48 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1957–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stogniew v. McQueengreen2 sentences2018To be in privity with a party to an earlier lawsuit, "one must have an interest in the action such that she will be bound by the final judgment as if she were a party." Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So. 3d 961, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); see also Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. 1995) (applying the same test in the context of the related doctrine of collateral estoppel). 2016The related doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as' estoppel by judgment or issue preclusion, “bars ‘the parties from litigating in the second suit issues— that is to say points and questions — common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation.’ ” Cook v. State, 921 So.2d 631, 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla.1995)). | 2 | 2 |
Washington v. Glucksberggreen2 sentences2011Third, as a related principle of judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a substantive due process analysis "must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for `[t]he doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 ("[W]e have requi 2011Third, as a related principle of judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a substantive due process analysis "must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for `[t]he doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 ("[W]e have requi | 2 | 2 |
Raymond James & Associates, Inc. v. Godshallgreen2 sentences2013Raymond James Assocs., Inc. v. Godshall, 851 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (dismissing appeal where money judgment included reservation of jurisdiction to determine additional damages). 2010Compare Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Godshall, 851 So.2d 879, 880-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (dismissing as premature an order that authorized execution but reserved jurisdiction to rule on a related claim of whether the plaintiff was entitled to further damages, and distinguishing McGum as concerning only prejudgment interest), with Lombardo v. Haige, 971 So.2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("[W]e cannot fathom how one can wait to appeal an order upon which execution can enter.”), and Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding that because a final jud | 1 | 2 |
Faircloth v. Hillgreen2 sentences2010In one case cited by Banco, this Court relied upon and quoted the Supreme Court of Florida’s holding in Faircloth v. Hill, 85 So.2d 870, 872 (Fla.1956): While each separate act involved in the drama might not in and of itself establish gross negligence, nevertheless, the entire course of conduct of the automobile driver under all of the circumstances and in the light of all the related factors taken collectively might well establish the existence of gross negligence-(emphasis added). 1957We feel that the rule has been well stated by the Supreme Court of this state in Faircloth v. Hill, Fla.1956, 85 So.2d 870 , 872: “We have held that all of the circumstances of each case entering into the particular happening must be considered in order to determine whether liability exists. * * * While each separate act involved in the drama might not in and of itself establish gross negligence, nevertheless, the entire course of conduct of the automobile driver under all of the circumstances and in the light of all of the related factors taken collectively might well establish the existence | 1 | 2 |
Hurst v. Floridagreen1 sentence2021We recognize that, since Combs and Davis, Florida’s capital sentencing scheme has changed in light of the mandate of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 102-03 (2016), that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that renders the defendant eligible for imposition of the death - 23 - sentence—i.e., the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 , 501-03 (Fla. 2020); see § 921.141(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Toney Deron Davis v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2021See also id. (rejecting the related claim that the prosecutor “improperly disparaged the role of the jury” in violation of Caldwell by referencing the jury’s “recommendation” as “advisory” and stating that “the final [sentencing] decision rests with [the trial court]”). | 1 | 1 |
Pearce III v. Sandlergreen1 sentence2018To be in privity with a party to an earlier lawsuit, "one must have an interest in the action such that she will be bound by the final judgment as if she were a party." Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So. 3d 961, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); see also Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. 1995) (applying the same test in the context of the related doctrine of collateral estoppel). | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Stategreen1 sentence2016The related doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as' estoppel by judgment or issue preclusion, “bars ‘the parties from litigating in the second suit issues— that is to say points and questions — common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation.’ ” Cook v. State, 921 So.2d 631, 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla.1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Ferrell v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). - 14 - Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 487 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 969 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted))). | 1 | 1 |
Maxwell v. Wainwrightgreen1 sentence2014Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). - 14 - Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 487 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 969 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted))). | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). - 14 - Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 487 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 969 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted))). | 1 | 1 |
Doorbal v. Stategreen1 sentence2012However, we have repeatedly rejected Snelgrove's argument that a firm IQ cut-off score of 70 or below is unconstitutional, see, e.g., Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82, 92-94 (Fla.2011), and Snelgrove failed to preserve for appeal his equal protection argument, see Doorbal, 983 So.2d at 492 ("For an issue to be preserved for appeal, it must be presented to the lower court, and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation.”). | 1 | 1 |
Franqui v. Stategreen1 sentence2012However, we have repeatedly rejected Snelgrove's argument that a firm IQ cut-off score of 70 or below is unconstitutional, see, e.g., Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82, 92-94 (Fla.2011), and Snelgrove failed to preserve for appeal his equal protection argument, see Doorbal, 983 So.2d at 492 ("For an issue to be preserved for appeal, it must be presented to the lower court, and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation.”). | 1 | 1 |
Madden v. Killingergreen1 sentence2010Madden v. Killinger, 97 So.2d 205, 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957). | 1 | 1 |
Lombardo v. Haigegreen1 sentence2010Compare Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Godshall, 851 So.2d 879, 880-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (dismissing as premature an order that authorized execution but reserved jurisdiction to rule on a related claim of whether the plaintiff was entitled to further damages, and distinguishing McGum as concerning only prejudgment interest), with Lombardo v. Haige, 971 So.2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("[W]e cannot fathom how one can wait to appeal an order upon which execution can enter.”), and Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding that because a final jud | 1 | 1 |
Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc.green1 sentence2010Compare Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Godshall, 851 So.2d 879, 880-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (dismissing as premature an order that authorized execution but reserved jurisdiction to rule on a related claim of whether the plaintiff was entitled to further damages, and distinguishing McGum as concerning only prejudgment interest), with Lombardo v. Haige, 971 So.2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("[W]e cannot fathom how one can wait to appeal an order upon which execution can enter.”), and Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding that because a final jud | 1 | 1 |
Unruh v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Courts should "avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless." Unruh v. State, 669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla.1996) (quoting Forsythe, 604 So.2d at 456 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Barnes v. the Kellogg Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown-Bey v. Early, District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Coloradogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barber v. Ohio Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doorbal v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duest v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Caufield v. Cantelegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Summersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fla. Soc. of Ophthalmology v. State, Bd. of Optometrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Iglehart v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Intern. Jai-Alai Players Ass'n v. Pari-Mutuel Com'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Padgett v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. O'Briengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schottenstein v. Schottensteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cook v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 6 . 2014Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 6 . | 3 | 2005–2014 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences2018But a related principle applies under the supreme court’s decision in Brown, which addressed the following certified question: “Does ownership and joint occupancy of a premises where illegal drugs are discovered in plain view, in the presence of the owner, constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction for constructive possession as to the owner or as to a lessee under the same circumstances?” 428 So. 2d at 251 . 2018But a related principle applies under the supreme court’s decision in Brown, which addressed the following certified question: “Does ownership and joint occupancy of a premises where illegal drugs are discovered in plain view, in the presence of the owner, constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction for constructive possession as to the owner or as to a lessee under the same circumstances?” 428 So. 2d at 251 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Deparvine v. State
green
2 sentences2014Id. 2014Id. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Reno v. Flores
green
2 sentences2011Third, as a related principle of judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a substantive due process analysis "must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for `[t]he doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 ("[W]e have requi 2011Third, as a related principle of judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a substantive due process analysis "must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for `[t]he doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 ("[W]e have requi | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Collins v. City of Harker Heights
green
2 sentences2011Third, as a related principle of judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a substantive due process analysis "must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for `[t]he doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 ("[W]e have requi 2011Third, as a related principle of judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that a substantive due process analysis "must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for `[t]he doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 , 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 ("[W]e have requi | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Kush v. Lloyd
green
2 sentences2007Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 , 417 n. 2 (Fla.1992). [6] Through his mother, Luis is claiming damages for loss of future earning capacity, past and future mental pain and suffering, and past and future medical expenses. [7] Rh immune globulin is given to Rh-negative women after pregnancies in which they carried Rh-positive babies to prevent the mother's immune system from reacting to the Rh-positive blood of any subsequent child. 2007Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 , 417 n. 2 (Fla.1992). . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Stano v. Singletary
green
2 sentences1999See Lopez v. Singletary, 719 So.2d 287 (Fla.1998) (order); Remeta v. Singletary, 717 So.2d 536 (Fla.1998) (order); Buenoano v. State, *236 717 So.2d 529 (Fla.1998) (order); Stano v. Singletary, 692 So.2d 180 (Fla.1997); Jones, 701 So.2d at 80 . 1999See Lopez v. Singletary, 719 So.2d 287 (Fla.1998) (order), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 892 , 142 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Remeta v. Singletary, 717 So.2d 536 (Fla.1998) (order); Buenoano v. State, 717 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1998) (order); Stano v. Singletary, 692 So.2d 180 (Fla.1997); Jones, 701 So.2d at 80 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences1999See Lopez v. Singletary, 719 So.2d 287 (Fla.1998) (order); Remeta v. Singletary, 717 So.2d 536 (Fla.1998) (order); Buenoano v. State, *236 717 So.2d 529 (Fla.1998) (order); Stano v. Singletary, 692 So.2d 180 (Fla.1997); Jones, 701 So.2d at 80 . 1999See Lopez v. Singletary, 719 So.2d 287 (Fla.1998) (order), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 892 , 142 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Remeta v. Singletary, 717 So.2d 536 (Fla.1998) (order); Buenoano v. State, 717 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1998) (order); Stano v. Singletary, 692 So.2d 180 (Fla.1997); Jones, 701 So.2d at 80 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Florida Power and Light Co. v. Price
green
2 sentences1989Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293 (Fla.1964); Lingold v. Transmerica Ins. 1989Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1964); Lingold v. Transmerica Ins. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
green
2 sentences1983Justice Stewart's opinion in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-31 , 99 S.Ct. 645, 649-51 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), gives us an overall picture: Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. 1983Justice Stewart's opinion in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-31 , 99 S.Ct. 645, 649-51 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), gives us an overall picture: Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. | 2 | 1980–1983 |
Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tubero
green
1 sentence2025In Commonwealth, the Florida Supreme Court held that it was extreme for a trial court to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint based on a discovery violation after (1) the plaintiff failed to respond to discovery served by the defense two months after the complaint was filed, (2) the plaintiff did not request additional time, (3) the plaintiff’s counsel moved to withdraw before the responses came due, (4) the record contained no indication that the plaintiff’s counsel notified the plaintiff of the motion to withdraw or the related hearing, (5) the defendant submitted a proposed order granting a mo | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Mancuso
green
1 sentence2015In Mancuso, 652 So.2d at 370 , we addressed a related claim that section 316.027 contained a requirement of actual knowledge that an injury had occurred. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Burns v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
green
1 sentence2007Burns, 914 So.2d at 453 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Hauss v. Waxman green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Wiggins v. Smith, Warden green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Massiah v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Patrick v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Nash v. Blumex U. S. A., Inc green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Flagship Real Estate Corp. v. FLAGSHIP BK. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Richardson v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| In Re TW green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Abelove green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| United States v. Henry green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Morgareidge v. Howey green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Meek v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| TORTOISE ISLAND COMMUNITIES INC. v. Roberts green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Beebe v. Richardson green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Carraway v. Revell green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| McNulty v. Hurley green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Bessie Cannon v. State of Florida green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| City of Boca Raton v. Mattef green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Byers v. Gunn green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Farrey v. Bettendorf green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Cadore v. Karp green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Cormier v. Williams green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.