plain view doctrine in Colorado

2018“As with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the exigent circumstances exception may 6 combine with the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless search and seizure.” People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529, 535 (Colo. 1999).

2018"As with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the exigent circumstances exception may combine with the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless search and seizure." People v. Kluhsman , 980 P.2d 529 , 535 (Colo. 1999).

2024See People v. Alameno , 193 P.3d 830, 834 (Colo. 2008) (citing People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000)) ("[E]vidence that is not supported by a valid search warrant may still be admissible if it falls under one of several exceptions to the warrant requirement, 11 such as the plain view exception.").

2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers "are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see *277 while conducting otherwise legitimate searches." People v. Gothard , 185 P.3d 180 , 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218 , 1222 (Colo. 2000) ).

2015See, e.g., Herrera, ¶ 26, 357 P.3d at 1231 ; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo. 2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585 ; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo. 2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60 , 64 n.9 (Colo. 1998). ¶25 In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity without conducting a further search.

2015See, eg., Herrera, % 26, 357 P.3d at *416 1231; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo.2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585 ; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo.2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60 , 64 n.9 (Colo.1998). 125 In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity without conducting a further search.

2015We conclude, however, that the "Faith Fallout" folder is analogous to a closed container that could not reasonably contain texts between "Stazi" and Herrera, and that therefore the plain view exception does not apply. - ¶24 Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), this court has identified. three requirements for applying the plain view exception to warrantless searches: (1) the government's initial intrusion must be legitimate, (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence must be apparent immediately, and

2015We conclude, however, that the "Faith Fallout" folder is analogous to a closed container that could not reasonably contain texts between "Stazi" and Herrera, and that therefore the plain view exception does not apply. - ¶24 Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), this court has identified. three requirements for applying the plain view exception to warrantless searches: (1) the government's initial intrusion must be legitimate, (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence must be apparent immediately, and

1992The Plain View Doctrine “It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (holding that the plain view doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable).

1992The Plain View Doctrine “It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (holding that the plain view doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable).

1984In order for the plain view doctrine to apply, a police officer must have a “prior justification for an ihtrusion in the course of which he [comes] inadvertently across the piece of evidence incriminating the accused.” People v. Franklin, 640 P.2d 226, 229 (Colo.1982) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66 , 91 S.Ct. at 2037-38 ).

1983We have held that for the plain view doctrine to apply, a police officer must have a “prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he [comes] inadvertently across the piece of evidence incriminating the accused.” People v. Franklin, 640 P.2d 226, 229 (Colo.1982) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-2038 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)).

2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers "are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see *277 while conducting otherwise legitimate searches." People v. Gothard , 185 P.3d 180 , 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218 , 1222 (Colo. 2000) ).

2018See People v. Gothard , 185 P.3d 180 , 183 (Colo. 2008) (noting that to satisfy the plain view doctrine, the People must show, among other things, that the initial intrusion was legitimate).

2015See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); People v. Koehn, 178 P.3d 536, 537 (Colo. 2008). ¶20 The trial court found, and Swietlicki concedes, that the first and third requirements were satisfied but decided that the incriminating nature of the laptop was not immediately apparent.

2015See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); People v. Koehn, 178 P.3d 536, 537 (Colo.2008).

1982E.g., People v. Hearty, supra; People v. Franklin, supra; People v. Stoppel, supra. Of course, the propriety of the seizure depends upon the satisfaction of all the conditions of the plain view doctrine, particularly, as pertinent here, a prior valid intrusion, as well as an inadvertent discovery and reasonable cause to believe the article is incriminating.

1982We have recently explained the plain view doctrine in People v. Franklin, Colo., 640 P.2d 226 (1982) and People v. Stoppel, Colo., 637 P.2d 384 (1981).

2011"The rationale of the plain-view doctrine recognizes that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).

2011"The rationale of the plain-view doctrine recognizes that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).

2019Citing Riley 's recognition that the modern cell phones owned by many Americans hold "the privacies of life," we "proceed[ed] cautiously in applying the plain view doctrine to searches involving digital data." See id. at ¶ 35, 357 P.3d at 1233-34 (citing Riley , 573 U.S. at 403 , 134 S.Ct. 2473 ). ¶20 Most recently, in Carpenter v. United States , the Supreme Court again recognized the distinctive nature of cell phones. --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2206 , 2217-19, 201 L.Ed.2d 507 (2018).

2019See Carpenter , 138 S.Ct. at 2221 (holding that the government must generally obtain a search warrant before acquiring location information recorded by their wireless carriers); Riley , 573 U.S. at 401 , 134 S.Ct. 2473 ("Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest."); Herrera, ¶ 35, 357 P.3d at 1233-34 (holding that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement must be applied cautiously in situations involving digital

2015See, e.g., Herrera, ¶ 26, 357 P.3d at 1231 ; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo. 2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585 ; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo. 2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60 , 64 n.9 (Colo. 1998). ¶25 In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity without conducting a further search.

2015See, eg., Herrera, % 26, 357 P.3d at *416 1231; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo.2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585 ; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo.2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60 , 64 n.9 (Colo.1998). 125 In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity without conducting a further search.

2015See, e.g., Herrera, ¶ 26, 357 P.3d at 1231 ; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo. 2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585 ; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo. 2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60 , 64 n.9 (Colo. 1998). ¶25 In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity without conducting a further search.

2015See, eg., Herrera, % 26, 357 P.3d at *416 1231; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo.2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585 ; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo.2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60 , 64 n.9 (Colo.1998). 125 In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity without conducting a further search.

2024See People v. Alameno , 193 P.3d 830, 834 (Colo. 2008) (citing People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000)) ("[E]vidence that is not supported by a valid search warrant may still be admissible if it falls under one of several exceptions to the warrant requirement, 11 such as the plain view exception.").

2013People v. Alameno, 193 P.3d 830 , 834 (Colo.2008). *60 E.

2015See, e.g., United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 384 , 388 & n.17 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding plain view seizure of laptop and cellphones by an officer lacking probable cause where detective who instructed the officer to seize the laptop and cellphones had probable cause); United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding plain view seizure of defendant’s gun case, based on probable cause to believe the case held a gun and was therefore evidence of the crime of being a felon in possession of a gun, where seizing officers did not know defendant was a felon but another officer

2013E.g ., Banks, 514 F.3d at 776 ; Waldrop, 404 F.3d at 370 ; United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 , 810 (4th Cir.1996) ; United States v. Menon , 24 F.3d 550 , 562-63 (3d Cir.1994) ; United States v. Johnston , 784 F.2d 416 , 421 (1st Cir.1986) ; United States v. Rose , 695 F.2d 1356 , 1359 (10th Cir.1982).

2015See, e.g., United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 384 , 388 & n.17 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding plain view seizure of laptop and cellphones by an officer lacking probable cause where detective who instructed the officer to seize the laptop and cellphones had probable cause); United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding plain view seizure of defendant’s gun case, based on probable cause to believe the case held a gun and was therefore evidence of the crime of being a felon in possession of a gun, where seizing officers did not know defendant was a felon but another officer

2013E.g ., Banks, 514 F.3d at 776 ; Waldrop, 404 F.3d at 370 ; United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 , 810 (4th Cir.1996) ; United States v. Menon , 24 F.3d 550 , 562-63 (3d Cir.1994) ; United States v. Johnston , 784 F.2d 416 , 421 (1st Cir.1986) ; United States v. Rose , 695 F.2d 1356 , 1359 (10th Cir.1982).

2013See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 (although it "was the first step in a process" by which defendant was deprived of stereo equipment, no seizure occurred when a police officer lifted the equipment to record serial numbers); cf. People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 , 245 (Colo.App.1990) (officer's actions in recording a serial number on a turntable during a consent search did not constitute a seizure "because they did not interfere with any possessory interest"). ¶ 44 Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's admission of the turquoise shirt under the plain view exception.

2013See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 (although it "was the first step in a process" by which defendant was deprived of stereo equipment, no seizure occurred when a police officer lifted the equipment to record serial numbers); cf. People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 , 245 (Colo.App.1990) (officer's actions in recording a serial number on a turntable during a consent search did not constitute a seizure "because they did not interfere with any possessory interest"). ¶ 44 Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's admission of the turquoise shirt under the plain view exception.

1996See Hearty, 644 P.2d at 311 (“Given the highly incriminating character of [cocaine and narcotics paraphernalia] as contraband, there was no constitutional prohibition against their seizure under the plain view doctrine.”).

1982E.g., People v. Hearty, supra; People v. Franklin, supra; People v. Stoppel, supra. Of course, the propriety of the seizure depends upon the satisfaction of all the conditions of the plain view doctrine, particularly, as pertinent here, a prior valid intrusion, as well as an inadvertent discovery and reasonable cause to believe the article is incriminating.

2024See People v. Swietlicki, 2015 CO 67, ¶ 19 (listing the elements for the plain view exception).

2021The Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of a container that conceals its contents from plain view, and a search of the concealed contents of a seized container must be either accompanied by a search warrant or justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.5 Jackson, 5Although the pill bottle here was translucent enough to see that it contained pill-shaped objects, it was opaque in that it concealed the specific appearance or identity of the pills. 14 381 F.3d at 989 (a container may be properly be searched without a warrant, independent of lawfulness of its seizure, if its

2021The People argue that (1) the deputies’ search of the glove box was justifiable under a type of “vehicle paperwork” exception and (2) the deputies’ seizure of the pill bottle was proper under the plain view exception. 26 ¶ 54 The propriety of a warrantless search of an automobile’s glove box for vehicle paperwork has been approved in, for instance, New York, see Pryor, 896 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82, and New Jersey, see State v. Terry, 179 A.3d 378, 388 (N.J. 2018) (Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “[w]hen the operator of a vehicle is unable or unwilling to produce the registration or ownership p

2021The Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of a container that conceals its contents from plain view, and a search of the concealed contents of a seized container must be either accompanied by a search warrant or justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.5 Jackson, 5Although the pill bottle here was translucent enough to see that it contained pill-shaped objects, it was opaque in that it concealed the specific appearance or identity of the pills. 14 381 F.3d at 989 (a container may be properly be searched without a warrant, independent of lawfulness of its seizure, if its

2021The Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of a container that conceals its contents from plain view, and a search of the concealed contents of a seized container must be either accompanied by a search warrant or justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.5 Jackson, 5Although the pill bottle here was translucent enough to see that it contained pill-shaped objects, it was opaque in that it concealed the specific appearance or identity of the pills. 14 381 F.3d at 989 (a container may be properly be searched without a warrant, independent of lawfulness of its seizure, if its

2021See People v. Lopez, 453 P.3d 150, 152 (Cal. 2019) (“Considering the issue in light of more recent decisions from both the United States Supreme Court and our sister states, we now conclude that the desire to obtain a driver’s identification following a traffic stop does not constitute an independent, categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”). ¶ 56 Even if we were to endorse this exception, it would not benefit the People in this case.

2021The Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of a container that conceals its contents from plain view, and a search of the concealed contents of a seized container must be either accompanied by a search warrant or justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.5 Jackson, 5Although the pill bottle here was translucent enough to see that it contained pill-shaped objects, it was opaque in that it concealed the specific appearance or identity of the pills. 14 381 F.3d at 989 (a container may be properly be searched without a warrant, independent of lawfulness of its seizure, if its