plain view exception in Kansas

2003Although warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, Kansas adopted the plain view exception of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L.

2003Although warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, Kansas adopted the plain view exception of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L.

1998Ed. 2d 564 , 91 S. Ct. 2002 , reh. denied 404 U.S. 874 (1971), for the three basic requirements, previously set forth, which must be met before the plain view exception may be applied. 232 Kan. at 91 .

1984These three basic requirements for the plain view exception were adopted and approved by the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , reh. denied 404 U.S. 874 (1971).

2019Much more is constitutionally required, to-wit: " 'Under [the plain-view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a **141 warrant. [Citations omitted.] If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object-i.e., if "its incriminating character [is not] 'immediately apparent,' " [citation omitted]-the plain-view doct

2019Much more is constitutionally required, to-wit: " 'Under [the plain-view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a **141 warrant. [Citations omitted.] If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object-i.e., if "its incriminating character [is not] 'immediately apparent,' " [citation omitted]-the plain-view doct

2014And in upholding the search, the court observed: “Among the well-established legitimate reasons’ for a police officer to be present on privately occupied premises is in response to an emergency.” 2 Kan.

1997The court distinguished the case from those where plain view has been used to justify a warrantless entry absent exigent circumstances, because the plain view observance only occurred after the legitimate emergency entry. 2 Kan.

1998Under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement, a law enforcement official can seize evidence of a crime if “(1) the initial intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating character of the article is immediately apparent to searching authorities.” State v. Parker, 236 Kan. 353 , Syl. ¶ 2, 690 P.2d 1353 (1984).

1998Under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement, a law enforcement official can seize evidence of a crime if “(1) the initial intrusion which afforded authorities the plain view is lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating character of the article is immediately apparent to searching authorities.” State v. Parker, 236 Kan. 353 , Syl. ¶ 2, 690 P.2d 1353 (1984).

2003Inadvertence was subsequently eliminated as a plain view exception requirement in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 L.

2003Inadvertence was subsequently eliminated as a plain view exception requirement in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 L.

2018The court held: "When [the law enforcement officer], while investigating the accident scene, opened the wallet and observed the victim's driver's license in the black wallet, the plain view doctrine applied." 265 Kan. at 843 , 964 P.2d 681 .

2018The court held: "When [the law enforcement officer], while investigating the accident scene, opened the wallet and observed the victim's driver's license in the black wallet, the plain view doctrine applied." 265 Kan. at 843 , 964 P.2d 681 .

2006Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).’ “Another exception is the plain feel’ corollary to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).” Here, the State relied upon probable cause with exigent circumstances.

2006Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).’ “Another exception is the plain feel’ corollary to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).” Here, the State relied upon probable cause with exigent circumstances.

2006Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).’ “Another exception is the plain feel’ corollary to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).” Here, the State relied upon probable cause with exigent circumstances.

2003Ed. 2d 38 , 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981) (recognizing hot pursuit exception as one example of exigent circumstances exception); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 280 , 788 P.2d 266 (1990) (same).” Another exception is the “plain feel” corollaiy to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement which we adopted in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582 , Syl. ¶ 7, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).

1996Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39 .” 247 Kan. at 476-77 . *123 In State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87, 94 , 652 P.2d 673 (1982), the court considered the argument that “ ‘exigent circumstances’ [must] always be present before the plain view exception is applicable.” The argument was rejected in favor of “the better view,” which “is that die ‘exigent circumstance’ requirement applies only where the searching authority uses plain view as justification for the intrusion.” 232 Kan. at 94 .

1985Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983).

1976Relying upon State v. Schur, 217 Kan. 741 , 538 P. 2d 689 , defendant advances the argument that even though the ski mask was in Baker s plain view, he was still not justified in making a warrantless search and seizure in the absence of “exigent circumstances.” We have recognized the plain view doctrine is subject to certain limitations.

1976Relying upon State v. Schur, 217 Kan. 741 , 538 P. 2d 689 , defendant advances the argument that even though the ski mask was in Baker s plain view, he was still not justified in making a warrantless search and seizure in the absence of “exigent circumstances.” We have recognized the plain view doctrine is subject to certain limitations.

2022Doelz, 309 Kan. 133 , Syl. ¶ 2.

2019Recently, in the context of the search of a purse and billfold retrieved from an automobile, we instructed: "Where a container is involved, complying with the warrant requirement or one of its well-delineated exceptions is required because the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container if the container conceals its contents from plain view." State v. Evans , 308 Kan. 1422 , Syl. ¶ 4, 430 P.3d 1 (2018).

2018This is common sense."); United States v. Newton , 463 Fed.

2018In order for the plain view exception to apply, the officer must be lawfully present at the location at which he or she views the evidence, "[a]nd the object's incriminating character must be immediately apparent without conducting some further search of the object." 299 Kan. at 252 , 328 P.3d 1081 .

2018In order for the plain view exception to apply, the officer must be lawfully present at the location at which he or she views the evidence, "[a]nd the object's incriminating character must be immediately apparent without conducting some further search of the object." 299 Kan. at 252 , 328 P.3d 1081 .

2018See United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 , 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (equating smelling marijuana with the plain view doctrine, stating "[t]hese facts [-seeing the boxes and smelling marijuana-] combined to place the contraband in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses"); Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275 , 280-81 (Colo. 1999) ("In holding that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained police officer."); People v. Baker , 813 P.2d 331 , 333 (Colo. 1991) ("[O]fficers had probable

2018See United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 , 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (equating smelling marijuana with the plain view doctrine, stating "[t]hese facts [-seeing the boxes and smelling marijuana-] combined to place the contraband in plain view, that is, obvious to the senses"); Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275 , 280-81 (Colo. 1999) ("In holding that probable cause existed in this case, we emphasize that the smell of burning marijuana is sufficiently distinctive as to be readily identifiable to a trained police officer."); People v. Baker , 813 P.2d 331 , 333 (Colo. 1991) ("[O]fficers had probable

2013State v. Campbell, No. 101,860, 2010 WL 2348692 (Kan.