related principle in Virginia

2017A related principle is that the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction." Turner v. Commonwealth , 226 Va. 456 , 459, 309 S.E.2d 337 , 338 (1983) (citation omitted).

2017A related principle is that the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction." Turner v. Commonwealth , 226 Va. 456 , 459, 309 S.E.2d 337 , 338 (1983) (citation omitted).

1996A related principle is that the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction.’ ” Virginia Employment Comm’n v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va.App. 491, 495 , 452 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1995) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459 , 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)). “ ‘[WJords and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.’ ” Id. (quoting Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847 , 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994)).

1996A related principle is that the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction.’ ” Virginia Employment Comm’n v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va.App. 491, 495 , 452 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1995) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459 , 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)). “ ‘[WJords and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.’ ” Id. (quoting Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847 , 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994)).

1996A related principle is that the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction.’ ” Virginia Employment Comm’n v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va.App. 491, 495 , 452 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1995) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459 , 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)). “ ‘[WJords and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.’ ” Id. (quoting Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847 , 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994)).

1996A related principle is that the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction.’ ” Virginia Employment Comm’n v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va.App. 491, 495 , 452 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1995) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459 , 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)). “ ‘[WJords and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.’ ” Id. (quoting Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847 , 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994)).

2023Id. at 197 (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (noting the “obligation of the Judicial 16 I also join with the majority in its criticism of our dissenting colleagues for ignoring the required standard of appellate review to view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and their use of speculative hindsight to advance arguments and assert facts not in the record.

2022See, e.g., Watson-Scott v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 251 , 258 n.2 (2019) (recognizing that an appellate court must decide cases “on the best and narrowest grounds” (quoting White, 293 Va. at 419 )); see also Armstead, 56 Va. App. at 575 -76 & n.3 (holding that the constitutionality of the seizure and search rather than the exclusionary rule or procedural bar was the best and narrowest ground for decision), cited with approval in Abdo v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 468 , 473 n.1 (2015).

2022See, e.g., Watson-Scott v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 251 , 258 n.2 (2019) (recognizing that an appellate court must decide cases “on the best and narrowest grounds” (quoting White, 293 Va. at 419 )); see also Armstead, 56 Va. App. at 575 -76 & n.3 (holding that the constitutionality of the seizure and search rather than the exclusionary rule or procedural bar was the best and narrowest ground for decision), cited with approval in Abdo v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 468 , 473 n.1 (2015).

2022See, e.g., Watson-Scott v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 251 , 258 n.2 (2019) (recognizing that an appellate court must decide cases “on the best and narrowest grounds” (quoting White, 293 Va. at 419 )); see also Armstead, 56 Va. App. at 575 -76 & n.3 (holding that the constitutionality of the seizure and search rather than the exclusionary rule or procedural bar was the best and narrowest ground for decision), cited with approval in Abdo v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 468 , 473 n.1 (2015).

2014See Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220 , 228-29 & n.11, 623 S.E.2d 922 , 926-27 & n.11 (2006).

2014See Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220 , 228-29 & n.11, 623 S.E.2d 922 , 926-27 & n.11 (2006).

2009Act or use of economic leverage which results in an unjust deprivation’ of benefits under the Act or an unjust application of the Act’s provisions.” Overhead Door Co. v. Lewis, 29 Va.App. 52, 60 , 509 S.E.2d 535, 538-39 (1999) (quoting Butler v. City of Virginia Beach, 22 Va.App. 601, 605, 471 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1996)).

2009Act or use of economic leverage which results in an unjust deprivation’ of benefits under the Act or an unjust application of the Act’s provisions.” Overhead Door Co. v. Lewis, 29 Va.App. 52, 60 , 509 S.E.2d 535, 538-39 (1999) (quoting Butler v. City of Virginia Beach, 22 Va.App. 601, 605, 471 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1996)).

2009Act or use of economic leverage which results in an unjust deprivation’ of benefits under the Act or an unjust application of the Act’s provisions.” Overhead Door Co. v. Lewis, 29 Va.App. 52, 60 , 509 S.E.2d 535, 538-39 (1999) (quoting Butler v. City of Virginia Beach, 22 Va.App. 601, 605, 471 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1996)).

2009Act or use of economic leverage which results in an unjust deprivation’ of benefits under the Act or an unjust application of the Act’s provisions.” Overhead Door Co. v. Lewis, 29 Va.App. 52, 60 , 509 S.E.2d 535, 538-39 (1999) (quoting Butler v. City of Virginia Beach, 22 Va.App. 601, 605, 471 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1996)).

2000See generally id. at 221-22 , 487 S.E.2d at 272-73 . - 4 - We, therefore, affirm the convictions, but reverse the misdemeanor sentencing order and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

2000See generally id. at 221-22 , 487 S.E.2d at 272-73 . - 4 - We, therefore, affirm the convictions, but reverse the misdemeanor sentencing order and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

1998"Although the issue of voluntariness is a question of law subject to the court's independent review of the entire record, 'the trial court's subsidiary factual findings, upon which voluntariness is determined, . . . will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong.'" Green v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1998) (citations omitted). "[T]he burden is upon the defendant to show the trial judge's ruling, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (citing Fore v. Commonweal

1998"Although the issue of voluntariness is a question of law subject to the court's independent review of the entire record, 'the trial court's subsidiary factual findings, upon which voluntariness is determined, . . . will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong.'" Green v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1998) (citations omitted). "[T]he burden is upon the defendant to show the trial judge's ruling, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (citing Fore v. Commonweal

1996First, "subsequently" is ordinarily accepted to mean "following in time; coming or being later than something else." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2278 (3d ed. 1981); accord Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 410 , 4 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1939).

1996First, "subsequently" is ordinarily accepted to mean "following in time; coming or being later than something else." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2278 (3d ed. 1981); accord Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 410 , 4 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1939).

1995In Hutcherson v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 534, 536-37 , 375 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1989), this Court approved a “finding of nonamenability based solely on the nature of the offense,” provided the related inquiry included consideration of “circumstances surrounding the offense,” the “extent of the juvenile’s involvement[,] and the interests of society and of the child.” We also expressly recognized that a “determination of non-amenability based solely on the face of the charge is ... permissible when the offense is one of those enumerated in the statute [i.e., armed robbery, rape, and murder].” Id. at

1995In Hutcherson v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 534, 536-37 , 375 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1989), this Court approved a “finding of nonamenability based solely on the nature of the offense,” provided the related inquiry included consideration of “circumstances surrounding the offense,” the “extent of the juvenile’s involvement[,] and the interests of society and of the child.” We also expressly recognized that a “determination of non-amenability based solely on the face of the charge is ... permissible when the offense is one of those enumerated in the statute [i.e., armed robbery, rape, and murder].” Id. at

1995A related principle is that the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459 , 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983) (citation omitted). “[Wjords and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847 , 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994); Stein v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 65, 69 , 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1991).

1995A related principle is that the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459 , 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983) (citation omitted). “[Wjords and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847 , 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994); Stein v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 65, 69 , 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1991).

1993See Raley v. Parke, 945 F.2d 137, 141 (6th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. —, 121 L.

1993See Raley v. Parke, 945 F.2d 137, 141 (6th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. —, 121 L.

1993Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272 (1970).

1989Gypsum, 229 Va. 596, 603 (1985).