plain view exception in Wyoming

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

2018Id ., see Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). [¶12] The plain feel doctrine is similar to the plain view doctrine.

2018Id ., see Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). [¶12] The plain feel doctrine is similar to the plain view doctrine.

2018This argument, however, ignores that an officer may reasonably seize an item he observes in "plain view" or "plain feel" while conducting the more limited Terry search. [¶11] In Texas v. Brown , 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the plain view doctrine.

2018This argument, however, ignores that an officer may reasonably seize an item he observes in "plain view" or "plain feel" while conducting the more limited Terry search. [¶11] In Texas v. Brown , 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the plain view doctrine.

2019United States v. Montes-Ramos , 347 Fed.Appx. 383 , 390 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2018The plain feel doctrine permits an officer to "seize nonthreatening contraband detected through the sense of touch during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry , so long as the search stays within the bounds marked by Terry ." Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366 , 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 2135, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).

2018The plain feel doctrine permits an officer to "seize nonthreatening contraband detected through the sense of touch during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry , so long as the search stays within the bounds marked by Terry ." Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366 , 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 2135, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).

2008Peña v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29 , 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo.2004).

2008Peña v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29 , 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004).

2006The serial numbers came into Officer Nelson's view upon removal of the battery packs and therefore the inspection thereof also fell within the scope of the February 5 warrant because it "produced no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest." Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 , 107 S.Ct. at 1152 .

2006The serial numbers came into Officer Nelson's view upon removal of the battery packs and therefore the inspection thereof also fell within the scope of the February 5 warrant because it "produced no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest." Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 , 107 S.Ct. at 1152 .

2004Some of these boxes had pictures such as a marijuana leaf on them and a marijuana leaf on a wooden box was, according to Trooper Guen-ther, "commonly associated" with such a stash box." The wooden box's incriminating *995 character was therefore immediately apparent and Trooper Guenther had probable cause to seize the wooden box. [T19] For the same reasons, we also find that Trooper Guenther had probable cause to search the wooden stash box. 7 The "seizure" of a container pursuant to the plain view doctrine "does not compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents because it

2004Some of these boxes had pictures such as a marijuana leaf on them and a marijuana leaf on a wooden box was, according to Trooper Guen-ther, "commonly associated" with such a stash box." The wooden box's incriminating *995 character was therefore immediately apparent and Trooper Guenther had probable cause to seize the wooden box. [T19] For the same reasons, we also find that Trooper Guenther had probable cause to search the wooden stash box. 7 The "seizure" of a container pursuant to the plain view doctrine "does not compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents because it

1999The Lopez search could have been ruled valid under either a Chimel search incident to arrest for a weapon within the arrestee's immediate control or the plain-view doctrine recognized in Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 453 (Wyo.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 , 92 S.Ct. 1259 , 31 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972).

1999The Lopez search could have been ruled valid under either a Chimel search incident to arrest for a weapon within the arrestee’s immediate control or the plain-view doctrine recognized in Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 453 (Wyo.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 , 92 S.Ct. 1259 , 31 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972).

1999The Lopez search could have been ruled valid under either a Chimel search incident to arrest for a weapon within the arrestee's immediate control or the plain-view doctrine recognized in Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 453 (Wyo.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 , 92 S.Ct. 1259 , 31 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972).

1999The Lopez search could have been ruled valid under either a Chimel search incident to arrest for a weapon within the arrestee’s immediate control or the plain-view doctrine recognized in Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 453 (Wyo.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 , 92 S.Ct. 1259 , 31 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972).

1994In his first claim of error, McDermott contends the items of evidence observed in his car by the police officers while it was parked in his girlfriend's driveway do not fall within the plain view exception justifying a warrantless search, and any evidence taken from the car thereafter pursuant to the search warrant should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

1994In his first claim of error, McDermott contends the items of evidence observed in his car by the police officers while it was parked in his girlfriend's driveway do not fall within the plain view exception justifying a warrantless search, and any evidence taken from the car thereafter pursuant to the search warrant should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

1982The court there notes that the primary requirement for application of the plain-view exception is "(1) a prior justification for intrusion." State v. Chrisman, supra, 619 P.2d at 974 .

1982The court there notes that the primary requirement for application of the plain-view exception is “(1) a prior justification for intrusion.” State v. Chrisman, supra, 619 P.2d at 974 .

1982This, in essence, is the primary element for application of the plain-view exception as set forth in McCutcheon v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 537 (1979), which is stated in the majority opinion as “(1) the officer’s presence must be proper.” As the Supreme Court of Washington noted, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 , 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972).

1982This, in essence, is the primary element for application of the plain-view exception as set forth in McCutcheon v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 537 (1979), which is stated in the majority opinion as “(1) the officer’s presence must be proper.” As the Supreme Court of Washington noted, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 , 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972).

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin 'my inquiry with the proposition that “the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S., 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin my inquiry with the proposition that "the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.

1979Reeves, supra. The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin 'my inquiry with the proposition that “the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S., 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.