plain view doctrine in California

2024(Id. at pp. 326–327.) But the plain view doctrine is an unrelated “exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable . . . .” (Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 133 , fn. omitted.) Hicks and its 5 Smith in his reply brief notes the California Racial Justice Act, effective January 1, 2021, added section 745 with the intent “ ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ ” (Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106 , 123.

2023The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant.” (Horton, v. California, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 138 (Horton).) Thus, if an officer “has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first.’’ (Id. at p. 139.) Put dif

2022(Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 466 ; cf. Trent v. Wade (5th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 368, 386 [because an officer “was lawfully on the [private] property when he observed the [all-terrain vehicle], which had just been used as an instrumentality in the crime of evading arrest,” the officer “did not violate clearly established law by effecting a seizure of the automobile”]; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205, fn. 2 [noting the “prosecution did not argue that investigators could seize” an incriminating item under the plain view doctrine, as an instrumentality of a crime].) Here, police

2022(Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 466 ; cf. Trent v. Wade (5th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 368, 386 [because an officer “was lawfully on the [private] property when he observed the [all-terrain vehicle], which had just been used as an instrumentality in the crime of evading arrest,” the officer “did not violate clearly established law by effecting a seizure of the automobile”]; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205, fn. 2 [noting the “prosecution did not argue that investigators could seize” an incriminating item under the plain view doctrine, as an instrumentality of a crime].) Here, police

2016Analysis The Fourth Amendment proscribes searches and seizures conducted without a warrant, and deems them per se unreasonable, “ ‘subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.’ ” (Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (Dickerson).) One is the plain view doctrine, which sanctions police in seizing an item without a warrant if police are lawfully in a position from which they view the object and have a lawful right of access to it, and the incriminating nature of the object is “immediately apparent.” (Dickerson, at p. 375; Horton v. California (1990)

2015(Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 739 .) As explained in Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 , "the practical justification of [the] extension [of the plain view doctrine to private places] is the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk—to themselves or to preservation of the evidence—of going to obtain a warrant." (Id. at p. 327; Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 375 [plain view doctrine "justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magi

2016(Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 742 (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) If “police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object,” such as by feeling it or moving it even a few inches, the plain view doctrine does not authorize its warrantless seizure.

2016(See Texas v. Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 741–742.) It “is a flexible, common-sense standard” (id. at p. 742), that merely requires “the kind of ‘fair probability’ on which ‘reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.’ ” (Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. at p. 1055 ; accord, Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 243, fn. 13 (Gates) [requiring “only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity” ].) In the context of the plain view doctrine, probable cause exists as long as “the facts available to the officer would warrant a per

1987(Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 155 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 460 P.2d 485 ].) However, “[w]hen officers, in the course of a bona fide effort to execute a valid search warrant, discover articles which, although not included in the warrant, are reasonably identifiable as contraband, they may seize them whether they are initially in plain sight or come into plain sight subsequently, as a result of the officers’ efforts.” (Id. at p. 157.) The plain view doctrine is limited by the requirement that the search under the warrant be carried out in good faith.

1987(Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 155 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 460 P.2d 485 ].) However, “[w]hen officers, in the course of a bona fide effort to execute a valid search warrant, discover articles which, although not included in the warrant, are reasonably identifiable as contraband, they may seize them whether they are initially in plain sight or come into plain sight subsequently, as a result of the officers’ efforts.” (Id. at p. 157.) The plain view doctrine is limited by the requirement that the search under the warrant be carried out in good faith.

2016(Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 375-376 ; People v. Gallegos, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 623 .) This is primarily a warrantless search case, but to the extent that plain view seizure applies, the deputy properly entered the car and seized the victim’s bag under the plain view doctrine, as well.

2016Analysis The Fourth Amendment proscribes searches and seizures conducted without a warrant, and deems them per se unreasonable, “ ‘subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.’ ” (Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (Dickerson).) One is the plain view doctrine, which sanctions police in seizing an item without a warrant if police are lawfully in a position from which they view the object and have a lawful right of access to it, and the incriminating nature of the object is “immediately apparent.” (Dickerson, at p. 375; Horton v. California (1990)

2024(Illinois v. Andreas (1983) 463 U.S. 765, 771 .) “The plain view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity.” (Ibid.) “Although a routine traffic stop would rarely justify a police officer in drawing a gun or using handcuffs, such actions may be appropriate when the stop is of someone suspected of committing a felony.” (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676 .) “A person is guilty of car

2021The Bat That Was Seized Was in Plain View “[W]hether a lawful entry and search is based upon exigent circumstances or consent, the law is clear that any incriminating evidence observed in plain view may be seized. [Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has said, ‘The plain-view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity. [Citations.] The plain- view doctrine is grounded on the proposit

2024(See, e.g., Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 307 [“probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction”]; People v. Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612, 623 [“the required ‘nexus’ ” for application of the plain view doctrine “is that between the item discovered and a criminal activity, though not necessarily the criminal activity denominated in the warrant”]; U.S. v. Menon (3d Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 550, 562 [“the immediate 39 PEOPLE v. HELZER Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C.

1990(Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321, 323, 326 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 347, 352-353 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 ].) The probable cause rule articulated in Hicks has been described as a specific application of the requirement declared in Warden v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 307 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 792 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 ], that before property may be seized without a warrant, there must be a “nexus” between the item to be seized and criminal behavior.

2021The Bat That Was Seized Was in Plain View “[W]hether a lawful entry and search is based upon exigent circumstances or consent, the law is clear that any incriminating evidence observed in plain view may be seized. [Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has said, ‘The plain-view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity. [Citations.] The plain- view doctrine is grounded on the proposit

2012(See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 465 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ]; see also Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 133-137 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 112 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 ] (Horton).) The United States Supreme Court has said, “The plain-view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity. [Citations.] The plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawf

2015(Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 739 .) As explained in Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 , "the practical justification of [the] extension [of the plain view doctrine to private places] is the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk—to themselves or to preservation of the evidence—of going to obtain a warrant." (Id. at p. 327; Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 375 [plain view doctrine "justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magi

2015(Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 739 .) As explained in Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 , "the practical justification of [the] extension [of the plain view doctrine to private places] is the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk—to themselves or to preservation of the evidence—of going to obtain a warrant." (Id. at p. 327; Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 375 [plain view doctrine "justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magi

1980(Harris v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 234, 236 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1069-1070 , 88 S.Ct. 992 ]; De Conti v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 907, 909 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 287 ].) The first question thus arises whether the deputy sheriffs were entitled to conduct aerial observations and surveillance in the case at bench.

1980(Harris v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 234, 236 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1069-1070 , 88 S.Ct. 992 ]; De Conti v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 907, 909 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 287 ].) The first question thus arises whether the deputy sheriffs were entitled to conduct aerial observations and surveillance in the case at bench.

1980(Warden v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 307 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 792 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 ]; People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 762 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 528 P.2d 1 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 558 P.2d 872 ]; People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 69, 79 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 382 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Superior Court (Meyers) (1979) 25 Cal.3d 67, 77, fn. 9 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 716 , 598 P.2d 877 ].) In People v. Miller (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 849 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 863 ], the court aptly discussed the antec

1980(Warden v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 307 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 792 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 ]; People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 762 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 528 P.2d 1 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 558 P.2d 872 ]; People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 69, 79 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 382 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Superior Court (Meyers) (1979) 25 Cal.3d 67, 77, fn. 9 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 716 , 598 P.2d 877 ].) In People v. Miller (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 849 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 863 ], the court aptly discussed the antec

2022(Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 466 ; cf. Trent v. Wade (5th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 368, 386 [because an officer “was lawfully on the [private] property when he observed the [all-terrain vehicle], which had just been used as an instrumentality in the crime of evading arrest,” the officer “did not violate clearly established law by effecting a seizure of the automobile”]; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205, fn. 2 [noting the “prosecution did not argue that investigators could seize” an incriminating item under the plain view doctrine, as an instrumentality of a crime].) Here, police

2022(Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 466 ; cf. Trent v. Wade (5th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 368, 386 [because an officer “was lawfully on the [private] property when he observed the [all-terrain vehicle], which had just been used as an instrumentality in the crime of evading arrest,” the officer “did not violate clearly established law by effecting a seizure of the automobile”]; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205, fn. 2 [noting the “prosecution did not argue that investigators could seize” an incriminating item under the plain view doctrine, as an instrumentality of a crime].) Here, police

2022(Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 466 ; cf. Trent v. Wade (5th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 368, 386 [because an officer “was lawfully on the [private] property when he observed the [all-terrain vehicle], which had just been used as an instrumentality in the crime of evading arrest,” the officer “did not violate clearly established law by effecting a seizure of the automobile”]; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205, fn. 2 [noting the “prosecution did not argue that investigators could seize” an incriminating item under the plain view doctrine, as an instrumentality of a crime].) Here, police

2022(Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 466 ; cf. Trent v. Wade (5th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 368, 386 [because an officer “was lawfully on the [private] property when he observed the [all-terrain vehicle], which had just been used as an instrumentality in the crime of evading arrest,” the officer “did not violate clearly established law by effecting a seizure of the automobile”]; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205, fn. 2 [noting the “prosecution did not argue that investigators could seize” an incriminating item under the plain view doctrine, as an instrumentality of a crime].) Here, police

2015(Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 137 & fn. 7; State v. Betts (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) 397 S.W.3d 198, 206-207 [absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter backyard even though they saw evidence of crime in plain view from street]; United States v. Davis (4th Cir. 2012) 690 F.3d 226, 233-234 .) On the other hand, assuming the police have probable cause to believe the item is associated with criminal activity, the authority to seize the item includes the authority to further inspect the item at the time of seizure.

2015(Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 137 & fn. 7; State v. Betts (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) 397 S.W.3d 198, 206-207 [absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter backyard even though they saw evidence of crime in plain view from street]; United States v. Davis (4th Cir. 2012) 690 F.3d 226, 233-234 .) On the other hand, assuming the police have probable cause to believe the item is associated with criminal activity, the authority to seize the item includes the authority to further inspect the item at the time of seizure.

2024“Officers executing a warrant may seize items of evidence or contraband not listed in the warrant but observed in plain view.” (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 166 .) “The plain view doctrine does not create an independent ‘exception’ to the warrant clause, but simply is an extension of whatever may be the prior justification for the officers’ ‘access to an object.’ [Citation.] The officers lawfully must be in a position from which they can view a particular area; it must be immediately apparent to them that the items they are observing may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise

2002A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. [Citation.]” (Texas v. Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 742 [ 103 S.Ct. at p. 1543 ].) “If, however, the incriminating character of an object in plain view is not immediately apparent, the plain view doctrine cannot justify its seizure. [Citations.]” (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1295 .) b.

1982Under the circumstances of this case, we do not think so, even though this court, in People v. Murray (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 305, 309-310 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 502 ], stated, “Most commonly, the plain view doctrine is applied to items which are inherently recognizable as contraband, such as drugs, drug paraphernalia or illegal weapons.” In Murray , we declined to stretch the plain view doctrine to those limits which would throw out the central purpose of a warrant “which is to interpose an unprejudiced and detached judicial mind be *87 tween the officer and the seizure and to eliminate discretion in t

1982Under the circumstances of this case, we do not think so, even though this court, in People v. Murray (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 305, 309-310 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 502 ], stated, “Most commonly, the plain view doctrine is applied to items which are inherently recognizable as contraband, such as drugs, drug paraphernalia or illegal weapons.” In Murray , we declined to stretch the plain view doctrine to those limits which would throw out the central purpose of a warrant “which is to interpose an unprejudiced and detached judicial mind be *87 tween the officer and the seizure and to eliminate discretion in t

1980Those who thoughtlessly over-apply the plain view doctrine to every situation where there is a visual open view have not yet learned the simple lesson long since mastered by old hands at the burlesque houses, `You can't touch everything you can see'." (Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great `Search Incident' Geography Battle (1975) 26 Mercer L.Rev. 1047, 1096, fn.2.) [2] When the court in Lorenzana spoke of "the salutary rule of law that observations of things in plain sight made from a place where a police officer has a right to be do not amount to a search in the cons

1980Those who thoughtlessly over-apply the plain view doctrine to every situation where there is a visual open view have not yet learned the simple lesson long since mastered by old hands at the burlesque houses, ‘You can’t touch everything you can see’.” (Moyian, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great ‘Search Incident’ Geography Battle (1975) 26 Mercer L.Rev. 1047, 1096, fn.2.) When the court in Lorenzana spoke of “the salutary rule of law that observations of things in plain sight made from a place where a police officer has a right to be do not amount to a search in the constitu

2026(People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 (Stokes).) Much of Judge Dickerson’s application of the plain view doctrine is appropriately unchallenged on appeal.

2013(People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 .) “In the context of the plain view doctrine, probable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard, which requires only that the facts available to the officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that the item may be contraband or stolen property or evidence of a crime.

2025When a lawful entry “is based upon exigent circumstances or consent, the law is clear that any incriminating evidence observed in plain view may be seized. . . . ‘The plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s 16 The Ninth Circuit was critical of Thompson because it involved a misdemeanor offense (Hopkins v. Bonvicino (2009) 573 F.3d 752 , 768–769, 772), but that has no bearing where, as here, a potential murder is involved. 38 privacy interest in that item is lost . . . .’ ” ( Chapman, supra, 204 Ca

2021The Bat That Was Seized Was in Plain View “[W]hether a lawful entry and search is based upon exigent circumstances or consent, the law is clear that any incriminating evidence observed in plain view may be seized. [Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has said, ‘The plain-view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity. [Citations.] The plain- view doctrine is grounded on the proposit

2024“Officers executing a warrant may seize items of evidence or contraband not listed in the warrant but observed in plain view.” (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 166 .) “The plain view doctrine does not create an independent ‘exception’ to the warrant clause, but simply is an extension of whatever may be the prior justification for the officers’ ‘access to an object.’ [Citation.] The officers lawfully must be in a position from which they can view a particular area; it must be immediately apparent to them that the items they are observing may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise

2023(See People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 167 [officers from another jurisdiction may accompany officers conducting a search pursuant to a warrant without tainting the evidence uncovered in the process, even when the accompanying 37 officers lack probable cause for their own search warrant].) Detective Hecht stated his belief that the coin purse and briefcase recovered on that date were incriminating as to the Turnage murders, but even if it turned out that they were in fact incriminating as to the Morcos murders, Detective Hecht’s seizure was permissible under the plain view doctrine.

2024(See, e.g., Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 307 [“probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction”]; People v. Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612, 623 [“the required ‘nexus’ ” for application of the plain view doctrine “is that between the item discovered and a criminal activity, though not necessarily the criminal activity denominated in the warrant”]; U.S. v. Menon (3d Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 550, 562 [“the immediate 39 PEOPLE v. HELZER Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C.

2016(Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 375-376 ; People v. Gallegos, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 623 .) This is primarily a warrantless search case, but to the extent that plain view seizure applies, the deputy properly entered the car and seized the victim’s bag under the plain view doctrine, as well.

2023(See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 465 [“An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character”]; United States v. Williams (4th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 511, 522 [plain view doctrine applied to discovery of child pornography while conducting computer search under warrant authorizing search for evidence of crimes involving threats of bodily harm and harassment by computer].) “‘[T]he require

2016(People v. Hochstraser (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 883, 891, 903-905 [police properly searched parked 5 car for evidence of missing person without warrant under automobile exception, even though officers had the car key and the defendant could not move the car]; People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 89, 100-101 [police properly searched parked car for evidence of crime regardless of warrant under automobile exception]; see California v. Carney (1985) 471 U.S. 386, 392-393 [“[w]hen a vehicle is [readily capable of] being used on the highways . . and is found stationary . . . t

2012(See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 465 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ]; see also Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 133-137 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 112 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 ] (Horton).) The United States Supreme Court has said, “The plain-view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity. [Citations.] The plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawf

2012(See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 465 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ]; see also Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 133-137 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 112 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 ] (Horton).) The United States Supreme Court has said, “The plain-view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity. [Citations.] The plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawf

1993Under the plain view doctrine, “. . . if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. [Citations.]’’ (Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 334, 344-346 , 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137 ]; see also People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 431 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 ].) Calvert argues Vehicle Code section 2805 only authorizes inspections of vehicles, their parts, title or registration and “could

1993Under the plain view doctrine, “. . . if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. [Citations.]’’ (Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. _ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 334, 344-346 , 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137 ]; see also People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 431 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 ].) Calvert argues Vehicle Code section 2805 only authorizes inspections of vehicles, their parts, title or registration and “could

1988Justice Brown wrote: “We decline to stretch the plain view doctrine to those limits as to do so would be to throw out the central purpose of a warrant, which is to interpose an unprejudiced and detached judicial mind between the officer and the seizure and to eliminate discretion in the officer. [Citations.] Notwithstanding a generalized suspicion that the television sets and other items had been stolen, and aside from the 20 television sets from which the serial numbers had been removed, the testimony at the preliminary hearing did not establish that the officers in fact knew which items were

1982Under the circumstances of this case, we do not think so, even though this court, in People v. Murray (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 305, 309-310 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 502 ], stated, “Most commonly, the plain view doctrine is applied to items which are inherently recognizable as contraband, such as drugs, drug paraphernalia or illegal weapons.” In Murray , we declined to stretch the plain view doctrine to those limits which would throw out the central purpose of a warrant “which is to interpose an unprejudiced and detached judicial mind be *87 tween the officer and the seizure and to eliminate discretion in t