plain view doctrine in Ohio

2025Mulcahy told Vargas he was being detained because Mulcahy had seen something in plain view that should not be there. {¶ 22} “Under the Fourth Amendment’s plain-view doctrine, an officer may seize an object in plain view without a warrant if (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be viewed, (2) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a right to access the object where it is located.” State v. Burroughs, 2022-Ohio-2146, ¶ 15 , citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 (1990).

2023However, the Court later clarified that the Fourth Amendment does not impose an inadvertence requirement in the plain view analysis, reasoning that applying a standard dependent “upon the subjective state of mind of the officer” causes significant difficulty in attaining “evenhanded law enforcement.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).

2014Medina No. 10CA0048-M, 2011-Ohio-5703, ¶ 11 , quoting State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶10} Under the plain view exception, “an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 442 (1992), superseded on 4 other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 (1997), fn. 4.

2012Under the plain view doctrine, “an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St. 3d 424, 442 (1992) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)); see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). {¶4} According to Mr. Lorenzo, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing did not establish that it was immediately apparent to Agent Fatula that the vials and syringes were contraband.

2025But you’ve not conducted any kind of tests to verify that this is a fact - A. No sir, just 18 years of experience and probably a thousand drug arrests. {¶37} In Halczyszak, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished the application of the plain view doctrine to stolen automobiles versus drugs and noted that “nothing about an auto itself proclaims its illegal character.” Id. at 208.

2025In essence, the plain view doctrine allows police officers, under particular circumstances, to seize an ‘article of incriminating character’ which is not described in their search warrant.” State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301, 303 (1986).

2020“Under ‘the plain- view exception, “police may seize evidence in plain view during a lawful search if: (1) the seizing officer is lawfully present at the place from which the evidence can -9- Case No. 9-19-91 be plainly viewed; (2) the seizing officer has a right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent.”’” (Emphasis added.) Id., quoting Bazrawi at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Alihassan, 10th Dist.

2019“The plain view doctrine allows police officers, under particular circumstances, to seize an ‘article of incriminating character’ which is not described in their search warrant.” State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301, 303 , 496 N.E.2d 925 (1986). {¶ 28} “In order for evidence to be seized under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement it must be shown that (1) the initial intrusion which afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizin

2022A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless one of the following judicially-recognized exceptions applies: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine.” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). 10.

2022A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless one of the following judicially-recognized exceptions applies: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine.” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). 10.

2024The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the general rule requiring search warrants: (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain view doctrine; and (g) administrative search State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, fn. 4 (1992). {¶14} The “stop-and-frisk doctrine” originates in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2017City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988). {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement a warrant be obtained prior to a search: {¶22} (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; {¶23} (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; {¶24} (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; {¶25} (d) hot pursuit; {¶26} (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; {¶27} (f) the plain view doctrine; and {¶28} (g) administrative search. {¶29} Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 165 , 593 N.E

2024Rather, for a search to qualify as inadvertent, an officer must ‘ “not know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” ’ relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a pretext.” Lane at ¶ 13, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2024Rather, for a search to qualify as inadvertent, an officer must ‘ “not know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” ’ relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a pretext.” Lane at ¶ 13, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2024Rather, for a search to qualify as inadvertent, an officer must ‘ “not know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” ’ relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a pretext.” Lane at ¶ 13, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2024“Under the plain-view exception, ‘police may seize an article when its incriminating nature is immediately apparent to an officer who comes in contact with the item through lawful activity.’ ” Id., citing State v. Thompson, 2d Dist.

2025The doctrine “is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost . . .” State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301, 303 (1986), citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). {¶60} The plain view doctrine contains a three-part test: “First, the initial intrusion that brought the police into a position to view the object must have been legitimate.

2023The plain view exception “is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that item is lost * * *.” Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).

2004Arizona v. Hicks (1987), 480 U.S. 321, 326 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 . {¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court has similarly adopted the plain-view doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement, stating, “Under [the plain-view] doctrine, an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 442 , 588 N.E.2d 819 ; see, also, State v. Kinley (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 491 , 651 N.E.2d 419 . {¶ 18} Here, there is no question that

2004Arizona v. Hicks (1987), 480 U.S. 321, 326 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 . {¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court has similarly adopted the plain-view doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement, stating, “Under [the plain-view] doctrine, an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 442 , 588 N.E.2d 819 ; see, also, State v. Kinley (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 491 , 651 N.E.2d 419 . {¶ 18} Here, there is no question that

2025Concerning “the second requirement of the plain-view doctrine, the police need to have probable cause, with some narrow exceptions, to immediately believe upon discovery of the article in plain view that it is obviously incriminating evidence or contraband.” State v. Willoughby, 81 Ohio App.3d 562, 568 (6th Dist. 1992), citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).

2023While the law may prohibit manipulating or moving an object to initially determine if that object is contraband or evidence of a crime – see, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (2010) – we find no authority that prohibits moving an object in order to collect an item of contraband in plain view, assuming the officers, as here, are lawfully in a position to do so. {¶46} Accordingly, for all of those reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in determining that the plain view exception to the general search warrant -21- Case Nos. 5-22-15 and 5-22-16 req

2019Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2018AP070030 15 {¶37} The trial court rejected the plain-view exception, under Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), as a justification to the search of appellant’s purse, because there was no testimony to suggest that appellant’s purse possessed an incriminating character that was immediately apparent.

2019Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2018AP070030 15 {¶37} The trial court rejected the plain-view exception, under Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), as a justification to the search of appellant’s purse, because there was no testimony to suggest that appellant’s purse possessed an incriminating character that was immediately apparent.

2025Some exceptions include the “search incident to arrest” exception, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the automobile exception,1 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105 (1999); the plain-view exception, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); the “plain feel” exception, State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993); the consensual-search exception, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), and the “stop and frisk” exception, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2023The plain-view doctrine holds that “objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.” Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).

2009Those exceptions are: "(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; *** (f) the plain view doctrine[;] or (g) an administrative search[.]" (Quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Price (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 464 , 467 . {¶ 11} Probable cause for an arrest exists where at the moment of the arrest, from the information known to the arresting officers based on reasonably trustworthy *Page 6 information, a reasonably

2008Those exceptions are: "(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; * * * (f) the plain view doctrine[;] or (g) an administrative search[.]" (Quotations and citations omitted.) Price , 134 Ohio App.3d at 467 . {¶ 20} Motley argues that the warrantless entry violated his constitutional rights.

2026State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4165, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶23} This matter involves evidence discovered from the search of a purse located inside an automobile which was not attributed to the driver of the vehicle at issue, but to the passenger.

2025State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4165, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶51} It is important to consider that the analysis pertaining to the warrant exceptions applies only to the seizure of these phones, as they were searched pursuant to a signed warrant.

2024State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 48 , 734 N.E.2d 804, 805 (2000) (the smell of marijuana by a person qualified to recognize the odor is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 630 , 620 N.E.2d 906, 910 (4th Dist.1993) (police can seize illegal Adams App. No. 23CA1165 12 drugs in vehicle under the plain view doctrine without a warrant).

2024State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 48 , 734 N.E.2d 804, 805 (2000) (the smell of marijuana by a person qualified to recognize the odor is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 630 , 620 N.E.2d 906, 910 (4th Dist.1993) (police can seize illegal Adams App. No. 23CA1165 12 drugs in vehicle under the plain view doctrine without a warrant).

2023State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978). 6 Plain View Exception {¶17} One exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view exception.

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of -8- Case No. 9-19-91 establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶16} In this case, the trial court concluded that law enforcement’s search and seizure of the bookbag were lawfully conducted under the

2020“The plain view doctrine represents the requirement that an individual must protect his or her privacy, and should an officer observe items in plain view from a place where the officer is entitled to be, no warrant is required.” Jackson at ¶ 19, citing State v. Buzzard, 112 Ohio St.3d 451 , 2007-Ohio-373 , ¶ 16.

2019But we are not persuaded. {¶10} With respect to the plain view exception, officers may seize evidence in plain view during a lawful search if (1) the seizing officer is lawfully located in a place from which the evidence can be plainly viewed; (2) the seizing officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object’s incriminating character is “immediately apparent.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); State v. 5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Buzzard, 112 Ohio St.3d 451 , 2007-Ohio-373 , 860 N.E.2d 1006, ¶ 16 (“[I]f

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of -8- Case No. 9-19-91 establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶16} In this case, the trial court concluded that law enforcement’s search and seizure of the bookbag were lawfully conducted under the

2017City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988). {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement a warrant be obtained prior to a search: {¶22} (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; {¶23} (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; {¶24} (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; {¶25} (d) hot pursuit; {¶26} (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; {¶27} (f) the plain view doctrine; and {¶28} (g) administrative search. {¶29} Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 165 , 593 N.E