plain view doctrine in Texas

2023In that case, we regarded the plain view doctrine not as an exception to the warrant requirement but rather as a recognition that a defendant lacks any expectation of privacy in an object in plain view of the public.11 As such it would provide an independent justification for the seizure in this case rather than an exception to the application of the exclusionary rule.12 As we explained in Walter, “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that the “plain view” doctrine is not really an “exception” to the warrant requirement because the seizure of the property in plain view involves no invasion of pri

2023In that case, we regarded the plain view doctrine not as an exception to the warrant requirement but rather as a recognition that a defendant lacks any expectation of privacy in an object in plain view of the public.11 As such it would provide an independent justification for the seizure in this case rather than an exception to the application of the exclusionary rule.12 As we explained in Walter, “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that the “plain view” doctrine is not really an “exception” to the warrant requirement because the seizure of the property in plain view involves no invasion of pri

2024Plain View “A seizure of an object is lawful under the plain view exception if three requirements are met.” Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim.

2021App. 2013) (holding that, because no other exigency existed, officers could not enter a fenced backyard without a warrant even though they could see abused and malnourished pets in plain view); Keehn, 279 S.W.3d at 34 (holding that the State could not rely on the plain view doctrine to enter a car without a warrant where drug manufacturing materials were visible but no other exigency existed); Tollefson v. State, 352 S.W.3d 816, 821 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref'd) (holding that officers could not enter a trailer without a warrant even though murder-related evidence was in plain view f

2024App. 1991) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)) (recognizing “[t]he immediately apparent prong of the plain view analysis does not require actual knowledge of the incriminating evidence”).

2023In that case, we regarded the plain view doctrine not as an exception to the warrant requirement but rather as a recognition that a defendant lacks any expectation of privacy in an object in plain view of the public.11 As such it would provide an independent justification for the seizure in this case rather than an exception to the application of the exclusionary rule.12 As we explained in Walter, “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that the “plain view” doctrine is not really an “exception” to the warrant requirement because the seizure of the property in plain view involves no invasion of pri

2024Among others, these include the plain view doctrine, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 136–140 (1990), and consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

2017For the plain-view exception to apply, “two requirements must be met: 1) the officer must be in a proper position to view the item or lawfully be on the premises; and 2) the fact that the officer has discovered evidence must be immediately apparent.” Joseph v. State, 807 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim.

2014“The immediately apparent prong of the plain view analysis does not require actual knowledge of incriminating evidence.” Joseph v. State, 807 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim.

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

1986See notes 1 and 2, supra. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), also see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), and Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 , 103 S.Ct. 3319 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983), the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out that one of the requirements that must be satisfied before the plain view doctrine may be invoked and applied to a case is the fact that the incriminating nature of the articles seized must be readily or immediately apparent.

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

2024But for the plain view doctrine to apply, “probable cause is required.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

2006See generally Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (balloons containing heroin); Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (a partially unzipped pouch exposing a dark brown bottle and a clear plastic bag containing a white powder); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (a red balloon containing heroin); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (recognizing the popularity of plastic bags as containers for narcotics, but declining to hold that the bag itself, without more, is contraband). (footnote: 6) Accordingly, a plastic bagg

2006See generally Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (balloons containing heroin); Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (a partially unzipped pouch exposing a dark brown bottle and a clear plastic bag containing a white powder); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (a red balloon containing heroin); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (recognizing the popularity of plastic bags as containers for narcotics, but declining to hold that the bag itself, without more, is contraband). (6) Accordingly, a plastic baggie, under

2023What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 3 The Fourth Amendment generally does not apply to seizures of contraband found in a public place because there is no expectation of privacy. 4 It is well-settled, as the United States Supreme Court has observed, “that objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant.” 5 Objects falling in the plain view of an 1 Massey v. State, 649 S.W.3d 500 , 521 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022). 2 The Court granted the State’s third ground of review which aske

2023What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 3 The Fourth Amendment generally does not apply to seizures of contraband found in a public place because there is no expectation of privacy. 4 It is well-settled, as the United States Supreme Court has observed, “that objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant.” 5 Objects falling in the plain view of an 1 Massey v. State, 649 S.W.3d 500 , 521 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022). 2 The Court granted the State’s third ground of review which aske

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

2021App. 2010)); see also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 ); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66 . 26 See also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (“If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object — i.e., if ‘its incriminating character [is not] “immediately apparent”’ . . . — the plain- view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.”) (internal citations omitted, brackets provided by the Supreme Court); Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 266 (Tex. Crim.

2021App. 2013) (noting that for the plain view doctrine to apply, (1) police officers must lawfully be where the object can be “plainly viewed,” (2) the “incriminating character” of the object in plain view must be “immediately apparent” to the police officers, and (3) the officers must have the right to access the object); see also State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. Crim.

2018Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, these discoveries pursuant to a valid warrant and the plain view exception, see State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim.

2014The plain-view doctrine requires “(1) that law enforcement officials see an item in plain view at a vantage point where they have the right to be, and (2) it is immediately apparent that the item seized constitutes evidence — that is, there is probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 685 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2009KEEHN—6 Outwardly displeased with our decision, the court of appeals declared that it had addressed every issue Keehn raised.8 Nevertheless, the court went on to hold: To the extent that Keehn’s sole issue contains a sub-argument that the plain view doctrine did not authorize the officers to open the unlocked door of the van to seize the propane tank, when, for the reasons set forth in our prior opinion they had a lawful right to be on Keehn’s driveway where they observed the tank, and which, for the reasons set forth in our prior opinion, they had probable cause to believe constituted evidenc

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. refd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

2021App. 2010)); see also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 ); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66 . 26 See also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (“If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object — i.e., if ‘its incriminating character [is not] “immediately apparent”’ . . . — the plain- view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.”) (internal citations omitted, brackets provided by the Supreme Court); Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 266 (Tex. Crim.

2017See Haley, 811 S.W.2d at 599 . invoked, there must be probable cause to believe that the Having satisfied the first element of Coolidge, we item in question is evidence of a crime. must next determine whether in discovering the air The State, in turn, argues that this was not an un- freshener, it was immediately apparent that Roberts had lawful search of the vehicle and that the plain view doc- discovered evidence of a crime. [HN11] The "immedi- trine was designed to allow the seizure of evidence in ately apparent" prong of the plain view analysis does not this type of scenario.

2007See Martinez, 17 S.W.3d at 685 (holding, “We agree with the State that the gun belt was properly obtained [from the appellant’s vehicle] under the plain view seizure doctrine”); Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (recognizing items not encompassed within search warrant were nonetheless validly seized pursuant to “plain view seizure” doctrine), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1198 , 117 S.Ct. 1556 , 137 L.Ed.2d 704 (1997); State v. Haley, 811 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (holding, “It has been very well settled that items in “plain view” may be seized by *616 law enforcement

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2003U.S. v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 , 112 S.Ct. 2288 , 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992); Morgan v. State, 906 S.W.2d 620, 629 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. refd), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 865 , 117 S.Ct. 174 , 136 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996).

2015Zayas v. State, 972 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. ref'd.) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam); Clark v. State, 548 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Clark v. State, 548 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (holding that “police officer may seize what he sees in plain sight or open view if he is lawfully where he is.”) Standard of Review A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2006See generally Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (balloons containing heroin); Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (a partially unzipped pouch exposing a dark brown bottle and a clear plastic bag containing a white powder); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (a red balloon containing heroin); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (recognizing the popularity of plastic bags as containers for narcotics, but declining to hold that the bag itself, without more, is contraband). (footnote: 6) Accordingly, a plastic bagg

2006See generally Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (balloons containing heroin); Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (a partially unzipped pouch exposing a dark brown bottle and a clear plastic bag containing a white powder); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (a red balloon containing heroin); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (recognizing the popularity of plastic bags as containers for narcotics, but declining to hold that the bag itself, without more, is contraband). (6) Accordingly, a plastic baggie, under

2022Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 266 (Tex. Crim.

2021App. 2010)); see also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 ); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66 . 26 See also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 (“If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object — i.e., if ‘its incriminating character [is not] “immediately apparent”’ . . . — the plain- view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.”) (internal citations omitted, brackets provided by the Supreme Court); Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 266 (Tex. Crim.

1990Snider v. State, 681 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Winslow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, pet. ref’d).

1987Instead, the State contends that the seizure of the items was proper under the plain view doctrine and relies on Snider v. State, 681 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) and Gonzalez v. State, 677 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.).

2006See generally Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (balloons containing heroin); Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (a partially unzipped pouch exposing a dark brown bottle and a clear plastic bag containing a white powder); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (a red balloon containing heroin); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (recognizing the popularity of plastic bags as containers for narcotics, but declining to hold that the bag itself, without more, is contraband). (footnote: 6) Accordingly, a plastic bagg

2006See generally Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (balloons containing heroin); Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (a partially unzipped pouch exposing a dark brown bottle and a clear plastic bag containing a white powder); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (a red balloon containing heroin); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977) (recognizing the popularity of plastic bags as containers for narcotics, but declining to hold that the bag itself, without more, is contraband). (6) Accordingly, a plastic baggie, under

2023App. 2013). 5 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980).

2021The law of the land clearly states that before searching or seizing evidence without a warrant, the “incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.”25 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the “immediately apparent” component of the plain view doctrine to mean “probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.” Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 365 .26 Both the panel majority and the concurrence erroneously concluded (without any the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package.”) (footnote omitted); Horton v. Cali

2015See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim.

2015Id.

2007See Arrick v. State, 107 S.W.3d 710, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, pet. refd) (holding that the second “immediately apparent” prong of the plain view analysis requires only probable cause, not actual knowledge of incriminating evidence).

2007See Arrick v. State , 107 S.W.3d 710, 719 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding that t he second “immediately apparent” prong of the plain view analysis requires only probable cause, not actual knowledge of incriminating evidence).

2012The requirement of the plain-view doctrine that it be “immediately apparent” to an officer that a substance is contraband does not imply “an unduly high degree of certainty.” Williams, 668 S.W.2d at 700 n.12 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 12 730, 741, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (plurality op.)); see also Joseph v. State, 807 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim.

1988Id.; See also, White v. State, 729 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987); Williams v. State, 668 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).