plain view doctrine in South Carolina

2026The State bears the burden to demonstrate that it was entitled to conduct the search or seizure under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. . . . [T]he criminal defendant . . . bears the burden to demonstrate that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place illegally searched." (internal citations omitted)); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) ("Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012) ("These

2026The State bears the burden to demonstrate that it was entitled to conduct the search or seizure under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. . . . [T]he criminal defendant . . . bears the burden to demonstrate that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place illegally searched." (internal citations omitted)); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) ("Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012) ("These

2026The State bears the burden to demonstrate that it was entitled to conduct the search or seizure under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. . . . [T]he criminal defendant . . . bears the burden to demonstrate that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place illegally searched." (internal citations omitted)); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) ("Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012) ("These

2026The State bears the burden to demonstrate that it was entitled to conduct the search or seizure under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. . . . [T]he criminal defendant . . . bears the burden to demonstrate that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the place illegally searched." (internal citations omitted)); State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) ("Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012) ("These

2021See Abdullah, 357 S.C. at 352 , 592 S.E.2d at 349 ("[A]ny object falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is lawfully in a position to view the object is subject to lawful seizure."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing authorities." (quoting State v. Wright, 416 S.C. 353, 368 , 785 S.E.2d 479, 487 (Ct

2021See Abdullah, 357 S.C. at 352 , 592 S.E.2d at 349 ("[A]ny object falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is lawfully in a position to view the object is subject to lawful seizure."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing authorities." (quoting State v. Wright, 416 S.C. 353, 368 , 785 S.E.2d 479, 487 (Ct

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2009The plain view doctrine applies when “‘(1) the initial intrusion which afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating [nature of the] evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing authorities.’” Id. at 352-53, 592 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting State v. Culbreath , 300 S.C. 232, 237 , 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990)).

2009The plain view doctrine applies when “‘(1) the initial intrusion which afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating [nature of the] evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing authorities.’” Id. at 352-53, 592 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting State v. Culbreath , 300 S.C. 232, 237 , 387 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1990)).

2017Under the plain view exception, "objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in a position to view the objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced as evidence." State v. Beckham , 334 S.C. 302 , 317, 513 S.E.2d 606 , 613 (1999).

2017Under the plain view exception, "objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in a position to view the objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced as evidence." State v. Beckham , 334 S.C. 302 , 317, 513 S.E.2d 606 , 613 (1999).

2026See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 209 n.4, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 n.4 (2009) (applying the plain view doctrine and stating "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980) (a legitimate expectation of privacy is necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment protections).2 Here, the bail agreement with the bond company is not in the record; thus, there is no evidence that Eberhart consented to giving anyone other than the bond company access to his GPS data.

2026See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 209 n.4, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 n.4 (2009) (applying the plain view doctrine and stating "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980) (a legitimate expectation of privacy is necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment protections).2 Here, the bail agreement with the bond company is not in the record; thus, there is no evidence that Eberhart consented to giving anyone other than the bond company access to his GPS data.

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2023State v. Counts, 413 S.C. 153, 163 , 776 S.E.2d 59, 65 (2015).

2023State v. Counts, 413 S.C. 153, 163 , 776 S.E.2d 59, 65 (2015).

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2017Our courts have specifically recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the following: “(1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) hot pursuit, (3) stop and frisk, (4) automobile exception, (5) the plain view doctrine, and (6) consent.” State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571, 580 , 769 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2015) (quoting State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 36 , 274 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1981)).

2017Our courts have specifically recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the following: “(1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) hot pursuit, (3) stop and frisk, (4) automobile exception, (5) the plain view doctrine, and (6) consent.” State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571, 580 , 769 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2015) (quoting State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 36 , 274 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1981)).

1997State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454 , 462 S.E.2d 279 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 951 , 133 L.Ed.2d 875 (1996). [4] The United States Supreme Court, however, has concluded that the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies even if the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent, if the other requirements of the exception are satisfied.

1997State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454 , 462 S.E.2d 279 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 951 , 133 L.Ed.2d 875 (1996). [4] The United States Supreme Court, however, has concluded that the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies even if the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent, if the other requirements of the exception are satisfied.

2013State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 456-57 , 462 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1995); State v. Moore, 377 S.C. 299, 309 , 659 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Ct.App.2008); see also Wright, 391 S.C. at 444 , 706 S.E.2d at 327-28 (discussing an exception for exigent circumstances); State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494-95 (2009) (same).

2013State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 456-57 , 462 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1995); State v. Moore, 377 S.C. 299, 309 , 659 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Ct.App.2008); see also Wright, 391 S.C. at 444 , 706 S.E.2d at 327-28 (discussing an exception for exigent circumstances); State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494-95 (2009) (same).

1987State v. Dingle, 279 S. C. 278, 306 S. E. (2d) 223 (1983) [citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.

1987State v. Dingle, 279 S. C. 278, 306 S. E. (2d) 223 (1983) [citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.

2026See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201 , 209 n.4, 692 S.E.2d 490 , 494 n.4 (2009) (applying the plain view doctrine and stating "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 , 104-05 (1980) (a legitimate expectation of privacy is necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment protections).2 Here, the bail agreement with the bond company is not in the record; thus, there is no evidence that Eberhart consented to giving anyone other than the bond company access to his GPS data.

2026See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 209 n.4, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 n.4 (2009) (applying the plain view doctrine and stating "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980) (a legitimate expectation of privacy is necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment protections).2 Here, the bail agreement with the bond company is not in the record; thus, there is no evidence that Eberhart consented to giving anyone other than the bond company access to his GPS data.

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2022See State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 588 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) ("Under th[e plain view] exception, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is rightfully in position to view these objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 595 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The two elements needed to satisfy the plain view exception are (1) the initial intrusion that afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing author

2018"Pursuant to the automobile exception, if there is probable cause to search a vehicle, a warrant is not necessary so long as the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained." State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 320 , 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007).

2018"Pursuant to the automobile exception, if there is probable cause to search a vehicle, a warrant is not necessary so long as the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained." State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 320 , 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007).

2017Our courts have specifically recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the following: “(1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) hot pursuit, (3) stop and frisk, (4) automobile exception, (5) the plain view doctrine, and (6) consent.” State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571, 580 , 769 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2015) (quoting State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 36 , 274 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1981)).

2017Our courts have specifically recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the following: “(1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) hot pursuit, (3) stop and frisk, (4) automobile exception, (5) the plain view doctrine, and (6) consent.” State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571, 580 , 769 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2015) (quoting State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 36 , 274 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1981)).

2013The court relied upon the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 , 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986): In [Class, 475 U.S. at 114-15 , 106 S.Ct. 960 ], the Supreme Court stated that “a car’s interior as a whole is ... subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police.” The Court held that an officer’s opening the driver’s door of an automobile to examine the vehicle identification number constituted a “search” and that the search was justified because the officer sought only to uncover the VIN, or vehicle identification

2013The court relied upon the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 , 106 S.Ct. 960 , 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986): In [Class, 475 U.S. at 114-15 , 106 S.Ct. 960 ], the Supreme Court stated that “a car’s interior as a whole is ... subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police.” The Court held that an officer’s opening the driver’s door of an automobile to examine the vehicle identification number constituted a “search” and that the search was justified because the officer sought only to uncover the VIN, or vehicle identification

2011"An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389 , 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000) (citation omitted).

2011"An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389 , 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000) (citation omitted).

2011We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Tindall , 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010) ("On appeals from a motion to suppress based on Fourth Amendment grounds, [an appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse if there is clear error."); State v. Bailey , 276 S.C. 32, 36 , 274 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1981) (recognizing consent as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement); State v. Wright , 391 S.C. 436, 443 , 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) ("[T]he two elements needed to satisfy the plain view excepti

2011We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Tindall , 388 S.C. 518, 521 , 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010) ("On appeals from a motion to suppress based on Fourth Amendment grounds, [an appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse if there is clear error."); State v. Bailey , 276 S.C. 32, 36 , 274 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1981) (recognizing consent as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement); State v. Wright , 391 S.C. 436, 443 , 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011) ("[T]he two elements needed to satisfy the plain view excepti

2011ISSUE Did the circuit court err in granting Respondents' motion to suppress because the evidence at issue was properly seized under the plain view and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement, and inadvertent discovery is not required for purposes of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement? *442 STANDARD OF REVIEW "The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557 , 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002) (citations omitted).

2011ISSUE Did the circuit court err in granting Respondents' motion to suppress because the evidence at issue was properly seized under the plain view and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement, and inadvertent discovery is not required for purposes of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement? *442 STANDARD OF REVIEW "The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557 , 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002) (citations omitted).