plain view doctrine in District of Columbia

2012Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511-12 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding evidence seized during unlawful entry into premises is obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment); Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 443, 470-71 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 (“[W]here the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different[, and a warrant is required.]”); accord, Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1138-39 (D.C.1985); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 549 (6th Cir.2003) (“Although the plain view doctrine would likely have justifi

2012Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511-12 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding evidence seized during unlawful entry into premises is obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment); Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 443, 470-71 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 (“[W]here the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different[, and a warrant is required.]”); accord, Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137, 1138-39 (D.C.1985); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 549 (6th Cir.2003) (“Although the plain view doctrine would likely have justifi

2025That is because the “immediately apparent” requirement for the incriminating nature of an item seen in plain view has been interpreted to mean “probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.” Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 999 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 741-42 ); see Brown, 460 U.S. at 741-42 (for the plain-view exception to apply, officer must have probable cause to believe item is associated with criminal activity).

2025Although the Court did not use the phrase “automobile exception,” it cited Ross, 456 U.S. 798—an automobile exception case—to support the conclusion that the warrantless intrusion into the car “was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 741 & n.6. 3 Justice White also addressed this issue in his dissenting opinion in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).

2025That is because the “immediately apparent” requirement for the incriminating nature of an item seen in plain view has been interpreted to mean “probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.” Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 999 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 741-42 ); see Brown, 460 U.S. at 741-42 (for the plain-view exception to apply, officer must have probable cause to believe item is associated with criminal activity).

2021However, such observation must first square with the plain view exception, which only allows for the warrantless seizure of evidence “in plain sight” when: “(1) an officer [did] not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) the evidence’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251, 256 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C. 2002)). 12 The “automobile exception to the Fourth Amendmen

2012Cf. Brooks v. United States, 367 A.2d 1297, 1311 (D.C.1976) (reasoning that where, after arresting Brooks, officers conducted a war-rantless search and seized evidence from several places in his apartment, the trial court would need to determine which items of evidence "f[e]ll within the proper limits of the plain view doctrine” (and thus were admissible) and “which items should be considered inadmissible”); Clark, 593 A.2d at 198 n. 25 (finding it unnecessary to decide whether the legality of the evidence-collection officer’s warrantless seizure of a slug that the emergency-response officer h

1982This court has applied a “primary purpose” test in interpreting the inadvertence requirement of the plain view doctrine: “[s]atisfaction of the inadvertency criterion would require the discovery of the [challenged evidence] to have been a subordinate aspect of the arrest itself, or the result of some justifying purpose other than merely gathering evidence.” Vance v. United States, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 52, 59 (1979) (quoting Brooks v. United States, D.C.App., 367 A.2d 1297, 1307 (1976)).

2014Under the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a *1084 lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); accord Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C.2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).

2014Under the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a *1084 lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); accord Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C.2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).

2025Thus, “[u]nder the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, ‘if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.’” (Bernard) West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)).

2019The plain view doctrine provides that, "if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant." West v. United States , 100 A.3d 1076 , 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366 , 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) ).

2025Thus, “[u]nder the so-called plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, ‘if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.’” (Bernard) West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)).

2025And when faced 7 See (Prince) Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 718 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies where “the police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel,” not where, as here, “the police had mutually exclusive options and . . . chose the option that turned out to be unlawful”); West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (noting that the plain- view exception to the Fourth Amendment applies only where police can see an incriminating object from a lawful position). 24 with the government’s failure to preserve such argume

2002We held that the seizure was not justified under the plain view doctrine because the police “officer was without probable cause to believe that such contents were subject to seizure as contraband.” Id. at 478 .

1997The plain view exception also requires (1) that the officer “have a lawful right of access to the object....” and (2) that the “incriminating character” of items seized be “immediately apparent.” Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. at 2307 -08 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-71 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038-41 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). “‘[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.’” Christmas v. United States, 314 A.2d 473, 476 (D.C.1974) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468 , 91 S.Ct. at 2039 ).

1988This court upheld the search, concluding that the “police were justified in entering the bedroom as part of a protective search in a hot pursuit situation,” id. at 56 , and that “once the police were lawfully in the bedroom, their subsequent search and seizure of the various items of evidence was justified under the plain view doctrine....” Id.

1988This court upheld the search, concluding that the “police were justified in entering the bedroom as part of a protective search in a hot pursuit situation,” id. at 56 , and that “once the police were lawfully in the bedroom, their subsequent search and seizure of the various items of evidence was justified under the plain view doctrine....” Id.

2000“The plain view exception also requires ... that the ‘incriminating character’ of items seized be ‘immediately apparent.’ ” Hicks, supra, 705 A.2d at 640 (quoting Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990)).

2000“The plain view exception also requires ... that the ‘incriminating character’ of items seized be ‘immediately apparent.’ ” Hicks, supra, 705 A.2d at 640 (quoting Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990)).

1980In United States v. Boswell, D.C.App., 347 A.2d 270, 273 (1975), we concluded that when the police removed a blanket covering an object which turned out to be a television set and then wrote down its serial number, this constituted a search and seizure.

1976If, on the other hand, the closets were searched for the purpose of finding clothing matching .the description given by the victim, or if the bed was stripped in search of evidence of the alleged offenses, [cf. United States v. Boswell, D.C.App., 347 A.2d 270, 273 (1975)], the plain view exception would be unavilable. 18 .

2015See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 445 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) ("[0]b-jects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”) (quoting Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that for the plain view doctrine to permit the warrantless seizure of private possessions, the "police officer must lawfully make an 'initial intrusion' or oth

2015See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 445 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) ("[0]b-jects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”) (quoting Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that for the plain view doctrine to permit the warrantless seizure of private possessions, the "police officer must lawfully make an 'initial intrusion' or oth

1976See United States v. Thweatt, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 120 , 126 n. 6, 433 F.2d 1226 , 1232 n. 6 (1970). 15 .

1976See United States v. Thweatt, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 120 , 126 n. 6, 433 F.2d 1226 , 1232 n. 6 (1970). 15 .

2025Carroll v. United 19 States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982); Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 450-53 (D.C. 1996). 2 Thus, where an officer sees contraband or evidence of a crime inside a car, it is (as the government argued in its trial court briefing) the automobile exception, and not the plain-view exception, that governs the legality of the officer’s entry into the car to seize the item.

2025Although the Court did not use the phrase “automobile exception,” it cited Ross, 456 U.S. 798—an automobile exception case—to support the conclusion that the warrantless intrusion into the car “was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 741 & n.6. 3 Justice White also addressed this issue in his dissenting opinion in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).

2025And when faced 7 See (Prince) Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 718 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies where “the police engaged in lawful and unlawful processes in parallel,” not where, as here, “the police had mutually exclusive options and . . . chose the option that turned out to be unlawful”); West v. United States, 100 A.3d 1076, 1083-84 (D.C. 2014) (noting that the plain- view exception to the Fourth Amendment applies only where police can see an incriminating object from a lawful position). 24 with the government’s failure to preserve such argume

2025Carroll v. United 19 States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982); Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 450-53 (D.C. 1996). 2 Thus, where an officer sees contraband or evidence of a crime inside a car, it is (as the government argued in its trial court briefing) the automobile exception, and not the plain-view exception, that governs the legality of the officer’s entry into the car to seize the item.

2025Cf. United States v. Kiyuyung, 171 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that the government failed to meet its burden to establish the plain-view exception where the police officer who found a gun during a search did not testify at the suppression hearing and thus there was no evidence “as to how [the gun] came to be within his range of vision”).

2025Carroll v. United 19 States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982); Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 450-53 (D.C. 1996). 2 Thus, where an officer sees contraband or evidence of a crime inside a car, it is (as the government argued in its trial court briefing) the automobile exception, and not the plain-view exception, that governs the legality of the officer’s entry into the car to seize the item.

2025See (Gregory) Smith v. United States, 283 A.3d 88 , 98 (D.C. 2022) (explaining that the government’s failure to preserve an inevitable-discovery argument in the trial court “would permit [this court] to bypass it” unless “exceptional circumstances” were present (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (“We are not persuaded that the government should have a second chance to elicit facts supporting an affirmance of the trial court’s ruling as the record indicates that it had a full and fair opportunity to present whatever facts it chose to mee

2025Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam) (“The justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant.” (citation modified)); id. at 261 n.2 (with a search conducted on the roadside, before the car has been towed, there is a “possibility that the occupants of the vehicle could have

2025Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam) (“The justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant.” (citation modified)); id. at 261 n.2 (with a search conducted on the roadside, before the car has been towed, there is a “possibility that the occupants of the vehicle could have

2021However, such observation must first square with the plain view exception, which only allows for the warrantless seizure of evidence “in plain sight” when: “(1) an officer [did] not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) the evidence’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251, 256 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 998-99 (D.C. 2002)). 12 The “automobile exception to the Fourth Amendmen

2015Courts have been "divided on the question of whether the community caretaker exception applies outside of the automobile context,” Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 556 (7th Cir.2014), but this court has recognized that the community caretak-ing function may apply outside that context, at least in "exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Gaskin, 368 A.2d 1138, 1139 (D.C.1977).

2015See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 445 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) ("[0]b-jects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”) (quoting Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that for the plain view doctrine to permit the warrantless seizure of private possessions, the "police officer must lawfully make an 'initial intrusion' or oth

2015See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 445 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) ("[0]b-jects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”) (quoting Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that for the plain view doctrine to permit the warrantless seizure of private possessions, the "police officer must lawfully make an 'initial intrusion' or oth

2015Courts have been "divided on the question of whether the community caretaker exception applies outside of the automobile context,” Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 556 (7th Cir.2014), but this court has recognized that the community caretak-ing function may apply outside that context, at least in "exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Gaskin, 368 A.2d 1138, 1139 (D.C.1977).

2014See Glover, 851 A.2d at 477 ("[MJerely because the police may have been justified in stopping [the defendant] and removing him from his car does not mean that [the officer] was entitled to frisk him_The validity under the Fourth Amendment of those additional intrusions during a lawful traffic stop depends on whether the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion based on objective facts and circumstances that [the defendant] was armed or had access to a weapon in the car and was dangerous.”) (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111-12 , 98 S.Ct. 330 (holding that a subsequent search of the driver’s

2014See Glover, 851 A.2d at 477 ("[MJerely because the police may have been justified in stopping [the defendant] and removing him from his car does not mean that [the officer] was entitled to frisk him_The validity under the Fourth Amendment of those additional intrusions during a lawful traffic stop depends on whether the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion based on objective facts and circumstances that [the defendant] was armed or had access to a weapon in the car and was dangerous.”) (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111-12 , 98 S.Ct. 330 (holding that a subsequent search of the driver’s