31 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lohgreen2 sentences2025The plain view doctrine 11 permits officers, “‘under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.’” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996) (providing an overview of Montana case law regarding the plain view doctrine and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciation of the doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))). 2025The plain view doctrine 11 permits officers, “‘under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.’” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996) (providing an overview of Montana case law regarding the plain view doctrine and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciation of the doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))). | 8 | 13 |
Horton v. Californiagreen2 sentences2025The plain view doctrine 11 permits officers, “‘under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.’” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996) (providing an overview of Montana case law regarding the plain view doctrine and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciation of the doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))). 2025The plain view doctrine 11 permits officers, “‘under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.’” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996) (providing an overview of Montana case law regarding the plain view doctrine and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciation of the doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))). | 5 | 8 |
United States v. Smithgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F.Supp.2d 1111 (C.D.Ill.1998) (police could seize computer pursuant to plain view doctrine where police discovered child pornography while conducting search authorized by third party); see also State v. Ready, 148 Or.App. 149 , 939 P.2d 117 (1997) (police could seize videotapes labeled "kid porn" pursuant to plain view doctrine during valid third-party consent search). 2009See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F.Supp.2d 1111 (C.D.Ill.1998) (police could seize computer pursuant to plain view doctrine where police discovered child pornography while conducting search authorized by third party); see also State v. Ready, 148 Or.App. 149 , 939 P.2d 117 (1997) (police could seize videotapes labeled “kid porn” pursuant to plain view doctrine during valid third-party consent search). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Readygreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F.Supp.2d 1111 (C.D.Ill.1998) (police could seize computer pursuant to plain view doctrine where police discovered child pornography while conducting search authorized by third party); see also State v. Ready, 148 Or.App. 149 , 939 P.2d 117 (1997) (police could seize videotapes labeled “kid porn” pursuant to plain view doctrine during valid third-party consent search). 2009See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F.Supp.2d 1111 (C.D.Ill.1998) (police could seize computer pursuant to plain view doctrine where police discovered child pornography while conducting search authorized by third party); see also State v. Ready, 148 Or.App. 149 , 939 P.2d 117 (1997) (police could seize videotapes labeled “kid porn” pursuant to plain view doctrine during valid third-party consent search). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Goetzgreen2 sentences2025The plain view doctrine 11 permits officers, “‘under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.’” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996) (providing an overview of Montana case law regarding the plain view doctrine and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciation of the doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))). 2020The plain view doctrine permits the seizure of evidence “without a warrant—so long as the evidence can be plainly seen by the officer, the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent, and the officer has a lawful right of access to the evidence.” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 24 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2025The plain view doctrine 11 permits officers, “‘under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.’” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996) (providing an overview of Montana case law regarding the plain view doctrine and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciation of the doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))). 2025The plain view doctrine 11 permits officers, “‘under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.’” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996) (providing an overview of Montana case law regarding the plain view doctrine and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciation of the doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))). | 1 | 5 |
G & G Jewelry, Inc. v. City Of Oaklandgreen2 sentences2020United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that “officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure” of an object seen “through the window of a house, or . . . via aerial photography or long-range surveillance,” because “to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises”); see also United States v. Perry, 95 F. App’x. 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that plain view doctrine “does not justify a warrantless seizure” on private premises “because persons still retain an expectation of privacy, which requires a warrant for l 2020United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that “officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure” of an object seen “through the window of a house, or . . . via aerial photography or long-range surveillance,” because “to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises”); see also United States v. Perry, 95 F. App’x. 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that plain view doctrine “does not justify a warrantless seizure” on private premises “because persons still retain an expectation of privacy, which requires a warrant for l | 1 | 2 |
State v. Doylegreen2 sentences2013The District Court rejected the State’s argument that the seizure fell within the plain view doctrine because it concluded that Krause was not “lawfully present” in Kelm’s truck when he seized the evidence. *71 ¶34 We use three criteria for determining whether a police officer’s seizure of evidence was valid under the plain view doctrine: (1) “the officer must be lawfully at the place from which he could plainly view the evidence”; (2) “the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be immediately apparent”; and (3) the officer “must also have a lawful right of access to the ob 2013The District Court rejected the State’s argument that the seizure fell within the plain view doctrine because it concluded that Krause was not “lawfully present” in Kelm’s truck when he seized the evidence. *71 ¶34 We use three criteria for determining whether a police officer’s seizure of evidence was valid under the plain view doctrine: (1) “the officer must be lawfully at the place from which he could plainly view the evidence”; (2) “the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be immediately apparent”; and (3) the officer “must also have a lawful right of access to the ob | 1 | 2 |
State v. Weaselboygreen2 sentences2007DeWitt , ¶ 25; Bassett , ¶ 52; State v. Weaselboy, 1999 MT 274, ¶ 23, 296 Mont. 503, ¶ 23 , 989 P.2d 836, ¶ 23 ; Loh, 275 Mont, at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 . ¶23 We have, on occasion, suggested that the plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement for searches. 2007DeWitt , ¶ 25; Bassett , ¶ 52; State v. Weaselboy, 1999 MT 274, ¶ 23, 296 Mont. 503, ¶ 23 , 989 P.2d 836, ¶ 23 ; Loh, 275 Mont, at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 . ¶23 We have, on occasion, suggested that the plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement for searches. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sorensongreen2 sentences1996State v. Sorenson (1979), 180 Mont. 269, 272 , 590 P.2d 136, 139 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 ). 1996State v. Sorenson (1979), 180 Mont. 269, 272 , 590 P.2d 136, 139 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 ). | 1 | 2 |
Carroll v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025In accordance with federal precedent, we have outlined two conditions which must be satisfied to justify warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: “First, the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be ‘immediately apparent.’ Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Loh, 275 Mont. at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S. Ct. at 2307 ). ¶20 The plain view doctrine applies to law enforcement’s seizur 2025In accordance with federal precedent, we have outlined two conditions which must be satisfied to justify warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: “First, the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be ‘immediately apparent.’ Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Loh, 275 Mont. at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S. Ct. at 2307 ). ¶20 The plain view doctrine applies to law enforcement’s seizur | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Allen Royce Weatherspoongreen2 sentences2020Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 1542 n. 6 (1983) (“While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion into Brown’s automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain-view doctrine were satisfied.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Weatherspoon, 82 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 , 110 S. Ct. at 2304 ) (finding warrantless seizure of a gun seen in plain view extending out from under a vehicle seat permissible). ¶10 An officer’s ability to seize plainly visible contraband from a 2020Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 1542 n. 6 (1983) (“While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion into Brown’s automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain-view doctrine were satisfied.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Weatherspoon, 82 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 , 110 S. Ct. at 2304 ) (finding warrantless seizure of a gun seen in plain view extending out from under a vehicle seat permissible). ¶10 An officer’s ability to seize plainly visible contraband from a | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Phillip E. Nauglegreen2 sentences2020United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that “officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure” of an object seen “through the window of a house, or . . . via aerial photography or long-range surveillance,” because “to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises”); see also United States v. Perry, 95 F. App’x. 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that plain view doctrine “does not justify a warrantless seizure” on private premises “because persons still retain an expectation of privacy, which requires a warrant for l 2020United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that “officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure” of an object seen “through the window of a house, or . . . via aerial photography or long-range surveillance,” because “to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises”); see also United States v. Perry, 95 F. App’x. 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that plain view doctrine “does not justify a warrantless seizure” on private premises “because persons still retain an expectation of privacy, which requires a warrant for l | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Melvin Ray Paigegreen2 sentences2020United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that “officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure” of an object seen “through the window of a house, or . . . via aerial photography or long-range surveillance,” because “to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises”); see also United States v. Perry, 95 F. App’x. 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that plain view doctrine “does not justify a warrantless seizure” on private premises “because persons still retain an expectation of privacy, which requires a warrant for l 2020United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that “officers cannot use the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless seizure” of an object seen “through the window of a house, or . . . via aerial photography or long-range surveillance,” because “to do so would require a warrantless entry upon private premises”); see also United States v. Perry, 95 F. App’x. 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that plain view doctrine “does not justify a warrantless seizure” on private premises “because persons still retain an expectation of privacy, which requires a warrant for l | 1 | 1 |
| State v. O'NEILLgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gregory James Freeman and David Lyle Boese, A/K/A Dennis Phillip Stevens and David Sterlinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences2002The plain view doctrine is a *275 recognized exception to the warrant requirement which “begins with the premise that the police officer had a prior justification for an intrusion, in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.” State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460, 468-69 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-38 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 582-83 ). 2002The plain view doctrine is a *275 recognized exception to the warrant requirement which “begins with the premise that the police officer had a prior justification for an intrusion, in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.” State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460, 468-69 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-38 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 582-83 ). | 6 | 1977–2002 |
Texas v. Brown
green
2 sentences2020Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 1542 n. 6 (1983) (“While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion into Brown’s automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain-view doctrine were satisfied.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Weatherspoon, 82 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 , 110 S. Ct. at 2304 ) (finding warrantless seizure of a gun seen in plain view extending out from under a vehicle seat permissible). ¶10 An officer’s ability to seize plainly visible contraband from a 2020Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 1542 n. 6 (1983) (“While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion into Brown’s automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain-view doctrine were satisfied.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Weatherspoon, 82 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 , 110 S. Ct. at 2304 ) (finding warrantless seizure of a gun seen in plain view extending out from under a vehicle seat permissible). ¶10 An officer’s ability to seize plainly visible contraband from a | 4 | 1983–2020 |
People v. Blair
green
2 sentences2009Indeed, the discussion in Blair was premised upon the fact that police there "lacked probable cause to believe that defendant's computer contained contraband or was otherwise connected with a crime." Blair, 254 Ill.Dec. 872 , 748 N.E.2d at 324 . 2009Indeed, the discussion in Blair was premised upon the fact that police there "lacked probable cause to believe that defendant's computer contained contraband or was otherwise connected with a crime." Blair, 254 Ill.Dec. 872 , 748 N.E.2d at 324 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. McCarthy
green
2 sentences1999We conclude that the search and seizure was not justified by either exigent circumstances or the plain view doctrine. ¶47 Exigent circumstances for conducting a warrantless search exist “where it is not practicable to secure a warrant.” State v. McCarthy (1993), 258 Mont. 51, 57 , 852 P.2d 111, 114 . 1999We conclude that the search and seizure was not justified by either exigent circumstances or the plain view doctrine. ¶47 Exigent circumstances for conducting a warrantless search exist “where it is not practicable to secure a warrant.” State v. McCarthy (1993), 258 Mont. 51, 57 , 852 P.2d 111, 114 . | 2 | 1998–1999 |
State v. Lane
green
2 sentences1996In so holding, we adopted the conditions set forth in Coolidge : “[w]here there is prior justification for the police to search an area, and in searching the area, they inadvertently find incriminating evidence which they had no reason to anticipate, they may lawfully seize that incriminating evidence.” In State v. Lane (1977), 175 Mont. 225 , 573 P.2d 198 , we reiterated the predicate to and the conditions of the plain view doctrine as set forth in Coolidge . 1996In so holding, we adopted the conditions set forth in Coolidge : “[w]here there is prior justification for the police to search an area, and in searching the area, they inadvertently find incriminating evidence which they had no reason to anticipate, they may lawfully seize that incriminating evidence.” In State v. Lane (1977), 175 Mont. 225 , 573 P.2d 198 , we reiterated the predicate to and the conditions of the plain view doctrine as set forth in Coolidge . | 2 | 1982–1996 |
State v. Osteen
green
2 sentences1996In State v. Osteen (1985), 216 Mont. 258 , 700 P.2d 188 , we returned to the two-part test for application of the plain view doctrine: the officers must have prior justification for the intrusion and the incriminating evidence must be discovered inadvertently in the course of the justified intrusion. 1996In State v. Osteen (1985), 216 Mont. 258 , 700 P.2d 188 , we returned to the two-part test for application of the plain view doctrine: the officers must have prior justification for the intrusion and the incriminating evidence must be discovered inadvertently in the course of the justified intrusion. | 2 | 1995–1996 |
State v. Z. Tenold
green
2 sentences2025In accordance with federal precedent, we have outlined two conditions which must be satisfied to justify warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: “First, the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be ‘immediately apparent.’ Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Loh, 275 Mont. at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S. Ct. at 2307 ). ¶20 The plain view doctrine applies to law enforcement’s seizur 2025In accordance with federal precedent, we have outlined two conditions which must be satisfied to justify warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: “First, the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be ‘immediately apparent.’ Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Loh, 275 Mont. at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S. Ct. at 2307 ). ¶20 The plain view doctrine applies to law enforcement’s seizur | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Elison
green
2 sentences2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 54 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 (“[W]e conclude that, despite any language to the contrary in our previous decisions, there is no ‘automobile exception’ to the search warrant requirement under the Montana Constitution.”). 2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 54 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 (“[W]e conclude that, despite any language to the contrary in our previous decisions, there is no ‘automobile exception’ to the search warrant requirement under the Montana Constitution.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Delao
neutral
2 sentences2013We addressed an issue similar to that raised by Kelm in State v. Delao, 2006 MT 179 , 333 Mont. 68 , 140 P.3d 1065 . 2013We addressed an issue similar to that raised by Kelm in State v. Delao, 2006 MT 179 , 333 Mont. 68 , 140 P.3d 1065 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Collard
green
2 sentences2006State v. Collard (1997), 286 Mont. 185, 195 , 951 P.2d 56, 62-63 ; Loh, 275 Mont. at 468 , 914 P.2d at 597 (citing Horton v. California (1990), 496 U.S. 128, 133-34 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 ). 2006State v. Collard (1997), 286 Mont. 185, 195 , 951 P.2d 56, 62-63 ; Loh, 275 Mont. at 468 , 914 P.2d at 597 (citing Horton v. California (1990), 496 U.S. 128, 133-34 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Boston
green
1 sentence2001Boston, 269 Mont. at 306 , 889 P.2d 814 . ¶16 The District Court also concluded that the police officers could have seized the pouch lawfully based on the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Boston
green
1 sentence2001Boston, 269 Mont. at 306 , 889 P.2d 814 . ¶16 The District Court also concluded that the police officers could have seized the pouch lawfully based on the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Stucker
green
2 sentences1999Standard of Review ¶6 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence “to determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law.” State v. Stucker, 1999 MT 14, ¶ 31 , 293 Mont. 123, ¶ 31 , 973 P.2d 835, ¶ 31 . 1999Standard of Review ¶6 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence “to determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law.” State v. Stucker, 1999 MT 14, ¶ 31 , 293 Mont. 123, ¶ 31 , 973 P.2d 835, ¶ 31 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lisby v. State
green
1 sentence1999He argues that under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement as set forth in State v. Loh, (1996), 275 Mont. 460 , 914 *414 P.2d 592, an essential predicate is that the police officer must be lawfully at the place from which he can see the evidence. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences1999Relying primarily on this Court's decision in State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460 , 914 P.2d 592 , and the Washington Supreme Court's decision in State v. Bell (1987), 108 Wash.2d 193 , 737 P.2d 254 , the District Court concluded that the deputy sheriff lawfully entered Bassett's bedroom without a warrant and seized the various items in the closet. 1999Relying primarily on this Court’s decision in State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460 , 914 P.2d 592 , and the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bell (Wash. 1987), 737 P.2d 254 , the District Court concluded that the deputy sheriff lawfully entered Bassett’s bedroom without a warrant and seized the various items in the closet. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State Ex Rel. Zander v. DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
green
2 sentences1998Zander, 180 Mont. at 553 , 591 P.2d at 659 . ¶17 This Court has recently reaffirmed that when officers acting on probable cause and good faith reasonably believe from the totality of the circumstances that the nature of the crime or characteristics of the suspect pose a risk of danger to the arresting officer or third persons, exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry, search, or seizure of the premises. 1998Zander, 180 Mont. at 553 , 591 P.2d at 659 . ¶17 This Court has recently reaffirmed that when officers acting on probable cause and good faith reasonably believe from the totality of the circumstances that the nature of the crime or characteristics of the suspect pose a risk of danger to the arresting officer or third persons, exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry, search, or seizure of the premises. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Gallagher green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Godsey green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Hembd green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Williams neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Carlson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Oliver v. United States green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Dunn green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Illinois v. Andreas green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Washington v. Chrisman green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Anthony J. Dichiarinte green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Amor neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.