951 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2026 375 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Arizona v. Phil Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2025DISCUSSION ¶9 Lewis argues the superior court erred by dismissing his Rule 33 petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) both his trial counsel and post-conviction relief counsel were ineffective; (2) he was unlawfully arrested; (3) he was denied discovery and disclosure; and (4) the court failed to remove his “improper party status.” ¶10 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this Court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 3 STATE v. LEWIS Decision of the Court See State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573 , 577 ¶ 19 (2012). 2017The only requirement is that the victim must be under the age of eighteen years and be an actual human being rather than a fictitious or simulated person." The court denied Regenold's motion for rehearing, and this petition for review followed. ¶5 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, we will not disturb a superior court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 2 STATE v. REGENOLD Decision of the Court State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). | 701 | 776 |
State v. MacIasgreen2 sentences2023State v. 4 STATE v. STEWART Decision of the Court Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012); State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 340, ¶ 16 (App. 2020). 2022State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012); State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 340, ¶ 16 (App. 2020). | 6 | 6 |
State v. Gulbrandsongreen2 sentences2025See State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 60 (1995). 2000See Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. at 63 , 906 P.2d at 596 . | 4 | 4 |
Ramsey Air Meds, L.L.C. v. Cutter Aviation, Inc.green2 sentences2009Discussion ¶ 5 The sole issue presented on appeal 2 is whether the trial court erred in ordering Buckley to pay Zeagler $50,000 of his attorney fees under § 12-341.01(A) and (B). 3 “The applicability of § 12-341.01(A) ‘is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo ’ ” but “ ‘[t]he trial court’s decision on the amount of fees to award is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.’” Modular Mining Sys. v. Jigsaw Tech., 221 Ariz. 515, ¶ 21 , 212 P.3d 853, 859 (App.2009), quoting Ramsey Air Meds, L.L.C. v. Cutter Aviation, Inc., 198 Ariz. 10, ¶ 12 , 6 P.3d 315, 318 (App. 2009“The trial court’s decision on the amount of fees to award is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” Id. ¶ 22 Modular does not dispute Jigsaw’s entitlement to attorney fees incurred in connection with Modular’s claims for breaches of employment agreements. | 3 | 5 |
State v. Swoopesgreen2 sentences2023State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 393, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). 2018State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 393, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). | 3 | 3 |
Graville v. Dodgegreen2 sentences2020See Graville v. Dodge, 195 Ariz. 119, 131, ¶ 56 (App. 1999) (stating the abuse of discretion standard recognizes the trial court’s opportunity to observe the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct). 2016See Graville v. Dodge, 195 Ariz. 119, 131, ¶ 56 (App. 1999). ¶13 The superior court found that Wife had not taken any unreasonable positions, but that Husband had taken unreasonable post- decree positions and that his “pattern and practice of litigation is done with the intent to escalate litigation costs for Wife.” The superior court then found twenty specific post-decree positions taken by Husband that were unreasonable. | 3 | 3 |
Maricopa County v. Kinko's Inc.green2 sentences2018See Grand, 214 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 73 ; Maricopa County v. Kinko’s Inc., 203 Ariz. 496, 501, ¶ 19 (App. 2002) (“We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a denial of relief under Rule 56(f).”). 2006See, e.g., Maricopa County v. Kinko’s Inc., 203 Ariz. 496, ¶ 19 , 56 P.3d 70, 75 (App.2002) (“We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a denial of relief under Rule 56(f).”). | 3 | 3 |
City of Glendale v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2015See McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 16 , 265 P.3d 1061, 1065 (App. 2011) (citing City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 114 Ariz. 236, 237-38 , 560 P.2d 420, 421-22 (1977); Delbridge v. Salt River Project Agric. 2015See McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 16 , 265 P.3d 1061, 1065 (App. 2011) (citing City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 114 Ariz. 236, 237-38 , 560 P.2d 420, 421-22 (1977); Delbridge v. Salt River Project Agric. | 3 | 3 |
In Re Marriage of Pownallgreen2 sentences2014In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 581, ¶ 15 , 5 P.3d 911, 915 (App. 2000). 2014In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 581, ¶ 15 , 5 P.3d 911, 915 (App. 2000). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Woodygreen2 sentences2014Although the Majority acknowledges the abuse of discretion standard, its decision is inconsistent with an application of that standard, which only permits reversal upon a showing that there has been “an exercise of discretion which is manifestly unreasonable, exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 570, ¶ 11 , 161 P.3d 608, 613 (App.2007) (quoting State v. Woody, 173 Ariz. 561, 563 , 845 P.2d 487, 489 (App.1992)). ¶28 As relevant here, American’s motion for new trial was premised on juror H.T.’s sworn statement that “a[t] one point” during d 2014Although the Majority acknowledges the abuse of discretion standard, its decision is inconsistent with an application of that standard, which only permits reversal upon a showing that there has been “an exercise of discretion which is manifestly unreasonable, exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 570, ¶ 11 , 161 P.3d 608, 613 (App.2007) (quoting State v. Woody, 173 Ariz. 561, 563 , 845 P.2d 487, 489 (App.1992)). ¶28 As relevant here, American’s motion for new trial was premised on juror H.T.’s sworn statement that “a[t] one point” during d | 3 | 3 |
State v. Chapplered2 sentences2024Arizona’s elimination of peremptory strikes did not remove trial courts from being in the best position to assess potential jurors’ fairness and impartiality, and it did not alter the abuse-of-discretion standard, which requires affirmance unless the court’s action was “clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount[ed] to a denial of justice.” State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 297 n.18 (1983), superseded on other grounds by A.R.S. § 13–756. ¶72 Thus, we review the court’s refusal to dismiss Juror 17 for cause for abuse of discretion. 2013A. Proper standard of review and constitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-756(A) ¶ 66 Benson argues that the above-articulated abuse-of-discretion standard is “more deferential” and yields a different result than the abuse-of-discretion standard outlined in a footnote in State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208 , 1224 n. 18 (1983). | 2 | 5 |
City of Phoenix v. Geylergreen2 sentences2019See Waltner v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 231 Ariz. 484 , 490, ¶ 24 (App. 2013) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a motion for new trial); City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328 (1985) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a motion to vacate). 2017Id. | 2 | 3 |
Hrudka v. Hrudkagreen2 sentences2014Hrudka, 186 Ariz. at 94-95 , 919 P.2d at 189-90 . ¶47 The decree does not indicate whether it found Husband’s positions unreasonable; the decree does state that Husband has substantially greater assets than Wife. 2014Hrudka, 186 Ariz. at 94-95 , 919 P.2d at 189-90 . ¶47 The decree does not indicate whether it found Husband’s positions unreasonable; the decree does state that Husband has substantially greater assets than Wife. | 2 | 3 |
Helland v. Hellandgreen2 sentences2024Wife contends that Husband obligated the community through the retainer agreement, thereby creating a community debt. “[This Court] appl[ies] an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the superior court’s division of property, but review[s] the court’s characterization of property de novo.” Helland v. Helland, 236 Ariz. 197, 199, ¶ 8 (App. 2014). 2020Lastly, the court granted Wife’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs because of the “substantial disparity of financial resources between the parties” and denied Husband’s request because he “acted unreasonably in the litigation.” Husband timely appealed the decree and we have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 78(c). 3 STEVENS v. STEVENS Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶8 “We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the superior court’s division of property, but review the court’s | 2 | 2 |
Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLCgreen2 sentences2023Desert Images, LLC, 218 Ariz. 121, 128, ¶ 14 (App. 2008) (reasoning that the abuse of discretion standard should apply to the superior court’s decision whether expert testimony is required under A.R.S. § 12-2602, the companion statute to A.R.S. § 12-2603, because the determination at trial of areas of expert testimony is discretionary). ¶6 The Franciscos argue that A.R.S. § 12-2603 only applies to medical malpractice claims and that, because a lack of informed consent claim is not a medical malpractice claim, expert testimony is not required. 2019Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLC, 218 Ariz. 121, 133, ¶ 33 (App. 2008); State ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
McBride v. KIECKHEFER ASSOCIATES, INC.green2 sentences2021P. 59(a)(1)(H). “[W]e apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a new trial.” McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 16 (App. 2011). ¶8 Hill asserts the superior court erred in vacating the jury verdict where the Millers never formally pled in their complaint that Hill was liable for only a portion of the damages pursuant to the CC&Rs. 2015See McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 16 , 265 P.3d 1061, 1065 (App. 2011) (citing City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 114 Ariz. 236, 237-38 , 560 P.2d 420, 421-22 (1977); Delbridge v. Salt River Project Agric. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Travis Wade Amaralgreen2 sentences2020P. 33.11(a); see also State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217 , 220 ¶ 11 (2016) (“If the alleged facts would not have probably changed the verdict or sentence, then the claim is subject to summary dismissal.”); State v. D’Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 (1988) (a PCR petitioner must present a colorable claim to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing). ¶5 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb the superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 2017State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). ¶6 "The relevant inquiry for determining whether [Christie] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing is whether he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have changed the verdict or sentence." State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 220, ¶ 11 (2016). | 2 | 2 |
State v. D'AMBROSIOgreen2 sentences2020P. 33.11(a); see also State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217 , 220 ¶ 11 (2016) (“If the alleged facts would not have probably changed the verdict or sentence, then the claim is subject to summary dismissal.”); State v. D’Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 (1988) (a PCR petitioner must present a colorable claim to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing). ¶5 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb the superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 2020State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573 , 577 ¶ 19 (2012); see State v. D’Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 (1988) (“A decision as to whether a petition for post-conviction relief presents a colorable claim is, to some extent, a discretionary decision for the trial court.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hoskinsgreen2 sentences2020State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 142, ¶ 52 (2000). 2014State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶ 52 , 14 P.3d 997, 1012 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Owen v. Blackhawkgreen2 sentences2019Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶ 7 (App. 2003). 2018Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶ 7 (App. 2003). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2019State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012) (citing State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 566, ¶ 17 (2006)). 2018State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 566, ¶ 17 (2006). ¶5 Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate “[i]f . . . the court determines that no . . . claim presents a material issue of fact or law that would entitle the defendant to relief under [Ariz. R. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Priongreen2 sentences2018We disagree. ¶13 “The admissibility of third party culpability evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Prion, 203 Ariz. 157, 161, ¶ 21 (2002). 2018A defendant may “attempt to show that another person committed the crime for which he is charged, but it remains in the trial court’s discretion to exclude the evidence if it offers only a possible ground of suspicion against another.” Id. (internal citation omitted). ¶14 Arizona Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 “set forth the proper test for determining the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence.” State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, 324, ¶ 19 (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Hannosh v. Segalgreen2 sentences2016See Hannosh v. Segal, 235 Ariz. 108, ¶ 22 , 328 P.3d 1049, 1056 (App. 2014); State ex rel. 2016See Hannosh v. Segal, 235 Ariz. 108, ¶ 22 , 328 P.3d 1049, 1056 (App. 2014); State ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
Styles v. Ceranskigreen2 sentences2015Styles v. Ceranski, 185 Ariz. 448, 450 (App. 1996). 2008Styles v. Ceranski, 185 Ariz. 448, 450 , 916 P.2d 1164, 1166 (App.1996). ¶34 We first address whether there was evidence that IT was insolvent at the times transfers were made that benefitted Higgins. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Bergergreen2 sentences2015Van Dyke v. Steinle, 183 Ariz. 268, 273 (App. 1995) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to a finding of changed circumstances); In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 (App. 1983) (establishing that maintenance awards will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion). 2007See In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 , 680 P.2d 1217, 1228 (App.1983) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Van Dyke v. Steinlegreen2 sentences2015Van Dyke v. Steinle, 183 Ariz. 268, 273 (App. 1995) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to a finding of changed circumstances); In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 (App. 1983) (establishing that maintenance awards will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion). 2006See Van Dyke v. Steinle, 183 Ariz. 268, 273 , 902 P.2d 1372, 1377 (App.1995) (spousal maintenance); In re Marriage of Robinson & Thiel, 201 Ariz. 328, 331, ¶ 5 , 35 P.3d 89, 92 (App.2001) (child support). | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Morrisgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Boltongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Modular Mining System, Inc. v. Jigsaw Technologies, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Rogus v. Lordsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Schrockgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Mammo v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Gilbert v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen | 2 | 2 |
ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2003Similarly, although attorney fee awards are generally subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, see ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwards, 191 Ariz. 48 , 952 P.2d 286 (App. 1996), whether the common fund doctrine applies is also a question of law. 2003Similarly, although attorney fee awards are generally subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, see ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwards, 191 Ariz. 48 , 952 P.2d 286 (App. 1996), whether the common fund doctrine applies is also a question of law. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Pobletegreen2 sentences2020State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573 , 577 ¶ 19 (2012); State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537 , 538 ¶ 1 (App. 2011). 2018State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 576-77, ¶ 19 (2012); State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538, ¶ 1 (App. 2011). ¶7 A defendant may be entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of actual innocence only upon a showing “by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable fact-finder would find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ariz. R. | 1 | 2 |
| Clemons v. Mississippigreen | 1 | 2 |
| Kelly v. Kellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Baileygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marriage of Boncoskey v. Boncoskeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitt v. Mezagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona Board of Regents v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025That deference is illustrated by Phoenix Newspapers, where our supreme court concluded that ABOR “had the discretion to balance the countervailing interests.” 167 Ariz. at 257 . ¶43 Phoenix Newspapers involved requests from newspapers for identifying information about 256 prospects who had been considered for 11 ABRAHAM v. ARIZ. 2025That deference is illustrated by Phoenix Newspapers, where our supreme court concluded that ABOR “had the discretion to balance the countervailing interests.” 167 Ariz. at 257 . ¶43 Phoenix Newspapers involved requests from newspapers for identifying information about 256 prospects who had been considered for 11 ABRAHAM v. ARIZ. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State of Arizona v. Hon. marner/darren Goldin
green
2 sentences2024Marner, 251 Ariz. at 200 ¶ 8. 2023Marner, 251 Ariz. at 200 ¶ 8. | 2 | 2023–2024 |
| Connolly v. Harris Trust Co. green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| cluster 767593 green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp. green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Archibeque green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Blakely v. Washington green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Burns green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Kline v. Kline green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Vermuele green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Martinez v. Ryan green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Donald green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.