related doctrine in Maryland

2011A related rule of statutory construction, known as ejusdem generis , expresses "the supposition that if the legislature had intended the general words to be construed in an unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated the specific things." In re Wallace W ., 333 Md. 186 , 190-91 , 634 A.2d 53 (1993). 9 The Court in Montgomery County also decided that the Quadrennial Elections Article did not apply to special elections to fill initial county council vacancies occurring upon adoption of a home rule charter under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. 337 Md. at 211 -12 .

2011See, e.g., Ames v. Bd. of Supvrs of Elections of Montgomery County, 195 Md. 543, 550 , 74 A.2d 29 (1950); Prince George’s County v. Bd. of Supvrs of Elections of Prince George’s County, 337 Md. 496, 505 , 654 A.2d 1303 (1995); see also Letter of Assistant Attorney General Kathryn M.

2011A related rule of statutory construction, known as ejusdem generis , expresses "the supposition that if the legislature had intended the general words to be construed in an unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated the specific things." In re Wallace W ., 333 Md. 186 , 190-91 , 634 A.2d 53 (1993). 9 The Court in Montgomery County also decided that the Quadrennial Elections Article did not apply to special elections to fill initial county council vacancies occurring upon adoption of a home rule charter under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. 337 Md. at 211 -12 .

2011A related rule of statutory construction, known as ejusdem generis , expresses "the supposition that if the legislature had intended the general words to be construed in an unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated the specific things." In re Wallace W ., 333 Md. 186 , 190-91 , 634 A.2d 53 (1993). 9 The Court in Montgomery County also decided that the Quadrennial Elections Article did not apply to special elections to fill initial county council vacancies occurring upon adoption of a home rule charter under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution. 337 Md. at 211 -12 .

2015The related doctrine of collateral estoppel “looks to issues of fact or law that were actually decided in an earlier action, whether or not on the same claim.” Id.

2011But, we have cautioned, a finding of contributory negligence must not be “based on conjecture” or “require, as to the two vehicles, speculation as to the related factors of time, speed, and distance.” Barrett, 165 Md.App. at 298 , 885 A.2d 392 .

2011But, we have cautioned, a finding of contributory negligence must not be “based on conjecture” or “require, as to the two vehicles, speculation as to the related factors of time, speed, and distance.” Barrett, 165 Md.App. at 298 , 885 A.2d 392 .

2011As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[i]f ... the relative rights of travellers ... are held to depend upon nice calculations of speed, time, and distance^] the rule would encourage recklessness and the privilege of uninterrupted travel would mean little more than the privilege of having a jury guess in the event of a collision whose guess was wrong.” Belle Isle, 187 Md. at 179 , 49 A.2d 537 .

2011As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[i]f ... the relative rights of travellers ... are held to depend upon nice calculations of speed, time, and distance^] the rule would encourage recklessness and the privilege of uninterrupted travel would mean little more than the privilege of having a jury guess in the event of a collision whose guess was wrong.” Belle Isle, 187 Md. at 179 , 49 A.2d 537 .

2004The Supreme Court has articulated the purpose of collateral estoppel in a similar manner: “Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 , 99 S.Ct. at 649 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 559 , citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 , 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1442-1443 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788, 799 (1971).

2004The Supreme Court has articulated the purpose of collateral estoppel in a similar manner: “Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 , 99 S.Ct. at 649 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 559 , citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 , 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1442-1443 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788, 799 (1971).

2004It has concluded, moreover, that “[application of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions.” Montana, 440 U.S. 147 at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973, 59 L.Ed.2d at 217 .

2004It has concluded, moreover, that “[application of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions.” Montana, 440 U.S. 147 at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973, 59 L.Ed.2d at 217 .

2003The Court elucidated the relationship between stare decisis, res judicata, and law of the case in Tu, 336 Md. at 416 , 648 A.2d 993 : “The law of the case, like stare decisis, deals with the circumstances that permit reconsideration of issues of law.

2003The Court elucidated the relationship between stare decisis, res judicata, and law of the case in Tu, 336 Md. at 416 , 648 A.2d 993 : “The law of the case, like stare decisis, deals with the circumstances that permit reconsideration of issues of law.

2003The related doctrine of res judicata “is intended to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to avoid the vexation, costs and expenses incident to more than one suit on the same cause of action.” Carlin v. Fischer, 212 Md. 526, 533 , 129 A.2d 827 (1957).

2003The related doctrine of res judicata “is intended to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to avoid the vexation, costs and expenses incident to more than one suit on the same cause of action.” Carlin v. Fischer, 212 Md. 526, 533 , 129 A.2d 827 (1957).

1993Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77 , 629 A.2d 1239 (1993).

1993Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77 , 629 A.2d 1239 (1993).

1992Co., 63 Md.App. 412, 424 , 492 A.2d 977 , (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Md. 754, 766 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986) (citations omitted), that “[an] insurer has a right — and whenever reasonable and possible, a duty — to settle a claim made against its insured.” In State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that “for an insurer to measure up to the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence.” Id. at 333 , 236 A.2d 269 .

1992Co., 63 Md.App. 412, 424 , 492 A.2d 977 , (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Md. 754, 766 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986) (citations omitted), that “[an] insurer has a right — and whenever reasonable and possible, a duty — to settle a claim made against its insured.” In State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that “for an insurer to measure up to the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence.” Id. at 333 , 236 A.2d 269 .

1992Co., 63 Md.App. 412, 424 , 492 A.2d 977 , (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Md. 754, 766 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986) (citations omitted), that “[an] insurer has a right — and whenever reasonable and possible, a duty — to settle a claim made against its insured.” In State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that “for an insurer to measure up to the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence.” Id. at 333 , 236 A.2d 269 .

1992Co., 63 Md.App. 412, 424 , 492 A.2d 977 , (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Md. 754, 766 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986) (citations omitted), that “[an] insurer has a right — and whenever reasonable and possible, a duty — to settle a claim made against its insured.” In State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that “for an insurer to measure up to the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence.” Id. at 333 , 236 A.2d 269 .

1992Co., 63 Md.App. 412, 424 , 492 A.2d 977 , (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Md. 754, 766 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986) (citations omitted), that “[an] insurer has a right — and whenever reasonable and possible, a duty — to settle a claim made against its insured.” In State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that “for an insurer to measure up to the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence.” Id. at 333 , 236 A.2d 269 .

1992Co., 63 Md.App. 412, 424 , 492 A.2d 977 , (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Md. 754, 766 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986) (citations omitted), that “[an] insurer has a right — and whenever reasonable and possible, a duty — to settle a claim made against its insured.” In State Farm v. White, 248 Md. 324 , 236 A.2d 269 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that “for an insurer to measure up to the good faith test, its action in refusing to settle must consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence.” Id. at 333 , 236 A.2d 269 .

1990Cassidy v. Board of Education, 316 Md. 50, 62 , 557 A.2d 227 (1989); Murray International v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989).

1990Cassidy v. Board of Education, 316 Md. 50, 62 , 557 A.2d 227 (1989); Murray International v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989).

1990Cassidy v. Board of Education, 316 Md. 50, 62 , 557 A.2d 227 (1989); Murray International v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989).

1990Cassidy v. Board of Education, 316 Md. 50, 62 , 557 A.2d 227 (1989); Murray International v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989).

1990Employees Int’l v. MTA, 295 Md. 88 , 453 A.2d 1191 (1982), in discussing remedies in respect to labor law issues, stated: A related principle is that where a statute authorizes or permits a person or agency to take a certain type of action in a particular manner, such manner becomes a mandatory limitation, and the action must be taken in conformity with it.

1990Employees Int’l v. MTA, 295 Md. 88 , 453 A.2d 1191 (1982), in discussing remedies in respect to labor law issues, stated: A related principle is that where a statute authorizes or permits a person or agency to take a certain type of action in a particular manner, such manner becomes a mandatory limitation, and the action must be taken in conformity with it.

1982App. 1 , 389 A.2d 374 , cert. den. 283 Md. 734 (1978), res judicata, and the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, "derive immediately from the larger jurisprudential demand that properly entered judgments be regarded as final, a concept which itself emanates from, and is required by, the societal need for certainty in the law.” Id. at 12, 389 A.2d 381 .