference between the federal and State pleading standards, we must conclude," as this Court did in Fox , "that a federal court's dismissal of claims pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of collaterally estopping ... plaintiff[s] from raising the same or related claim[ ] under State law in our State's courts." Id. at ----, 777 S.E.2d at 325 (citation omitted).

2005Unlike the related claim of criminal conversation: (1) there need not be a definitive act which triggers liability, see Brown, 124 N.C.App. at 380 , 477 S.E.2d at 237 (criminal conversation is defined as "actual marriage between the spouses and sexual intercourse between defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during the coverture"); and (2) the intruding third party is not always a paramour, see Reynolds, supra, § 5.46(A), at 396-97 (alienation of affection actions arise against in-law parties and near relatives, but plaintiffs may face the doctrine of family privilege as an obstacle).

2005Unlike the related claim of criminal conversation: (1) there need not be a definitive act which triggers liability, see Brown, 124 N.C.App. at 380 , 477 S.E.2d at 237 (criminal conversation is defined as "actual marriage between the spouses and sexual intercourse between defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during the coverture"); and (2) the intruding third party is not always a paramour, see Reynolds, supra, § 5.46(A), at 396-97 (alienation of affection actions arise against in-law parties and near relatives, but plaintiffs may face the doctrine of family privilege as an obstacle).

1989See id. at Sec. 27.

1989See id. at Sec. 27.

1979United States v. Wright, 468 F. 2d 1184, 1185 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938 , 37 L.Ed. 2d 397 , 93 S.Ct. 2771 (1973); Keiningham v. United States, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 272 , 287 F. 2d 126 (1960); Empire Steel Mfg.

1975See also, State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643 , 185 S.E. 2d 227 (1971), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 408 U.S. 940 . *563 Defendant also contends the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury with respect to his defense of intoxication in that the court only related the defense to an intentional or willful shooting and not to a shooting arising from wanton conduct on the part of the defendant.

1975See also, State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643 , 185 S.E. 2d 227 (1971), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 408 U.S. 940 . *563 Defendant also contends the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury with respect to his defense of intoxication in that the court only related the defense to an intentional or willful shooting and not to a shooting arising from wanton conduct on the part of the defendant.

1975See also, State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643 , 185 S.E. 2d 227 (1971), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 408 U.S. 940 . *563 Defendant also contends the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury with respect to his defense of intoxication in that the court only related the defense to an intentional or willful shooting and not to a shooting arising from wanton conduct on the part of the defendant.