abuse of discretion standard in Colorado

2025Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999). ¶ 22 “The abuse of discretion standard gives deference to the trial court’s credibility assessments, recognizing that court’s unique perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language of live witnesses, and it serves to discourage an appellate court from second-guessing the trial court’s assessments based on a cold record.” People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 13 . ¶ 23 Allowing a biased or incompetent individual to serve on a jury violates the defendant’s right to an impartial jury and requires reversal.

2019The abuse of discretion standard gives deference to the trial court’s credibility assessment of a prospective juror’s responses, recognizes the trial court’s unique role and perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language of live witnesses, and serves to discourage an appellate court from “second-guessing those judgments based on a cold record.” Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999).

2026Id. at 1219 (citation omitted); see also People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 58 (“[U]nder the abuse of discretion standard, the test is not ‘whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.’” (citation omitted)).

2025If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.” (quoting People v. Hoover, 165 P.3d 784, 802 (Colo. App. 2006))); People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 58 (“[U]nder the abuse of discretion standard, the test is not ‘whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.’” (quoting People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 32 (Bender, C.J., dissenting))). ¶ 50 Third, Sanders argues that Ward provided ineffective a

2026Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo. App. 2006).

2025Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo. App. 2006) (Under the abuse of discretion standard, we ask “not whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court's decision fell within a range of reasonable options.”).

2025People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002).

2025People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002).

2014We discern no abuse of discretion, for the following reasons: • The reference was isolated in a lengthy summation, see People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d 113, 124 (Colo.App.2009) (holding court did not abuse its discretion in finding inappropriate comment harmless because it was an "isolated portion of the prosecution's closing"); • The reference was qualified ("[Wle don't [know] what took place in those meetings.

2014We discern no abuse of discretion, for the following reasons: • The reference was isolated in a lengthy summation, see People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d 113, 124 (Colo.App.2009) (holding court did not abuse its discretion in finding inappropriate comment harmless because it was an “isolated portion of the prosecution's closing”); • The reference was qualified (“[W]e don't [know] what took place in those meetings.

2013Colo. Springs Utils., 239 P.3d 1264, 1268 (Colo.2010); accord In re Bueno, 248 B.R. 581, 582-83 (Bankr.D.Colo.2000) (explaining that under an abuse-of-discretion standard the trial court's reason "need not be one that is agreeable to the reviewing court").

2012"It is not necessary that we agree with the trial court's decision." Id. (citing In re Bueno, 248 B.R. 581, 582-83 (D.Colo.2000) (explaining that under an abuse-of-discretion standard the trial court's reason "need not be one that is agreeable to the reviewing court")).

2012The trial court's determination simply must not "exceed[ ] the bounds of the rationally available choices." Big Sky Network Can., Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Gov't, 533 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir.2008). 1 48 A trial court "may" increase an exemplary damages award up to three times the amount of actual damages if it is shown that the "defendant has acted in a willful and wanton manner during the pendency of the action in a manner which has further aggravated the damages of the plaintiff when the defendant knew or should have known such action would produce aggravation." § 13-21-102(8)(b). { 44 He

2009As Judge Gorsuch recently explained, an appellate court reviewing a trial court's ruling under the abuse of discretion standard will reverse a district court's determination only if the court "exceeded the bounds of the rationally available choices." Big Sky Network Canada, Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Gov't, 533 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir.2008).

2008See Hartman v. Cmty. Responsibility Ctr., Inc., 87 P.3d 254, 257 (Colo.App.2004).

2007Hartman v. Cmty. Responsibility Ctr., Inc., 87 P.3d 254, 257 (Colo.App.2004).

2025The touchstone of the abuse of discretion standard is “whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 32 (Bender, C.J., dissenting) (quoting E-470 Pub.

2025If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.” (quoting People v. Hoover, 165 P.3d 784, 802 (Colo. App. 2006))); People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 58 (“[U]nder the abuse of discretion standard, the test is not ‘whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.’” (quoting People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 32 (Bender, C.J., dissenting))). ¶ 50 Third, Sanders argues that Ward provided ineffective a

2025Water Conservation Dist., 74 P.3d 462, 468 (Colo. App. 2003) (reviewing under an abuse of discretion standard a trial court’s conclusions regarding application of the attorney-client privilege in a CORA case); City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1057 (Colo. 1998) (reviewing under an abuse of discretion standard a trial court’s conclusions regarding application of the deliberative process privilege in a CORA case); see also Land Owners United, LLC v. Waters, 293 P.3d 86 , 95 4 (Colo. App. 2011) (“When reviewing matters of discovery and privilege, we apply an abuse of discretion st

2011City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1057 (Colo.1998) (citing Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33 , 40 (Colo.1984) (holding that, so long as trial court applies correct legal standard, "[dfiscovery rulings are ordinarily within the discretion of the trial court"), and In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 740 (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that appellate court ordinarily reviews trial court's ruling that privilege applies to documents "only for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion").

2018“Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court must affirm the trial court’s decision if there is any evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding.” People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380, 383 (Colo. 2005).

2010See People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380, 383 (Colo.2005) ("Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court must affirm the trial court's decision if there is any evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding.").

2025Id.; see also Tippet, ¶ 64 (“Under the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court doesn’t ask whether it would have ruled as the trial court did, but instead considers ‘whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.’” (quoting Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74 )).

2023Under the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court doesn’t ask whether it would have ruled as the trial court did, but instead considers “whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.” Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74 , 285 P.3d 986, 1008 (quoting E-470 Pub.

2007We analyze such discretionary powers according to an abuse of discretion standard, and we will only interfere when discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. [12] Matter of Brooks' Estate, 42 Colo.App. 333, 335 , 596 P.2d 1220, 1221 (1979); see also Cent.

2007We analyze such discretionary powers according to an abuse of discretion standard, and we will only interfere when discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. [12] Matter of Brooks' Estate, 42 Colo.App. 333, 335 , 596 P.2d 1220, 1221 (1979); see also Cent.

2025People v. Loper , 241 P.3d 543, 546 (Colo. 2010).

2020People v. Loper, 241 P.3d 543, 546 (Colo. 2010).

2025If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.” (quoting People v. Hoover, 165 P.3d 784, 802 (Colo. App. 2006))); People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 58 (“[U]nder the abuse of discretion standard, the test is not ‘whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.’” (quoting People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 32 (Bender, C.J., dissenting))). ¶ 50 Third, Sanders argues that Ward provided ineffective a

2014If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.' " People v. Hoover, 165 P.3d 784, 802 (Colo.App.2006) (quoting State v. Heywood, 245 Kan. 615 , 783 P.2d 890, 894 (1989)); see People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 27 , 338 P.3d 472 ("A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.") (emphasis added); People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 58 , 349 P.3d 280 ("[UInder the abuse of discretion standard, the test is not whether we would have reac

2024People v. Robson , 80 P.3d 912, 914 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 24 Similarly, the People cite People v. Gee , 2015 COA 151, ¶ 72 , 371 P.3d 714, 725 , for the proposition that we apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a ruling on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

2024People v. Robson , 80 P.3d 912, 914 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 24 Similarly, the People cite People v. Gee , 2015 COA 151, ¶ 72 , 371 P.3d 714, 725 , for the proposition that we apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a ruling on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

2024Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454, 458 (Colo. App. 2003).

2013SeeGoodman, 222 P.3d at 314 , A court abuses its discretion when its decision rests on a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454, 458 (Colo.App.2003), or when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfau Goodman, 222 P.3d at 314 . 118 To set aside a judgment under CRCP. 60(b), the movant-here, Sebastian-bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the motion should be granted.

2024See In re Marriage of Nevarez , 170 P.3d 808, 814 (Colo. App. 2007).

2024See In re Marriage of Nevarez , 170 P.3d 808, 814 (Colo. App. 2007).

2019Despite the wide discretion afforded trial courts, however, appellate courts must not “abdicate their responsibility to ensure that the requirements of fairness are fulfilled.” Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo. 1981). ¶60 Applying these principles, appellate courts in this state have concluded that reversible error occurs when a trial court denies a challenge for cause to a prospective juror who expresses doubt as to his or her ability to be impartial and 6 neither the prosecution nor the trial court then rehabilitates that juror.

2001Carrillo v. People, supra; see Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo.1981) (where juror repeatedly indicated he would have difficulty applying the proper burden of proof, trial court abused its discretion by refusing to excuse him).

2017Spencer Contractor, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 884 P.2d 326 , 328 n.6 (Colo. 1994) (citing Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th Cir. 1990)); see also Wheeler v. T.L.

1994Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th Cir.1990). [7] Plaintiff purchased the property pursuant to two written agreements which provided that the "prevailing party" would be "entitled" to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

2015A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law T8 A trial court has broad discretion to determine the terms and conditions of a restitution order, People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo. App. 2010), and thus we review a restitution order under an abuse of discretion standard, see People v. Maestas, 2014 COA 139M, ¶ 11 , 343 P.3d 1038 ; People v. Henson, 2013 COA 36, ¶ 9 , 307 P.3d 1135 . 19 Section 19-2-918, C.R.S. 2015, the juvenile restitution statute, authorizes a court to order a juvenile who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent to make restitution to the victim, "{ilf the court finds that

2015A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶8       A trial court has broad discretion to determine the terms and conditions of a restitution order, People v. Rivera , 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo. App. 2010), and thus we review a restitution order under an abuse of discretion standard, see People v. Maestas , 2014 COA 139M , ¶11; People v. Henson , 2013 COA 36 , ¶9. ¶9       Section 19-2-918, C.R.S. 2015, the juvenile restitution statute, authorizes a court to order a juvenile who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent to make restitution to the victim, “[i]f the court finds that

2015A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law T8 A trial court has broad discretion to determine the terms and conditions of a restitution order, People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo. App. 2010), and thus we review a restitution order under an abuse of discretion standard, see People v. Maestas, 2014 COA 139M, ¶ 11 , 343 P.3d 1038 ; People v. Henson, 2013 COA 36, ¶ 9 , 307 P.3d 1135 . 19 Section 19-2-918, C.R.S. 2015, the juvenile restitution statute, authorizes a court to order a juvenile who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent to make restitution to the victim, "{ilf the court finds that

2015A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶8       A trial court has broad discretion to determine the terms and conditions of a restitution order, People v. Rivera , 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo. App. 2010), and thus we review a restitution order under an abuse of discretion standard, see People v. Maestas , 2014 COA 139M , ¶11; People v. Henson , 2013 COA 36 , ¶9. ¶9       Section 19-2-918, C.R.S. 2015, the juvenile restitution statute, authorizes a court to order a juvenile who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent to make restitution to the victim, “[i]f the court finds that

2011City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1057 (Colo.1998) (citing Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33 , 40 (Colo.1984) (holding that, so long as trial court applies correct legal standard, "[dfiscovery rulings are ordinarily within the discretion of the trial court"), and In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 740 (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that appellate court ordinarily reviews trial court's ruling that privilege applies to documents "only for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion").

2003City of Colo. Springs v. White, supra; see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 740 (D.C.Cir.1997)(noting that appellate court ordinarily reviews trial court's ruling that privilege applies to documents "only for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion"); cf. Bond v. Dist.

2019See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35 (recognizing district court’s “great latitude” to equitably distribute marital property and that an appellate court must not disturb its decision “unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion”). ¶ 20 Additionally, the supreme court has previously applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to an issue involving competing constitutional rights.

2019See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35 (recognizing district court’s “great latitude” to equitably distribute marital property and that an appellate court must not disturb its decision “unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion”). ¶ 20 Additionally, the supreme court has previously applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to an issue involving competing constitutional rights.

2006In so doing, the appellate court must be mindful that the trial court is accorded a great deal of discretion in determining whether actual bias is present " 'primarily because such challenges require an assessment of the prospective juror's credibility, demeanor, and sincerity in explaining his or her state of mind and because the trial court is in a preferred position to evaluate those factors," Carrillo, supra, 974 P.2d at 486 (quoting Macrander, supra, 828 P.2d at 238 ), and that the abuse of discretion standard also "serves to discourage an appellate court from second-guessing those judgme

2006In so doing, the appellate court must be mindful that the trial court is accorded a great deal of discretion in determining whether actual bias is present " 'primarily because such challenges require an assessment of the prospective juror's credibility, demeanor, and sincerity in explaining his or her state of mind and because the trial court is in a preferred position to evaluate those factors," Carrillo, supra, 974 P.2d at 486 (quoting Macrander, supra, 828 P.2d at 238 ), and that the abuse of discretion standard also "serves to discourage an appellate court from second-guessing those judgme