plain view doctrine in Pennsylvania

2025The trial court reasoned that this evidence was properly seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine, relying in part on Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 629-31 (Pa. 2007), which addressed when evidence seized from a car is admissible pursuant to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

2025The trial court reasoned that this evidence was properly seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine, relying in part on Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 629-31 (Pa. 2007), which addressed when evidence seized from a car is admissible pursuant to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

2026Further, “the Motor Vehicle Code provides the statutory authorization for a police officer to stop a motor vehicle ‘[w]henever a police officer . . . has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred [so that he may] secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.” Id. at 333 (quoting 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b)) (alterations in original). -8- J-S38007-25 Courts have described the plain view doctrine as a three-prong test.

2026These exceptions include . . . the plain view exception . . . [and] the stop and frisk exception[.5] Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2026“The plain view doctrine provides that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized without a warrant[.]” Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

2025“The plain view doctrine provides that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized without a warrant[.]” Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

2025“Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception …, the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, . . . the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (some formatting altered and citation omitted).

2024Horton, 496 U.S. at 133–34 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).19 In practical terms, the first two elements of the plain view doctrine speak to the lawfulness of the initial observation and whether probable cause exists—the search 18 See n.1 supra. 19 As noted in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), “it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure.” Id. at 465 .

2024See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (“If ‘plain view’ justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable warrant requirement, therefore, it must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures rather than by searches.”); United States v. Green, 106 F. 4th 368 , 378 (4th Cir. 2024) (“The plain-view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for a seizure, not a search.”) (emphasis omitted).

2025App. Ct. 2015) (holding that law enforcement’s inspection and photograph of the “screen saver image” on the defendant’s cellular telephone was permissible under the plain view doctrine). - 17 - J-S20007-25 Commonwealth v. Anderson, 40 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).7 Herein, the trial court held that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable.

2025“The plain view doctrine provides that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized without a warrant[.]” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 40 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 616 Pa. 666 , 51 A.3d 837 (2012).

2026This Court has explained that “[s]uch exceptions include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception[,] the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1072 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

2025See also Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 490 A.2d 923, 927 (Pa.Super. 1985) (explaining seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming there is probable cause to associate property with criminal activity; experienced officer trained in ____________________________________________ an application of the plain view exception, we need not apply Alexander.” Smith, supra at 332 (quoting Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1074 (Pa.Super. 2022)). -7- J-S46043-24 narcotics can seize object, when he observes it from lawful vantage point, and ho

2026In finding that the plain view doctrine does not apply to the matter sub judice, my colleagues rely upon our High Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Graham, 721 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Norris, 446 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1982).

2024See Commonwealth v. McCullum, 602 A.2d 313, 320 (Pa. 1992); see also McCree, 924 A.2d at 625 ; Commonwealth v. Graham, 721 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. 1998) (opinion announcing judgment of court).5 Here, it is undisputed the first two prongs of the plain view test are satisfied.

2025See Heidelberg, 267 A.3d at 505 ; Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473-74 (Pa. Super. 2022) (affirming denial of suppression pursuant to the plain view doctrine where police during the process of an investigatory detention resulting from a motor ____________________________________________ 4 The search warrant is not included in the certified record. -7- J-S47003-24 vehicle stop, saw a gun from a lawful vantage point, its incriminating nature was immediately apparent, and the police had a lawful right of access).

2024Police may search “the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden[]” if they ____________________________________________ 6 “The plain view doctrine allows the admission of evidence seized without a warrant when: (1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467 , 471 (Pa. Super. 2022) (emphasis omitted).

2024Horton, 496 U.S. at 133–34 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).19 In practical terms, the first two elements of the plain view doctrine speak to the lawfulness of the initial observation and whether probable cause exists—the search 18 See n.1 supra. 19 As noted in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), “it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure.” Id. at 465 .

2024Horton, 496 U.S. at 133–34 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).19 In practical terms, the first two elements of the plain view doctrine speak to the lawfulness of the initial observation and whether probable cause exists—the search 18 See n.1 supra. 19 As noted in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), “it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure.” Id. at 465 .

2024This Court, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa. Super. 2011), defined what the phrase “lawful right of access to an object” means under the plain view doctrine.

2024To understand what it is and how to define it, and question) (applying Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 557 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc)); Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 334 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that because the police officer “lacked advance notice and an opportunity to obtain a warrant before commencing [the] search, he had a lawful right of access to the interior of Appellee’s vehicle to recover the evidence”); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (applying McMahon and Smith in rejecting a claim that “Alexander requires the Commonwealth to prove exigent c

2024See Commonwealth v. McCullum, 602 A.2d 313, 320 (Pa. 1992); see also McCree, 924 A.2d at 625 ; Commonwealth v. Graham, 721 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. 1998) (opinion announcing judgment of court).5 Here, it is undisputed the first two prongs of the plain view test are satisfied.

2020However: the plain view doctrine provides that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized without a warrant, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), as modified by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), and it was adopted by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McCullum, 529 Pa. 117 , 602 A.2d 313 (1992).

2025Id. (citation omitted). -4- J-S25042-25 One exception, the plain view doctrine, permits the warrantless seizure of an object when: (1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.

2021See, e.g., Miller, 56 A.3d at 430-31 (holding police officer’s warrantless seizure of beer bottles from inside appellant’s vehicle was lawful under plain view exception where incriminating nature of bottles was immediately apparent and officer lacked advance notice and an opportunity to obtain warrant before commencing search); Bumbarger, supra. Also, even if the requirements of the plain view exception were not met, the bags of crack cocaine would have been lawfully — and inevitably — discovered during an inventory search of Appellant’s vehicle.

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 ; see also McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (explaining that “Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, not the plain view exception”); Lutz, 270 A.3d at 576 (holding -7- J-S44028-23 that “Alexander did not impact [the trial court’s] ruling because its decision did not ‘rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view’” exception); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “Alexander requires the Com

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 ; see also McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (explaining that “Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, not the plain view exception”); Lutz, 270 A.3d at 576 (holding -7- J-S44028-23 that “Alexander did not impact [the trial court’s] ruling because its decision did not ‘rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view’” exception); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “Alexander requires the Com

2009Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1045 (Pa.Super.2008) ( en banc )(citing Commonwealth *886 v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621, 628-29 (2007)). ¶ 16 Appellant's sole challenge to the applicability of the plain view doctrine assails the conclusion that the first two prongs were met. [3] We reject his claim.

2009Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1045 (Pa.Super.2008) (en banc )(citing Com monwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621, 628-29 (2007)). ¶ 16 Appellant’s sole challenge to the applicability of the plain view doctrine assails the conclusion that the first two prongs were met. 3 We reject his claim.

2026Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure of an item is only permissible when: “(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.” Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 504 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted).

2025The plain view doctrine "permits the warrantless seizure of an object when: (1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object." Commonwealth v. v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 504 (Pa. Super. 2021) v. Bumbarger, (quoting Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10, 19 (Pa. Super. 2020)). 2020)).

2021More specifically, the plain view doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of evidence where a police officer views an object from a lawful vantage point, and it is immediately apparent that object is incriminating." Commonwealth v. Petrol!, 576, 738 A.2d 993,999 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Ballard, 806 A.2d 889 , 891 8 (Pa. Super.

2018As a result, their actions from that point forward must be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment principles, Livingstone , 174 A.3d at 637 , and Trooper Smolleck thus could not reenter the sorority house without a warrant or some other basis for claiming an entitlement to a different exception to the warrant requirement. 14 Because no other exception to the warrant requirement applied to permit his reentry, Trooper Smolleck did not observe the glass marijuana bong and pipe in the sorority house from a lawful vantage point, Commonwealth v. Petroll , 558 Pa. 565 , 738 A.2d 993 , 999 (1999

1996Id. [1] The plain feel doctrine is an adjunct of the plain view doctrine and was first enunciated in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993): If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context.

1996Id. [1] The plain feel doctrine is an adjunct of the plain view doctrine and was first enunciated in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993): If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context.

2026See Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10, 20 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting that the plain view exception applies when: “(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object”).6 On appeal, Cirilo maintains that the investigator unlawfully removed him from his vehicle due to the investigators’ reliance of a factual error.

2026He contends that “[t]he only reason [the investigators] removed him from the vehicle was so police could have the vehicle towed.” ____________________________________________ 6 Although not discussed at length by Cirilo, we note his suppression and appellate arguments challenged the first prong of the plain view exception, namely, whether the investigators were in a lawful position when the viewed the firearm. -6- J-S34026-25 Id.

2025See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (finding that an officer’s conduct of shining a flashlight into a stopped car and changing his position to get a better view of certain angles inside the car did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Jones, 978 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Pa.Super. 2009) (concluding that the plain view exception was met when “officers did nothing more than illuminate activity, two individuals standing on the porch of a suspected drug house, which they could already readily observe from a lawful and non-intrusive vantage point”); Commonwealth v. Merkt, 600 A

2025However, “inherent in the plain view doctrine is the principle the seized object must not have been put in plain view as a result of unlawful police conduct.” Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 504 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (stating the “question whether property in plain view of the police may be seized [ ] must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables them to perceive and physically seize the property in question.”).

2025See also Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 490 A.2d 923, 927 (Pa.Super. 1985) (explaining seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming there is probable cause to associate property with criminal activity; experienced officer trained in ____________________________________________ an application of the plain view exception, we need not apply Alexander.” Smith, supra at 332 (quoting Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1074 (Pa.Super. 2022)). -7- J-S46043-24 narcotics can seize object, when he observes it from lawful vantage point, and ho

2018The plain view exception cannot be used as a pretext when police officers know in advance the location of an item and intend to seize it. [Commonwealth v.] Kendrick, [ 490 A.2d 923, 926 (Pa. Super. 1985)] (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)[)].

2024The plain view doctrine is “wholly applicable to . . . seizure issues under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 656 (Pa. 2010).

2014Commonwealth v. MCCree, 924 A.2d 621, 625 (2007); Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649 (2010). [T]he police lawfully seized the gun under the plain view exception.

2012However, Horton, supra, "clearly discarded this prong of the plain view test.” Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285 , 662 A.2d 1043 , 1049 n. 6 (1995).

2012However, Horton, supra, "clearly discarded this prong of the plain view test.” Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285 , 662 A.2d 1043 , 1049 n. 6 (1995).

2021More specifically, the plain view doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of evidence where a police officer views an object from a lawful vantage point, and it is immediately apparent that object is incriminating." Commonwealth v. Petrol!, 576, 738 A.2d 993,999 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Ballard, 806 A.2d 889 , 891 8 (Pa. Super.

2015"The plain view doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of evidence where a police officer views an object from a " ... lawful vantage point, and it is immediately apparent that object is incriminating." Commonwealth v. Winfield, 835 A.2d 365, 369 (Pa.Super. 2003) citing Commonwealth v. Petrol!, 558 Pa. 565, 576 , 738 A.2d 993 , 999 (1999); and Commonwealth v. Ballard, 806 A.2d 889, 891 (Pa.Super. 2002).

2022Commonwealth v. Weik, 521 A.2d 44 (Pa.Super. 1987), delineates two categories of cases involving the plain view doctrine: The first line of cases involves those situations in which the “view” takes place after an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.

2021In Commonwealth v. Weik, 521 A.2d 44 (Pa.Super. 1987), this Court explained that cases involving the plain view doctrine fall into two categories: The first line of cases involves those situations in which the “view” takes place after an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.

2021Further, “inherent in the plain view doctrine is the principle the seized object must not have been put in plain view as a result of unlawful police conduct.” Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 311 A.2d 914 , 918 (Pa. 1973); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 737 (1983) (the “question of whether property in plain view of the police may be seized [] must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables them to perceive and physically seize the property in question.”). - 18 - J-E02007-21 We conclude the Commonwealth met the first requirement of the plain view test, as the officers viewed the bags

2021Further, “inherent in the plain view doctrine is the principle the seized object must not have been put in plain view as a result of unlawful police conduct.” Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 311 A.2d 914 , 918 (Pa. 1973); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 737 (1983) (the “question of whether property in plain view of the police may be seized [] must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables them to perceive and physically seize the property in question.”). - 18 - J-E02007-21 We conclude the Commonwealth met the first requirement of the plain view test, as the officers viewed the bags

2026See, e.g., Jones, 978 A.2d at 1005 ; Merkt, 600 A.2d at 1299 .

2025See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (finding that an officer’s conduct of shining a flashlight into a stopped car and changing his position to get a better view of certain angles inside the car did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Jones, 978 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Pa.Super. 2009) (concluding that the plain view exception was met when “officers did nothing more than illuminate activity, two individuals standing on the porch of a suspected drug house, which they could already readily observe from a lawful and non-intrusive vantage point”); Commonwealth v. Merkt, 600 A

2000In defining "immediately apparent” for purposes of the plain feel doctrine, Dickerson cited to Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), for the proposition that where police lack probable cause to believe that the object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search, the plain view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.

2000In defining "immediately apparent” for purposes of the plain feel doctrine, Dickerson cited to Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), for the proposition that where police lack probable cause to believe that the object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search, the plain view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.

2024See Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (“It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”); see also - 10 - J-A21031-24 Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 628 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that the plain view doctrine justifies the seizure of an item that is within the officers’ plain view, but cannot provide the justification as to why the officer was in the vantage point to observe the item in the first place).

1977The plain view doctrine has been recognized as part of the Pennsylvania law of search and seizure, Commonwealth v. Davenport, 453 Pa. 235 , 308 A.2d 85 (1973), and the rule of that doctrine is that “objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.” Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992, 993 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (citations omitted).