plain view doctrine in Ohio

2026The plain-view exception allows officers to seize an object in plain view if an officer is lawfully in a place with lawful access to an object in which its incriminating nature “is immediately apparent.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 (1990).

2026Under the plain-view doctrine, “an officer may seize an object in plain view without a warrant if (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be viewed, (2) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a right to access the object where it is located.” State v. Vargas, 2025-Ohio-4482, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Burroughs, 2022-Ohio- 2146, ¶ 15, citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). {¶42} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that an officer who observed marijuana in a vehicle had

2014Medina No. 10CA0048-M, 2011-Ohio-5703, ¶ 11 , quoting State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶10} Under the plain view exception, “an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 442 (1992), superseded on 4 other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 (1997), fn. 4.

2012Under the plain view doctrine, “an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St. 3d 424, 442 (1992) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)); see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). {¶4} According to Mr. Lorenzo, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing did not establish that it was immediately apparent to Agent Fatula that the vials and syringes were contraband.

2024The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the general rule requiring search warrants: (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain view doctrine; and (g) administrative search State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, fn. 4 (1992). {¶14} The “stop-and-frisk doctrine” originates in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2017City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988). {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement a warrant be obtained prior to a search: {¶22} (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; {¶23} (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; {¶24} (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; {¶25} (d) hot pursuit; {¶26} (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; {¶27} (f) the plain view doctrine; and {¶28} (g) administrative search. {¶29} Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 165 , 593 N.E

2025The doctrine “is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost . . .” State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301, 303 (1986), citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). {¶60} The plain view doctrine contains a three-part test: “First, the initial intrusion that brought the police into a position to view the object must have been legitimate.

2025But you’ve not conducted any kind of tests to verify that this is a fact - A. No sir, just 18 years of experience and probably a thousand drug arrests. {¶37} In Halczyszak, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished the application of the plain view doctrine to stolen automobiles versus drugs and noted that “nothing about an auto itself proclaims its illegal character.” Id. at 208.

2020“Under ‘the plain- view exception, “police may seize evidence in plain view during a lawful search if: (1) the seizing officer is lawfully present at the place from which the evidence can -9- be plainly viewed; (2) the seizing officer has a right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent.”’” (Emphasis added.) Id., quoting Bazrawi at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Alihassan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-578, 2012-Ohio-825 , ¶ 11, citing Horton at 136-137 . {¶17} “Under the first prong, “[t]he plain-view exception permits a law enforcement offic

2020Thus, “[i]t is well established that law enforcement officers do not need a search warrant to seize incriminating evidence discovered in a place where they have a right to be under the plain-view exception to the search-warrant requirement.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Parsons, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-16-08, 2017-Ohio-1315, ¶ 29 , citing State v. Bazrawi, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1043, 2013-Ohio-3015 , ¶ 32, citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990) and State v. Williams, 55 Ohio St.2d 82, 84 (1978).

2022A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless one of the following judicially-recognized exceptions applies: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine.” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). 10.

2022A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless one of the following judicially-recognized exceptions applies: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine.” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). 10.

2026See United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that “although the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a container believed to contain contraband, any subsequent search of its concealed contents must either be accompanied by a search warrant or justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement”); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 749-51 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).

2024Rather, for a search to qualify as inadvertent, an officer must ‘ “not know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” ’ relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a pretext.” Lane at ¶ 13, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2024Rather, for a search to qualify as inadvertent, an officer must ‘ “not know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” ’ relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a pretext.” Lane at ¶ 13, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2024Rather, for a search to qualify as inadvertent, an officer must ‘ “not know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” ’ relying on the plain-view doctrine only as a pretext.” Lane at ¶ 13, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2025The doctrine “is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost . . .” State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301, 303 (1986), citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). {¶60} The plain view doctrine contains a three-part test: “First, the initial intrusion that brought the police into a position to view the object must have been legitimate.

2023The plain view exception “is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that item is lost * * *.” Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).

2004Arizona v. Hicks (1987), 480 U.S. 321, 326 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 . {¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court has similarly adopted the plain-view doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement, stating, “Under [the plain-view] doctrine, an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 442 , 588 N.E.2d 819 ; see, also, State v. Kinley (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 491 , 651 N.E.2d 419 . {¶ 18} Here, there is no question that

2004Arizona v. Hicks (1987), 480 U.S. 321, 326 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 . {¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court has similarly adopted the plain-view doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement, stating, “Under [the plain-view] doctrine, an officer may seize an item without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 442 , 588 N.E.2d 819 ; see, also, State v. Kinley (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 491 , 651 N.E.2d 419 . {¶ 18} Here, there is no question that

2025Concerning “the second requirement of the plain-view doctrine, the police need to have probable cause, with some narrow exceptions, to immediately believe upon discovery of the article in plain view that it is obviously incriminating evidence or contraband.” State v. Willoughby, 81 Ohio App.3d 562, 568 (6th Dist. 1992), citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).

2023While the law may prohibit manipulating or moving an object to initially determine if that object is contraband or evidence of a crime – see, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (2010) – we find no authority that prohibits moving an object in order to collect an item of contraband in plain view, assuming the officers, as here, are lawfully in a position to do so. {¶46} Accordingly, for all of those reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in determining that the plain view exception to the general search warrant -21- Case Nos. 5-22-15 and 5-22-16 req

2019The court found that the trooper retrieved and searched the purse after he had handcuffed and secured appellant in his vehicle and so she was not within reach of her purse when he retrieved and searched it.” Banks-Harvey, ¶7. {¶37} The trial court rejected the plain-view exception, under Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), as a justification to the search of appellant’s purse, because there was no testimony to suggest that appellant’s purse possessed an incriminating character that was immediately apparent.

2019The court found that the trooper retrieved and searched the purse after he had handcuffed and secured appellant in his vehicle and so she was not within reach of her purse when he retrieved and searched it.” Banks-Harvey, ¶7. {¶37} The trial court rejected the plain-view exception, under Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), as a justification to the search of appellant’s purse, because there was no testimony to suggest that appellant’s purse possessed an incriminating character that was immediately apparent.

2026See United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that “although the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a container believed to contain contraband, any subsequent search of its concealed contents must either be accompanied by a search warrant or justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement”); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 749-51 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).

2020See also State v. Wehr, 5th Dist. Richland No. 14CA46, 2014-Ohio-4396, ¶ 26 (“Many a closed container is accessible; opening it requires justification.”), citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 (1977). {¶20} “‘[A]lthough the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a container believed to contain contraband, any subsequent search of its concealed contents must either be accompanied by a search warrant or justified by one of the [other] exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 15 JE 0020, 2017-Ohio-5708, ¶

2025Some exceptions include the “search incident to arrest” exception, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the automobile exception,1 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105 (1999); the plain-view exception, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); the “plain feel” exception, State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993); the consensual-search exception, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), and the “stop and frisk” exception, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2023The plain-view doctrine holds that “objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.” Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).

2009Those exceptions are: "(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; *** (f) the plain view doctrine[;] or (g) an administrative search[.]" (Quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Price (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 464 , 467 . {¶ 11} Probable cause for an arrest exists where at the moment of the arrest, from the information known to the arresting officers based on reasonably trustworthy *Page 6 information, a reasonably

2008Those exceptions are: "(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; * * * (f) the plain view doctrine[;] or (g) an administrative search[.]" (Quotations and citations omitted.) Price , 134 Ohio App.3d at 467 . {¶ 20} Motley argues that the warrantless entry violated his constitutional rights.

2026State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4165, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶23} This matter involves evidence discovered from the search of a purse located inside an automobile which was not attributed to the driver of the vehicle at issue, but to the passenger.

2025State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4165, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶51} It is important to consider that the analysis pertaining to the warrant exceptions applies only to the seizure of these phones, as they were searched pursuant to a signed warrant.

2025Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence is permissible if “(1) the officers are lawfully positioned in a place from which the object can be plainly viewed, (2) the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” (Further citation omitted.) State v. Garrett, 2018-Ohio-4530, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.). {¶ 73} Ohio courts have generally found that the contents of videotapes do not fall under the plain view exception as the contents are not “immediately apparent.” In Villolovos, Sixth

2025Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence is permissible if “(1) the officers are lawfully positioned in a place from which the object can be plainly viewed, (2) the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” (Further citation omitted.) State v. Garrett, 2018-Ohio-4530, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.). {¶ 73} Ohio courts have generally found that the contents of videotapes do not fall under the plain view exception as the contents are not “immediately apparent.” In Villolovos, Sixth

2024State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 48 , 734 N.E.2d 804, 805 (2000) (the smell of marijuana by a person qualified to recognize the odor is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 630 , 620 N.E.2d 906, 910 (4th Dist.1993) (police can seize illegal drugs in vehicle under the plain view doctrine without a warrant).

2024State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 48 , 734 N.E.2d 804, 805 (2000) (the smell of marijuana by a person qualified to recognize the odor is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 630 , 620 N.E.2d 906, 910 (4th Dist.1993) (police can seize illegal drugs in vehicle under the plain view doctrine without a warrant).

2023State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978). 6 Plain View Exception {¶17} One exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view exception.

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of -8- establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶16} In this case, the trial court concluded that law enforcement’s search and seizure of the bookbag were lawfully conducted under the plain-view excep

2020“The plain view doctrine represents the requirement that an individual must protect his or her privacy, and should an officer observe items in plain view from a place where the officer is entitled to be, no warrant is required.” Jackson at ¶ 19, citing State v. Buzzard, 112 Ohio St.3d 451 , 2007-Ohio-373 , ¶ 16.

2019But we are not persuaded. {¶10} With respect to the plain view exception, officers may seize evidence in plain view during a lawful search if (1) the seizing officer is lawfully located in a place from which the evidence can be plainly viewed; (2) the seizing officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object’s incriminating character is “immediately apparent.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); State v. 5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Buzzard, 112 Ohio St.3d 451 , 2007-Ohio-373 , 860 N.E.2d 1006, ¶ 16 (“[I]f

2025Some exceptions include the “search incident to arrest” exception, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the automobile exception,1 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105 (1999); the plain-view exception, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); the “plain feel” exception, State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993); the consensual-search exception, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), and the “stop and frisk” exception, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

1989Nor is the state entitled to assert any of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement before searching defendant’s bag, such as the automobile exception (see United States v. Ross [1982], 456 U.S. 798, 809-813 ); the plain view exception (see Coolidge v. New Hampshire [1971], 403 U.S. 443 ); or any other exigent circumstance.

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of -8- establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶16} In this case, the trial court concluded that law enforcement’s search and seizure of the bookbag were lawfully conducted under the plain-view excep

2017City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988). {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement a warrant be obtained prior to a search: {¶22} (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; {¶23} (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; {¶24} (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; {¶25} (d) hot pursuit; {¶26} (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; {¶27} (f) the plain view doctrine; and {¶28} (g) administrative search. {¶29} Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 165 , 593 N.E