abuse of discretion standard in Alaska

2022STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the superior court’s distribution of marital assets for abuse of discretion.2 The court abuses its discretion if it “considers improper factors, fails to 2 Ethelbah v. Walker, 225 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Alaska 2000) (“We review the trial court’s equitable distribution under an abuse of discretion standard, and will reverse (continued...) -4- 7590 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.”3 We review the superior court’s findings of fact for clear error.4 “A finding is clearly erroneous if we are ‘left with a definite and firm convic

2015STANDARD OF REVIEW In property division cases, a trial court’s property valuation “is a factual determination that will be upset only if there is clear error.”1 “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is unsupported by anything in the record.”2 A trial court’s property allocation “is reviewed purely under the abuse of discretion standard and will not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust.”3 1 Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988). 2 Id. at 347 ; see also Stevens v. Stevens, 265 P.3d 279, 284 (Alaska 2011) (“A valuation is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm

2015STANDARD OF REVIEW In property division cases, a trial court’s property valuation “is a factual determination that will be upset only if there is clear error.”1 “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is unsupported by anything in the record.”2 A trial court’s property allocation “is reviewed purely under the abuse of discretion standard and will not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust.”3 1 Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988). 2 Id. at 347 ; see also Stevens v. Stevens, 265 P.3d 279, 284 (Alaska 2011) (“A valuation is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm

2015STANDARD OF REVIEW In property division cases, a trial court’s property valuation “is a factual determination that will be upset only if there is clear error.”1 “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is unsupported by anything in the record.”2 A trial court’s property allocation “is reviewed purely under the abuse of discretion standard and will not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust.”3 1 Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988). 2 Id. at 347 ; see also Stevens v. Stevens, 265 P.3d 279, 284 (Alaska 2011) (“A valuation is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm

2013Compare Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 330 (Alaska 2006) ("The characterization of property as separate or marital may involve both legal and factual questions." (citing Martin v. Martin, 52 P.3d 724, 726 (Alaska 2002))), Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska 1994) (same), and Moffitt, 749 P.2d at 346 ("Step one-determining what property is available for distribution-is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, although it may involve legal determinations to which this court applies its independent judgment." (citing Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 570 )), with Carr v. Carr, 152 P.3d 450, 454 (Alaska

2005The equitable allocation of property is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard and will not be reversed "unless it is clearly unjust.” Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 913-14 (Alaska 1994) (citations omitted). 2 . 969 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1998). 3 . 956 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Alaska 1998). 4 .

2014Co., 482 P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1971). -11- 6889 The superior court exercises broad discretion in property division cases.10 When faced with a marriage of long duration where parties have commingled assets, property division in divorce proceedings consists of three steps: (1) characterizing the property available for distribution, (2) valuing the property, and (3) equitably allocating those assets between the parties.11 If the superior court makes legal determinations on the character of the property available for distribution, we review those legal determinations de novo, using our independent

2013STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court has “broad discretion in fashioning a property division in divorce actions.”2 The division of property by the trial court is a three-step process.3 Step one, “determining what property is available for division as marital property,”4 “is in large part a legal determination, involving the interpretation of AS 25.24.160(a)(4), and applying legal principles to the facts of the case.” 5 We apply our independent judgment to the trial court’s legal determinations.6 “Otherwise, we review a trial court’s determinations as to property available for distribution under

2021An abuse of discretion exists when a party has been deprived of a substantial right or seriously prejudiced by the lower court’s ruling.”3 “We review constitutional questions, including due process and equal protection, de novo, and we ‘will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.’ ”4 The decision to appoint counsel in a civil case, because of its constitutional nature, is reviewed de novo.5 “We review a superior court’s issuance of an order permitting the sale of property using the same abuse of discretion standard that we employ when reviewing

2010Id. (quoting Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375, 378-79 (Alaska 1982)). 6 .

2025When we review a superior court’s decision under this standard of review, we will reverse it only if the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or stemmed from improper motive.” Id. (quoting Ware, 161 P.3d at 1192 ). 14 Roderer v. Dash, 233 P.3d 1101, 1112 (Alaska 2010). -6- 7765 DISCUSSION A. Alaska Statute 09.65.070(d)(4) Bars Rochon’s Lawsuit.

2015STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether the superior court has decided an issue based on a legal theory not argued by one of the parties is a question we initially review under the abuse of discretion standard.11 An abuse of discretion exists where the superior court’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or improperly motivated.”12 If the superior court has not abused its discretion, we then review the court’s decision to determine if it has violated a party’s right to due process.13 Whether a party’s right to due process has been violated presents a question of law,14 which “[w]e

2023He also claims that he purchased the family home, four-plex, and other properties with separate funds that he earned before marrying Abeir. 46 See Layton v. O’Dea, 515 P.3d 92, 101 (Alaska 2022) (providing that we review “characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any ‘[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,’ and de novo with respect to ‘whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 459 (Alaska 2013))); Od

2022We review the characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any “[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,” and de novo with respect to “whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.”8 The superior court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous “only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction based on the entire record that a mistake has been made.”9 “A [superior] court has broad discretion to provide for the equitable division of property between the parties in a div

2023STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review grants of summary judgment de novo and draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” 10 We generally review for abuse of discretion a superior court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.11 But we review “evidentiary conclusions turning on questions of law” de novo.12 “We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing superior courts’ rulings on motions for extension of time.” 13 We will find an abuse of discretion 9 See Brandner v. Pease, 361 P.3d 915, 920 (Alaska 2015) (“In medical malpractice actions . . . the jury ordinarily ma

2021Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 71 P.3d 811, 817 (Alaska 2003) (quoting In re Estate of McCoy, 844 P.2d 1131, 1135-36 (Alaska 1993) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a disqualification in an estate case)). 11 Sykes v. Lawless, 474 P.3d 636, 646 (Alaska 2020) (quoting Erica G. v. Taylor Taxi, Inc., 357 P.3d 783, 786-87 (Alaska 2015)). 12 See Harper v. BioLife Energy Sys., Inc., 426 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Polar Supply Co. v. Steelmaster Indus., Inc., 127 P.3d 52, 54 (Alaska 2005)). 13 Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299, 302 (Alaska 2009). -9- 7506 is adversely affe

2014Her report and testimony are well thought-out, fair, and take into consideration the statutory considerations set out by AS 25.24.150.” Jason alleges that Bowman was biased in her report and testimony and argues that the superior court “erred in failing to consider the bias of custody investigator Jocelyn Bowman, and her testimony regarding a video that she never viewed.” Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.6(d)(2) provides that “[u]nless otherwise ordered, the custody investigator’s report is deemed to be admitted into evidence upon filing.” In general, we review a trial court’s decision to adm

2014But when the admissibility of evidence or expert testimony turns on a question of law, we apply our independent judgment.”22 “We apply ‘the abuse of discretion standard to review a trial court’s decisions relating to appointment of a child custody investigator and admission of the investigator’s report into evidence.’ ”23 19 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 195 P.3d 127, 130 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Hopper v. Hopper, 171 P.3d 124, 129 (Alaska 2007)). 20 Weimer v. Cont’l Car & Truck, LLC, 237 P.3d 610 , 613 (Alaska 2010) (citing Glamann v. Kirk, 29 P.3d 255, 259 (Alaska 2001)). 21 See Koller v. Reft, 71 P.3

2003"Under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court’s decision will only be overturned if this court has ‘a definite and firm conviction that the judge made a mistake.' ” Arbelovsky, 922 P.2d at 227 (quoting City of Kenai v. Ferguson, 732 P.2d 184, 190 (Alaska 1987)). 2 .

1998Under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court's decision will be overturned only if this court has "a definite and firm conviction that the judge made a mistake." City of Kenai v. Ferguson, 732 P.2d 184, 190 (Alaska 1987).

1998See Patch v. Patch, 760 P.2d 526, 529 (Alaska 1988).

1997Patch v. Patch, 760 P.2d 526, 529 (Alaska 1988).

1997Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 171 (Alaska 1991).

1995See Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 171 (Alaska 1991) (‘We review the trial court’s determination of public interest status under the abuse of discretion standard.”).

2013STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court has “broad discretion in fashioning a property division in divorce actions.”2 The division of property by the trial court is a three-step process.3 Step one, “determining what property is available for division as marital property,”4 “is in large part a legal determination, involving the interpretation of AS 25.24.160(a)(4), and applying legal principles to the facts of the case.” 5 We apply our independent judgment to the trial court’s legal determinations.6 “Otherwise, we review a trial court’s determinations as to property available for distribution under

2013STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court has “broad discretion in fashioning a property division in divorce actions.”2 The division of property by the trial court is a three-step process.3 Step one, “determining what property is available for division as marital property,”4 “is in large part a legal determination, involving the interpretation of AS 25.24.160(a)(4), and applying legal principles to the facts of the case.” 5 We apply our independent judgment to the trial court’s legal determinations.6 “Otherwise, we review a trial court’s determinations as to property available for distribution under

2023He also claims that he purchased the family home, four-plex, and other properties with separate funds that he earned before marrying Abeir. 46 See Layton v. O’Dea, 515 P.3d 92, 101 (Alaska 2022) (providing that we review “characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any ‘[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,’ and de novo with respect to ‘whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 459 (Alaska 2013))); Od

2022We review the characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any “[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,” and de novo with respect to “whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.”8 The superior court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous “only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction based on the entire record that a mistake has been made.”9 “A [superior] court has broad discretion to provide for the equitable division of property between the parties in a div

1990A litigant either satifies the requirements for being a public interest litigant, or does not. [2] We apply the abuse of discretion standard "in reviewing a trial court's finding that a litigant has a public interest status." Citizens for the Preservation of the Kenai River, Inc. v. Sheffield, 758 P.2d 624, 626 (Alaska 1988); see also Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1988). [3] There is no question that the documents were released solely because of the Daily News's efforts.

1990We apply the abuse of discretion standard "in reviewing a trial court's finding that a litigant has a public interest status." Citizens for the Preservation of the Kenai River, Inc. v. Sheffield, 758 P.2d 624, 626 (Alaska 1988); see also Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1988). .

2025See, e.g., Falcone v. State, 227 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska App. 2010) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the trial court’s determination that the defendant was incapable of presenting his case in a coherent fashion or conforming to the orderly procedures of the court).

2022In Falcone v. State, for example, the trial court denied the defendant’s request to represent himself because the court found that the defendant was not capable of presenting his case in a coherent fashion and was incapable of conforming to the orderly procedures of the court.29 Likewise, in Barry H. v. State, 26 See, e.g., Falcone v. State, 227 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska App. 2010); Ramsey v. State, 834 P.2d 811, 815 (Alaska App. 1992); Gargan v. State, 805 P.2d 998, 1000-01 (Alaska App. 1991); see also Bourdon v. State, 2018 WL 3933557, at *3 (Alaska App. Aug. 15, 2018) (unpublished); Tix v. Stat

2025Dist., 268 P.3d 346, 350 (Alaska 2012)); see also id. at 420 n.21 (“In contrast, when we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence solely as an application of a correctly interpreted rule of evidence to the facts of the instant case, we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review.”). 34 State Farm Mut.

2025Dist., 268 P.3d 346, 350 (Alaska 2012)); see also id. at 420 n.21 (“In contrast, when we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence solely as an application of a correctly interpreted rule of evidence to the facts of the instant case, we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review.”). 34 State Farm Mut.

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2022STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the superior court’s distribution of marital assets for abuse of discretion.2 The court abuses its discretion if it “considers improper factors, fails to 2 Ethelbah v. Walker, 225 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Alaska 2000) (“We review the trial court’s equitable distribution under an abuse of discretion standard, and will reverse (continued...) -4- 7590 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.”3 We review the superior court’s findings of fact for clear error.4 “A finding is clearly erroneous if we are ‘left with a definite and firm convic

2023He also claims that he purchased the family home, four-plex, and other properties with separate funds that he earned before marrying Abeir. 46 See Layton v. O’Dea, 515 P.3d 92, 101 (Alaska 2022) (providing that we review “characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any ‘[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,’ and de novo with respect to ‘whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 459 (Alaska 2013))); Od

2022We review the characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any “[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,” and de novo with respect to “whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.”8 The superior court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous “only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction based on the entire record that a mistake has been made.”9 “A [superior] court has broad discretion to provide for the equitable division of property between the parties in a div

2023He also claims that he purchased the family home, four-plex, and other properties with separate funds that he earned before marrying Abeir. 46 See Layton v. O’Dea, 515 P.3d 92, 101 (Alaska 2022) (providing that we review “characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any ‘[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,’ and de novo with respect to ‘whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 459 (Alaska 2013))); Od

2013Compare Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 330 (Alaska 2006) ("The characterization of property as separate or marital may involve both legal and factual questions." (citing Martin v. Martin, 52 P.3d 724, 726 (Alaska 2002))), Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska 1994) (same), and Moffitt, 749 P.2d at 346 ("Step one-determining what property is available for distribution-is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, although it may involve legal determinations to which this court applies its independent judgment." (citing Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 570 )), with Carr v. Carr, 152 P.3d 450, 454 (Alaska

2023STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review grants of summary judgment de novo and draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” 10 We generally review for abuse of discretion a superior court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.11 But we review “evidentiary conclusions turning on questions of law” de novo.12 “We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing superior courts’ rulings on motions for extension of time.” 13 We will find an abuse of discretion 9 See Brandner v. Pease, 361 P.3d 915, 920 (Alaska 2015) (“In medical malpractice actions . . . the jury ordinarily ma

2021Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 71 P.3d 811, 817 (Alaska 2003) (quoting In re Estate of McCoy, 844 P.2d 1131, 1135-36 (Alaska 1993) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a disqualification in an estate case)). 11 Sykes v. Lawless, 474 P.3d 636, 646 (Alaska 2020) (quoting Erica G. v. Taylor Taxi, Inc., 357 P.3d 783, 786-87 (Alaska 2015)). 12 See Harper v. BioLife Energy Sys., Inc., 426 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Polar Supply Co. v. Steelmaster Indus., Inc., 127 P.3d 52, 54 (Alaska 2005)). 13 Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299, 302 (Alaska 2009). -9- 7506 is adversely affe

2022We review the characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any “[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,” and de novo with respect to “whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.”8 The superior court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous “only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction based on the entire record that a mistake has been made.”9 “A [superior] court has broad discretion to provide for the equitable division of property between the parties in a div

2022We review the characterization of property as separate or marital for clear error with respect to any “[u]nderlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate,” and de novo with respect to “whether the [superior] court applied the correct legal rule.”8 The superior court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous “only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction based on the entire record that a mistake has been made.”9 “A [superior] court has broad discretion to provide for the equitable division of property between the parties in a div

2022The order gave O’Dea “full authority to market, price, authorize repairs, and sell” the marital home and to “otherwise take any actions needed to liquidate the property.” 23 Beal v. Beal, 88 P.3d 104, 110 (Alaska 2004) (quoting Edelman v. Edelman, 3 P.3d 348, 351 (Alaska 2000)); see also Ethelbah v. Walker, 225 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Alaska 2009) (“We review the [superior] court’s equitable distribution under an abuse of discretion standard.”). -13- 7615 Layton argues that the superior court abused its discretion by authorizing sale of the marital home prior to dividing the marital estate.

2006Id. 19 .See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Homer, 113 P.3d 659, 662 (Alaska 2005) (reviewing discovery orders for abuse of discretion); Caldwell v. State, 105 P.3d 570, 573 (Alaska 2005) (determining whether the superior court abused its discretion when issuing a child support order); Beal v. Beal, 88 P.3d 104, 111 (Alaska 2004) (applying an abuse of discretion analysis to "orders that merely enforce a property division or divorce decree”). 20 .

2021An abuse of discretion exists when a party has been deprived of a substantial right or seriously prejudiced by the lower court’s ruling.”3 “We review constitutional questions, including due process and equal protection, de novo, and we ‘will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.’ ”4 The decision to appoint counsel in a civil case, because of its constitutional nature, is reviewed de novo.5 “We review a superior court’s issuance of an order permitting the sale of property using the same abuse of discretion standard that we employ when reviewing

2021An abuse of discretion exists when a party has been deprived of a substantial right or seriously prejudiced by the lower court’s ruling.”3 “We review constitutional questions, including due process and equal protection, de novo, and we ‘will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.’ ”4 The decision to appoint counsel in a civil case, because of its constitutional nature, is reviewed de novo.5 “We review a superior court’s issuance of an order permitting the sale of property using the same abuse of discretion standard that we employ when reviewing

2020Richfield Co., 541 P.2d 717, 722 (Alaska 1975)); see also Bennett v. Hedglin, 995 P.2d 668, 674 (Alaska 2000) (“A party on appeal who alleges that oral argument was improperly denied must show both that the denial was in error and that the error caused substantial prejudice.” (quoting Cleary Diving Serv., Inc. v. Thomas, Head & Greisen, 688 P.2d 940, 942 (Alaska 1984))). 43 See Alaska R.

2012DISCUSSION A. Oral Argument The motion for an enlargement of the redemption period was not a dispositive motion within the meaning of Alaska Civil Rule 77(e)(2), which provides that oral argument on non-dispositive motions “shall be held only in the discretion of the judge.” The Rule lists several specific examples of dispositive motions, such as motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and motions for judgment on the pleadings, and includes a catch-all provision for “other dispositive motions[.]” Falke argues that his motion fits within this catch-all provision because “the trial cou

2020Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 3 P.3d 342, 344 (Alaska 2000). 8 Id. (footnote omitted). 9 State, Dep’ts of Transp. & Labor v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 629 (Alaska 1989). 10 del Rosario v. Clare, 378 P.3d 380, 383 (Alaska 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Gunn v. Gunn, 367 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Alaska 2016) (quoting Roderer v. Dash, 233 P.3d 1101, 1107 (Alaska 2010))). 11 In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 380 (Alaska 1986). 12 Id. at 380-81 . -12- 7489 unreasonable.”13 Whether the superior court erred in finding that OCS abused its discretion is a mixed question of law and

2020We review a superior court judge’s interpretation of another superior court judge’s order de novo, just as we would a judge’s analysis of a similar written document, such as a contract or out-of-court custody agreement.3 Ronald also challenges the substance of the September 2015 and January 2017 decisions, effectively arguing that they were not final judgments and that he can 2 See del Rosario v. Clare, 378 P.3d 380, 383-84 (Alaska 2016) (Although we have not specifically articulated a standard of review for this situation, enforcement of an order — reviewed for abuse of discretion — necessari

2020Richfield Co., 541 P.2d 717, 722 (Alaska 1975)); see also Bennett v. Hedglin, 995 P.2d 668, 674 (Alaska 2000) (“A party on appeal who alleges that oral argument was improperly denied must show both that the denial was in error and that the error caused substantial prejudice.” (quoting Cleary Diving Serv., Inc. v. Thomas, Head & Greisen, 688 P.2d 940, 942 (Alaska 1984))). 43 See Alaska R.

2012DISCUSSION A. Oral Argument The motion for an enlargement of the redemption period was not a dispositive motion within the meaning of Alaska Civil Rule 77(e)(2), which provides that oral argument on non-dispositive motions “shall be held only in the discretion of the judge.” The Rule lists several specific examples of dispositive motions, such as motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and motions for judgment on the pleadings, and includes a catch-all provision for “other dispositive motions[.]” Falke argues that his motion fits within this catch-all provision because “the trial cou

2020H.L.S., 42 P.3d 1093, 1096 (Alaska 2002) (citing 39 AM.

2012Such constitutional questions are questions of law, which [we] review[] de novo.”7 We will “adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.”8 4 In re Protective Proceedings of W.A., 193 P.3d 743, 748 (Alaska 2008); H.C.S. v. Cmty. Advocacy Project of Alaska, Inc., 42 P.3d 1093, 1096 (Alaska 2002) (citing In re Estate of Romberg, 942 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. App. 1997)); see also 39 A M .JUR .2D Guardian and Ward § 38 (2011) (“The selection of a guardian is a matter committed largely to the discretion of the appointing court, whose decision will only be inte