plain view doctrine in Maryland

2001“The plain view doctrine ‘serves to supplement a previously justified intrusion, ... and permits a warrantless seizure.’ ” Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 412 , 564 A.2d 414, 416 , (1989) (quoting State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 194 , 367 A.2d 1223, 1227 (1977)).

2001“The plain view doctrine ‘serves to supplement a previously justified intrusion, ... and permits a warrantless seizure.’ ” Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 412 , 564 A.2d 414, 416 , (1989) (quoting State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 194 , 367 A.2d 1223, 1227 (1977)).

1988Thus, it is clear, in order to justify a warrantless seizure pursuant to the plain view doctrine, in addition to demonstrating that the police had prior valid justification for the intrusion, see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 , 91 S.Ct. at 2038 , the State must prove circumstances which show that the evidence seized was found inadvertently, in plain view, and was such that the police were immediately aware of its significance.

1988Thus, it is clear, in order to justify a warrantless seizure pursuant to the plain view doctrine, in addition to demonstrating that the police had prior valid justification for the intrusion, see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 , 91 S.Ct. at 2038 , the State must prove circumstances which show that the evidence seized was found inadvertently, in plain view, and was such that the police were immediately aware of its significance.

2016See Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 88 , 771 A.2d 389, 396 (2001) (invoking the plain view doctrine first requires that the police officer’s initial intrusion was lawful or the officer was otherwise lawfully “in a position from which he or she can view a particular area ... ”).

2016See Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 88 , 771 A.2d 389, 396 (2001) (invoking the plain view doctrine first requires that the police officer’s initial intrusion was lawful or the officer was otherwise lawfully “in a position from which he or she can view a particular area ... ”).

2026The State argues that Detective Rodriguez “lawfully seized the second handgun in [appellant]’s ‘open’ satchel through the plain-sight doctrine, and the cocaine in his front pants pocket through the ‘plain feel’ doctrine, respectively.” The plain view doctrine requires three elements to be met: “(1) the officer must be lawfully ‘at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed’; (2) the ‘incriminating character’ of the item in question must be ‘immediately apparent’; and (3) the officer ‘must also have a lawful 48 right of access to the object itself.’” McCraken v. State, 429 Md. 50

2020The purpose of the requirement that a valid search warrant describe the place, people, or things to be searched and seized with sufficient particularity is to protect citizens from constitutionally prohibited general warrants, which effectively permit unlimited searches of private residences and 16 The facts do not implicate any of the following warrant exceptions: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest (Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)); (2) hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967)); (3) the plain view doctrine (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 1

2020See Grant v. State, 449 Md. 1, 16 , 141 A.3d 138 n.3 (2016). 25 places of business.

2020See Grant v. State, 449 Md. 1, 16 , 141 A.3d 138 n.3 (2016). 25 places of business.

2001In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 510 (1983), the Court clarified the inadvertent element: ”[T]he officer must discover incriminating evidence 'inadvertently,' which is to say, he may not 'know in advance the location of [certain] evidence [or contraband] and intend to seize it,’ relying on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext.” (Internal citations omitted.) Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139-40 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2309-10 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 124-25 (1990), made clear that inadvertence was not and never had been a requirement of the plain view

2001In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 , 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 510 (1983), the Court clarified the inadvertent element: ”[T]he officer must discover incriminating evidence 'inadvertently,' which is to say, he may not 'know in advance the location of [certain] evidence [or contraband] and intend to seize it,’ relying on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext.” (Internal citations omitted.) Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139-40 , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2309-10 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 124-25 (1990), made clear that inadvertence was not and never had been a requirement of the plain view

2026The rationale of the plain view doctrine applies equally to situations where law enforcement “discovers contraband or evidence of a crime through a sense of touch.” Id.

1990The Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), addressed the application of the plain view doctrine.

2020The theoretical underpinning to the plain feel doctrine—a corollary of the plain view doctrine— is that “there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 .

2015The rationale behind the so-called plain- view doctrine is that, “if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375 .

2026The State argues that Detective Rodriguez “lawfully seized the second handgun in [appellant]’s ‘open’ satchel through the plain-sight doctrine, and the cocaine in his front pants pocket through the ‘plain feel’ doctrine, respectively.” The plain view doctrine requires three elements to be met: “(1) the officer must be lawfully ‘at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed’; (2) the ‘incriminating character’ of the item in question must be ‘immediately apparent’; and (3) the officer ‘must also have a lawful 48 right of access to the object itself.’” McCraken v. State, 429 Md. 50

2021“For the incriminating character of an item to be immediately apparent, the officer, upon seeing the item, must have probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband.” McCracken v. State, 429 Md. 507, 516 (2012) (citations and quotations omitted).

2001The Supreme Court “has made clear that ‘the plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that *396 item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title and possession but not privacy.’ ” Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 87-88 , 771 A.2d 389 (2001) (quoting Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 , 103 S.Ct. 3319 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983)).

2001The Supreme Court “has made clear that ‘the plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that *396 item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title and possession but not privacy.’ ” Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 87-88 , 771 A.2d 389 (2001) (quoting Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 , 103 S.Ct. 3319 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983)).

2021For the plain view doctrine to be applicable: “(1) the police officer’s initial intrusion must be lawful[;] (2) the incriminating character of the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (3) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Sinclair v. State, 444 Md. 16, 42 (2015) (citations and quotations omitted).

2015See also Sinclair v. State, 444 Md. 16, 42 , 118 A.3d 872 (2015); Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 88-89 , 771 A.2d 389 (2001); Dent, 33 Md.App. at 557 , 365 A.2d 57 (holding that the plain view doctrine only applies when “the observation made by police (is) the result of a prior valid intrusion and the discovery of the evidence in plain view [is] inadvertent”).

2019As such, a law enforcement officer may legitimately frisk an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the person with whom the officer is dealing is armed and dangerous.13 Id. at 367 , 987 A.2d at 83 (citations omitted). (. . . continued) 129 S. Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)); 2) hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S. Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)); 3) the plain view doctrine (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)); 4) the Carroll doctrine (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S. Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 54

2019As such, a law enforcement officer may legitimately frisk an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the person with whom the officer is dealing is armed and dangerous.13 Id. at 367 , 987 A.2d at 83 (citations omitted). (. . . continued) 129 S. Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)); 2) hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S. Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)); 3) the plain view doctrine (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S. Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)); 4) the Carroll doctrine (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S. Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 54

2020The purpose of the requirement that a valid search warrant describe the place, people, or things to be searched and seized with sufficient particularity is to protect citizens from constitutionally prohibited general warrants, which effectively permit unlimited searches of private residences and 16 The facts do not implicate any of the following warrant exceptions: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest (Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)); (2) hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967)); (3) the plain view doctrine (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 1

2020The purpose of the requirement that a valid search warrant describe the place, people, or things to be searched and seized with sufficient particularity is to protect citizens from constitutionally prohibited general warrants, which effectively permit unlimited searches of private residences and 16 The facts do not implicate any of the following warrant exceptions: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest (Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)); (2) hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967)); (3) the plain view doctrine (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 1

2026App. 556, 594 (2025). “[I]f, upon our independent constitutional reflective review of the evidence . . . we determine that the State failed to prove any one of the . . . requirements of the plain view doctrine, reversal of the denial of the motion to suppress is mandated.” Coomes, 74 Md.

1988In Coomes v. State, 74 Md.App. 377, 387 , 537 A.2d 1208 (1988), we held that “in order to justify a warrantless seizure pursuant to the plain view doctrine” the State must: (1) demonstrate that the police had a prior valid justification for the intrusion; (2) prove circumstances which show that the evidence seized was found inadvertently; (3) show that the evidence was in plain view; and (4) show that the evidence was such that the police were immediately aware of its significance.

1980As the Court stated in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968), "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." The plain view doctrine, as articulated in Coolidge , requires the concurrence of four elements: (1) the police have a prior justification for the intrusion; (2) they find the evidence in plain view; (3) they find it inadvertently; and (4) it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them.

1980As the Court stated in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968), "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." The plain view doctrine, as articulated in Coolidge , requires the concurrence of four elements: (1) the police have a prior justification for the intrusion; (2) they find the evidence in plain view; (3) they find it inadvertently; and (4) it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them.

1980See also State v. Meichel, 290 So.2d 878 (La. 1974) (police officer's seeing pills in a bottle on the front seat of an automobile held not within the plain view doctrine); State v. McCrea, 22 Wash. App. 526 , 590 P.2d 367 (1979).

1980See also State v. Meichel, 290 So. 2d 878 (La. 1974) (police officer’s seeing pills in a bottle on the front seat of an automobile held not within the plain view doctrine); State v. McCrea, 22 Wash. App. 526 , 590 P.2d 367 (1979).

2025Glanden v. State, 249 Md.

2025See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 337 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa. 1975) (“Fundamental to the application of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the principle that the seized objects must not have been put in plain view as a result of unlawful police conduct.”) (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)).

2021One such exception is the plain view doctrine, which “permits a police officer to seize an item in plain view when the officer has probable cause to believe that the item is contraband or evidence of a crime.” Peters v. State, 224 Md.

2016See also Cruz v. State, 168 Md.App. 149, 167-68 , 895 A.2d 1076, 1086-87 (2006) (noting that a K-9 dog’s handler who intentionally directs or instructs *19 the K-9 to scan a vehicle’s interior constitutes a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment); accord, e.g., United States v. Watson, 783 F.Supp. 258, 265 (E.D.Va.1992); United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir.1998); State v. Freel, 29 Kan.App.2d 852 , 32 P.3d 1219, 1225 (2001).

2016See also Cruz v. State, 168 Md.App. 149, 167-68 , 895 A.2d 1076, 1086-87 (2006) (noting that a K-9 dog’s handler who intentionally directs or instructs *19 the K-9 to scan a vehicle’s interior constitutes a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment); accord, e.g., United States v. Watson, 783 F.Supp. 258, 265 (E.D.Va.1992); United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir.1998); State v. Freel, 29 Kan.App.2d 852 , 32 P.3d 1219, 1225 (2001).

2016See also Cruz v. State, 168 Md.App. 149, 167-68 , 895 A.2d 1076, 1086-87 (2006) (noting that a K-9 dog’s handler who intentionally directs or instructs *19 the K-9 to scan a vehicle’s interior constitutes a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment); accord, e.g., United States v. Watson, 783 F.Supp. 258, 265 (E.D.Va.1992); United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir.1998); State v. Freel, 29 Kan.App.2d 852 , 32 P.3d 1219, 1225 (2001).