plain view doctrine in Massachusetts

2015Similarly, the tequila bottles could not lawfully be seized under the plain view doctrine because, at that time, their “incriminating character” was not “immediately apparent.” Commonwealth v. D’Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 730 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 211 (1995).

2015Similarly, the tequila bottles could not lawfully be seized under the plain view doctrine because, at that time, their "incriminating character" was not "immediately apparent." Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 730 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 211 (1995).

2015Similarly, the tequila bottles could not lawfully be seized under the plain view doctrine because, at that time, their “incriminating character” was not “immediately apparent.” Commonwealth v. D’Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 730 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 211 (1995).

2015Similarly, the tequila bottles could not lawfully be seized under the plain view doctrine because, at that time, their "incriminating character" was not "immediately apparent." Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 730 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 211 (1995).

2015Under the plain view doctrine, the evidence must be discovered inadvertently, which “means only that the police lacked probable cause to believe, prior to the search, that specific items would be discovered during the search.” Commonwealth v. Balicki, supra at 10 .

2013See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 9 (2002) (declining to abandon the inadvertence requirement of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under Article 14 as the Supreme Court did under the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (under Article 14, unlike under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not order the occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle out of the vehicle as a matter of course); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 789 (1996) (person is seized under Article 14 when police pursue the person with the obvious intent o

2004There is no dispute that, once the officer entered the car, the cocaine fell within the domain of his plain view, but "[p]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); rather, there are prerequisites that must be established before the plain view doctrine comes into play.

2004There is no dispute that, once the officer entered the car, the cocaine fell within the domain of his plain view, but “[p]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); rather, there are prerequisites that must be established before the plain view doctrine comes into play.

2006The Supreme Judicial Court has “described the inadvertence element of the plain view doctrine as requiring ‘that police lack[] probable cause before entering the [defendant’s private space] to believe the items would be there.’ ” Commonwealth v. D’Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 732 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 331 (1980).

2002“We have described the inadvertence element of the plain view doctrine as requiring ‘that police lack[] probable cause before entering the room to believe the items would be there.’ ” Commonwealth v. D'Amour, supra at 732 , quoting Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 331 (1980).

2011Under the Fourth Amendment, the plain view doctrine provides that “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 211 (1995), quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).

1996The “Plain Feel” Doctrine In the United States Supreme Court case of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S., 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), the Court states that “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons, if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical consideration that inhere in the plain view context.” Several oth

2010See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Accaputo, 380 Mass. 435, 447-448 (1980); Commonwealth v. Bond, 375 Mass. 201, 206 (1978).

2002“In the case of contraband and fruits and instrumentalities of crime, the nexus to criminal activity is obvious.” Commonwealth v. D'Amour, supra at 731 , citing Commonwealth v. Accaputo, 380 Mass. 435, 447 (1980). 10 However, in order for the plain view doctrine to apply, “[o]ur cases also have required that the police come across the item inadvertently.” Commonwealth v. D' Amour, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Santana, supra. See Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 473 (1978); Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 557 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976).

2020The automobile exception, Sheridan, 470 Mass. at 759 , and the plain view exception, Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 306 (2010) (citations omitted), are two such well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.

2014Ibid.

1980This is not such a case as Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 801-803 (1975), where prior investigation had established a basis for securing a search warrant and the exigent circumstances urged by the Commonwealth for invocation of the plain view doctrine appeared contrived; Here the presence of the envelopes of drugs on the person of Blatz could not have been reliably predicted and their discovery was inadvertent.

1976When the plain view doctrine is relied on to justify a warrantless seizure of evidence, attention must be paid also to seeing that the police, in full possession of probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence is present in a particular place, have not waited until an opportune moment to “place themselves in a position to gain a plain view of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 809 (1975) (Hennessey, J., concurring in result).

2010Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the plain view doctrine applies (1) where the police are lawfully in a position to view the object; (2) where the police have a lawful right of access to the object; and (3) in cases concerning (a) contraband, weapons, or other items illegally possessed, where the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990); Commonwealth v. D‘Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 731 (1999) (D’Amour)-, or (b) other types of evidence (“mere evidence”), where the particular evidence is plausibly re

2002The Supreme Court, which initially required that the seizure of items in plain view be inadvertent, Coolidge v. New Hamp shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), abandoned that requirement in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).

2013See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 9 (2002) (declining to abandon the inadvertence requirement of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under Article 14 as the Supreme Court did under the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (under Article 14, unlike under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not order the occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle out of the vehicle as a matter of course); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 789 (1996) (person is seized under Article 14 when police pursue the person with the obvious intent o

2012The Supreme Judicial Court has on many occasions interpreted Article 14 to provide greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the area of searches and seizures. 14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 9 (2002) (declining to abandon the inadvertence requirement of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under Article 14 as the Supreme Court did under the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (under Article 14, unlike under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not order the occupants of a lawf

2013See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 9 (2002) (declining to abandon the inadvertence requirement of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under Article 14 as the Supreme Court did under the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (under Article 14, unlike under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not order the occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle out of the vehicle as a matter of course); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 789 (1996) (person is seized under Article 14 when police pursue the person with the obvious intent o

2012The Supreme Judicial Court has on many occasions interpreted Article 14 to provide greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the area of searches and seizures. 14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 9 (2002) (declining to abandon the inadvertence requirement of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under Article 14 as the Supreme Court did under the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (under Article 14, unlike under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not order the occupants of a lawf

2013HodariD., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373 (1985) (“We conclude that art. 14 provides more substantive protection to criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment in the determination of probable cause”).

2012The Supreme Judicial Court has on many occasions interpreted Article 14 to provide greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the area of searches and seizures. 14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 9 (2002) (declining to abandon the inadvertence requirement of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement under Article 14 as the Supreme Court did under the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999) (under Article 14, unlike under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not order the occupants of a lawf

2012Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 Mass. 756 , 762 n.3 (1996), quoting United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992).

1996“In cases involving closed containers . . . the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a container believed to contain contraband but any subsequent search of the concealed contents of the container must be accompanied by a warrant or justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992).

2010Under the plain view doctrine, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Hinds, 437 Mass. 54, 61 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1205 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. D’Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 730-731 (1999).

2007See also Commonwealth v. Hinds, 437 Mass. 54, 61 (2002) (applying plain view doctrine to computer search).

2002“In the case of contraband and fruits and instrumentalities of crime, the nexus to criminal activity is obvious.” Commonwealth v. D'Amour, supra at 731 , citing Commonwealth v. Accaputo, 380 Mass. 435, 447 (1980). 10 However, in order for the plain view doctrine to apply, “[o]ur cases also have required that the police come across the item inadvertently.” Commonwealth v. D' Amour, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Santana, supra. See Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 473 (1978); Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 557 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976).

1999“The inadvertence requirement simply lends credibility to the doctrine by ensuring that only evidence which the police did not anticipate or know to be at the locus of a search will be seized without a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 473 (1978), quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 557 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976).

2002“In the case of contraband and fruits and instrumentalities of crime, the nexus to criminal activity is obvious.” Commonwealth v. D'Amour, supra at 731 , citing Commonwealth v. Accaputo, 380 Mass. 435, 447 (1980). 10 However, in order for the plain view doctrine to apply, “[o]ur cases also have required that the police come across the item inadvertently.” Commonwealth v. D' Amour, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Santana, supra. See Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 473 (1978); Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 557 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976).

1987In Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 557 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976), we applied the plain view doctrine enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and stated that “[t]he plain view doctrine requires prior police justification for an intrusion in the course of which an officer inadvertently comes across incriminating evidence.” Citing this passage, the judge in this case granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the seized marihuana cigarette on the ground that Sergeant Gendron lacked “prior justification” to be in the position which resulted in his observation

2025Relying on Commonwealth v. King, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 830 (2006), in which we affirmed the allowance of a motion to suppress where the officer who made a plain view observation of drugs did not testify at the motion hearing, the defendant contends that the judge could not properly conclude that the cocaine was seized under the plain view doctrine based solely on Trooper Martineau's testimony.

2020Id. at 828 — 829.

2023Perkins, supra at 604 .

2016See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 603-604 (2013) (“Under [the plain view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they [inadvertently encounter] an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant”).

2016More recently, however, the court expressed concern that a search of digital files could be "joined with the plain view doctrine to enable the Commonwealth to use against defendants inculpatory evidence . . . even though 9 See, e.g., United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176-1177 (9th Cir. 2010); Note, Digital Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Interplay Between the Plain View Doctrine and Search-Protocol Warrant Restrictions, 49 Am.

2013We take seriously the concern that a cursory review of every e-mail undermines the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, particularly where — as the Commonwealth appears to argue would be permissible and appropriate in this case •— the cursory review is joined with the plain view doctrine to enable the Commonwealth to use against the defendants inculpatory evidence with respect to the pending indictments that it finds in the emails, even though such evidence may not actually fit within the scope of the search warrants obtained. 32 See United States v. Comprehensive Dru

1993The trooper’s discovery of the drugs and drug paraphernalia resulted from a mere “plain view observation.” In Commonwealth v. *656 Sergienko, 399 Mass. 291 (1987), we said, “The key to understanding the distinction between the plain view doctrine and a plain view observation is a recognition that a plain view observation involves no intrusion into an area in which the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

1992See Commonwealth v. Sergienko, 399 Mass. 291, 294-295 (1987), and cases cited. 6 That the officers employed a flashlight in making their observation does not change our *750 analysis.

1991Nothing in Commonwealth v. Anderson, 366 Mass. 394 (1974), which is relied on by the Commonwealth, suggests a different result.

1975See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. at 466-471 ; Commonwealth v. Rand , 363 Mass, at 557; Commonwealth v. Anderson, 366 Mass. 394, 401 (1974). 13 We assume that it is the potential of a vehicle actually to be moved in a given situation with which we are concerned, and not some mobility inherent in the automobile.

2020Moreover, "[f]or evidence seized without a warrant to be admissible, the Commonwealth bears the burden to establish that a warrantless search fell within an exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 217 (2019) (internal and external citations omitted).

2020The automobile exception, Sheridan, 470 Mass. at 759 , and the plain view exception, Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 306 (2010) (citations omitted), are two such well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.

2020See Sheridan, 470 Mass. at 759 (ruling that the plain view doctrine under Article 14 requires, inter alia, "the officer 'come across the object inadvertently.'") (citation omitted).

2016It is an open question whether application of the plain view doctrine to searches of digital media would undermine the constitutional prohibition on general searches.9 This court applied the plain view doctrine to a search of computer files in McDermott, supra at 777 .

2016It is an open question whether application of the plain view doctrine to searches of digital media would undermine the constitutional prohibition on general searches. 9 This court applied the plain view doctrine to a search of computer files in McDermott, supra at 111.

2016See Commonwealth v. Ringgard, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 197, 202-203 (2008). 9 In order for the police to enter a home under the emergency aid exception, “[i]t suffices that there are objectively reasonable grounds to believe that emergency aid might be needed.” Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 214 .

2016More recently, however, the court expressed concern that a search of digital files could be "joined with the plain view doctrine to enable the Commonwealth to use against defendants inculpatory evidence . . . even though 9 See, e.g., United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176-1177 (9th Cir. 2010); Note, Digital Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Interplay Between the Plain View Doctrine and Search-Protocol Warrant Restrictions, 49 Am.

2016More recently, however, the court expressed concern that a search of digital files could be "joined with the plain view doctrine to enable the Commonwealth to use against defendants inculpatory evidence . . . even though 9 See, e.g., United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176-1177 (9th Cir. 2010); Note, Digital Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Interplay Between the Plain View Doctrine and Search-Protocol Warrant Restrictions, 49 Am.