abuse of discretion standard in North Carolina

2019"Thus, even though a trial court's rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard ... such rulings are given great deference on appeal." Id.

2018As for determinations of relevancy, those "technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard[.]" State v. Wallace , 104 N.C.

2021AND K.R.M. 2021-NCSC-77 Ervin, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part of ‘(1) justifiable cause, (2) reasonable notice to the client, and (3) the permission of the court.’ ” In re K.M.W., 376 N.C. at 209. “[B]efore allowing an attorney to withdraw or relieving an attorney from any obligation to actively participate in a termination of parental rights proceeding when the parent is absent from a hearing, the trial court must inquire into the efforts made by counsel to contact the parent in order to ensure that the parent’s rights are adequately protected.” Id. at 210. ¶ 54 A trial cour

2021AND K.R.M. 2021-NCSC-77 Ervin, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part of ‘(1) justifiable cause, (2) reasonable notice to the client, and (3) the permission of the court.’ ” In re K.M.W., 376 N.C. at 209. “[B]efore allowing an attorney to withdraw or relieving an attorney from any obligation to actively participate in a termination of parental rights proceeding when the parent is absent from a hearing, the trial court must inquire into the efforts made by counsel to contact the parent in order to ensure that the parent’s rights are adequately protected.” Id. at 210. ¶ 54 A trial cour

2010App. 632, 635 , 442 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1994); see also Turner, 325 N.C. at 165 , 381 S.E.2d at 714 (supporting the propriety of an abuse of discretion standard here, where "[t]he rule's provision that the court shall impose sanctions for motions abuses . . . concentrates [the court's] discretion on the selection of an appropriate sanction rather than on the decision to impose sanctions" (internal quotation marks omitted).

2010App. 632, 635 , 442 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1994); see also Turner, 325 N.C. at 165 , 381 S.E.2d at 714 (supporting the propriety of an abuse of discretion standard here, where "[t]he rule's provision that the court shall impose sanctions for motions abuses . . . concentrates [the court's] discretion on the selection of an appropriate sanction rather than on the decision to impose sanctions" (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021“Under the abuse of discretion standard, our role is not to surmise whether we would have disagreed with the trial court, but instead to decide whether the trial court’s ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 899 , 787 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2016) (citation omitted). ¶ 16 Substantial evidence exists in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact.

2021“Under the abuse of discretion standard, our role is not to surmise whether we would have disagreed with the trial court, but instead to decide whether the trial court’s ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 899 , 787 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2016) (citation omitted). ¶ 16 Substantial evidence exists in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact.

2023“Although the trial court’s rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard[,] . . . such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” Dunn v. Custer, 162 N.C.

2023“Although the trial court’s rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard[,] . . . such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” Dunn v. Custer, 162 N.C.

2009"The trial court's decision to terminate parentalrights is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard." Nesbitt , 147 N.C.

2004On appeal, the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, In re Nesbitt, 147 N.C.App. 349, 352 , 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001), and we must affirm "where the court's findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law." In re Allred, 122 N.C.App. 561, 565 , 471 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1996).

2020“We review this decision on an abuse of discretion standard[.]” In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 171 , 752 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013).

2020“We review this decision on an abuse of discretion standard[.]” In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 171 , 752 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013).

2026Analysis Respondent-Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing her a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem “without notice or conducting an inquiry.” “[T]rial court decisions concerning both the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the extent to which an inquiry concerning a parent’s competence should be conducted are reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 , 772 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2015) (citing In re M.H.B., 192 N.C.

2026Analysis Respondent-Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in appointing her a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem “without notice or conducting an inquiry.” “[T]rial court decisions concerning both the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the extent to which an inquiry concerning a parent’s competence should be conducted are reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 , 772 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2015) (citing In re M.H.B., 192 N.C.

2011Because the disposition of forum selection matters is highly fact-specific, “[w]e employ the abuse-of-discretion standard to review a trial court’s decision concerning clauses on venue selection.” Mark Group Int’l, Inc. v. Still, 151 N.C.

2011Under an abuse of discretion standard, we must “determine whether a decision is manifestly unsupported by reason, or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Mark Group Int’l, Inc. v. Still, 151 N.C.

2024Under an abuse of discretion standard, reversal is appropriate only to correct “gross abuse,” such as where a decision “was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 , 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).

2024Under an abuse of discretion standard, reversal is appropriate only to correct “gross abuse,” such as where a decision “was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 , 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).

2022App. 1, 14 , 616 S.E.2d 264, 272 (2005).

2022App. 1, 14 , 616 S.E.2d 264, 272 (2005).

2012“Under an abuse of discretion standard, we defer to the trial court’s discretion and will reverse its decision ‘only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ ” Gibbs v. Mayo, 162 N.C.

2009“Under an abuse of discretion standard, we defer to the trial court’s discretion and will reverse its decision only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Gibbs v. Mayo, 162 N.C.

2026Ordinarily, “[a] challenge to a trial court’s decision to impose a condition of probation is reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard of review . . . .” State v. Allah, 231 N.C.

2025“A challenge to a trial court’s decision to impose a condition of probation is reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard of review.” State v. Allah, 231 N.C.

2026See Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206, 218 (1986) (“The abuse of discretion standard of review is applied to those decisions which necessarily require the exercise of judgment.”).

2020See, e.g., Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206, 218 , 345 S.E.2d 204, 212 (1986) (stating that, in cases subject to review using an abuse of discretion standard, “the purpose of the reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment in place of the decision maker,” with the reviewing court being limited to “insur[ing] that the decision could, in light of the factual context in which it is made, be the product of reason”).

2021As in that case, “we again reaffirm our application of the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the trial court’s determination of ‘whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest’ under N.C.G.S. § 7B- 1110(a).” In re C.V.D.C., 374 N.C. at 529; see also In re K.S.D-F., 375 N.C. 626 , 636 (2020) (citing In re C.V.D.C. for the proposition that an “argument that each of the N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) factors weighs against termination in this matter when reviewed under a de novo standard cannot prevail”). ¶ 31 In the present case, where the trial court made specific f

2021As in that case, “we again reaffirm our application of the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the trial court’s determination of ‘whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest’ under N.C.G.S. § 7B- 1110(a).” In re C.V.D.C., 374 N.C. at 529; see also In re K.S.D-F., 375 N.C. 626 , 636 (2020) (citing In re C.V.D.C. for the proposition that an “argument that each of the N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) factors weighs against termination in this matter when reviewed under a de novo standard cannot prevail”). ¶ 31 In the present case, where the trial court made specific f

2023The test for abuse of discretion is whether a decision “is manifestly unsupported by reason,” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985), or “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538 , 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985).

2023The test for abuse of discretion is whether a decision “is manifestly unsupported by reason,” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777 , 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985), or “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538 , 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985).

1993In reviewing a decision of the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to withdraw, the appellate court does not apply an abuse of discretion standard, but instead makes an “independent review of the record.” Handy, 326 N.C. at 539 , 391 S.E.2d at 163 .

1993In reviewing a decision of the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to withdraw, the appellate court does not apply an abuse of discretion standard, but instead makes an “independent review of the record.” Handy, 326 N.C. at 539 , 391 S.E.2d at 163 .

2017Denial of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea A. Standard of Review "In reviewing a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentencing, 'the appellate court does not apply an abuse of discretion standard, but instead makes an independent review of the record.' " State v. Robinson , 177 N.C.App. 225 , 229, 628 S.E.2d 252 , 254 (2006) (quoting State v. Marshburn , 109 N.C.App. 105 , 108, 425 S.E.2d 715 , 718 (1993) ).

2017"In reviewing a decision of the trial court to deny defendant's motion to withdraw, the appellate court does not apply an abuse of discretion standard, but instead makes an 'independent review of the record.' " State v. Marshburn , 109 N.C.

2025Although we give great deference to the trial court when reviewing under an abuse of discretion standard, see Davis, 360 N.C. at 523 , here, we find no evidence in the Record to support a demonstration of prejudice.

2025We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard and reverse only upon a showing that its actions were “manifestly unsupported by reason.” Davis v. Davis 360 N.C. 518, 523 (2006).

2025The decision to include or “exclude evidence under Rule 403 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court,” State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 281 , 389 S.E.2d 48, 56 (1990) (citation omitted), which we review for an abuse of discretion, State v. Gillard, __ N.C. __, __, 909 S.E.2d 226 , 248 (2024); see also Triplett, 368 N.C. at 175 , 775 S.E.2d at 807 (“We review relevancy determinations by the trial court de novo before applying an abuse of discretion standard to any subsequent balancing done by the trial court.”).

2025The decision to include or “exclude evidence under Rule 403 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court,” State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 281 , 389 S.E.2d 48, 56 (1990) (citation omitted), which we review for an abuse of discretion, State v. Gillard, __ N.C. __, __, 909 S.E.2d 226 , 248 (2024); see also Triplett, 368 N.C. at 175 , 775 S.E.2d at 807 (“We review relevancy determinations by the trial court de novo before applying an abuse of discretion standard to any subsequent balancing done by the trial court.”).

2024“When applying the abuse of discretion standard to closing arguments, this Court first determines if the remarks were improper.” Id.

2021“When applying the abuse of discretion standard to closing arguments, this Court first determines if the remarks were improper. . . . [I]mproper remarks include statements of personal opinion, personal conclusions, name-calling, and references to events and circumstances outside the evidence, such as the infamous acts of others.” Jones, 355 N.C. at 131 , 558 S.E.2d at 106 .

2018"A trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 is usually subject to an abuse of discretion standard." Davis v. Davis , 360 N.C. 518 , 523, 631 S.E.2d 114 , 118 (2006) (citation omitted). "[A]n appellate court's review of a trial judge's discretionary ruling either granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict and order a new trial is strictly limited to the determination of whether the record affirmatively demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion by the judge." Worthington v. Bynum and Cogdell v. Bynum , 305 N.C. 478 , 482, 290 S.E.2d 599 , 602 (1982) (citation omi

2018"A trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 is usually subject to an abuse of discretion standard." Davis v. Davis , 360 N.C. 518 , 523, 631 S.E.2d 114 , 118 (2006) (citation omitted). "[A]n appellate court's review of a trial judge's discretionary ruling either granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict and order a new trial is strictly limited to the determination of whether the record affirmatively demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion by the judge." Worthington v. Bynum and Cogdell v. Bynum , 305 N.C. 478 , 482, 290 S.E.2d 599 , 602 (1982) (citation omi