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24 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mahajan v. Department of Environmental Protectiongreen2 sentences2017See id. at 616 ("the spirit of art. 97 is derived from the related doctrine of 'prior public use'"). 2016See generally Mahajan, supra at 616 ("Because the spirit of art. 97 is derived from the related doctrine of 'prior public use,' cases applying that doctrine inform our analysis"). | 3 | 3 |
Murphy v. ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DIV OF PERSONNEL ADMIN.green2 sentences2002See Murphy v. Administrator of the Div. of Personnel Admin., 377 Mass. 217, 220 (1979). 1987Id. | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. O'CONNORgreen1 sentence2026We note that, in responding to the defendant's Miranda argument, the Commonwealth contends in part that suppression is not required because the evidence was not obtained by exploitation of any tainted statements by the defendant but instead was obtained through "an independent source," namely, "the dog hit on the glove box." The Commonwealth's brief makes no argument under the independent source doctrine with respect to the repeated searches of the defendant's person, and the Commonwealth did not raise any argument before the motion judge under either the independent source doctrine, cf. Commo | 1 | 1 |
Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Collegegreen1 sentence2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Armstronggreen1 sentence2025See Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 758 (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Chase Precast v. JOHN J. PAONESSA CO., COMMONWEALTHgreen1 sentence2021See Chase Precast, 409 Mass. at 374 . | 1 | 1 |
Muir v. City of Leominstergreen1 sentence2014Like the prior public use doctrine, art. 97 “is only applicable ‘to those lands which are in fact ”devoted to one public use." ’ “ Id. at 617 (emphasis in original), quoting Muir v. City of Leominster, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 587, 591 (1974), quoting in turn Robbins v. Department of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc.green1 sentence2012Collateral estoppel applies to issues actually litigated, determined by, and essential to a previous judgment.” Curtis v. Altria Group, 792 N.W.2d 836, 853 (Minn. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dykensgreen1 sentence2007Commonwealth v. Dykens, 438 Mass. 827, 837 (2003). c. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2005See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992). 5. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Agostogreen1 sentence2005See Commonwealth v. Agosto, 428 Mass. 31, 33-38 (1998) (under state statutory law, “the Commonwealth must show probable cause for an investigative search or for a forfeiture to a neutral magistrate who may then issue the proper search warrant or temporary orders relevant to forfeiture”). | 1 | 1 |
White Construction Co., Inc. v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2001Co. v. Commonwealth, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 648 . 2001Co. v. Commonwealth, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 640, 647 (1981), S.C., 385 Mass. 1005 (1982), which also stated the related principle that “persons who deal with a governmental agency must take notice of limitations upon that agency’s contracting power and cannot recover upon a contract which oversteps those limitations.” White Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Riveragreen1 sentence2000A related doctrine — that a party, including a criminal defendant, is not permitted to raise an issue before the trial judge on a specific theory and then present that issue to an appellate court on a different theory, Commonwealth v. Phoenix, 409 Mass. 408 , 415-416 n.4 (1991); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 636-637 (1997); Commonwealth v. Silva, 431 Mass. 401, 405 (2000) — underscores the defendant’s waiver of the self-incrimination issue. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Silvagreen1 sentence2000A related doctrine — that a party, including a criminal defendant, is not permitted to raise an issue before the trial judge on a specific theory and then present that issue to an appellate court on a different theory, Commonwealth v. Phoenix, 409 Mass. 408 , 415-416 n.4 (1991); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 636-637 (1997); Commonwealth v. Silva, 431 Mass. 401, 405 (2000) — underscores the defendant’s waiver of the self-incrimination issue. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Ringgreen1 sentence1998“Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1978); see also Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 61-62 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Roberge's Casegreen1 sentence1998There is a related rule of construction which also is relevant here: “Statutes are not to be interpreted so as to require a radical change in established public policy if the language does not manifest an intent that such change is to be effected.” Roberge's case, 330 Mass. 506, 509 (1953). | 1 | 1 |
Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A.green1 sentence1998“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether the same or a different claim." Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 395 Mass. 366, 372 (1985), quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments §27 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Fay v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assoc., 419 Mass. 782, 790 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Fay v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'ngreen1 sentence1998“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether the same or a different claim." Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 395 Mass. 366, 372 (1985), quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments §27 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Fay v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assoc., 419 Mass. 782, 790 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shoregreen1 sentence1998“Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1978); see also Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 61-62 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Allen v. McCurrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
green
1 sentence2026A hearing examiner "has discretion . . . to consider which statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe to each factor . . . ." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 96 Mass. App. Ct. 738 , 742 (2019) (Doe No. 22188), quoting Doe No. 68549, 470 Mass. at 109-110 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3974 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
green
2 sentences2026We follow the rule that "[i]n the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, the administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts" (quotation omitted), id. at 57-58 , because "when a party neglects to raise an issue during agency proceedings, the reviewing court lacks a record on which to evaluate questions of statutory authority or jurisdiction." Id. at 58 . 5 To the extent it can be considered a separate argument, the plaintiff's related claim that the examiner erred in weighing the high-risk and risk-elevating factors against the risk- mitigating factors is als 2026We follow the rule that "[i]n the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, the administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts" (quotation omitted), id. at 57-58 , because "when a party neglects to raise an issue during agency proceedings, the reviewing court lacks a record on which to evaluate questions of statutory authority or jurisdiction." Id. at 58 . 5 To the extent it can be considered a separate argument, the plaintiff's related claim that the examiner erred in weighing the high-risk and risk-elevating factors against the risk- mitigating factors is als | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Philip Chism
green
1 sentence2026We note that, in responding to the defendant's Miranda argument, the Commonwealth contends in part that suppression is not required because the evidence was not obtained by exploitation of any tainted statements by the defendant but instead was obtained through "an independent source," namely, "the dog hit on the glove box." The Commonwealth's brief makes no argument under the independent source doctrine with respect to the repeated searches of the defendant's person, and the Commonwealth did not raise any argument before the motion judge under either the independent source doctrine, cf. Commo | 1 | 2026–2026 |
R & F Financial Services v. North American Building Solutions
neutral
1 sentence2021Servs., LLC v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc., N.W.2d , 2021 ND 12 , ¶¶ 17–21, 2021 WL 99733 , at *4–*5 (N.D. 2021) (where party leased modules to be used only for employee housing at specified location, duty to pay rent was discharged by frustration of purpose when city annexed the property and its ordinances barred such workforce housing); Restatement § 265, supra, comment a, illustration 4 (where business rented neon signs to advertise in windows, duty to pay rent would be discharged by frustration of purpose if new regulation prohibits lighting of such signs). -5- Frustration of purpose has s | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Kozec
green
2 sentences2018Prosecutors may argue "based on the evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence." Commonwealth v. Kozec , 399 Mass. 514 , 516, 505 N.E.2d 519 (1987). 4 The telephone calls were made between 5:57 p.m. and 6:44 p.m. , providing strong circumstantial evidence that the defendant returned to the victim's apartment on the evening of the victim's death, after Hernandez had left for the last time. 5 The defendant's related claim that it was a violation of due process for the prosecutor to exploit the absence of evidence that was excluded at her request is also unavailing. 2018Prosecutors may argue "based on the evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence." Commonwealth v. Kozec , 399 Mass. 514 , 516, 505 N.E.2d 519 (1987). 4 The telephone calls were made between 5:57 p.m. and 6:44 p.m. , providing strong circumstantial evidence that the defendant returned to the victim's apartment on the evening of the victim's death, after Hernandez had left for the last time. 5 The defendant's related claim that it was a violation of due process for the prosecutor to exploit the absence of evidence that was excluded at her request is also unavailing. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation
green
1 sentence2012“Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery, 436 U.S. at 328, citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 . 2 Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an issue when: “(1) the issue is identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; (3) the | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Buckman v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2012Our decision in Commonwealth v. Buckman, 461 Mass. 24 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2781 (2012) (Buckman), does not support the defendant’s related claim, in reliance on that case, that the chart was erroneously admitted. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Buckman
green
2 sentences2012In Buckman, supra at 34 , we said that “the fact of, but not the details of, an inconclusive test result may be admitted to show the extent of the police investigation.” Although the chart in question here contained “details of” the inconclusive test results, in that it identified certain alleles present in the DNA obtained from the wire, these are not the type of details to which our decision in Buckman was directed. 2012Our decision in Commonwealth v. Buckman, 461 Mass. 24 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2781 (2012) (Buckman), does not support the defendant’s related claim, in reliance on that case, that the chart was erroneously admitted. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
White Construction Co. v. Commonwealth Desmond & Lord, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001Co. v. Commonwealth, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 640, 647 (1981), S.C., 385 Mass. 1005 (1982), which also stated the related principle that “persons who deal with a governmental agency must take notice of limitations upon that agency’s contracting power and cannot recover upon a contract which oversteps those limitations.” White Constr. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Phoenix
green
1 sentence2000A related doctrine — that a party, including a criminal defendant, is not permitted to raise an issue before the trial judge on a specific theory and then present that issue to an appellate court on a different theory, Commonwealth v. Phoenix, 409 Mass. 408 , 415-416 n.4 (1991); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 636-637 (1997); Commonwealth v. Silva, 431 Mass. 401, 405 (2000) — underscores the defendant’s waiver of the self-incrimination issue. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. Parker
green
1 sentence1996We believe that this additional evidence, if pressed at trial, “would not likely have influenced the jury’s conclusion that, at the time of the killing, the defendant had the mens rea necessary for a conviction of deliberately premeditated murder in the first degree.” Commonwealth v. Parker, supra at 247 . 1 Accordingly, we reject this claim as well as the related claim that Robbins should be allowed the opportunity to conduct further discovery and be granted an evidentiary hearing to consider further the effectiveness of trial counsel. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Certified Corp. v. GTE Products Corp. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.