plain view doctrine in New Jersey

2026See also Gonzales, 227 N.J. at 101 ("Under the plain-view doctrine, the constitutional limiting principle is that the officer must lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband, and it must be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime.").

2026"Under the plain-view doctrine, the constitutional limiting principle is that the officer must lawfully be in the area where he observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband, and it must be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime." State v. Williams, 254 N.J. 8 , 45 (2023) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016)).

2025A-3983-22 5 The court, citing State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237-38 (1983), cert. den., 465 U.S. 1030 (1984); State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 211 (2002); and State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010), also found the State established by a preponderance of the evidence the seizure of handgun was justified under the plain-view doctrine.

2022See State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016) (eliminating the inadvertence requirement for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement based in part on the strong preference for objective standards of reasonableness, as inadvertence analysi s calls for a subjective inquiry into an officer's motivation); see also Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 219 (noting that the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable actions, not improper thoughts, and rejecting a "bad faith doctrine").

2025A-3983-22 5 The court, citing State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237-38 (1983), cert. den., 465 U.S. 1030 (1984); State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 211 (2002); and State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010), also found the State established by a preponderance of the evidence the seizure of handgun was justified under the plain-view doctrine.

2024The State further maintains that "[o]nce the officers A-1115-22 12 effectuated a valid traffic stop, they observed in plain view a partially open fanny pack containing glass vials with clear liquid inside," which officers could then seize under the plain-view doctrine under State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 , 340- 41 (2010).

2025A-3983-22 5 The court, citing State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237-38 (1983), cert. den., 465 U.S. 1030 (1984); State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 211 (2002); and State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010), also found the State established by a preponderance of the evidence the seizure of handgun was justified under the plain-view doctrine.

2024Hempele, 120 N.J. at 216 . "[T]here are important differences between the interests of citizens protected from unlawful searches and those protected from unlawful seizures that are relevant to the plain view doctrine." Johnson, 171 N.J. at 206 .

2020The plain view doctrine, another exception to the warrant requirement, applies when the following requirements are met: (1) the officer must be "lawfully in the viewing area"; (2) it must be "immediately apparent" to the A-0977-18T4 11 officer that the items in plain view "were evidence of a crime" or are contraband; and (3) the evidence must be discovered "inadvertently." 1 State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 592 (2013) (quoting State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2007)).

2019In order to satisfy the plain view doctrine at the time when this case was decided, 1 the State must have demonstrated: (1) the officer was "lawfully in the viewing area," (2) the officer discovered the evidence "'inadvertently,' meaning that he did not know in advance where the evidence was located nor intend beforehand to seize it," and (3) it was "immediately apparent" that the items "were evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure." [State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 592 (2013) (quoting State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010)).] Here, defendant is only disputing the inadv

2021The plain view exception allows police to seize contraband in plain view without a warrant if three requirements are met: "(1) the officer must be lawfully in the viewing area when making the observation; (2) 'the discovery of the evidence . . . must be inadvertent,'" State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 91 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 468- 12 A-5470-18 69 (1971)); and (3) the "police officer must have 'probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity,'" State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237 (1983) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.

2019The "inadvertence" prong of the plain view test "is satisfied if the police did not 'know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it.'" Johnson, 171 N.J. at 211 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971)).

2021The plain view exception allows police to seize contraband in plain view without a warrant if three requirements are met: "(1) the officer must be lawfully in the viewing area when making the observation; (2) 'the discovery of the evidence . . . must be inadvertent,'" State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 91 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 468- 12 A-5470-18 69 (1971)); and (3) the "police officer must have 'probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity,'" State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237 (1983) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.

2021The plain view exception allows seizures without a warrant so long as an officer is "lawfully . . . in the area where he observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband, and it [is] immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime." Gonzales, 227 N.J. at 101 . "[A] police A-2572-18 16 officer must have 'probable cause to associate the [item] with criminal activity.'" State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 207 (2002) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983)).

2026The plain view doctrine recognizes that a police officer "need not 'close his eyes to suspicious evidence in plain view.'" State v. Reninger, 430 N.J.

2020The plain view exception to the warrant requirement has three elements: (1) "the police officer must be lawfully in the viewing area"; (2) "the officer has to discover the evidence 'inadvertently,' meaning that he did not know in A-4795-17T3 17 advance where evidence was located nor intend beforehand to seize it"; and (3) "it has to be 'immediately apparent' to the police that the items in plain view were evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure." [1] [State v. Reininger, 430 N.J.

2021Rather, as Illinois v. Andreas made clear, the plain view doctrine "authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer" only if the 14 A-1900-18 officer's "access to the object" itself has a prior Fourth Amendment justification. 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (noting that for the plain view doctrine to apply, "not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself").

2020We therefore conclude that for purposes of the plain view exception as well, the State has established that Officer Martinez was lawfully present in the upstairs hallway when he looked into the open bedroom from the hallway and immediately recognized the criminal nature of the packaged crack cocaine and the handle of a revolver. 8 We 7 In State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77 (2016), our Supreme Court embraced the United States Supreme Court's decision in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), and eliminated the "inadvertence" prong.

2025A-3983-22 5 The court, citing State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237-38 (1983), cert. den., 465 U.S. 1030 (1984); State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 211 (2002); and State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010), also found the State established by a preponderance of the evidence the seizure of handgun was justified under the plain-view doctrine.

2016In this appeal, we must determine the proper scope of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. *81 In State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236-38 , 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 , 104 S.Ct. 1295 , 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984), this Court adopted the plain-view exception as articulated in the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2016In this appeal, we must determine the proper scope of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. *81 In State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236-38 , 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 , 104 S.Ct. 1295 , 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984), this Court adopted the plain-view exception as articulated in the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2013The rationale for the plain view doctrine is that “a police officer lawfully in the viewing area” need not “close his eyes to suspicious evidence in plain view.” State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237 , 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 , 104 S.Ct. 1295 , 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984).

2016In this appeal, we must determine the proper scope of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. *81 In State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236-38 , 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 , 104 S.Ct. 1295 , 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984), this Court adopted the plain-view exception as articulated in the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2013The rationale for the plain view doctrine is that “a police officer lawfully in the viewing area” need not “close his eyes to suspicious evidence in plain view.” State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237 , 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 , 104 S.Ct. 1295 , 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984).

2019Super. at 32 (quoting State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 11 (2009)).

2017See Minitee, supra, 210 N.J. at 318 ; State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 20 (2009) ("[T]he search incident to arrest exception is focused on the arrestee himself and on eliminating his potential to endanger the police or destroy evidence."), overruled on other grounds by State v. 3 Our Supreme Court recently eliminated the "inadvertence prong" from the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, applying this new rule of law prospectively.

1989The applicability of the plain view doctrine depends upon the right of the officer "`to be in the position to have that view.'" State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 35 (1979), quoting Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992, 993 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 1067, 1069 (1968).

1989The applicability of the plain view doctrine depends upon the right of the officer "`to be in the position to have that view.'" State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 35 (1979), quoting Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 , 88 S.Ct. 992, 993 , 19 L.Ed. 2d 1067, 1069 (1968).

2018See State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 592 (2013) (finding the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement is established where the officer is "lawfully in the viewing area," the discovery of the items is inadvertent and it was immediately apparent what was seen 10 A-2432-16T2 constitutes contraband, evidence of a crime or is "otherwise subject to seizure").7 The record reveals substantial credible evidence supporting the court's fact-findings, see State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224 , 243- 44 (2007), and its determination Belbin properly seized the plastic bag containing the drugs because it was in

2017Therefore, the plain view exception to a warrantless search was not satisfied.1 We disagree. 1 For the plain view exception to apply, the State must prove that (1) the officer was "lawfully in the viewing area," (2) the officer discovered the evidence "'inadvertently,' meaning that he did not know in advance where the evidence was located nor intend beforehand to seize it," and (3) it was "immediately apparent" that the items "were evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure." [State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 592 (2013) (quoting State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010.)] 4 A-

2023The Court held the officer "was lawfully on the premises . . . , and given the plain view doctrine, the police did not have to wait for judicial permission to question and eventually take [the] defendant into custody." Ibid.

2017See Bogan, supra, 200 N.J. at 379-80 (noting the plain view doctrine permitted an officer to question and detain the defendant without "judicial permission" after the officer had lawfully entered the apartment where defendant was hiding pursuant to the community caretaking doctrine).

2021In State v. Gonzalez, 227 N.J. 77 (2016), our Supreme Court modified the plain view doctrine to eliminate the 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2018See Rodriquez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (finding extending a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of the stop is unlawful); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding a determination of reasonableness of an investigatory stop requires consideration of "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 7 In State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 100-01 (2016), the Court prospectively modified the plain-view doctrine, eliminating the inadvertence

2025Relying on State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 305 (1993), the judge also concluded "it is clear that Diaz had authority to consent to search the Impala because she was the one who was driving, the police saw her identification in the car, and it was reasonable for police to believe that she possessed common authority over the car." Additionally, the judge also found the search was valid under the plain view doctrine because: (1) the officers were lawfully present at the scene; (2) the vehicle's doors had been left open by its occupants; (3) the officers could see the tire iron from outside the

2025Relying on State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 305 (1993), the judge also concluded "it is clear that Diaz had authority to consent to search the Impala because she was the one who was driving, the police saw her identification in the car, and it was reasonable for police to believe that she possessed common authority over the car." Additionally, the judge also found the search was valid under the plain view doctrine because: (1) the officers were lawfully present at the scene; (2) the vehicle's doors had been left open by its occupants; (3) the officers could see the tire iron from outside the

2022Additionally, citing State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975), the judge confirmed the search of defendant's vehicle was valid under the "recognized exception to the warrant requirement" of consent.

2022Additionally, citing State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975), the judge confirmed the search of defendant's vehicle was valid under the "recognized exception to the warrant requirement" of consent.

2021Rather, as Illinois v. Andreas made clear, the plain view doctrine "authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer" only if the 14 A-1900-18 officer's "access to the object" itself has a prior Fourth Amendment justification. 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (noting that for the plain view doctrine to apply, "not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself").

2019Rather, as Illinois v. Andreas made clear, "[t]he plain view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification." 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (citing Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 ); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (clarifying that for the plain view doctrine to apply, "not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself").

2019An Investigatory Stop To lawfully stop a motor vehicle, a police officer must have a "reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense[.] " State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016) (citing Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470 ).

2017We will uphold the decision below so long as it is "supported by sufficient credible evidence" and not "so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 32-33 (2016) (citing Elders, supra, at 243-44 ).

2025Super. 1 , 21 (App. Div. 2023) (explaining that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement does not authorize police to cross the threshold of a constitutionally protected place and does not apply, for example, when the officer has no right to enter a private residence even though the officer clearly sees contraband or other evidence inside (citing State v. Lewis, 116 N.J. 477 (1989))).

2022See State v. Lewis, 116 N.J. 477 (1989).

2018Contrarily, if an officer "lack[s] probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object-i.e., if its incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent-the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure." Ibid. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1999Thus, [i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context. [ Id. at 375-76 , 113 S.Ct. at 2137 , 124 L.Ed. 2d at 346 .] The Dickerson Court analogized the plain-feel doctrine to the plain-view doctrine, id. at 375 , 113 S.Ct. at 2137

2024Hempele, 120 N.J. at 216 . "[T]here are important differences between the interests of citizens protected from unlawful searches and those protected from unlawful seizures that are relevant to the plain view doctrine." Johnson, 171 N.J. at 206 .

1995Indeed, Hempele rejects its application to justify the seizure of garbage at one's curbside under the plain view doctrine. 120 N.J. at 209-10 , 576 A. 2d 793 ("[t]he cases here might be different had the garbage been strewn across the front yard for all to see.

2007Bound by the finding that the officer was standing on the driveway at this time, State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 , 724 A. 2d 234 (1999), we are required to conclude that the officer was in a "semi-private area" where a visitor might be expected to go and what he may have seen in plain view from that vantage point, even with the aid of a flashlight, [6] would not preclude a finding that the first prong of the plain view exception was met.

2007Bound by the finding that the officer was standing on the driveway at this time, State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 , 724 A. 2d 234 (1999), we are required to conclude that the officer was in a "semi-private area" where a visitor might be expected to go and what he may have seen in plain view from that vantage point, even with the aid of a flashlight, [6] would not preclude a finding that the first prong of the plain view exception was met.

2010See State v. Bogan, 200 *26 N.J. 61, 79 n. 10, 975 A.2d 377 (2009) (describing elements of the plain view doctrine); State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 610 , 847 A.2d 561 (2004) (explaining that police “officer could not ignore the evidence of [illegal] activity that he observed in plain view”).

2010See State v. Bogan, 200 *26 N.J. 61, 79 n. 10, 975 A.2d 377 (2009) (describing elements of the plain view doctrine); State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 610 , 847 A.2d 561 (2004) (explaining that police “officer could not ignore the evidence of [illegal] activity that he observed in plain view”).

2024Ibid.

2015Id. at 211-13 ; see also State v. Padilla, 321 N.J.

1979See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 8-10 , 89 S.Ct. 1868 (the "stop and frisk" exception); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 782 (1967) (the "hot pursuit" type of exigent circumstance exception); Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at 764-765 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 (search incident to arrest). [1] I concur in the Court's decision that the evidence uncovered during the search cannot be upheld under the plain view doctrine for substantially the reasons given by Judge Conford.

1979See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 8-10 , 89 S.Ct. 1868 (the "stop and frisk" exception); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 782 (1967) (the "hot pursuit" type of exigent circumstance exception); Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at 764-765 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 (search incident to arrest). [1] I concur in the Court's decision that the evidence uncovered during the search cannot be upheld under the plain view doctrine for substantially the reasons given by Judge Conford.