abuse of discretion standard in District of Columbia

2023As the trial court’s decision not to strike Officer Thomas’ testimony fell outside the conceded “range of permissible alternatives,” Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979), and the government has not argued that the court’s refusal to strike the testimony of Officer Thomas—the only witness who it called to testify at the suppression hearing—was harmless, see id. at 366 (recognizing harm is a component of an abuse of discretion analysis); Hairston v. United States, 908 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (D.C. 2006) (per 10 As noted above, the government’s arguments against sanctions are prem

2023As the trial court’s decision not to strike Officer Thomas’ testimony fell outside the conceded “range of permissible alternatives,” Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979), and the government has not argued that the court’s refusal to strike the testimony of Officer Thomas—the only witness who it called to testify at the suppression hearing—was harmless, see id. at 366 (recognizing harm is a component of an abuse of discretion analysis); Hairston v. United States, 908 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (D.C. 2006) (per 10 As noted above, the government’s arguments against sanctions are prem

2014“We then evaluate whether the decision is supported by substantial reasoning, drawn from a firm factual foundation in the record.” In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1323 (D.C. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2000R. 52(a) (“In all actions tried upon the facts the Court shall make written findings of fact, separate conclusions of law and judgment”); In re D.Í.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1323 (D.C.1985) (“To assure proper review under the abuse of discretion standard, the rules of the court require detailed, written findings of fact and separate conclusions of law on all mat *419 ters.”) Therefore, we base our review solely on the trial court’s findings that both parents “love the minor child and are good parents who have the best interest of the minor in mind” and that it is in her best interest to “have continu

2015Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. 1977); see also Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363-66 (D.C. 1979) (factors that should be taken into account on appellate review of a trial court decision under the abuse of discretion standard include: (1) whether the determination was committed to the trial court’s discretion; (2) whether the trial court recognized that discretion and purported to exercise it; (3) whether the record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court’s determination was based; (4) whether the trial court exercised its 32 discretion erroneously; and (

2015Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. 1977); see also Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363-66 (D.C. 1979) (factors that should be taken into account on appellate review of a trial court decision under the abuse of discretion standard include: (1) whether the determination was committed to the trial court’s discretion; (2) whether the trial court recognized that discretion and purported to exercise it; (3) whether the record reveals sufficient facts upon which 32 the trial court’s determination was based; (4) whether the trial court exercised its discretion erroneously; and (

2014In conducting this review of the trial court’s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2014In conducting this review of the trial court‟s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2014In conducting this review of the trial court’s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2014In conducting this review of the trial court‟s orders in neglect proceedings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and evaluate whether the trial court “exercised its discretion within the range of permissible alternatives, based on all relevant factors and no improper factor.” In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1993) (citing In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 790 (D.C. 1982)).

2008See Lacy v. District of Columbia, 408 A.2d 985, 988 (D.C.1979).

2007See Lacy v. District of Columbia, 408 A.2d 985, 988 (D.C.1979).

2025Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629 , 641 (D.C. 2024); see Walden v. United States, 366 A.2d 1075, 1076-77 (D.C. 1976) (holding that rulings by trial courts on sentence reduction motions are entitled to 42 “broad deference” and “the scope of appellate review of decisions on sentence reduction motions is very limited”). 1 In my view, the trial court’s thoughtful and balanced ruling easily passes muster under this standard.

2025Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629 , 641 (D.C. 2024); see Walden v. United States, 366 A.2d 1075, 1076-77 (D.C. 1976) (holding that rulings by trial courts on sentence reduction motions are entitled to 42 “broad deference” and “the scope of appellate review of decisions on sentence reduction motions is very limited”). 1 In my view, the trial court’s thoughtful and balanced ruling easily passes muster under this standard.

2023As the trial court’s decision not to strike Officer Thomas’ testimony fell outside the conceded “range of permissible alternatives,” Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979), and the government has not argued that the court’s refusal to strike the testimony of Officer Thomas—the only witness who it called to testify at the suppression hearing—was harmless, see id. at 366 (recognizing harm is a component of an abuse of discretion analysis); Hairston v. United States, 908 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (D.C. 2006) (per 10 As noted above, the government’s arguments against sanctions are prem

2023As the trial court’s decision not to strike Officer Thomas’ testimony fell outside the conceded “range of permissible alternatives,” Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979), and the government has not argued that the court’s refusal to strike the testimony of Officer Thomas—the only witness who it called to testify at the suppression hearing—was harmless, see id. at 366 (recognizing harm is a component of an abuse of discretion analysis); Hairston v. United States, 908 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (D.C. 2006) (per 10 As noted above, the government’s arguments against sanctions are prem

2017See generally Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C. 2014) (summarizing this court’s abuse-of-discretion standard of review).

2015See Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C.1992): “A trial court has broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings because of its familiarity with the details of the case and expertise in evidentiary matters,” Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C.2014), and “will be upset ... only upon a showing of grave abuse.” Jones v. United States, 739 A.2d 348, 350 (D.C.1999) (citation omitted).

2015See Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C.1992): “A trial court has broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings because of its familiarity with the details of the case and expertise in evidentiary matters,” Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C.2014), and “will be upset ... only upon a showing of grave abuse.” Jones v. United States, 739 A.2d 348, 350 (D.C.1999) (citation omitted).

2001See Jones v. United States, 739 A.2d 348, 350 (D.C. 1999); Frost v. United States, 618 A.2d 653 , 664 n. 21 (D.C.1992); Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 497-98 (D.C.1986).

2015See Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C. 1992).

2015See Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C.1992): “A trial court has broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings because of its familiarity with the details of the case and expertise in evidentiary matters,” Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C.2014), and “will be upset ... only upon a showing of grave abuse.” Jones v. United States, 739 A.2d 348, 350 (D.C.1999) (citation omitted).

2010See Byrd v. United States, 485 A.2d 947, 949-50 (D.C.1984) (stipulation that witness would have testified in a certain fashion; “It is true that trial courts do have discretion to relieve a party from a stipulation where such action is intended to prevent manifest injustice.”); Gooding v. United States, 529 A.2d 301, 306 (D.C.1987) (motions to withdraw guilty pleas “are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court”); Sparks v. United States, 358 A.2d 307, 311 (D.C.1976) (waiver of the right to a jury trial; “[T]his court will reverse a lower court’s determination to either allow or dis

2005See Gooding, 529 A.2d at 306 ; Carmichael, 479 A.2d at 327 ; Bettis, 325 A.2d at 195 ; see generally M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). .

2009See, e.g., In re E.S.N., 446 A.2d 16, 18 (D.C.1982).

2009See, e.g., In re E.S.N., 446 A.2d 16, 18 (D.C.1982).

2009Generally, our review of the issues T.W. presents on appeal is governed by an abuse of discretion standard, see In re W.E.T., 793 A.2d 471, 477 (D.C.2002), and “the trial court has considerable discretion in determining how it shall proceed in a particular case.” In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d 314, 325 (D.C.2001) (citations omitted).

2009Generally, our review of the issues T.W. presents on appeal is governed by an abuse of discretion standard, see In re W.E.T., 793 A.2d 471, 477 (D.C.2002), and "the trial court has considerable discretion in determining how it shall proceed in a particular case." In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d 314, 325 (D.C.2001) (citations omitted).

2009Generally, our review of the issues T.W. presents on appeal is governed by an abuse of discretion standard, see In re W.E.T., 793 A.2d 471, 477 (D.C.2002), and “the trial court has considerable discretion in determining how it shall proceed in a particular case.” In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d 314, 325 (D.C.2001) (citations omitted).

2009Generally, our review of the issues T.W. presents on appeal is governed by an abuse of discretion standard, see In re W.E.T., 793 A.2d 471, 477 (D.C.2002), and "the trial court has considerable discretion in determining how it shall proceed in a particular case." In re A.W.K., 778 A.2d 314, 325 (D.C.2001) (citations omitted).

2008Lynch v. Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d 515, 517 (D.C.1985).

1985Lynch v. Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d 515, 517 (D.C.1985); Joseph v. Parekh, 351 A.2d 204, 205 (D.C.1976).

2006See Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

2002See Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C.1997); Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

2001See In re D.M., 771 A.2d 360, 366 (D.C.2001), 2001 D.C.App.

2001See In re D.M., 771 A.2d 360 , 366 (D.C. 2001), 2001 D.C.App.

2007Appellants Goldschmidt and Kahn Violated Rule 11 Following the Supreme Court’s lead, we “apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of [the trial] court’s Rule 11 determination.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 .

2007Appellants Goldschmidt and Kahn Violated Rule 11 Following the Supreme Court’s lead, we “apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of [the trial] court’s Rule 11 determination.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 .

2006See Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

2002See Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C.1997); Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

2006See Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

2002See Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C.1997); Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

2006See Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

2002See Payne v. United States, 697 A.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C.1997); Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 , 108 S.Ct. 1738 , 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988).

1979In Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit — discussing the issue of new trials in the context of whether a verdict was excessive— acknowledged that traditionally, under the abuse of discretion standard, reversals of trial courts’ new-trial decision were rare. 133 U.S.App.D.C. at 113, 409 F.2d at 148 .

1976Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 2819 at 123, note that “[i]t is extremely difficult to reconcile appellate review, under any circumstances, of the denial of these new motions with the Seventh Amendment, which prohibits reexamination of any ‘fact tried by jury . . . (other) than according ,to the rules of the common law.’ ” In spite of this problem, an abuse of discretion standard was articulated in Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 133 U.S.App.D.C. 110 , 112, 409 F.2d 145, 147 (1969), and is generally accepted as the standard doctrine.

2026Haley v. United States, 799 A.2d 1201, 1207 (D.C. 2002).

2025See Nat’l Ass’n of Postmasters of U.S., 894 A.2d at 477-78 .

2025See ante at 19 (focusing on “Ms. Austin’s demeanor on the 911 call itself—specifically, her raised voice, her apparent inability to focus on the operator’s questions, and her decision to terminate the call in the middle of her conversation with the operator”). 68 admission of this call based on its substituted reasoning under the guise of abuse of discretion review. 22 22 Abuse of discretion review incorporates an assessment of harm, (Eddie) Williams v. United States, 106 A.3d 1063, 1066 (D.C. 2015) (“Part of the abuse of discretion standard includes an inquiry into whether substantial prejudi

2024See Tyree v. Evans, 728 A.2d 101, 103-04 (D.C. 9 1999) (citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931); Fortune v. Evans, 58 A.2d 919, 920 (D.C. 1948)).