related rule in Oregon

2024Winters v. Tillamook County, 330 Or App 191 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum disposition) (Winters II).

2024Winters v. Tillamook County, 330 Or App 191 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum disposition) (Winters II).

2022In considering whether the legislature had cre- ated statutory liability to enforce violations of that statu- tory duty, this court relied in part on context supplied by a related immunity provision, which specified that a police officer would not be “ ‘held criminally or civilly liable for actions pursuant to [former ORS 426.460 (1989)], provided the actions are in good faith, on probable cause and without malice.’ ” Scovill, 324 Or at 162 , 167-68 (quoting former ORS 426.470 (1989), renumbered as ORS 430.401 (1995) (emphasis omitted)).

2022This court construed the immunity provision as suggesting that the legislature “contemplated” that a failure to perform the statutory duty could “give rise to a potential liability in tort in circumstances in which the limitations Cite as 370 Or 215 (2022) 231 stated [in the immunity provision] did not apply.” Id. at 169.

2021The basis of our earlier decision that, for purposes of ORS 803.540(1)(b), “two plates are required” for most vehicles, was the related requirement, under ORS 803.525, that the Department of Transportation “issue two registra- tion plates for every vehicle that is registered by the depart- ment except as otherwise provided.” Blueback, 291 Or App at 783 .

2020Cite as 306 Or App 167 (2020) 185 added an ordinary claim for breach of contract and a related claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

2015Id.

2014Id. at 265-66 .

2008State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269 , 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006).

2008State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269 , 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006).

2008State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269 , 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006).

2002As described below, 182 Or App at 587-88 , we reject that argument for the same reasons described in our opinion in the companion case.

1990Section 83 continues: “(3) An adjudicative determination of a claim by an administrative tribunal does not preclude relitigation in another tribunal of the same or a related claim based on the same transaction if the scheme of remedies permits assertion of the second claim notwithstanding the adjudication of the first claim.” Among the exceptions to the general rule specifically cross-referenced by comment f to section 83(1) is section 26 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which in part provides: “(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule of § 24 does not apply to

1990Section 83 continues: “(3) An adjudicative determination of a claim by an administrative tribunal does not preclude relitigation in another tribunal of the same or a related claim based on the same transaction if the scheme of remedies permits assertion of the second claim notwithstanding the adjudication of the first claim.” Among the exceptions to the general rule specifically cross-referenced by comment f to section 83(1) is section 26 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which in part provides: “(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule of § 24 does not apply to

1987Dictionaries define “building” as referring to any roofed and walled structure constructed for permanent use. 2 As we indicated in State v. Essig, *398 31 Or App 639 , 571 P2d 170 (1977), rev den 281 Or 323 (1978), the ordinary meaning of the term building does not exclude stationary structures used for storage. 3 A related inquiry is whether the forced entry of each storage unit should be classified as an independent burglary or whether, as defendants argue, the only “building” was the large structure consisting of the storage units.

1987Dictionaries define “building” as referring to any roofed and walled structure constructed for permanent use. 2 As we indicated in State v. Essig, *398 31 Or App 639 , 571 P2d 170 (1977), rev den 281 Or 323 (1978), the ordinary meaning of the term building does not exclude stationary structures used for storage. 3 A related inquiry is whether the forced entry of each storage unit should be classified as an independent burglary or whether, as defendants argue, the only “building” was the large structure consisting of the storage units.

1982The other is the significance attached to the contribution of the spouse “as a homemaker” and the related presumption (in the third sentence of the statute) “that both spouses have contributed equally to the acquisition of property during the marriage.” In Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117 , 653 P2d 1258 (1982), we held that the term “marital assets” does not include assets brought into the marriage.

1982The other is the significance attached to the contribution of the spouse “as a homemaker” and the related presumption (in the third sentence of the statute) “that both spouses have contributed equally to the acquisition of property during the marriage.” In Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117 , 653 P2d 1258 (1982), we held that the term “marital assets” does not include assets brought into the marriage.

1979Wolff v. Du Puis, 233 Or 317, 321 , 378 P2d 707 (1963), 2 indicates that an issue of fact on which collateral estoppel is predicated should be "determined by a valid final judgment.” We see no reason why the same should not be true where an issue of law is claimed to have been conclusively determined in previous litigation.

1979Wolff v. Du Puis, 233 Or 317, 321 , 378 P2d 707 (1963), 2 indicates that an issue of fact on which collateral estoppel is predicated should be "determined by a valid final judgment.” We see no reason why the same should not be true where an issue of law is claimed to have been conclusively determined in previous litigation.