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27 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1997See Williams v. State, 327 Ark. at 218, 939 S.W.2d at 267 (stating an element of the plain-view exception is that “the initial intrusion was lawful”); Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263 , 724 S.W.2d 160, 162 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987). 1997See Williams v. State, 327 Ark. at 218, 939 S.W.2d at 267 (stating an element of the plain-view exception is that “the initial intrusion was lawful”); Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263 , 724 S.W.2d 160, 162 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987). | 2 | 5 |
Fultz v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Under the plain-view doctrine, “[w]hen police officers are legitimately at a location and acting without a search warrant, they may seize an object in plain view if they have probable cause to believe that the object is either evidence of a crime, fruit of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime.” Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 593 , 972 S.W.2d 222, 224-25 (1998) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)). 2006Under the plain-view doctrine, “[w]hen police officers are legitimately at a location and acting without a search warrant, they may seize an object in plain view if they have probable cause to believe that the object is either evidence of a crime, fruit of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime.” Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 593 , 972 S.W.2d 222, 224-25 (1998) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)). | 1 | 4 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 213 , 939 S.W.2d 264 (1997). 1997See Williams v. State, 327 Ark. at 218, 939 S.W.2d at 267 (stating an element of the plain-view exception is that “the initial intrusion was lawful”); Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263 , 724 S.W.2d 160, 162 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987). | 1 | 3 |
Arizona v. Hicksgreen2 sentences2006Under the plain-view doctrine, “[w]hen police officers are legitimately at a location and acting without a search warrant, they may seize an object in plain view if they have probable cause to believe that the object is either evidence of a crime, fruit of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime.” Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 593 , 972 S.W.2d 222, 224-25 (1998) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)). 1997According to the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the prerequisites for applying the plain-view exception is that “the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such [evidence] is supported,” if not by a warrant, then “by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Newton v. Stategreen2 sentences2021App. 649 , at 7–8, 448 S.W.3d at 219 (quoting Newton v. State, 366 Ark. 587, 590 , 237 S.W.3d 451, 453 (2006). 2021App. 649 , at 7–8, 448 S.W.3d at 219 (quoting Newton v. State, 366 Ark. 587, 590 , 237 S.W.3d 451, 453 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003Fultz v. State, supra. The Supreme Court has stated that intrusion into an area cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 2003Fultz v. State, supra. The Supreme Court has stated that intrusion into an area cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
Wofford v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 25 , 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997); Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 213, 219 , 939 S.W.2d 264 (1997). 1998See Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 25 , 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997); Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 213, 219 , 939 S.W.2d 264 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Risingergreen2 sentences1997See generally State v. Risinger, 297 Ark. 405 , 762 S.W.2d 787 (1989) (although a container on a table was in plain view, its contents were not; thus the plain-view doctrine did not apply to the contents). 1997See generally State v. Risinger, 297 Ark. 405 , 762 S.W.2d 787 (1989) (although a container on a table was in plain view, its contents were not; thus the plain-view doctrine did not apply to the contents). | 1 | 1 |
La Fournier v. Stategreen1 sentence1997In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the holding in La Fournier v. State, 280 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Wis. 1979), that, where the police enter a private residence in accordance with the emergency exception but are unable to preserve the evidence that they observe in plain view while rendering assistance, a second entry by other officers without a warrant is lawful, even though the emergency has passed, if the search that follows is restricted in nature and scope to securing the evidence observed in plain view by the officers who entered pursuant to the emergency exception. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Drewgreen1 sentence1993See United States v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1971) (pistol contained within an opaque plastic folder); United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1986) (black zippered case containing lock-picking tools). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Horton v. California
green
2 sentences2003Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). 1993In order for the plain view doctrine to be applicable the incriminating character of the object must be “immediately apparent.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 (1987). | 4 | 1990–2003 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1981As to the cashbox, the officers' conduct met the three-fold standard to be deduced from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971): First, the plain view doctrine was satisfied, because the officers were acting under the authority of a valid search warrant and had a right to search the premises. 1981As was stated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the plain view doctrine applies if (1) the initial intrusion resulting in the plain view was lawful, (2) discovery of the object was inadvertent, and (3) the incriminating nature of the object was immediately apparent. | 4 | 1977–1990 |
Stout v. State
green
2 sentences1997In determining the admissibility of the alcohol and other items found inside the pickup, we find guidance from this court’s decision in Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552 , 898 S.W.2d 457 (1995), where the court set out the plain-view exception to the general requirement of a search warrant. 1997In determining the admissibility of the alcohol and other items found inside the pickup, we find guidance from this court’s decision in Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552 , 898 S.W.2d 457 (1995), where the court set out the plain-view exception to the general requirement of a search warrant. | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Munguia v. State
green
2 sentences1994Munguia v. State, 22 Ark. 1992Munguia v. State, 22 Ark. | 2 | 1992–1994 |
United States v. John D. Johnson
green
2 sentences1981On appeal, we discussed the plain view doctrine, citing United States v. Johnson, 541 F. 2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1976). 1977Citing Coolidge, supra, the court stated: * * * The plain view rule applies if 1) the initial intrusion resulting in the “plain view” was lawful, 2) discovery of the object was inadvertent, and 3) the incriminating nature of the object was “immediately apparent.” Although we have found the initial intrusion into appellant’s home was lawful, we must conclude that the other requirements enunciated in Coolidge, supra, and Johnson, supra, were not met. | 2 | 1977–1981 |
Owen v. State
green
1 sentence2021Owen v. State, 75 Ark. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Jones v. State
neutral
2 sentences2021Under the plain-view doctrine, “[w]hen police officers are legitimately at a location and acting without a search warrant, they may seize an object in plain view if they have probable cause to believe that the object is either evidence of a crime, fruit of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime.” The plain-view doctrine is 8 applicable if the officer has a lawful right of access to the object and if the incriminating nature of the object is readily apparent. 2014 Ark. 2021App. 649 , at 7–8, 448 S.W.3d at 219 (quoting Newton v. State, 366 Ark. 587, 590 , 237 S.W.3d 451, 453 (2006). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Smith v. State
neutral
1 sentence2014Then, because the search of the kitchen was improper, any and all warrants issued or interrogations conducted 3 Cite as 2014 Ark. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lewis v. State
neutral
1 sentence2005Neither is the plain view doctrine being relied upon, see McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216 , 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003), or the principles applicable when the occupant of the vehicle consents to the search, see Duncan v. State, 304 Ark. 311 , 802 S.W.2d 917 (1991). 1 Judge Griffen also argues that this case is similar to Izell v. State, 75 Ark. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Duncan v. State
green
1 sentence2005Neither is the plain view doctrine being relied upon, see McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216 , 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003), or the principles applicable when the occupant of the vehicle consents to the search, see Duncan v. State, 304 Ark. 311 , 802 S.W.2d 917 (1991). 1 Judge Griffen also argues that this case is similar to Izell v. State, 75 Ark. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Izell v. State
green
2 sentences2005App. 377 , 58 S.W.3d 400 (2001), where this court held that a search of a car parked in a driveway was not a valid search incident to arrest. 2005Neither is the plain view doctrine being relied upon, see McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216 , 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003), or the principles applicable when the occupant of the vehicle consents to the search, see Duncan v. State, 304 Ark. 311 , 802 S.W.2d 917 (1991). 1 Judge Griffen also argues that this case is similar to Izell v. State, 75 Ark. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
McDonald v. State
green
2 sentences2005Neither is the plain view doctrine being relied upon, see McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216 , 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003), or the principles applicable when the occupant of the vehicle consents to the search, see Duncan v. State, 304 Ark. 311 , 802 S.W.2d 917 (1991). 1 Judge Griffen also argues that this case is similar to Izell v. State, 75 Ark. 2005Neither is the plain view doctrine being relied upon, see McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216 , 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003), or the principles applicable when the occupant of the vehicle consents to the search, see Duncan v. State, 304 Ark. 311 , 802 S.W.2d 917 (1991). 1 Judge Griffen also argues that this case is similar to Izell v. State, 75 Ark. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
green
1 sentence2003Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Fultz v. State, supra. We have held that a search occurs whenever something not previously in plain view becomes exposed to an investigating officer. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
New York v. Class
green
1 sentence2003Fultz v. State, supra. The Supreme Court has stated that intrusion into an area cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Minnesota v. Dickerson
green
1 sentence2002“If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object. . . the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.” Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences1997See Williams v. State, 327 Ark. at 218, 939 S.W.2d at 267 (stating an element of the plain-view exception is that “the initial intrusion was lawful”); Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263 , 724 S.W.2d 160, 162 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987). 1997See Williams v. State, 327 Ark. at 218, 939 S.W.2d at 267 (stating an element of the plain-view exception is that “the initial intrusion was lawful”); Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263 , 724 S.W.2d 160, 162 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
McQueen v. State
green
2 sentences1993Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 (1987); McQueen v. State, 283 Ark. 232 , 675 S.W.2d 358 (1984); Freeman v. State, 37 Ark. 1993Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 (1987); McQueen v. State, 283 Ark. 232 , 675 S.W.2d 358 (1984); Freeman v. State, 37 Ark. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Freeman v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Miller green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| United States v. Jeffrey Grubczak green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Douglas Cormack Welsch
green
1 sentence1993In discussing a series of four cases, People v. Miller, 33 Cal. App. 3d 193 , 108 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1973); United States v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Brewer, 343 F.Supp. 468 (D. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| United States v. Robert Candella green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Brewer
green
1 sentence1993In discussing a series of four cases, People v. Miller, 33 Cal. App. 3d 193 , 108 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1973); United States v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Brewer, 343 F.Supp. 468 (D. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Texas v. Brown
green
1 sentence1993In order for the plain view doctrine to be applicable the incriminating character of the object must be “immediately apparent.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 (1987). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Enzor v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Kelley v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Isaac L. James, Jr. v. United States green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.