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57 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fishergreen2 sentences2018See State v. Fisher , 283 Kan. 272 , 292-99, 154 P.3d 455 (2007). 2007The critical issue that caused the majority to conclude that the seizure of the trash bag was unlawful, which is expressed by the majority as "[a]n additional reason for us to reject the State's request to apply the plain view doctrine for justification of the seizure," is that Officer Jager exceeded the scope of his lawful intrusion on defendant's property in seizing the trash bag. ___ Kan. at ___, 154 P.3d at 473-74 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Gallowaygreen2 sentences2026In adopting the plain view exception, this court set out three criteria for its application: "1) the initial intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; 2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and 3) the incriminating character of the article is immediately apparent to searching authorities." Wonders, 263 Kan. at 592 (quoting State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87 , Syl. ¶ 2, 652 P.2d 673 [1982]). 2026In adopting the plain view exception, this court set out three criteria for its application: "1) the initial intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; 2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and 3) the incriminating character of the article is immediately apparent to searching authorities." Wonders, 263 Kan. at 592 (quoting State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87 , Syl. ¶ 2, 652 P.2d 673 [1982]). | 1 | 12 |
State v. Wondersgreen2 sentences2026In adopting the plain view exception, this court set out three criteria for its application: "1) the initial intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; 2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and 3) the incriminating character of the article is immediately apparent to searching authorities." Wonders, 263 Kan. at 592 (quoting State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87 , Syl. ¶ 2, 652 P.2d 673 [1982]). 2026If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if "its incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure." [Citations omitted.]'" Wonders, 263 Kan. at 590 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S. Ct. 2130 , 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 [1993]). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Evansgreen2 sentences2020But it also noted there was no exigent need for the officers to verify Evans' identity and—unlike a situation where a person is found unconscious or is unable to communicate with officers—no medical emergency necessitated the search. 308 Kan. at 1436-37; see also 308 Kan. at 1437 (citing Wright, 804 P.2d at 871 ) (observing that "the Legislature did not impose a duty on officers that would justify invading the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment when . . . the driver is conscious and able to answer the officer's questions about her identity"). 2020But it also noted there was no exigent need for the officers to verify Evans' identity and—unlike a situation where a person is found unconscious or is unable to communicate with officers—no medical emergency necessitated the search. 308 Kan. at 1436-37; see also 308 Kan. at 1437 (citing Wright, 804 P.2d at 871 ) (observing that "the Legislature did not impose a duty on officers that would justify invading the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment when . . . the driver is conscious and able to answer the officer's questions about her identity"). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bloodgreen2 sentences1971(State v. Blood, 190 Kan. 812 , 378 P. 2d 548 .) We hold that the plain view doctrine applies not only to obj'ects, but to actions observed. 1971(State v. Blood, 190 Kan. 812 , 378 P. 2d 548 .) We hold that the plain view doctrine applies not only to obj'ects, but to actions observed. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Boonegreen2 sentences1978State v. Boone, 220 Kan. 758 , 556 P.2d 864 (1976), and State v. Karney, 208 Kan. 677 , 494 P.2d 1204 (1972), are cases which examine the admissibility of evidence seized from cars under the plain view doctrine. 1978State v. Boone, 220 Kan. 758 , 556 P.2d 864 (1976), and State v. Karney, 208 Kan. 677 , 494 P.2d 1204 (1972), are cases which examine the admissibility of evidence seized from cars under the plain view doctrine. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2020But it also noted there was no exigent need for the officers to verify Evans' identity and—unlike a situation where a person is found unconscious or is unable to communicate with officers—no medical emergency necessitated the search. 308 Kan. at 1436-37; see also 308 Kan. at 1437 (citing Wright, 804 P.2d at 871 ) (observing that "the Legislature did not impose a duty on officers that would justify invading the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment when . . . the driver is conscious and able to answer the officer's questions about her identity"). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Deleongreen1 sentence2018This is common sense."); United States v. Newton , 463 Fed. Appx. 462 , 466-67 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (holding probable cause to obtain a search warrant sufficient based on the smell of marijuana coming from an apartment and the resident fleeing from the officers when he knocked on the door); see also United States v. DeLeon , 979 F.2d 761 , 764-65 (9th Cir. 1992) (smell of growing marijuana alone did not provide probable cause because "there was no finding that [the person claiming to smell marijuana] was qualified to recognize the odor of growing marijuana, which doubtlessly d | 1 | 1 |
State v. Torresgreen2 sentences2018App. 2d at 266 , 386 P.3d 532 . 2018The Court of Appeals rejected a third exception the district court had cited-the plain-view exception. 53 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bakergreen1 sentence2018See United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 , 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (equating smelling marijuana with the plain view doctrine, stating "[t]hese facts [-seeing the boxes and smelling marijuana-] combined to place the contraband in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses"); Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275 , 280-81 (Colo. 1999) ("In holding that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained police officer."); People v. Baker , 813 P.2d 331 , 333 (Colo. 1991) ("[O]fficers had probable | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gomezgreen1 sentence2018See United States v. Gomez , 807 F.Supp.2d 1134 , 1141 (S.D. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2018See United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 , 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (equating smelling marijuana with the plain view doctrine, stating "[t]hese facts [-seeing the boxes and smelling marijuana-] combined to place the contraband in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses"); Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275 , 280-81 (Colo. 1999) ("In holding that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained police officer."); People v. Baker , 813 P.2d 331 , 333 (Colo. 1991) ("[O]fficers had probable 2018See United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 , 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (equating smelling marijuana with the plain view doctrine, stating "[t]hese facts [-seeing the boxes and smelling marijuana-] combined to place the contraband in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses"); Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275 , 280-81 (Colo. 1999) ("In holding that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained police officer."); People v. Baker , 813 P.2d 331 , 333 (Colo. 1991) ("[O]fficers had probable | 1 | 1 |
State v. Keenangreen2 sentences2018See State v. Keenan , 304 Kan. 986 , 993, 377 P.3d 439 (2016). 2018See State v. Keenan , 304 Kan. 986 , 993, 377 P.3d 439 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Sifuentesgreen1 sentence2018See United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 , 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (equating smelling marijuana with the plain view doctrine, stating "[t]hese facts [-seeing the boxes and smelling marijuana-] combined to place the contraband in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses"); Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275 , 280-81 (Colo. 1999) ("In holding that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained police officer."); People v. Baker , 813 P.2d 331 , 333 (Colo. 1991) ("[O]fficers had probable | 1 | 1 |
Mendez v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2018See United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 , 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (equating smelling marijuana with the plain view doctrine, stating "[t]hese facts [-seeing the boxes and smelling marijuana-] combined to place the contraband in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses"); Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275 , 280-81 (Colo. 1999) ("In holding that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained police officer."); People v. Baker , 813 P.2d 331 , 333 (Colo. 1991) ("[O]fficers had probable | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Waldschmidtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Vandeveldegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sanchez-Loredogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Phillip E. Nauglegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Charles S. Hammettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gockengreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Michael Antonio Rossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kenneth David Cushniegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Goodmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences2003Although warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, Kansas adopted the plain view exception of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L. 2003Although warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, Kansas adopted the plain view exception of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L. | 11 | 1976–2007 |
Minnesota v. Dickerson
green
2 sentences2026If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if "its incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure." [Citations omitted.]'" Wonders, 263 Kan. at 590 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S. Ct. 2130 , 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 [1993]). 2026If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if "its incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure." [Citations omitted.]'" Wonders, 263 Kan. at 590 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S. Ct. 2130 , 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 [1993]). | 5 | 1996–2026 |
State v. Parker
green
2 sentences2002Under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement, a law enforcement official can seize evidence of a crime if “ ‘(1) the initial intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating character of the article is immediately apparent to searching authorities.’ ” State v. Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, 843 , 964 P.2d 681 (1998) (quoting State v. Parker, 236 Kan. 353 , Syl. ¶ 2, 690 P.2d 1353 [1984]). 2002Under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement, a law enforcement official can seize evidence of a crime if “ ‘(1) the initial intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating character of the article is immediately apparent to searching authorities.’ ” State v. Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, 843 , 964 P.2d 681 (1998) (quoting State v. Parker, 236 Kan. 353 , Syl. ¶ 2, 690 P.2d 1353 [1984]). | 4 | 1986–2013 |
Griffin v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2003Ed. 2d 564 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , reh. denied 404 U.S. 874 (1971), in State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87, 90-94 , 652 P.2d 673 (1982). 1998Ed. 2d 564 , 91 S. Ct. 2002 , reh. denied 404 U.S. 874 (1971), for the three basic requirements, previously set forth, which must be met before the plain view exception may be applied. 232 Kan. at 91 . | 4 | 1990–2003 |
State v. Canaan
green
2 sentences2018The court held: "When [the law enforcement officer], while investigating the accident scene, opened the wallet and observed the victim's driver's license in the black wallet, the plain view doctrine applied." 265 Kan. at 843 , 964 P.2d 681 . 2018The court held: "When [the law enforcement officer], while investigating the accident scene, opened the wallet and observed the victim's driver's license in the black wallet, the plain view doctrine applied." 265 Kan. at 843 , 964 P.2d 681 . | 3 | 2002–2018 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2014And in upholding the search, the court observed: “Among the well-established legitimate reasons’ for a police officer to be present on privately occupied premises is in response to an emergency.” 2 Kan. 1997The court distinguished the case from those where plain view has been used to justify a warrantless entry absent exigent circumstances, because the plain view observance only occurred after the legitimate emergency entry. 2 Kan. | 3 | 1979–2014 |
Horton v. California
green
2 sentences2003Inadvertence was subsequently eliminated as a plain view exception requirement in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 L. 2003Inadvertence was subsequently eliminated as a plain view exception requirement in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 L. | 3 | 1990–2003 |
State v. Riddle
green
2 sentences2006Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).’ “Another exception is the plain feel’ corollary to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).” Here, the State relied upon probable cause with exigent circumstances. 2006Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).’ “Another exception is the plain feel’ corollary to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).” Here, the State relied upon probable cause with exigent circumstances. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Steagald v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).’ “Another exception is the plain feel’ corollary to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).” Here, the State relied upon probable cause with exigent circumstances. 2003Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).” Another exception is the “plain feel” corollaiy to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998). | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Texas v. Brown
red
2 sentences1996Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39 .” 247 Kan. at 476-77 . *123 In State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87, 94 , 652 P.2d 673 (1982), the court considered the argument that “ ‘exigent circumstances’ [must] always be present before the plain view exception is applicable.” The argument was rejected in favor of “the better view,” which “is that die ‘exigent circumstance’ requirement applies only where the searching authority uses plain view as justification for the intrusion.” 232 Kan. at 94 . 1985Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983). | 2 | 1985–1996 |
State v. Schur
green
2 sentences1976Relying upon State v. Schur, 217 Kan. 741 , 538 P. 2d 689 , defendant advances the argument that even though the ski mask was in Baker s plain view, he was still not justified in making a warrantless search and seizure in the absence of “exigent circumstances.” We have recognized the plain view doctrine is subject to certain limitations. 1976Relying upon State v. Schur, 217 Kan. 741 , 538 P. 2d 689 , defendant advances the argument that even though the ski mask was in Baker s plain view, he was still not justified in making a warrantless search and seizure in the absence of “exigent circumstances.” We have recognized the plain view doctrine is subject to certain limitations. | 2 | 1976–1979 |
State v. Daino
green
2 sentences2026State v. Daino, 312 Kan. 390 , 396, 475 P.3d 354 (2020). 2026State v. Daino, 312 Kan. 390 , 396, 475 P.3d 354 (2020). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Doelz
green
1 sentence2022Doelz, 309 Kan. 133 , Syl. ¶ 2. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Neighbors
green
2 sentences2018In order for the plain view exception to apply, the officer must be lawfully present at the location at which he or she views the evidence, "[a]nd the object's incriminating character must be immediately apparent without conducting some further search of the object." 299 Kan. at 252 , 328 P.3d 1081 . 2018In order for the plain view exception to apply, the officer must be lawfully present at the location at which he or she views the evidence, "[a]nd the object's incriminating character must be immediately apparent without conducting some further search of the object." 299 Kan. at 252 , 328 P.3d 1081 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. John Newton
green
1 sentence2018This is common sense."); United States v. Newton , 463 Fed. Appx. 462 , 466-67 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (holding probable cause to obtain a search warrant sufficient based on the smell of marijuana coming from an apartment and the resident fleeing from the officers when he knocked on the door); see also United States v. DeLeon , 979 F.2d 761 , 764-65 (9th Cir. 1992) (smell of growing marijuana alone did not provide probable cause because "there was no finding that [the person claiming to smell marijuana] was qualified to recognize the odor of growing marijuana, which doubtlessly d | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Campbell neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Smith v. District Court of Oklahoma County green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Commonwealth v. English green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Patrick Carey green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Mincey v. Arizona green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Reno green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ross v. United States green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State Ex Rel. Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino Bearing Vin 136807Z141367 green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. Leon green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Galloway v. Kansas green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Epperson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Marks green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Cardwell v. Lewis green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Vincent and Barbara Liberti, Movants-Appellees green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Worthington v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| United States v. Ford green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| United States v. James Lee Worthington green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| United States v. William Bruce Hare green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Opperman red | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Howard green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Turner neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Hanes neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Hubbard green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.