65 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Thelma J. Copegreen2 sentences2020See Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, 2017 ME 68, ¶ 12 , 158 A.3d 931 (articulating the abuse of discretion standard). 6 B. 2020See Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, 2017 ME 68, ¶ 12 , 158 A.3d 931 (articulating the abuse of discretion standard). 6 B. | 2 | 2 |
Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Copegreen2 sentences2020See Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, 2017 ME 68, ¶ 12 , 158 A.3d 931 (articulating the abuse of discretion standard). 6 B. 2020See Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cope, 2017 ME 68, ¶ 12 , 158 A.3d 931 (articulating the abuse of discretion standard). 6 B. | 2 | 2 |
City of Biddeford v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2019See City of Biddeford v. Adams, 1999 ME 49, ¶¶ 24-25 , 727 A.2d 346 . 2019See City of Biddeford v. Adams, 1999 ME 49, ¶¶ 24-25 , 727 A.2d 346 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dechainegreen2 sentences2009By contrast, "[bjecause ... [the] admissibility of evidence frequently involves the weighing of probative value against considerations militating against its admissibility ... the decision to admit evidence is more frequently reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 133 (Me.1990). 1995State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 133 (Me.1990). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2001State v. Robinson, 628 A.2d 664, 666 (1993). [¶ 9] The State argues that the evidence was properly excluded because Howe did not make an adequate offer of proof. 1995We review the decision of the trial court to admit or exclude such evidence under an abuse of discretion standard “because the question of admissibility frequently involves the weighing of probative value against considerations militating against its admissibility.” State v. Robinson, 628 A.2d 664, 666 (Me.1993); See M.R.Evid. 403. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Nyegreen2 sentences1993See id. (citing M.R.Evid. 403; State v. Nye, 516 A.2d 560, 562 (Me.1986)). 1990State v. Nye, 516 A.2d 560, 562 (Me.1986); accord State v. Morton, 397 A.2d 171, 178-79 (Me.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webstergreen2 sentences2017Pursuant to the practice established by Morse Brothers, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 18 , 772 A.2d 842 , when conflicting facts 6 In Morse Brothers, we stated that on appeal, we review the denial of a special motion to dismiss on anti-SLAPP grounds for an abuse of discretion or error of law. 2001 ME 70, ¶ 18 , 772 A.2d 842 . 2017Pursuant to the practice established by Morse Brothers, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 18 , 772 A.2d 842 , when conflicting facts 6 In Morse Brothers, we stated that on appeal, we review the denial of a special motion to dismiss on anti-SLAPP grounds for an abuse of discretion or error of law. 2001 ME 70, ¶ 18 , 772 A.2d 842 . | 1 | 3 |
Hawksley v. Gerowgreen2 sentences2015We review an order on a post-divorce judgment motion, including a motion to enforce, “for an abuse of discretion or error of law,” and we .“review factual findings contained therein for clear error.” Lewin v. Skehan, 2012 ,ME 31, ¶ 24, 39 A.3d 58 ; see also Hawksley v. Gerow, 2011 ME 3 ,. ¶ 4, 10 A.3d 715 (2011). 2015We review an order on a post-divorce judgment motion, including a motion to enforce, “for an abuse of discretion or error of law,” and we .“review factual findings contained therein for clear error.” Lewin v. Skehan, 2012 ,ME 31, ¶ 24, 39 A.3d 58 ; see also Hawksley v. Gerow, 2011 ME 3 ,. ¶ 4, 10 A.3d 715 (2011). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Crockergreen2 sentences2008See State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 71 (Me.1981); cf. State v. Lowry, 2003 ME 38, ¶ 7 , 819 A.2d 331, 333 (applying the abuse of discretion standard to challenges to the court’s conduct during voir dire, which includes the use of peremptory challenges). 2006We assume that Allen’s motion in limine served to preserve the objection, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review, which is more beneficial to Allen than the obvious error standard. 3 Even with the more beneficial *459 standard of review, Allen cannot prevail in this appeal because the trial court acted well within its discretion by ruling on the motion in limine to admit the photograph. [¶ 10] In State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58 (Me.1981), we articulated the three determinations that a court should make when it rules on the admissibility of photographs. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth, Department of Corrections v. Reesegreen1 sentence2021Va. 2006) (“We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.”); Commonwealth v. Reese, 774 A.2d 1255, 1261 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1 |
Villa v. Smithgreen1 sentence2021See Smith v. 26 Rideout, 2010 ME 69, ¶¶ 15-18 , 1 A.3d 441 ; Villa v. Smith, 534 A.2d 1310, 1312 (Me. 1987) (explaining that the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a change in circumstances has affected the children’s best interests to a degree significant enough to justify a change of primary custody). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Rideoutgreen2 sentences2021See Smith v. 26 Rideout, 2010 ME 69, ¶¶ 15-18 , 1 A.3d 441 ; Villa v. Smith, 534 A.2d 1310, 1312 (Me. 1987) (explaining that the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a change in circumstances has affected the children’s best interests to a degree significant enough to justify a change of primary custody). 2021See Smith v. 26 Rideout, 2010 ME 69, ¶¶ 15-18 , 1 A.3d 441 ; Villa v. Smith, 534 A.2d 1310, 1312 (Me. 1987) (explaining that the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a change in circumstances has affected the children’s best interests to a degree significant enough to justify a change of primary custody). | 1 | 1 |
Finn v. Lipmangreen1 sentence2021“A court has the discretion to judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute when it is either generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Finn v. Lipman, 526 A.2d 1380, 1381 (Me. 1987) (quotation marks omitted); see 11Here, we apply the abuse of discretion standard, not the clear error standard, because the judicially noticed fact—a judgment issued by the same trial court that took judicial notice of the judgment—is not subject to | 1 | 1 |
Otis v. Town of Sebagogreen1 sentence2021See id. ¶ 9; Otis v. Town of Sebago, 645 A.2d 3, 4-5 (Me. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Soucygreen2 sentences2020Cf. Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 1, 10, 19 , 890 A.2d 719 (finding no abuse of discretion where maximum sentence at step two was eight years on Class B unlawful sexual contact counts); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-53 (2007) (discussing the “practical considerations” underpinning use of the abuse of discretion standard for review of sentences by appellate courts). [¶32] At the third step of the analysis, after considering the purposes and goals of sentencing, 17-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2018), and observing that “[t]he age of the victim is . . . absolutely paramount in this case,” the court 2020Cf. Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 1, 10, 19 , 890 A.2d 719 (finding no abuse of discretion where maximum sentence at step two was eight years on Class B unlawful sexual contact counts); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-53 (2007) (discussing the “practical considerations” underpinning use of the abuse of discretion standard for review of sentences by appellate courts). [¶32] At the third step of the analysis, after considering the purposes and goals of sentencing, 17-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2018), and observing that “[t]he age of the victim is . . . absolutely paramount in this case,” the court | 1 | 1 |
Gall v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020Cf. Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 1, 10, 19 , 890 A.2d 719 (finding no abuse of discretion where maximum sentence at step two was eight years on Class B unlawful sexual contact counts); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-53 (2007) (discussing the “practical considerations” underpinning use of the abuse of discretion standard for review of sentences by appellate courts). [¶32] At the third step of the analysis, after considering the purposes and goals of sentencing, 17-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2018), and observing that “[t]he age of the victim is . . . absolutely paramount in this case,” the court | 1 | 1 |
Anne M. McBride v. Jeffrey R. Worthgreen1 sentence2020See McBride v. Worth, 2018 ME 54, ¶ 10 , 184 A.3d 14 . | 1 | 1 |
McBride v. Worthgreen1 sentence2020See McBride v. Worth, 2018 ME 54, ¶ 10 , 184 A.3d 14 . | 1 | 1 |
Boothbay Harbor Condominium I v. Whittengreen1 sentence2020I v. Whitten, 387 A.2d 1117, 1120-21 (Me. 1978). | 1 | 1 |
| People ex rel. T.I.green | 1 | 1 |
Tyrus H. Thompson and Ja'Ree C. Thompson v. Fairfax County Department of Family Servicesgreen1 sentence2019J.L.P. , 870 P.2d at 1258 ; In re S.B.C. , 377 Mont. 400 , 340 P.3d 534 , 539 (2014) ; In re Interest of D.M. , 685 N.W.2d 768 , 771 (S.D. 2004) ; Thompson , 747 S.E.2d at 844 (stating that the abuse of discretion standard "requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decisionmaker's judgment that the court does not reverse merely because it would have come to a different result in the first instance" (quotation marks omitted) ). | 1 | 1 |
| MacDonald v. MacDonaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ma v. Bryangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lowrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McLeangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cooksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Landry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Qualey v. Secretary of Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Human Services v. Levesquegreen | 1 | 1 |
| John W. Goodwin, Inc. v. Foxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bangor Motor Co. v. Chapmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jacobsen v. Mintzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barclay v. Eckertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Higgins v. Higginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Town of Freeport v. Brickyard Cove Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wexler v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bryant v. Bryantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Patricia Mae Voter v. Dexter R. Voter
green
2 sentences2017If we conclude that the judgment is ambiguous, we then “consider, using an abuse of discretion standard, whether the clarification is consistent with its language read as a whole and is objectively supported by the record.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 15] The divorce judgment, as construed by the clarifying judgment, was ambiguous because it contained an internal inconsistency. 2017If we conclude that the judgment is ambiguous, we then “consider, using an abuse of discretion standard, whether the clarification is consistent with its language read as a whole and is objectively supported by the record.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 15] The divorce judgment, as construed by the clarifying judgment, was ambiguous because it contained an internal inconsistency. | 4 | 2017–2017 |
Lewin v. Skehan
green
2 sentences2021“We review an order on a post-divorce motion for an abuse of discretion or error of law and review factual findings contained therein for clear error.” Lewin v. Skehan, 2012 ME 31, ¶ 24 , 39 A.3d 58 . “[O]nly a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the most recent decree can justify the modification of the decree, and . . . the overriding consideration whenever a proposed modification is sought is the best interest[s] of the minor children.” Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.6[1] at 6-61 (8th ed. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). [¶35] We do not agree with Martin that the court acted 2021“We review an order on a post-divorce motion for an abuse of discretion or error of law and review factual findings contained therein for clear error.” Lewin v. Skehan, 2012 ME 31, ¶ 24 , 39 A.3d 58 . “[O]nly a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the most recent decree can justify the modification of the decree, and . . . the overriding consideration whenever a proposed modification is sought is the best interest[s] of the minor children.” Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.6[1] at 6-61 (8th ed. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). [¶35] We do not agree with Martin that the court acted | 2 | 2015–2021 |
Marc B. Terfloth v. Town of Scarborough
green
2 sentences2019“That the record contains evidence inconsistent with the result, or that inconsistent conclusions could be drawn from the evidence, does not render the Board’s findings invalid if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support the Board’s conclusion.” Terfloth v. Town of Scarborough, 2014 ME 57, ¶ 10 , 90 A.3d 1131 (alterations omitted). [¶14] Although the Superior Court and the Board gave significant weight to the requirement of 36 M.R.S. § 843(1) that any abatement provided by the Board be “reasonable,” our case law suggests that an abatement is reasonable if it 2019“That the record contains evidence inconsistent with the result, or that inconsistent conclusions could be drawn from the evidence, does not render the Board’s findings invalid if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support the Board’s conclusion.” Terfloth v. Town of Scarborough, 2014 ME 57, ¶ 10 , 90 A.3d 1131 (alterations omitted). [¶14] Although the Superior Court and the Board gave significant weight to the requirement of 36 M.R.S. § 843(1) that any abatement provided by the Board be “reasonable,” our case law suggests that an abatement is reasonable if it | 2 | 2019–2019 |
David Sullivan v. Zoe (Sullivan) Rockwood
green
2 sentences2018A party to a divorce judgment who files a motion to enforce is entitled to an order of enforcement when the other party has failed to comply with an unambiguous provision of the judgment." Sullivan v. Rockwood , 2015 ME 119 , ¶ 19, 124 A.3d 150 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 2018A party to a divorce judgment who files a motion to enforce is entitled to an order of enforcement when the other party has failed to comply with an unambiguous provision of the judgment." Sullivan v. Rockwood , 2015 ME 119 , ¶ 19, 124 A.3d 150 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Wendell K. Brasier v. Vanessa L. Preble
green
2 sentences2016DISCUSSION [¶ 12] “We review the findings of fact in an order on a post-divorce' motion for clear error, and the court’s ultimate decision for an abuse of discretion or error of law.” Brasier v. Preble, 2013 ME 109, ¶ 12 , 82 A.3d 841 (quotation marks' omitted). 2016DISCUSSION [¶ 12] “We review the findings of fact in an order on a post-divorce' motion for clear error, and the court’s ultimate decision for an abuse of discretion or error of law.” Brasier v. Preble, 2013 ME 109, ¶ 12 , 82 A.3d 841 (quotation marks' omitted). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Reese
green
2 sentences2024State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 23 , 991 A.2d 806 . 2024State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 23 , 991 A.2d 806 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Children of Anthony L.
green
1 sentence2021Indeed, Wells Fargo does not contest the accuracy of the 2013 judgment. 11 also In re Children of Anthony L., 2019 ME 62 , ¶ 9 n.4, 207 A.3d 624 (“A judge may take judicial notice of any matter of record when that matter is relevant to the proceedings at hand.” (quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Children of Anthony L.
green
1 sentence2021Indeed, Wells Fargo does not contest the accuracy of the 2013 judgment. 11 also In re Children of Anthony L., 2019 ME 62 , ¶ 9 n.4, 207 A.3d 624 (“A judge may take judicial notice of any matter of record when that matter is relevant to the proceedings at hand.” (quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Pamela Haskell v. Dusty Haskell
green
1 sentence2021We have explained that “[r]eview for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three questions: (1) are factual findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard; (2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of reasonableness.” Haskell v. Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶ 12 , 160 A.3d 1176 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Haskell v. Haskell
green
1 sentence2021We have explained that “[r]eview for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three questions: (1) are factual findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard; (2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of reasonableness.” Haskell v. Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶ 12 , 160 A.3d 1176 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People in Interest of JLP green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In the Interest of D.M. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Matter of S.B.C. Jr. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Sager v. Town of Bowdoinham green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Thompson v. Rothman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Diane L. Charette v. Dale N. Charette green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Desmond v. Desmond green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| United States v. Tejada green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| United States v. Lawrence Orlando, Sr. (00-6312) and Tera M. Daniels (00-6409) green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| UNITED STATES v. ARSENIO RODRÍGUEZ-ORTIZ, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LEONARDO SANTANA-RODRÍGUEZ, A/K/A VIEJO green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Bickart green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| cluster 2070630 green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Sweet green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Gagne v. Cianbro Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Gregory v. City of Calais green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Ferguson v. WAYLAND MANOR ASSOCIATES green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Gray v. Gray green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Ruest green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Pickering green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, Local No. 638 green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.