abuse of discretion standard in Indiana

2020Our Supreme Court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188 .

2020See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (a). “[A] trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).

2020The court’s division of the marital estate “is highly fact-sensitive and is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.” Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. 2002).

2020A trial court’s division of the marital estate is “‘highly fact sensitive and is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.’” Campbell v. Campbell, 993 N.E.2d 205, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied. [20] Husband’s argument is two-fold: He contends that the trial court “neither stated its intention to divide the marital estate equally nor made such an equal division, even assuming the [t]rial court’s valuation had been accurate and appropriate.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 12).

2020Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2008); Outback Steakhouse of Florida v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind. 2006).

2016Trial Rule 60(B) motions for relief from judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. [Holmes, 885 N.E.2d at 1270 ]; Outback Steakhouse of Florida v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind.2006).

2020See Ind. BMV v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Although rulings on motions to correct error are usually reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, we review a case de novo when the issue ... is purely a question of law.”); Christenson v. Struss, 855 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (challenge to magistrate’s authority to conduct hearing on motion to correct error presented question of law reviewed de novo).

2017See Ind. BMV v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Although rulings on motions to correct error are usually reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, we review a case de novo when the issue ... is purely a question of law.”)[.] City of Indpls. v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

2025It is in that review that the majority discovered the language of the order, including language seemingly calling for double payment for the alleged extracurricular activities arrearages, which was incorrect as a matter of [17] “It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2012) (citation omitted)).

2019As the Indiana Supreme Court has stated: "It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard of review." Steele-Giri v. Steele , 51 N.E.3d 119 , 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc. , 964 N.E.2d 198 , 202 (Ind. 2012) ).

2020Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

2019Jackson v. State , 6 N.E.3d 1040 , 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

2019“First, employing an abuse of discretion standard gives the post-conviction court the ability to curtail attempts by petitioners, including those in capital cases, to delay final judgment on their petitions.” Id.

2019Appendix to Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 (Emphases added). [12] Even assuming that Harris’s March 1, 2018 filing did not constitute a successive petition because a decision on the merits had not been previously rendered, we cannot say that reversal is warranted. [13] Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(c) provides in part that “[t]he petitioner shall be given leave to amend the petition as a matter of right no later than sixty [60] days prior to the date the petition has been set for trial” and that “[a]ny later amendment of the petition shall be by leave of the court.” “[T]he plain language of the

2019Decision [6] Bense argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. [7] Our supreme court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that his probation violation sanction should be reviewed under the inappropriate standard in Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)).

2018We disagree. [10] Our supreme court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that his probation violation sanction should be reviewed under the inappropriate standard in Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)).

2012“Where cases present mixed issues of fact and law, we have described the review as applying an abuse of discretion standard.” Bowyer, 944 N.E.2d at 983 ; Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 482 (Ind.2005).

2012"Where cases present mixed issues of fact and law, we have described the review as applying an abuse of discretion standard." Bowyer, 944 N.E.2d at 983 ; Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 482 (Ind.2005).

2026“It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). [31] GAL Harrington noted in her 2024 report that the children were “placed in the middle of an adult decision” because Mother shared her negative opinions about Avon schools with them.

2025It is in that review that the majority discovered the language of the order, including language seemingly calling for double payment for the alleged extracurricular activities arrearages, which was incorrect as a matter of [17] “It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2012) (citation omitted)).

2020McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. 2007).

2020McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. 2007).

2020Ross v. Bachkurinskiy, 770 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). [8] Bell maintains that his attorney was not served a copy of Vacuforce’s motion to dismiss because of a “clerical error[,] as the Indiana E-filing System sent notice of Vacuforce’s Motion to Dismiss to [Bell’s] Counsel’s wrong email address.” 1 Bell also appealed the trial court’s order granting Vacuforce’s motion to dismiss.

2016Ross v. Bachkurinskiy, 770 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).

2013Because Porche fails to differentiate his arguments and makes no attempt to meet his burden to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character, see King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we will consider his sentencing challenge solely as an abuse of discretion claim.

2012See King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (observing that “interspersed within King’s inappropriate sentence argument are references to the abuse of discretion standard . . .

2020Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490 .

2018As our supreme court noted after the sentencing statutes were amended in 2005, “[b]ecause the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, . . . a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 . [7] Although Whetstone’s argument section provides a comprehensive overview of the abuse of discretion standard, he does not challenge a particular factor identified by the court as improper.

2020“It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)). “‘We will reverse a trial court’s finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding.’” Id.

2020“It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016).

2019Beike v. Beike , 805 N.E.2d 1265 , 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

2012Beike v. Beike, 805 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2009Thus, the third step of our appellate review is "to *34 review the trial court's decision to award fees and the amount thereof under an abuse of discretion standard." Davidson, 745 N.E.2d at 899 -900 (citing Emergency Physicians, 714 N.E.2d at 1115 ).

2001Finally, we review the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees and the amount thereof under an abuse of discretion standard." Emergency Physicians of Indianapolis v. Pettit, 714 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), adopted in relevant part, 718 N.E.2d 753 (Ind.1999).

2017See Ind. BMV v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Although rulings on motions to correct error are usually reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, we review a case de novo when the issue ... is purely a question of law.”)[.] City of Indpls. v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

2017See Ind. BMV v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Although rulings on motions to correct error are usually reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, we review a case de novo when the issue ... is purely a question of law.”)[.] City of Indpls. v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

2013Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

2011Turning to this case, we note that although we review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, “the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo.” Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Green v. State, 719 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996))).

2026“Our court reviews findings of dissipation in various contexts under an abuse of discretion standard.” Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

2020“Our court reviews findings of dissipation in various contexts under an abuse of discretion standard.” Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh’g denied. [31] In determining whether dissipation has occurred, a court should consider: (1) whether the dissipating party had the intent to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset; (2) whether the expenditure benefited the marital enterprise or was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the marriage; (3) whether the transaction was remote in time and effect or occurred just before the filing of a divorce petition; and (4)

2015APS contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a guardian for Izzo’s person and estate. [10] Indiana Code section 29-3-2-4(a) provides that “[a]ll findings, orders, or other proceedings under this article shall be in the discretion of the court unless otherwise provided in this article.” “Thus, we apply the abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court’s findings and order.” In re Guardianship of Atkins, 868 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing In re Guardianship of V.S.D., 660 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)), trans. denied.

2009Thus, we apply the abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's findings and order, Id.; V.S.D. v. Williams-Huston (In re Guardianship of V.S.D.), 660 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

2016In re Estate of Long, 804 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Hollingsworth v. Key Benefit Adm’rs, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh’g denied, trans. denied. “ ‘An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.’” In re Estate of Long, 804 N.E.2d at 1178 (quoting Hollingsworth, 658 N.E.2d at 655 (internal citation omitted)). [6] The Yeagers argue that Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.6, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, Floyd County L

2016In re Estate of Long, 804 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Hollingsworth v. Key Benefit Adm’rs, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh’g denied, trans. denied. “ ‘An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.’” In re Estate of Long, 804 N.E.2d at 1178 (quoting Hollingsworth, 658 N.E.2d at 655 (internal citation omitted)). [6] The Yeagers argue that Ind.Code § 32-30-10.5-8.6, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, Floyd County L

2015Id. [7] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 29-1-7-19, the plaintiff in a will contest is required to post a bond with “sufficient sureties in an amount approved by the court, conditioned for the due prosecution of the proceedings and for the payment of all costs if in the proceedings judgment is rendered against the plaintiff.” “Costs” include only filing fees and statutory witness fees.

2013Id; Beemer, [ 677 N.E.2d at 1120 ], Gleason, 689 N.E.2d at 483-84 .

2017Sparkman v. State, 722 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

2017Id.

2016Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997) [10] Typically, we would review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the abuse-of-discretion standard.

1999“We review this balancing act by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard.” Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 223 .

2020See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

2016See Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 220 (observing that the general proposition that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a mitigating factor that was not raised at sentencing “has at least one important exception, namely: pleas of guilty,” holding that “[a]lthough Anglemyer did not argue before the sentencing court that his guilty plea was a mitigating factor, this does not preclude him from raising the issue for the first time on appeal,” and examining the trial court’s failure to mention this factor under the abuse of discretion standard of review). [12] A defendant w