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119 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Murraygreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Murray, 84 Wn.2d at 534 (holding the plain view exception did not apply when the officers tilted a television to read serial numbers that would prove the television was illegally acquired). 3 No. 99546-0 Madsen, J., concurring Unlike Morgan, where the majority determined the officer’s search was justified based on the surrounding circumstances, Morgan, 193 Wn.2d at 372 , the majority here correctly requires the officer to have immediate, apparent knowledge that there was incriminating evidence before them. 2016NO MANIPULATION Citing State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527 , 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), Schwartz also argues that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement does not apply because, rather than immediately recognize the contraband, Trooper Hicks had to “manipulate” the suspected material by picking up the straw to determine whether it contained drugs. | 4 | 10 |
State v. Chrismangreen2 sentences1985Thus, while the actions of the officers in Sharpe and Johns received sanction, the Court refused to permit the 90-min-ute warrantless detention of luggage in Place. 10 See also State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814 , 676 P.2d 419 (1984) as to the continued vitality of the plain view exception. 11 In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 77 L. 1985Thus, while the actions of the officers in Sharpe and Johns received sanction, the Court refused to permit the 90-min-ute warrantless detention of luggage in Place. 10 See also State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814 , 676 P.2d 419 (1984) as to the continued vitality of the plain view exception. 11 In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 77 L. | 3 | 11 |
State v. Lairgreen2 sentences2020This recognition is at the core of the plain view doctrine.” State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 719 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981). 2020This recognition is at the core of the plain view doctrine.” State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 719 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981). | 3 | 10 |
State v. Templegreen2 sentences2018State v. Temple, 170 Wn. 2013State v. Temple, 170 Wn. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Rosegreen2 sentences2016App. 644, 646 , 490 P.2d 123 (1971) (officer’s use of a flashlight to see contraband inside vehicle from lawful vantage point did not transform an otherwise lawful search under the plain view doctrine into an unlawful search) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 398-399 , 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (holding that use of a flashlight to see items left in plain sight, visible through an unobstructed window did not transform an observation that would fall within the open view doctrine during the daylight into an impermissible searc 2016App. 644, 646 , 490 P.2d 123 (1971) (officer’s use of a flashlight to see contraband inside vehicle from lawful vantage point did not transform an otherwise lawful search under the plain view doctrine into an unlawful search) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 398-399 , 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (holding that use of a flashlight to see items left in plain sight, visible through an unobstructed window did not transform an observation that would fall within the open view doctrine during the daylight into an impermissible searc | 3 | 3 |
State v. Hatchiegreen2 sentences2023On these bases, the court held that the officers were justified in reading and running the serial number. 3 “The plain view doctrine applies ‘when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity.’ ” State v. Morgan, 193 Wn.2d 365, 370 , 440 P.3d 136 (2019) (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). 4 The trial court did not appear to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the CrR 3.6 hearing. 5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 2023On these bases, the court held that the officers were justified in reading and running the serial number. 3 “The plain view doctrine applies ‘when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity.’ ” State v. Morgan, 193 Wn.2d 365, 370 , 440 P.3d 136 (2019) (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). 4 The trial court did not appear to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the CrR 3.6 hearing. 5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , | 2 | 9 |
State v. O'Neillgreen2 sentences2016App. 644, 646 , 490 P.2d 123 (1971) (officer’s use of a flashlight to see contraband inside vehicle from lawful vantage point did not transform an otherwise lawful search under the plain view doctrine into an unlawful search) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 398-399 , 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (holding that use of a flashlight to see items left in plain sight, visible through an unobstructed window did not transform an observation that would fall within the open view doctrine during the daylight into an impermissible searc 2016App. 644, 646 , 490 P.2d 123 (1971) (officer’s use of a flashlight to see contraband inside vehicle from lawful vantage point did not transform an otherwise lawful search under the plain view doctrine into an unlawful search) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 398-399 , 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (holding that use of a flashlight to see items left in plain sight, visible through an unobstructed window did not transform an observation that would fall within the open view doctrine during the daylight into an impermissible searc | 2 | 8 |
State v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2013At the very least, “[u]nder the plain view doctrine, an officer must: (1) have a prior justification for the intrusion; (2) inadvertently discover the incriminating evidence; and (3) immediately recognize the item as contraband.” State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 346 , 815 P.2d 761 (1991) (citing State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 726 P.2d 445 (1986)). 2013At the very least, “[u]nder the plain view doctrine, an officer must: (1) have a prior justification for the intrusion; (2) inadvertently discover the incriminating evidence; and (3) immediately recognize the item as contraband.” State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 346 , 815 P.2d 761 (1991) (citing State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 726 P.2d 445 (1986)). | 2 | 7 |
Arizona v. Hicksgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Johnson , 104 Wash. App. 489 , 501-02, 17 P.3d 3 (2001) (discussing Hicks , 480 U.S. at 328 -29 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 (manipulating stereo equipment that an officer reasonably suspects may be incriminating evidence to determine the serial number, which would give the officer probable cause, constitutes an unlawful search under the plain view doctrine)). ¶25 While we have generally recognized that "a policeman in the course of a valid search is entitled to keep his senses open to the possibility of ... evidence of a crime," Lair, 95 Wash.2d at 719 , 630 P.2d 427 , we have never suggeste 2019See State v. Johnson , 104 Wash. App. 489 , 501-02, 17 P.3d 3 (2001) (discussing Hicks , 480 U.S. at 328 -29 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 (manipulating stereo equipment that an officer reasonably suspects may be incriminating evidence to determine the serial number, which would give the officer probable cause, constitutes an unlawful search under the plain view doctrine)). ¶25 While we have generally recognized that "a policeman in the course of a valid search is entitled to keep his senses open to the possibility of ... evidence of a crime," Lair, 95 Wash.2d at 719 , 630 P.2d 427 , we have never suggeste | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Patrick Careygreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Whiteyellow | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Ladsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Commonwealth v. Cohengreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Myersgreen2 sentences2019We have said the plain view doctrine applies "when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity." State v. Hatchie, 161 Wash.2d 390 , 395, 166 P.3d 698 (2007) (citing State v. Myers, 117 Wash.2d 332 , 346, 815 P.2d 761 (1991) ). 2019We have said the plain view doctrine applies "when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity." State v. Hatchie, 161 Wash.2d 390 , 395, 166 P.3d 698 (2007) (citing State v. Myers, 117 Wash.2d 332 , 346, 815 P.2d 761 (1991) ). | 1 | 8 |
State v. Seagullgreen2 sentences2026State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901-02 , 632 P.2d 44 (1981); see also State v. Littlefair, 129 Wn. 1982Such a rule would contradict the first requirement in Daugherty that the officer have a prior justification for the intrusion, id. at 267 , when conducting an investigation of apparently clandestine activity that discloses evidence in "plain view." Because such investigations necessarily demand an inquiring and cautious disposition on the part of the officer involved, the term "inadvertent," in the context of the plain view doctrine, simply means that the officer discovered the evidence while in a position that does not infringe upon any reasonable expectation of privacy, and did not take any | 1 | 6 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2023On these bases, the court held that the officers were justified in reading and running the serial number. 3 “The plain view doctrine applies ‘when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity.’ ” State v. Morgan, 193 Wn.2d 365, 370 , 440 P.3d 136 (2019) (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). 4 The trial court did not appear to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the CrR 3.6 hearing. 5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 2023On these bases, the court held that the officers were justified in reading and running the serial number. 3 “The plain view doctrine applies ‘when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity.’ ” State v. Morgan, 193 Wn.2d 365, 370 , 440 P.3d 136 (2019) (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). 4 The trial court did not appear to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the CrR 3.6 hearing. 5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , | 1 | 4 |
State v. Morgangreen2 sentences2023On these bases, the court held that the officers were justified in reading and running the serial number. 3 “The plain view doctrine applies ‘when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity.’ ” State v. Morgan, 193 Wn.2d 365, 370 , 440 P.3d 136 (2019) (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). 4 The trial court did not appear to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the CrR 3.6 hearing. 5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 2023On these bases, the court held that the officers were justified in reading and running the serial number. 3 “The plain view doctrine applies ‘when the police (1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity.’ ” State v. Morgan, 193 Wn.2d 365, 370 , 440 P.3d 136 (2019) (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). 4 The trial court did not appear to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the CrR 3.6 hearing. 5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , | 1 | 4 |
State v. Caglegreen2 sentences2016App. 644, 646 , 490 P.2d 123 (1971) (officer’s use of a flashlight to see contraband inside vehicle from lawful vantage point did not transform an otherwise lawful search under the plain view doctrine into an unlawful search) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 398-399 , 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (holding that use of a flashlight to see items left in plain sight, visible through an unobstructed window did not transform an observation that would fall within the open view doctrine during the daylight into an impermissible searc 1975The plain view doctrine comes into play only when the officer “has a right to be in a position to have that view.” State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Palmergreen2 sentences1979App. 405, 410-11 , 487 P.2d 627 (1971) as restated in State v. Campbell, supra at 729 is apposite: [W]e held the plain view doctrine applicable where the evidence seized was inside of a brown bag, and thus technically not "immediately" known to be evidence, where the officers had, as they did here, probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence was contained therein. 1979App. 405, 410-11 , 487 P.2d 627 (1971) as restated in State v. Campbell, supra at 729 is apposite: [W]e held the plain view doctrine applicable where the evidence seized was inside of a brown bag, and thus technically not "immediately" known to be evidence, where the officers had, as they did here, probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence was contained therein. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Stevensongreen2 sentences2020See Stevenson, - 17 - 55 Wn. App. at 732 n.5 (distinguishing Mincey as involving the unlawful seizure of incriminating evidence from concealed places rather than the lawful seizure of evidence in plain view). 2020Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. at 730 ; see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 , 98 S. Ct. 1942 , 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978). | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Claflingreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Bustamante-Davilagreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Broadnaxgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Ballgreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Mortimer R. Wheelergreen | 1 | 2 |
| Marron v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Littlefairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nelson v. McClatchy Newpapers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michigan v. Tylergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ortegagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jack Bruce Folkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Goodingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kullgreen2 sentences2016Officers do not need to be certain the item is evidence of a crime—“probable cause is sufficient.” the requirements for a plain view search without mentioning inadvertent discovery); State v. Ruem, 179 Wn.2d 195, 200 , 313 P.3d 1156 (2013) (defining the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7 and omitting inadvertent discovery); but see State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85 , 118 P.3d 307 (2005) (including the inadvertent discovery requirement, without analysis, based on State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn.2d 711, 715 , 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev’d and remanded on other grounds 2016Officers do not need to be certain the item is evidence of a crime—“probable cause is sufficient.” the requirements for a plain view search without mentioning inadvertent discovery); State v. Ruem, 179 Wn.2d 195, 200 , 313 P.3d 1156 (2013) (defining the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7 and omitting inadvertent discovery); but see State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85 , 118 P.3d 307 (2005) (including the inadvertent discovery requirement, without analysis, based on State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn.2d 711, 715 , 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev’d and remanded on other grounds | 1 | 6 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences2016The inadvertent discovery requirement under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement first appeared in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).3 In Coolidge, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, considered the application of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement in depth and referenced the inadvertent discovery of evidence: What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evi 2016The inadvertent discovery requirement under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement first appeared in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).3 In Coolidge, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, considered the application of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement in depth and referenced the inadvertent discovery of evidence: What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evi | 19 | 1971–2016 |
State v. Hudson
green
2 sentences2020This prong of the plain view exception is established ‘“when, considering the surrounding circumstances, the police can reasonably conclude’ that the subject evidence is 9 associated with a crime.” Id. at 372 (quoting State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 118 , 874 P.2d 160 (1994)). 2020This prong of the plain view exception is established ‘“when, considering the surrounding circumstances, the police can reasonably conclude’ that the subject evidence is 9 associated with a crime.” Id. at 372 (quoting State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 118 , 874 P.2d 160 (1994)). | 13 | 2003–2021 |
State v. Chrisman
red
2 sentences2016Officers do not need to be certain the item is evidence of a crime—“probable cause is sufficient.” the requirements for a plain view search without mentioning inadvertent discovery); State v. Ruem, 179 Wn.2d 195, 200 , 313 P.3d 1156 (2013) (defining the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7 and omitting inadvertent discovery); but see State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85 , 118 P.3d 307 (2005) (including the inadvertent discovery requirement, without analysis, based on State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn.2d 711, 715 , 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev’d and remanded on other grounds 2016Officers do not need to be certain the item is evidence of a crime—“probable cause is sufficient.” the requirements for a plain view search without mentioning inadvertent discovery); State v. Ruem, 179 Wn.2d 195, 200 , 313 P.3d 1156 (2013) (defining the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7 and omitting inadvertent discovery); but see State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85 , 118 P.3d 307 (2005) (including the inadvertent discovery requirement, without analysis, based on State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn.2d 711, 715 , 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev’d and remanded on other grounds | 7 | 1984–2016 |
State v. Dimmer
green
2 sentences2016Since O’Neill, our Washington Supreme Court seems to have omitted the inadvertent discovery requirement from its analysis of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7.4 4 See, e.g., State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d 557, 565-66 , 69 P.3d 862 (2003) (discussing the plain view exception to the warrant requirement when applied to article I, section 7, without referencing inadvertent discovery); State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007) (setting forth 8 No. 48813-2-II Bunn cites State v. Murray, 8 Wn. App. 944 , 509 P.2d 1003 (1973) and State v. 2016Since O’Neill, our Washington Supreme Court seems to have omitted the inadvertent discovery requirement from its analysis of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7.4 4 See, e.g., State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d 557, 565-66 , 69 P.3d 862 (2003) (discussing the plain view exception to the warrant requirement when applied to article I, section 7, without referencing inadvertent discovery); State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007) (setting forth 8 No. 48813-2-II Bunn cites State v. Murray, 8 Wn. App. 944 , 509 P.2d 1003 (1973) and State v. | 5 | 1974–2016 |
Washington v. Chrisman
green
2 sentences2016Officers do not need to be certain the item is evidence of a crime—“probable cause is sufficient.” the requirements for a plain view search without mentioning inadvertent discovery); State v. Ruem, 179 Wn.2d 195, 200 , 313 P.3d 1156 (2013) (defining the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7 and omitting inadvertent discovery); but see State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85 , 118 P.3d 307 (2005) (including the inadvertent discovery requirement, without analysis, based on State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn.2d 711, 715 , 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev’d and remanded on other grounds 1987Because the officers had prior lawful justification for their intrusion, the contraband inadvertently observed, and immediately recognizable, is admissible under the plain view exception, State v. Chrisman, 94 Wn.2d 711, 715 , 619 P.2d 971 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 1 , 70 L. | 5 | 1982–2016 |
State v. Weller
green
2 sentences2017Weller, 185 Wn. 2017State v. Weller, 185 Wn. | 4 | 2015–2017 |
Washington v. Murray
green
2 sentences1986State v. Chrisman, supra; State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534 , 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). 1981Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wn.2d 263, 267-68 , 616 P.2d 649 (1980); State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527 , 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 , 44 L.Ed.2d 673 , 95 S.Ct. 2407 (1975); State v. Johnson, 17 Wn. App. 153 , 561 P.2d 701 (1977). | 4 | 1976–1986 |
Robinson v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences2017State Br. at 25 (referencing "several alternatives that are less intrusive searches," but rejecting these alternatives because they are "more expensive and inconvenient"). 23 Recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement "include 'exigent circumstances, consent, searches incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, the plain view doctrine, and Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)] investigative stops.'" York, 163 Wn.2d at 310 (quoting Robinson, 102 Wn. App. at 813 ). 2'* Indeed, it appears that the framers intended to give both the legislature and the cou 2008These exceptions include “exigent circumstances, consent, searches incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, the plain view doctrine, and Terry[ 11 ] investigative stops.” Robinson, 102 Wn. | 3 | 2008–2017 |
State v. Hammond
green
2 sentences2013App. 596, 598 , 603 P.2d 377 (1979). 2 The plain view exception still applies when law enforcement officers "' ( 1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity. " 1 Lead opinion at 5 (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). 2013App. 596,598 , 603 P.2d 377 (1979). 13 The plain view exception still applies when law enforcement officers “ ‘(1) have a valid justification to be in an otherwise protected area and (2) are immediately able to realize the evidence they see is associated with criminal activity.’ ” Lead opinion at 200 (quoting State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390,395 , 166 P.3d 698 (2007)). | 3 | 1982–2013 |
State v. Lemus
green
2 sentences2026“The ‘plain view’ doctrine applies after the officer intrudes into an area or activity where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.” State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 102 , 11 P.3d 326 (2000) (quoting State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901 , 632 P.2d 44 (1981). 2026“The ‘plain view’ doctrine applies after the officer intrudes into an area or activity where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.” State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 102 , 11 P.3d 326 (2000) (quoting State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901 , 632 P.2d 44 (1981). | 2 | 2025–2026 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2020Id. at 201 . 1981Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wn.2d 263, 267-68 , 616 P.2d 649 (1980); State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527 , 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 , 44 L.Ed.2d 673 , 95 S.Ct. 2407 (1975); State v. Johnson, 17 Wn. App. 153 , 561 P.2d 701 (1977). | 2 | 1981–2020 |
State v. Bell
yellow
2 sentences1993In this case, other factors, such as the fact that Compton was elderly and had mental health problems, support the conclusion that she may have been alive in her home but ill or otherwise unresponsive to phone calls or visitors. 9 As the Supreme Court held in Bell , it is not necessary to establish that exigent circumstances were present if the first element of the plain view doctrine is otherwise satisfied. "[E]xigent circumstances are merely one factor to be considered in determining if the seizing officers' intrusion was justified." 108 Wn.2d at 198 . 10 We also note that, even if the evide 1993Thus, the first two elements of the plain view doctrine are satisfied. 9 As for the third element, "[a]ll that is required to satisfy the 'immediate knowledge' element is a reasonable belief that evidence is present." Bell, 108 Wn.2d at 197-98 . | 2 | 1993–2020 |
State v. Gibson
green
2 sentences2020State v. Gibson, 152 Wn. 2016State v. Gibson, 152 Wn. | 2 | 2016–2020 |
| State v. Garvin green | 2 | 2015–2019 |
| Texas v. Brown red | 2 | 1987–2016 |
| Horton v. California green | 2 | 1994–2016 |
| State v. Ruem green | 2 | 2015–2016 |
| State v. Murray green | 2 | 1974–2016 |
| Minnesota v. Dickerson green | 2 | 1994–2009 |
| State v. Winterstein green | 2 | 2006–2008 |
| State v. Alexander neutral | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Dennis green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Watkins green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Thompson v. Louisiana green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Broadnax yellow | 2 | 1993–1994 |
| State v. Daugherty green | 2 | 1981–1984 |
| State v. Callahan green | 2 | 1984–1984 |
| Washington v. Daugherty green | 2 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Henry neutral | 2 | 1984–1984 |
| Harris v. United States green | 2 | 1971–1981 |
| Morgan v. Washington neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State Of Washington v. Rachel C. Rawley green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Burleson green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Parker green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Kipp green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State Of Washington, Res/cross-app. v. George Donald Hatt, Jr., App/cross-res. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary red | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Houser green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Alger green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.