abuse of discretion standard in Illinois

2025The State, citing both Wheeler and People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000), observes that our supreme court has applied both a de novo standard and an abuse of discretion standard to claims of improper closing arguments.

2025However, in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000), the court applied the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument.

2025This confusion stems from two supreme court cases: (1) People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 121 (2007), where our supreme court held that whether a prosecutor’s comments were egregious enough to require a new trial is a question of law reviewed de novo, and (2) People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 244 (2000), where our supreme court reviewed the propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks during closing arguments under the abuse of discretion standard.

2025The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to resolve the long-standing conflict on this issue, created by its holdings in People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92 (2007), wherein, without much explanation, it applied a de novo standard to the review of prosecutorial comments, and People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000), wherein it followed countless decisions in applying the traditional abuse of discretion standard of review.

2024See People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18 (holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies to review of the trial court’s findings that State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and present threat that could not be mitigated by other conditions); People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11 (when a defendant claims the State failed to fulfill its burden under the Act by “clear and convincing evidence,” “we are reviewing the circuit court’s evaluation of that evidence for an abuse of discretion.”). ¶ 32 Other appellate decisions have applied

2024See People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18 (holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies to review of the trial court’s findings that State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and present threat that could not be mitigated by other conditions); People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11 (when a defendant claims the State failed to fulfill its burden under the Act by “clear and convincing evidence,” “we are reviewing the circuit court’s evaluation of that evidence for an abuse of discretion.”). ¶ 32 Other appellate decisions have applied

2025And, as our supreme court has made clear, “[r]easonable minds [can] differ about whether such evidence is admissible without requiring reversal under the abuse of discretion standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 186 (2003). ¶ 42 Mr. Dawson argues that the officers’ testimony about the radio dispatch, which led them to be in the area and to chase him, was admitted in error.

2024“An abuse of discretion has occurred when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or when no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the trial court.” People v. Wilson, 2015 IL App (4th) 130512, ¶ 75 . ¶ 62 “Our supreme court has repeatedly admonished its appellate courts that reasonable minds may differ about whether evidence of other crimes or bad acts is admissible without requiring reversal under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” People v. Serritella, 2022 IL App (1st) 200072, ¶ 87 (citing Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186 ). ¶ 63 In his brief on

2026The abuse of discretion standard of review is “the most deferential standard of review—next to no review at all.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004).

2026The abuse of discretion standard “is the most deferential standard of review—next to no review at all.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 , 356 (2004). ¶ 30 Section 115-7.4(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115- 7.4(a) (West 2022)), provides an exception to the common law rule barring other-crimes evidence where defendant is accused of an offense of “domestic violence as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 [(750 ILCS 60/101 et seq.

2024Because the judgment under review is not “purely discretionary, it makes little sense to *** apply an abuse of discretion standard on review.” People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2007); see also id. n.5 (“The abuse of discretion standard is not tied to any quantum of proof.”). ¶ 90 Some courts have suggested that the finding of dangerousness is discretionary because subsection (g) of the statute lists multiple factors to be considered in determining dangerousness.

2022However, our supreme court has stated, “the abuse of discretion standard is improper in section 2-1401 proceedings in which either judgment on the pleadings or dismissal for failure to state a cause of action has been entered.” People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 15 , 871 N.E.2d 17, 27 (2007). ¶ 27 The parties disagree as to our standard of review.

2023Id. “[R]easonable minds [can] differ” about whether such evidence is admissible without requiring reversal under the abuse of discretion standard.

2022“In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the closing arguments of both the State and the defendant must be examined in their entirety, and the complained-of remarks must -24- 1-19-1318 be placed in their proper context.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 104 (2001). ¶ 79 Defendant seeks for this court to review this issue pursuant to de novo review, while the prosecution seeks for this court to utilize an abuse of discretion standard.

2018Compare People v. Love, 377 Ill.

2018Compare People v. Love, 377 Ill.

2018People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill.

2018People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill.

2024See People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 30 (“[W]e continue to use the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a court's decision to grant or deny pretrial release.”). ¶ 13 Second, defendant asserts in his notice of appeal, “The State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022).

2024The State bears “the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or prevent the defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022). ¶ 22 Although the determination of whether pretrial release should be granted or denied is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard (see People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶¶ 27, 30 ), the proper standard of review for revocation of pretrial release un

2026App. 3d 200, 205 (2005) (we apply the manifest-weight standard to the factual findings for each factor upon which the court based its property disposition, but we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the court’s “final property disposition (and how the trial court considers those factors”)); (2) maintenance (In re Marriage of Micheli, 2014 IL App (2d) 121245, ¶¶ 20-21 (we apply manifest-weight standard to the factual findings regarding a maintenance determination, but we apply abuse-of-discretion standard to a maintenance award, as the “court has wide latitude in considering w

2025“A reviewing court applies the manifest weight of the evidence standard to the factual findings for each factor on which a trial court may base its property disposition, but it applies the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court’s final property disposition (and how the trial court considers those factors).” In re Marriage of Vancura, 356 Ill.

2015People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 154 (1998). ¶ 39 The parties disagree regarding the applicable standard of review with Johnson proposing a de novo standard and the State advocating an abuse of discretion standard.

2015People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 154 (1998). ¶ 39 The parties disagree regarding the applicable standard of review with Johnson proposing a de novo standard and the State advocating an abuse of discretion standard.

2026App. 3d 15, 24 (2009) (“ ‘[L]ittle turns *** on whether we label review of this particular question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse-of-discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate correction.’ ” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996))). ¶ 31 The circuit court, in setting aside the Commission’s award of section 19(k) penalties and section 16 attorney fees, found that the Commission applied the improper legal standard.

2020The abuse of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not “guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). ¶ 32 While the trial judge fully appreciated that he could not inquire into the thought process of the two jurors before him, his analysis demonstrates that he may have further believed he could not properly consider, in even an abstract way, what the likely effect of the information on a reasonable juror’s thought process may have been.

2021“That power, however, should be exercised ‘cautiously and sparingly.’ ” People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010) (quoting People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 300 (1988)). ¶ 16 Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review.

2020“That power, however, - 11 - No. 1-17-3025 should be exercised ‘cautiously and sparingly.’ ” People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010) (quoting People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 300 (1988). ¶ 31 Thus, a trial court’s sentencing decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

2025The abuse of discretion standard is “the most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998). ¶ 22 Here, in addition to the trial court having general discretion to allow witnesses to remain in the courtroom for the duration of trial, the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (Act) (725 ILCS 120/4(8) (West 2024)) provides victims have “[t]he right to be present at the trial and all other court proceedings on the same basis as the accused, unless the victim is to testify and

2024The abuse of discretion standard “is the most deferential standard of review—next to no review at all—and is therefore traditionally reserved 5 for decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004) (citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998)).

2019See Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 375 (applying an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s determination of whether the probative value of other- crimes evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect); see also Ill.

2019See Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 375 (applying an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s determination of whether the probative value of other- crimes evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect); see also Ill.

2024See People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18 (holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies to review of the trial court’s findings that State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and present threat that could not be mitigated by other conditions); People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11 (when a defendant claims the State failed to fulfill its burden under the Act by “clear and convincing evidence,” “we are reviewing the circuit court’s evaluation of that evidence for an abuse of discretion.”). ¶ 32 Other appellate decisions have applied

2024See People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18 (holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies to review of the trial court’s findings that State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and present threat that could not be mitigated by other conditions); People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11 (when a defendant claims the State failed to fulfill its burden under the Act by “clear and convincing evidence,” “we are reviewing the circuit court’s evaluation of that evidence for an abuse of discretion.”). ¶ 32 Other appellate decisions have applied

2020Doyle Trust v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 2014 IL App (2d) 121238, ¶ 30 , in applying an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court found that the trial court “drew on its knowledge of the proceedings in deciding that the facts presented did not warrant sanctions.” In Evergreen Real Estate Services, LLC v. Hanover Insurance Co., 2019 IL App (1st) 181867, ¶ 35 , the appellate court observed that section 155 provides that the court “may” impose sanctions when it “appears to the court” that the conduct is vexatious and unreasonable, which suggests that “[w]hether to sanction a party und

2020Doyle Trust v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 2014 IL App (2d) 121238, ¶ 29 , in applying an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court found that the trial court “drew on its knowledge of the proceedings in deciding that the facts presented did not warrant sanctions.” In Evergreen Real Estate Services, LLC v. Hanover Insurance Co., 2019 IL App (1st) 181867, ¶ 35 , the appellate court observed that section 155 provides that the court “may” impose sanctions when it “appears to the court” that the conduct is vexatious and unreasonable, which suggests that “[w]hether to sanction a party und

2018In particular, "[d]ecisions of whether to admit expert testimony are reviewed using this same abuse of discretion standard." People v. Becker , 239 Ill. 2d 215 , 234, 346 Ill.Dec. 527 , 940 N.E.2d 1131 (2010).

2018In particular, "[d]ecisions of whether to admit expert testimony are reviewed using this same abuse of discretion standard." People v. Becker , 239 Ill. 2d 215 , 234, 346 Ill.Dec. 527 , 940 N.E.2d 1131 (2010).

2025“Under the abuse of discretion standard, the question is not whether this court might have decided the issue differently, but whether any reasonable person could have taken the 16 position adopted by the trial court.” In re Marriage of Samardzija, 365 Ill.

2024“Under the abuse of discretion standard, the question is not whether this court might have decided the issue differently, but whether any reasonable person could have taken the position adopted by the trial court.” In re Marriage of Samardzija, 365 Ill.

2003People v. Kidd, 295 Ill.

2003People v. Kidd, 295 Ill.

2025While the case law may seem mixed, we have repeatedly and consistently employed the abuse of discretion standard, stating it more “properly invoke[s] over a century of Illinois Supreme Court precedent.” People v. Phagan, 2019 IL App (1st) 153031, ¶ 54 , rev’d on other grounds; accord People v. Cornejo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180199, ¶ 128 ; People v. Phillips, 392 Ill.

2023In Phagan, this district found that the abuse of discretion standard is the proper standard, as “the trial judge is present for the entire trial, * * * has the benefit of ‘hearing the remarks of counsel on both sides” and is better suited to determine whether anything that happened or was said justifies the challenged remark.” People v. Phagan, 2019 IL App (1st) 153031, ¶¶ 48-50 (quoting North Chicago Street Ry.

2001However, as the Childress court correctly stated, the abuse-of-discretion standard is only a general rule (Childress, 158 Ill. 2d at 296 , 633 N.E.2d at 644 ), and important exceptions exist.

2001However, as the Childress court correctly stated, the abuse-of-discretion standard is only a general rule (Childress, 158 Ill. 2d at 296 , 633 N.E.2d at 644 ), and important exceptions exist.

2025People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 142 (2009). “[A] reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion analysis to determinations about the propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks during argument.” People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶ 64 .

2022However, in People v. - 16 - No. 1-20-0651 Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000), our supreme court also stated that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review, stating “regulation of the substance and style of the closing argument is within the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's determination of the propriety of the remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion” (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 46 This court has explained that no conflict exists between Wheeler and Blue, as “a reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion analysis to determinati

2025App. 3d 832, 834 (1996) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd., v. Breakthrough Medical Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 814 (4th Cir. 1992). “[A] trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to apply the proper criteria when it weighs the facts, and our inquiry must consider both the legal adequacy of the way the trial court reached its result as well as whether the result is within the bounds of reason.” People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 360 (2004). ¶ 73 With respect to the trial court’s decision to impose a six-year sentence on each of the two charges of which defendant has been convicted, the abuse of discreti

2023Even the abuse of discretion standard may require this court to determine “ ‘the legal adequacy of [the] way the [circuit] court reached its result.’ ” Paul v. Gerald Adelman & Associates, Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d 85, 99 (2006) (quoting People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 360 (2004)).