plain view doctrine in Louisiana

2010In State v. Jones, 2002-1171, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 205, 211 , this Court discussed the plain view exception: In order for an object to be lawfully seized pursuant to the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment, “(1) there must be a prior justification for the intrusion into a protected area; (2) in the course of which the evidence is inadvertently discovered; and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband.” State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La.1982); State v. Tate, 623 So.2d 908, 917 (La.App. 4 Cir.

2010App. 4 Cir 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 205, 211 , this Court discussed the plain view exception: In order for an object to be lawfully seized pursuant to the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment, "(1) there must be a prior justification for the intrusion into a protected area; (2) in the course of which the evidence is inadvertently discovered; and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband." State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La.1982); State v. Tate, 623 So.2d 908, 917 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied 629 So.2d 1126 (La.1993)

2010In State v. Jones, 2002-1171, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 205, 211 , this Court discussed the plain view exception: In order for an object to be lawfully seized pursuant to the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment, “(1) there must be a prior justification for the intrusion into a protected area; (2) in the course of which the evidence is inadvertently discovered; and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband.” State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La.1982); State v. Tate, 623 So.2d 908, 917 (La.App. 4 Cir.

2010App. 4 Cir 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 205, 211 , this Court discussed the plain view exception: In order for an object to be lawfully seized pursuant to the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment, "(1) there must be a prior justification for the intrusion into a protected area; (2) in the course of which the evidence is inadvertently discovered; and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband." State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La.1982); State v. Tate, 623 So.2d 908, 917 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied 629 So.2d 1126 (La.1993)

2021See State v. Leger, 05-11 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 155 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. at 2308 , “Under the plain view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature that is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”).

2021See State v. Leger, 05-11 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 155 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. at 2308 , “Under the plain view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature that is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”).

2019The “immediately apparent” aspect of the plain view exception is better stated as probable cause to believe the item in question is or contains contraband, as clarified in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).

2019The “immediately apparent” aspect of the plain view exception is better stated as probable cause to believe the item in question is or contains contraband, as clarified in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).

2021The Supreme Court recognized that the 7 plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), provided that the plain view doctrine allowed the warrantless seizure of items when three circumstances were met: First, the “initial intrusion” must be lawful or the officer must otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a particular area.

2021The Supreme Court recognized that the 7 plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), provided that the plain view doctrine allowed the warrantless seizure of items when three circumstances were met: First, the “initial intrusion” must be lawful or the officer must otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a particular area.

2021See State v. Leger, 05-11 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 155 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. at 2308 , “Under the plain view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature that is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”).

2018"Under the plain view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature that is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant." State v. Leger , 05-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108 , 155, cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) ; Horton , 496 U.S. at 136 -137 , 110 S.Ct. at 2308 .

2003In State v. Smith, 96-2161 p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/3/98), 715 So.2d 547, 549 , this Court discussed the plain view exception: In order for an object to be lawfully seized pursuant to the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment, “(1) there must be a prior justification for the intrusion into a protected area; (2) in the course of which the evidence is inadvertently discovered; and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection |athat the items are evidence or contraband.” State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La.1982); State v. Tate, 623 So.2d 908, 917 (La.App. 4 Cir.),

2002Plain View In State v. Smith, 96-2161 p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/3/98), 715 So.2d 547, 549 , this court discussed the plain view exception: In order for an object to be lawfully seized pursuant to the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment, “(1) there must be a prior justification for the intrusion into a protected area; (2) in the course of which the evidence is inadvertently discovered; and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection'that the items are evidence or contraband.” State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La.1982); State v. Tate, 623 So.2d 908, 917 (La.App.

2025See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993) (“If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond 6 that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (footnote omitted) (discussing plain-view exception); Harris v. United St

2014State v. Gray, 2013-1326, p. 1 (La.6/28/13), 122 So.3d 531, 533 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990))[emphasis added]; see also State v. Sheehan, 99-0725, p. 1 (La.7/2/99), 767 So.2d 1 (even assuming reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and an articulable basis to conduct a self-protective frisk for weapons, the seizure and search of the cigarette pack from relator’s shirt pocket exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry pat-down frisk and “amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize ....

2023State v. Gray, 13-1326 (La. 6/28/13), 122 So.3d 531, 533 .

2023State v. Gray, 13-1326 (La. 6/28/13), 122 So.3d 531, 533 .

2016Jones , 12-0438, pp. 13-14, 119 So.3d at 19 (citing State v. Norals, 10-0293, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/30/10), 44 So.3d 907, 910 ); see also Fields, 12-0674, p. 11, 120 So.3d at 318 . |]CIn the case before us, the large amount of cash on the nightstand was within plain view.

2013See State v. Norals, 10-0293, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/30/10), 44 So.3d 907, 910 (under the plain view doctrine if officers are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an | ^incriminating nature which is immediately apparent they may seize it without a warrant).

1990Referring to the conditions set out in State v. Banks, supra, the court stated: “The facts of this case clearly bring it within the exception. [The officer] was lawfully on the premises, the discovery of the evidence was clearly inadvertent, and the record shows that the items were identifiable as being connected with the burglary.” In the instant case the seizure of the evidence clearly falls within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

1985In order for a warrantless seizure to come under the plain view doctrine, three conditions must be present: `(1) [T]here must be a prior justification for an intrusion into a protected area, (2) in the course of which evidence is inadvertently discovered, and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband.' State v. Rodriguez, 396 So.2d 1312, 1316 (La.1981) (quoting State v. Banks, 363 So.2d 491 (La. 1978)).

1985In order for a warrantless seizure to come under the plain view doctrine, three conditions must be present: `(1) [T]here must be a prior justification for an intrusion into a protected area, (2) in the course of which evidence is inadvertently discovered, and (3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband.' State v. Rodriguez, 396 So.2d 1312, 1316 (La.1981) (quoting State v. Banks, 363 So.2d 491 (La. 1978)).

1985In order for a warrantless seizure to come under the plain view doctrine, three conditions must be satisfied: "1) there must be a prior justification for an intrusion into a protected area, 2) in the course of which evidence is inadvertently discovered, and 3) where it is immediately apparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband." State v. Rodriguez, 396 So.2d 1312, 1316 (La. 1981).

2024State v. Miguel, 18- 21 0711 (La. 1/30/19), 263 So. 3d 873 .

2024Id., citing, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 75 L.

2021See State v. Leger, 05-11 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 155 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. at 2308 , “Under the plain view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature that is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”).

2021See State v. Leger, 05-11 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 155 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. at 2308 , “Under the plain view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object that has an incriminating nature that is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”).

1979They further claim that the seizure cannot be validated by reference to the plain view doctrine since none of the three criteria for its application, as set down by this Court in State v. Fearn, 345 So.2d 468 (La.1977), and State v. Parker, 355 So.2d 900 (La.1978), are present in this case.

1979Having carefully examined the facts of this case in light of the three-pronged test for the application of the plain view doctrine set forth by the court in State v. Fearn, supra , we conclude that the seizure of the shotgun from the apartment of the defendant was proper and that the trial judge committed no error in denying defendant's motion to suppress.

2019Relying on State v. Meichel, 290 So.2d 878 (La. 1974), the majority found the plain view exception did not apply because the incriminating character of the bottle was not immediately apparent.

2019Relying on State v. Meichel , 290 So.2d 878 (La. 1974), the majority found the plain view exception did not apply because the incriminating character of the bottle was not immediately apparent.

1984The testimony of both officers established that their only purpose for approaching the premises was to further investigate the complaint of the unidentified citizen-informant who had advised them that she had seen the occupants of the camper "shooting up." The plain view rule is set forth in State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 525, 527 (La. 1979) as follows: "[w]hen an officer inadvertently observes evidence of a crime from a vantage point that does not intrude upon a protected area or when that protected area is entered with prior justification, there is no violation of the search warrant rule because

1979See e. g., State v. Banks, 363 So.2d 491 (La.1978); State v. Schmidt, 359 So.2d 133 (La.1978); State v. Parker, 355 So.2d 900 (La.1978). *1189 The plain view rule is set forth in State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 525 (La. 1979), as follows: "When an officer inadvertently observes evidence of a crime from a vantage point that does not intrude upon a protected area or when that protected area is entered with prior justification, there is no violation of the search warrant rule because there has been no `search'...." Insofar as the seizure of the preludin and its paraphernalia is concerned, the officers

1989State v. Schouest, 351 So.2d 462 (La.1977); State v. Bourg, 332 So.2d 235 (La.1976); State v. McGary, 397 So.2d 1305 (La.1981).

1986State v. Bourg, 332 So.2d 235 (La.1976); State v. Thomas, 310 So.2d 517 (La.1975); State v. Terracina, 309 So.2d 271 (La.1975).” State v. Parker, supra. The fundamental question is whether there is an intrusion into an area in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.