abuse of discretion standard in Iowa

2025Thompson, 951 N.W.2d at 4 (“We will overturn a revocation of probation only if there has been an abuse of discretion.”); State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Iowa 2019) (applying an abuse of discretion standard when the sentence challenged is within statutory limits).

2021And “[w]e apply an abuse of discretion standard when the sentence challenged was within the statutory limits.” State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Iowa 2019).

2019The mother asserts “[s]he was denied her right to fully address and refute the allegations which the juvenile court relied upon in its ruling to grant a change in the permanency goal.” “We review a motion for continuance under an abuse of discretion standard and will only reverse if injustice will result to the party desiring the continuance.” In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

2019“We review a motion for continuance under an abuse of discretion standard and will only reverse if injustice will result to the party desiring the continuance.” In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

2019See State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 240 (Iowa 2001) (“The abuse of discretion standard of review applicable in this matter recognizes that whether evidence of prior crimes should be admitted is a judgment call on the part of the trial court.”).

2016“An abuse of discretion standard implicitly recognizes that a decision ‘is a judgment call on the part of the trial court.’” Tamco Pork II, LLC v. Heartland Co-op., ___ N.W.2d ___, 2015 WL 10436023 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (quoting State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 240 (Iowa 2001)).

2019But when the district court admits hearsay evidence because the expert witness relied on it in giving an opinion to the jury, “we will employ an abuse of discretion standard.” Id.

2013“Although we generally review the district court’s admission of hearsay evidence for errors at law, ‘when the basis for admission of hearsay evidence is the expert opinion rule ... we will employ an abuse of discretion standard.’ ” Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d at 697 (quoting Kurth v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 628 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2001)).

2022In support of his claim that his statements were irrelevant, Moyer relies on State v. Hanes.7 In Hanes, our supreme court found it improper to give a jury instruction addressing punishment for the crime charged.8 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court noted that “[i]t is well-settled that juries should not be instructed regarding the statutory penalty for the charged offenses” because the trial’s sole purpose is to seek the truth and “[p]enalties have nothing to do with the factual determination that a defendant did or did not commit a crime.” 9 It also 4 State v. Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d

2016“The abuse-of-discretion standard means ‘we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make [a] judgment call.’” State v. Richards, 879 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted).

2019“We review a district court's ruling as to whether a verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence for abuse of discretion.” State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 190 (Iowa 2013).

2018See State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 190 (Iowa 2013).

2020“In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community from further offenses.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724 .

2020“In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community from further offenses.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724 .

2024“Although we generally review the district court’s admission of hearsay evidence for errors at law, ‘when the basis for admission of hearsay evidence is the expert opinion rule, which provides no hard and fast rule regarding admissibility, we will employ an abuse of discretion standard.’” In re Det. of Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted).

2020See id. (noting “we generally review the district court’s admission of hearsay evidence for errors at law” unless “the basis for admission of hearsay evidence is the expert opinion rule,” where “we will employ an abuse of discretion standard”).

2025“In considering whether the trial court properly admitted prior-bad-acts evidence, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004); accord State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611 , 620 (Iowa 2022).

2024“In considering whether the trial court properly admitted prior-bad-acts evidence, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004).

2025Thus, under the abuse of discretion standard, “we will correct an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (quoting Barnhill v. Iowa Dist.

2025Thus, under the abuse of discretion standard, “we will correct an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (quoting Barnhill v. Iowa Dist.

2024But see State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Iowa 2016) (declining to resolve whether a defendant’s claim they were denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury should be reviewed under a de novo or an abuse-of-discretion standard).

2024But see State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Iowa 2016) (declining to resolve whether a defendant’s claim they were denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury should be reviewed under a de novo or an abuse-of-discretion standard).

2021State 5 v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015) (“We use the abuse of discretion standard if the sentence is within the statutory limits.”).

2019Standard of Review “We use the abuse of discretion standard if the sentence is within the statutory limits.” State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015). “[A] district 1 Thompson was charged with public intoxication third offense, in violation of Iowa Code sections 123.46 and 123.91 (2017); two counts of assault on persons in certain occupations in violation of Iowa Code section 708.3A(4); and interference with official acts, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.1(1)(b). 4 court did not abuse its discretion if the evidence supports the sentence.” Id. at 553 .

2023Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1996).

2000Foggia, 543 N.W.2d at 891 .

2023Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d at 559 .

2015State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006).

2023In Alcala, our supreme court made it clear that when reviewing the court’s refusal to instruct on spoliation, which involves a discretionary component, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. 880 N.W.2d at 707 (noting that “because the [spoliation] instruction ‘acts as a discovery sanction and discovery sanctions are discretionary,’” an abuse of discretion standard should be applied).

2018While the court previously applied an abuse of discretion standard for denial of a spoliation instruction in the context of a discovery sanction, see State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa 1979), and for review of the form of the instruction, see State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 915 (Iowa 2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Iowa 2010), the abuse- of-discretion standard of review “does not extend to all refusals to give a requested 4 jury instruction.” Alcala v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Iowa 2016).

2022In support of his claim that his statements were irrelevant, Moyer relies on State v. Hanes.7 In Hanes, our supreme court found it improper to give a jury instruction addressing punishment for the crime charged.8 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court noted that “[i]t is well-settled that juries should not be instructed regarding the statutory penalty for the charged offenses” because the trial’s sole purpose is to seek the truth and “[p]enalties have nothing to do with the factual determination that a defendant did or did not commit a crime.” 9 It also 4 State v. Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d

2019Grounds or reasons are untenable if they are "based on an erroneous application of the law or not supported by substantial evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Dudley , 856 N.W.2d 668 , 675 (Iowa 2014) ).

2022Under an abuse of discretion standard, this court must affirm the district court’s discretionary ruling absent a firm and definite conviction the ruling is “ ‘beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances’ presented—a decision so flawed and prejudicial to the administration of justice that this court must provide relief.” See In re 2018 Grand Jury of Dallas Cnty., 939 N.W.2d 50 , 66–67 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000)).

2022Under an abuse of discretion standard, this court must affirm the district court’s discretionary ruling absent a firm and definite conviction the ruling is “ ‘beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances’ presented—a decision so flawed and prejudicial to the administration of justice that this court must provide relief.” See In re 2018 Grand Jury of Dallas Cnty., 939 N.W.2d 50 , 66–67 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000)).

2019“If an abuse of discretion occurred, reversal will not be warranted if error was harmless.” State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Iowa 2009).

2016“If an abuse of discretion occurred, reversal will not be warranted if error was harmless.” State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Iowa 2009). 8 III.

2018While the court previously applied an abuse of discretion standard for denial of a spoliation instruction in the context of a discovery sanction, see State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa 1979), and for review of the form of the instruction, see State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 915 (Iowa 2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Iowa 2010), the abuse- of-discretion standard of review “does not extend to all refusals to give a requested 4 jury instruction.” Alcala v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Iowa 2016).

2015See Langlet, 283 N.W.2d at 335 .

2017See Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d at 693–94 (stating error based on an abuse of discretion results in reversal only when the abuse is prejudicial).

2017See Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d at 693–94 (stating error based on an abuse of discretion results in reversal only when the abuse is prejudicial).

2004Krugman v. Palmer Coll, of Chiropractic, 422 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 1988); Suckow v. Boone State Bank & Trust Co., 314 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Iowa 1982).

1991Mathias v. Glandon, 448 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1989) (rule 80(a)); Suckow v. Boone State Bank & Trust Co., 314 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Iowa 1982) (rule 134).

2024The abuse-of-discretion standard means “we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make [a] judgment call.” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6 , 20–21 (Iowa 2006).

2019The abuse-of-discretion standard means “we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make [a] judgment call.” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 20-21 (Iowa 2006).

2016Compare Everly, 774 N.W.2d at 492 (“A district court’s order imposing sanctions . . . is reviewable for an abuse of discretion.”), with Mathias v. Glandon, 448 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1989) (applying the abuse-of-discretion standard to an appeal of the court’s denial of a request for sanctions). 25 fails to exercise any discretion.” (citation omitted)).

1991“Under this standard the finding of fact may be disturbed on appeal only if ‘clearly erroneous ....’ ” Mathias, 448 N.W.2d at 445 .

2022An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court “bases its decisions on grounds or reasons clearly untenable or to an extent that is clearly unreasonable . . . [or] if it bases its conclusions on an erroneous application of the law.” State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611 , 620 (Iowa 2022) (omission and alteration in original) (quoting Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 501 (Iowa 2017)).5 5This is different from the abuse of discretion cited in Justice McDonald’s dissent, which ostensibly heightens the bar required to meet the abuse of discretion standard by claiming an abuse of discretion occ

2022An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court “bases its decisions on grounds or reasons clearly untenable or to an extent that is clearly unreasonable . . . [or] if it bases its conclusions on an erroneous application of the law.” State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611 , 620 (Iowa 2022) (omission and alteration in original) (quoting Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 501 (Iowa 2017)).5 5This is different from the abuse of discretion cited in Justice McDonald’s dissent, which ostensibly heightens the bar required to meet the abuse of discretion standard by claiming an abuse of discretion occ

2025State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 690 (Iowa 2017).

2020“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion ‘on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’ ” State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874 , 877 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 690 (Iowa 2017)).

2024We accord deference to the ruling of the trial court because “the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, observed the jury, and had before it all the incidents of trial before ruling on a motion for a new trial.” Est. of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005); see also Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 284 (“An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence; in applying that standard, other cases are of limited value.”).

2024We accord deference to the ruling of the trial court because “the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses, observed the jury, and had before it all the incidents of trial before ruling on a motion for a new trial.” Est. of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 345 (Iowa 2005); see also Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 284 (“An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence; in applying that standard, other cases are of limited value.”).